

The Psychology of the Incarnation in Thirteenth- and Early Fourteenth- Century Theology

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ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

The overall theme of my study concerns the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century academic discussions about the incarnation from the point of view medieval philosophical psychology. This study will especially explore the following questions: what themes were included in the discussions about knowledge, will, and passions in Christ's human nature, what the main psychological ideas employed in the psychology of the incarnation were, and whether the teachings about Christ's human soul were derived from psychology as a discipline of natural philosophy. The method of this study is a systematic analysis of the psychological conceptions. This includes the historical and philosophical construction of psychological ideas in these discussions about Christ's human soul. The most important sources of this study are commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. The sources of this study are composed, for example, by Alexander of Hales and other early Franciscan theologians, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard Middleton, John Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Peter Auriol, Walter Chatton, Durand of St. Pourçain and Peter of Palude.

As theologians studied the knowledge, will and passions of Christ separately, this study is also divided into a corresponding set of three chapters. In the first chapter, I examine the discussion about the knowledge of Christ. The main questions are what kind of knowledge the human Christ had and whether his soul knew everything that God knows. The thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians thought that Christ's human soul knew the Word of God and things in the Word of God, and that the soul had infused knowledge and experiences. Theologians were divided on the question of whether Christ's human soul was able to know everything that God knew. For example, Bonaventure argued that Christ's human soul habitually knew everything that God knows. Scotus first proposed that Christ's human soul actually knew everything that God knows, but he ended up in the view that the soul knew everything habitually. Unlike Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas held that Christ's human soul did not know everything, even habitually, as the soul did not know the unrealized divine possibilities.

In the second chapter, I study the discussion about Christ's will and ask what kind of human wills Christ had and how these wills were related to each other. Peter Lombard argued that Christ's human soul involved two human wills, as he divided Christ's human will into the will of reason and the will of sensuality. Later theologians took Lombard's basic division for granted, but they further divided the will of reason into will "as nature" and will "as reason". That division became standard, although theologians understood its parts differently. For example, Thomas Aquinas explained that will as nature was the act of the will, whereas John Duns

Scotus associated it with the inclination of the will. The theologians of the period remarked that Christ's prayer in Gethsemane (Matthew 26:39; Luke 22:42) implied that Christ both wished for death and wished to avoid it, but they argued that these wills were not contrary.

In the third chapter, I turn to a study of the passions of Christ. I ask how Christ's human soul was passible, what passions he had and how he was simultaneously able to have pain, sadness and joy. All theologians thought that Christ had a passible soul. The early Franciscans argued that Christ's human soul and the powers of its rational part were passible in an emotional sense. Later on, Franciscans like John Duns Scotus adopted this view. However, Aquinas explained that the soul was passible only accidentally and that the powers of the rational part of the soul did not have passions in a strict sense. Theologians agreed that Christ voluntarily assumed some but not all defects of human nature; among the assumed defects were pain, sadness, fear and anger. Following Peter Lombard, they argued that the pain, the sadness, the fear and the anger of Christ were sinless pre-passions. All the theologians agreed that the powers of the sensitive part of Christ's human soul had pain and sadness, but their understanding about pain varied. They also argued that the pain of Christ touched his whole soul, including the powers of the rational part of the soul, but as their views about the passibility of the soul varied, their teachings on how pain touched the whole soul differed as well. Theologians thought that when Christ had pain and sadness, he also had the greatest joy. Although Aristotle claimed that a person cannot feel pain and joy at once, theologians tried to explain how Christ was able to have them at the same time.

My study proves that some emphases in the discussions about the psychology of the incarnation indicate that the early Franciscan theologians and Aquinas established two traditions about the application of psychology to Christology; while the Franciscan theologians usually followed the Franciscan tradition, the Dominican theologians usually followed the Thomistic tradition. However, the study also shows that the traditions were not unequivocal in terms of their flexibility on all questions, since not all Franciscan theologians followed the Franciscan tradition and not all Dominicans followed the Thomistic tradition. In addition, this study shows that in the discussions about the knowledge, will and passion of Christ, theologians applied various ideas from psychology as a branch of natural philosophy in developing their views about theological matters, but Christological views also influenced the philosophical thought of some theologians.

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tutkimus tarkastelee 1200-luvulla ja 1300-luvun alussa käytyä akateemista keskustelua inkarnaation psykologiasta. Keskeisenä näkökulmana on filosofinen psykologia, joka keskiajalla oli yksi luonnonfilosofiaan kuuluva osa-alue. Inkarnaation psykologiaa koskevat keskustelut käsittelivät Kristuksen inhimillisen luonnon kykyä tietää, tahtoa ja tuntea.

Tutkimuksen tärkeimmät lähteet, joista osaa ei ole aiemmin tutkittu filosofisen psykologian näkökulmasta, ovat 1200–1300-luvuilla laadittuja sentenssikommentaareja Petrus Lombarduksen *Sentensseihin*, mutta myös muita aihepiiristä julkaistuja tekstejä käytetään lähdemateriaalina. Tutkimuksen lähdeaineisto on jaettu neljään pääryhmään. Ensimmäisen pääryhmän muodostavat varhaisen fransiskaanitradition tekstit, joihin kuuluvat *Summa Halensis* sekä Aleksanteri Halesilaisen ja Bonaventuran kirjoitukset. Toinen pääryhmä käsittää dominikaaniteologien, Albert Suuren ja Tuomas Akvinolaisen, tekstejä inkarnaation psykologiasta. Kolmannen pääryhmän muodostavat ne fransiskaani- ja dominikaaniteologit, jotka kirjoittivat Tuomaan ja Johannes Duns Scotuksen välissä. Tällaisia ovat esimerkiksi Petrus Tarentaise ja Richard Middleton. Lisäksi kolmanteen pääryhmään kuuluvat ne varhaisen 1300-luvun dominikaaniteologit, jotka kommentoivat Tuomaan näkemyksiä. Heitä ovat muun muassa Durandus Pyhä-Pourçainlainen sekä Petrus de Palude. Neljännessä pääryhmässä analysoidaan 1300-luvun alun fransiskaaniteologien, Scotuksen, William Ockhamin, Petrus Aureolin ja Walter Chattonin, kirjoituksia. Lähde pohjaltaan tutkimus luo varsin kattavan kuvan 1200-luvun ja 1300-luvun alun inkarnaation psykologiaa koskevasta keskustelusta. Tutkimusmetodina on psykologisten käsitteiden systemaattinen analyysi, mikä sisältää käsitteiden historiallisen ja filosofisen konstruktion.

Tutkimus jakautuu kolmeen pääluukuun, joista ensimmäisessä tarkastellaan Kristuksen tietoa, toisessa tahtoa ja kolmannessa tunteita, kuten keskiajan teologitkin käsittelivät niitä omina teemoinaan. Ensimmäisessä pääluvussa analysoidaan keskustelua Kristuksen tiedosta ja kysytään, millaista inhimillistä tietoa Kristuksella oli ja tiesikö hän ihmisenä kaiken, minkä Jumala tietää. Kaikkien tutkittavien teologien mukaan Kristuksen sielu tiesi Jumalan Sanan sekä luodut asiat Sanassa, minkä lisäksi Kristuksen sielulla oli vuodatettua tietoa ja kokemuksia. Teologit esittivät kuitenkin erilaisia näkemyksiä siitä, tiesikö Kristus ihmisenä kaiken, minkä Jumala tietää. Joidenkin, esimerkiksi Bonaventuran, mukaan Kristus tiesi kaiken habituaalisesti, koska Kristuksella oli synnynnäinen valmius tietää mitä tahansa. Scotus puolestaan esitti aluksi, että Kristus tiesi kaiken aktuaalisesti, mutta päätyi lopulta esittämään, että sielu tiesi kaiken vain habituaalisesti.

Tuomas Akvinolaisen mukaan Kristuksen sielu ei tiennyt edes habituaalisesti kaikkea, koska se ei tietänyt Jumalan toteutumattomia mahdollisuuksia.

Toisessa pääluvussa tarkastellaan Kristuksen tahtoa ja selvitetään, millaisia erotteluita teologit tekivät Kristuksen tahtoon sekä miten Kristuksen eri tahdot olivat suhteessa toinen toisiinsa. Tutkimuksen kohteena olevat teologit omaksuivat Petrus Lombarduksen esittämän tulkinnan, jonka mukaan Kristuksen sielussa on kaksi inhimillistä tahtoa – järjen tahto ja sensuaalisen sielunosan tahto – mutta jakoivat järjen tahdon vielä kahteen osaan eli tahtoon järkenä ja tahtoon luontona. Jaottelusta tuli yleisesti hyväksytty, vaikka teologit ymmärsivätkin sen monin eri tavoin. Esimerkiksi Tuomas Akvinolaisen mukaan tahto luontona oli tahdon akti, kun taas Scotuksen mukaan se oli tahdon taipumus. Erityisesti Kristuksen rukous Getsemanessa (Matt. 26:39; Luuk. 22:42) ja sen yhteys hänen tahdonkykyihinsä oli yksi eniten keskustelua herättäneistä esimerkeistä keskiajalla. Yleisen tulkinnan mukaan rukous osoitti Kristuksen sekä tahtoneen kuolla, että tahtoneen välttää sen, mutta Kristuksen tahdot eivät kuitenkaan olleet tällöin toisilleen vastakkaiset.

Kolmas pääluku käsittelee Kristuksen tunteita. Luvussa selvitetään, millaisia tunteita Kristus ihmisenä koki ja miten Kristus kykeni tuntemaan samaan aikaan sekä iloa että kipua. Varhaiset fransiskaanteologit esittivät, että Kristuksen sielu sekä rationaalisen sielunosan kyvyt kokivat tunteita (*passio*). Myöhemmin esimerkiksi fransiskaani Scotus esitti vaikutusvaltaisen näkemyksensä Kristuksen tahdon tunteista. Sen sijaan Tuomas Akvinolaisen mukaan Kristuksen sielu ja hänen rationaalisen sielunosansa kyvyt eivät varsinaisesti kokeneet tunteita. Tutkimuksen kohteena olevien teologioiden mukaan Kristus omaksui myös vapaaehtoisesti joitakin inhimillisiä heikkouksia kuten kivun, surun, pelon ja vihan tunteita. Seuraten Petrus Lombardusta kaikki teologit katsoivat, että Kristuksen tunteet olivat synnittämiä esitunteita. Edelleen kaikkien teologioiden mukaan Kristuksen sielun sensuaalisen osan kyvyt kokivat kipua ja surua, vaikka heidän tulkintansa Kristuksen tuntemasta kivusta ja surusta erosivatkin toisistaan. Teologit myös esittivät, että kipu kosketti koko Kristuksen sielua mukaan lukien rationaalisen sielunosan kyvyt. Koska tutkittavien teologioiden käsitykset Kristuksen sielun kyvystä kokea tunteita erosivat toisistaan, myös heidän käsityksensä siitä, miten kipu kosketti koko sielua, vaihteli ajattelijasta toiseen.

Tutkimus osoittaa, että eräät painotukset 1200-luvun keskusteluissa inkarnaation psykologiasta muodostavat kaksi tulkintaperinnettä suhteessa siihen, miten psykologiaa (ymmärrettynä luonnonfilosofian osa-alueena) sovellettiin inkarnaatio-oppiin. Nämä perinteet ovat varhaisten fransiskaanien kehittämä fransiskaanitradiitio ja Tuomas Akvinolaisen myötä kehittynyt tomistinen traditio. Analyysi toisaalta osoittaa myös näiden perinteiden joustavuuden, sillä kaikki

fransiskaanit eivät seuranneet vain fransiskaanitraditiota ja kaikki dominikaanit eivät puolestaan seuranneet varauksettomasti tomistista traditiota. Tutkimuksesta käy myös ilmi, että inkarnaation psykologiasta käydyssä keskustelussa teologia ja luonnonfilosofia vaikuttivat huomattavasti toinen toisiinsa. Teologit omaksuivat käsityksiä luonnonfilosofian alaan kuuluneesta psykologiasta ja sovelsivat niitä teologiseen keskusteluun. Toisaalta taas teologiassa kehitetyt käsitykset vaikuttivat luonnontieteissä esitettyihin näkemyksiin sielusta kuten osoittaa esimerkiksi keskustelu Kristuksen tahdosta järkenä ja luontona.

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My path with medieval theology started about fifteen years ago when I bought a Finnish translation of *Summa theologiae*. Aquinas's intellectual way of treating theological problems inspired me so much that I decided to apply to study theology at the University of Helsinki. Luckily, the Department of Systematic Theology arranged the so-called "medieval school", which provided me with a great opportunity to study medieval theology with researchers at the department. I wrote my Master's thesis on Aquinas in the medieval school. On Professor Reijo Työrinoja's recommendation, I continued my studies in medieval theology in the doctoral programme. As reading medieval texts is not an easy task, much practice and guidance is required in order to learn how to read and write about them. I am extremely grateful to all those people who helped and encouraged me during my doctoral studies and earlier. This project has taught me not only about medieval theology but also that one does not become a scholar without assistance from other, more learned scholars.

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ABBREVIATIONS

MS M ₁	Sarnano, Biblioteca comunale, MS E. 92 (Peter Auriol, <i>Commentarium in III librum Sententiarum</i>)
MS M ₂	Sarnano, Biblioteca comunale, MS E. 93 (William of Ware, <i>Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum</i>)
OPh	Opera philosophica. Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica. Cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae
OTh	Opera theologica. Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica. Cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae
PG	J.-P. Migne (ed.), Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca
PL	J.-P. Migne (ed.), Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina
<i>Sententia Ethic.</i>	Thomas Aquinas, <i>Sententia libri Ethicorum</i>
<i>Super Io.</i>	Thomas Aquinas, <i>Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura</i>
<i>Super Sent.</i>	Thomas Aquinas, <i>Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis</i>
<>	Indicate added material in transcriptions from manuscripts
{ }	Indicate deleted material in transcriptions from manuscripts

INTRODUCTION

Following the doctrine of the dual nature of Christ promulgated by the Council of Chalcedon (451 CE), the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Latin theologians taught that Christ had a divine nature and a human nature united in a single person, which was the second person of the Trinity. From the twelfth century to the fourteenth century, the various consequences of this doctrine were widely discussed by theologians. A common question among theologians was, for example, what kind of metaphysical ideas could explain the union between two natures in a single person. Since the orthodox interpretation of the doctrine of dual nature implied that Christ had a human soul in his completely human nature, theologians also studied the doctrine from a psychological point of view. Extensively studied questions were, for instance, whether the soul of Christ had knowledge and will separate from his divine knowledge and will, as well as whether his human nature had passions even though his divine nature did not.

Such questions of knowledge, will and passions were mostly addressed apart from the doctrine of the incarnation. In the twelfth century, the nature of the soul was often treated in non-Christological theological treatises, and discussions in the thirteenth century extended beyond theology. Various early Christian works – especially Augustine’s texts, such as *De Trinitate* and *Confessiones*, and Nemesius of Emesa’s *De natura hominis*, John of Damascus’s *De fide orthodoxa*, and later also the Latin translation of Avicenna’s Arabic *De anima* – influenced twelfth-century views about the soul. These works were still influential in the first part of the thirteenth century when Aristotle’s *De anima* began to be discussed in the universities with Averroes’s *Commentary* on it.¹ Commentaries on Aristotle’s *De anima* were part of natural philosophy, which was taught in the faculty of arts. However, philosophical and theological contexts of psychology were not entirely separate. Theologians applied the ideas of psychology as a branch of natural philosophy in developing their views about theological matters, and many of them were authors of treatises on the soul in the field of natural philosophy as well.

The overall theme of this study concerns the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century academic discussions about the incarnation from the point of view medieval philosophical psychology. My study will especially explore the following questions: what themes were included in the discussions about knowledge, will, and passions in Christ’s human nature, what the main psychological ideas employed in the psychology of the incarnation were, and whether the teachings about Christ’s human soul were

¹ For Avicenna’s *De anima* and its influence on medieval psychology, see Hasse 2000.

derived from psychology as a discipline of natural philosophy. I am not going to describe in detail all the views about the psychology of the incarnation proposed by the theologians whose works are investigated, but instead will concentrate on the aforementioned topics as they were formulated in the twelfth -century, in particular their later development and the new ideas put forward in these discussions. The method of this study is basically a systematic analysis of the psychological conceptions. This includes the historical and philosophical construction of psychological ideas in these discussions about Christ's human soul. Despite the fact that my main aim is not a comparative study of the medieval psychology of the incarnation, a systematic analysis of psychological conceptions also needs some kind of comparative approach. Although I pay special attention to new ideas proposed in the discussions about the psychology of incarnation, I also introduce the views of some theologians who based their work on an existing account, as these demonstrate doctrinal similarities between different theologians.

I shall discuss the basics of medieval psychological theories about knowledge, will and passions because these general views formed a background for the medieval discussions about the psychology of incarnation. In the thirteenth century, philosophical psychology was considered a part of natural philosophy, as Aristotle had explained that psychology was a branch of natural philosophy.² Medieval Aristotelian psychology was a faculty psychology: it concerned what the powers of the soul were, what kinds of acts they had, and how the powers interacted. A standard view was that a soul had a vegetative part, a sensitive part and an intellectual part. Whereas the vegetative part was responsible for growing, generation and nutrition, the sensitive and intellectual parts had cognitive and appetitive powers. Proper to the study of psychology was an investigation of the sensitive and intellectual parts of the soul.³

Theologians thought that the powers were necessary properties of the soul: a soul was never without them. However, theologians proposed different views on how the powers were related to a soul. For example, Thomas Aquinas argued that although the powers were necessary properties of the soul, the powers and the soul were really distinct because the powers were accidents of the soul. Scotus also expounded that the powers were necessary properties of the soul, but he believed that the powers and the soul were not really distinct. They were only distinct formally: the definition of the soul did not include the powers, but the powers and the soul

² For Aristotle and the faculty psychology, see King 2008, 255–258.

³ King 2008, 253–254.

were existentially inseparable.⁴ However, William Ockham argued that the powers and the soul were not separated in any way: the powers and the soul were identical.⁵ According to medieval psychology, the powers of the soul had acts. Active powers elicited their acts intrinsically, whereas the acts of the passive powers were caused externally. Aquinas, for instance, explained that acts and the powers were distinguished by their objects. For example, the object of the cognitive powers was true and the object of the appetitive powers was good, and the object of the sensitive appetitive power was the sensible good and the object of the will was the immaterial good.⁶

The standard view in medieval psychology was that the sensitive and the intellectual parts of the soul had cognitive and appetitive or motive powers. A human being was aware of the world through the cognitive powers and he engaged the world through the appetitive powers. Avicenna's distinction between these powers framed medieval views about the powers in the sensitive part of the soul. His view was based on Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic sources. According to Avicenna, the cognitive powers of the sensitive part of the soul were external senses (sight, smell, hearing, touch, taste) and internal senses (common sense, imagination, the imaginative power, memory, the estimative power). The external senses received sensible forms from external things, whereas a common sense received all forms of the external senses and it joined these forms together. The imagination preserved the forms, whereas the imaginative power could establish various configurations of the sensible forms in imagination by combining and dividing them. Later, theologians usually combined these two powers into one power and called it the imagination or phantasy. The estimative power evaluated whether the objects of the external senses were convenient or inconvenient. The aspects of sensible things which were not perceived by the external senses were called intentions, and they believed to be stored in the memory.⁷ According to Avicenna, the sensitive part of the soul also had a moving power, which was divided into two parts. One part commanded behavioural changes and the other part effected motions through the nervous system and muscles. The motive power which commanded behavioural changes was further divided into two parts: the concupiscible part reacted to pleasurable things or things which were useful for achieving pleasurable

⁴ Cross 2002b, 268–271; King 2008, 266–268. For the soul and its powers in medieval commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*, see Boer 2013, 209–299. For views about the soul and its powers from Augustine to Aquinas, see Künzle 1956.

⁵ Hirvonen 2004, 47–48; King 2008, 269–271.

⁶ King 2008, 258–264.

⁷ Hasse 2000, 107–167; Knuuttila 2002, 59. For Aristotle on the sense of touch, the imagination, and phantasia, see Schofield 1992; Frede 1992; and Freeland 1992.

things, while the irascible part reacted to adversaries and harmful or destructive things.⁸

According to medieval psychology, the intellectual part of the soul also had cognitive and appetitive powers. Following Aristotle and Avicenna, theologians thought that the cognitive powers in the intellectual part of the soul were comprised of an active intellect and a passive intellect, which corresponded to the active and passive elements of intellectual cognition. The appetitive power in the intellectual part was the will, which was the faculty of different kinds of volitions. Unlike the powers of the sensitive part of the soul, these powers did not require bodily organs for their acts.⁹ As Avicenna had claimed that the agent intellect was separate from the soul, the medieval theologians discussed whether there is only one active intellect common for all human beings or whether each human being had their own active intellect.¹⁰ The majority of theologians, most notably Thomas Aquinas, argued that each human being had their own agent and passive intellects.¹¹ However, there were also theologians who doubted whether the intellectual part had these cognitive powers. For example, Durand of St. Pourçain argued that the intellectual part of the soul had only the passive intellect.¹²

In medieval psychology, each power had a unique domain of psychological phenomena, but the activation of the powers included a complex interaction between the powers. For example, sensory cognition involved interaction between the senses, intellectual cognition needed interaction between the intellect and the senses, and willing demanded interaction between the will and the intellect.

How was a sensory cognition formed? Thomas Aquinas explained that sensory cognition originated in the exterior senses, which perceived an external singular thing, and it ended in the interior senses. His view of sensory cognition was based on the doctrines of Aristotle and Avicenna. Sensory cognition began when an exterior sense received through air, water or flesh a sensible species, being a matter-form composite, from an external singular thing. For example, when an eye received the sensible species of a cat, which was the form that informed the sensible matter, the sight saw the cat. Aquinas emphasized that sensible species were not what the sense perceived but the means by which it perceived, and, following Averroes, he explained that they were received spiritually in the sense organ. Different external senses were able to sense the same object at once. For

⁸ Hasse 2000, 139–140; Knuuttila 2002, 58–59; King 2008, 254–255.

⁹ King 2008, 254.

¹⁰ For Avicenna on the intellect, see Hasse 2000, 174–223.

¹¹ McInerney 1993.

¹² Spruit 1994, 281–282; Friedman 2003, 251–252.

example, when seeing the cat, the eye received one sensible species, and while touching it the sense of touch received another sensible species. These sensible species were joined in a common sense, which collected sensible species received via different external senses. After that, phantasms followed in the phantasy or imagination, being kinds of images of the things perceived by the external senses. The imagination was held to be able to compose and divide different phantasms. For example, when the imagination combined phantasm of gold with phantasm of mountain, the imagination would imagine a golden mountain.¹³

In Aquinas's description of sensory cognition, the senses passively received the sensible species. Perception was the actualization of the sense which was passive power activated by received sensible species. However, the medieval theologians discussed whether senses were passive or active when they sensed external things. The Aristotelian view emphasized the passivity of the senses, whereas the Augustinian Neo-Platonic view supposed that the senses were also active. According to this view, sense perception included apprehension of bodily changes and a soul, but no external cause affected the content of the perception. For example, Robert Kilwardby proposed this view as an option for Aristotelian theory.¹⁴

A standard view of medieval Aristotelian psychology was that intellectual cognition required sensory cognition. Aquinas also thought that although the intellect did not need a bodily organ in its act, normally it was not able to know without the bodily senses: when the intellect was thinking, the imagination was active as well. The intelligible species explained how intellectual cognition was related to sensory cognition. According to Aquinas, the agent intellect made unintelligible sensible things intelligible by abstracting intelligible species from phantasms. This abstraction of intelligible species meant that the agent intellect stripped the phantasms of individual sensible matter. After the abstraction, the agent intellect deposited the intelligible species in the passive intellect. As the agent intellect removed individual sensible matter by means of abstraction, the intelligible species were likenesses of universals. Therefore, according to Aquinas, the proper objects of the intellect were the universal quiddities of material things. The abstracted intelligible species activated the passive intellect. Aquinas explained that the intellect next formed the Augustinian mental word, and then the intellect apprehended an universal. However, the intellect was also

¹³ Stump 2003, 247–262. For the basics of the medieval views on sense perception, see Knuuttila & Kärkkäinen 2014, 61–79; 131–145.

¹⁴ Silva 2008, 88; Silva and Toivanen 2010, 247–249; Toivanen 2013, 135–139.

able to form propositions, as it could compound and divide one understood thing from another, and to reason from the known to the unknown.¹⁵

The details of the above-mentioned Thomistic view about intellectual cognition were under hot debate. For example, theologians discussed whether intellectual cognition required divine illumination, as Augustine had claimed. Bonaventure and Aquinas explained that intellectual cognition needed some kind of divine illumination, but Scotus argued that it did not.¹⁶ In addition, intelligible species were a much-debated theme. Although theologians like Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus argued that intellectual cognition required intelligible species, their need was also called into question.¹⁷ For example, Peter John Olivi, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, William Ockham and Durand of St. Pourçain expounded that intelligible species were not needed to explain how intellectual cognition was related to sensory cognition.¹⁸ Theologians also discussed how an act of the intellect and a mental word were related. For example, Thomas Aquinas explained that the mental word was the object of intellectual cognition, whereas Peter John Olivi and William Ockham argued that the word was an act of the intellect.¹⁹

The question about the need for intelligible species was related to the discussion about the abstract and intuitive cognitions. John Duns Scotus was the first to introduce the ideas of the abstract and intuitive cognitions. He argued that only abstract knowledge required intelligible species, whereas intuitive knowledge did not. Abstract knowledge abstracted from existence, and it was indifferent about the existence of the thing. Intuitive knowledge was about a thing insofar as it was directly present in its existence. For example, a sense perception was intuitive cognition and the imagination was abstract cognition. He claimed that the intellect could have abstract knowledge, but he doubted whether intellectual intuitive cognition was possible in this life.²⁰ Unlike Scotus, Peter Auriol argued that intuitive cognition was possible whether the object was present or absent. Auriol explained that intuitive cognition was immediate cognition and it required that a thing seem to be present and existent even when it was not present and existent. Therefore, unlike Scotus, Auriol explained there can be intuitive cognition of a thing which does not really exist. Auriol argued that sensory cognition was intuitive cognition, and he explained that the intellect can have

¹⁵ Stump 2003, 262–272. For the basics of the medieval views on intellectual cognition, see Toivo Holopainen 2014; Perälä 2014.

¹⁶ Marrone 2001; Pasnau 2015.

¹⁷ Spruit 1994, 134–137; 156–174; 257–266.

¹⁸ Spruit 1994, 205–224; 281–283; 291–298.

¹⁹ Pasnau 1997, 254–289.

²⁰ Wolter 1990b; Pasnau 2002a, 296–300.

it as well, although we do not have it in this life.²¹ William Ockham argued that intuitive cognition considered the existence and non-existence of a thing, and intuitive cognition could also take place when a thing was not actually existing, since one can have intuitive cognition about the non-existence of a thing.²²

The appetitive or motive power in the sensitive part of the soul was associated with the passions of the soul. Following Aristotle's compositional theory of the passions of the soul, a standard medieval view was that passions in the sensitive part of the soul involved four elements: 1) a cognitive element, an evaluation that something positive or negative was taking place; 2) an affective element, which was a pleasant or unpleasant feeling based on the evaluation; 3) a dynamic element, being a behavioural suggestion toward action; and 4) the change of the body.²³

Avicenna's view about the moving power of the sensitive part of the soul and its passions also involved these components. His view paved a way for the medieval theories about the passions of the soul.²⁴ In Avicenna's view, the estimative power evaluated whether the objects of the senses were pleasurable or painful. After the evaluation, the commanding motive power reacted to evaluations and it actualized the executive power, which moved nerves and muscles according to the aimed behaviour. However, in human beings, the actualization of the executive power did not necessarily follow from the act of the sensitive appetitive power because the will was able to prevent the acts of the executive power. Avicenna claimed that the passions of the soul included joy, pain, fear and anger, but his descriptions of them were quite cursory. They involved cardiac and spiritual changes, which were caused by the passions of the soul, but he thought that humours and the qualities of the spirit could also influence a soul. Sensible pleasure and pain were perceptions of the apprehensive power. Sensitive pleasure was the feeling aspect of the awareness that something positive was taking place, whereas sensitive pain was the feeling aspect of the awareness that something negative was happening. As the cardiac and spiritual changes and their relations to the passions of the soul were treated also in medical works, the medieval psychology of the passions was also related to medieval medicine.²⁵

²¹ Tachau 1988, 104–112; Friedman 2015a.

²² Piché 2009, 426; Biard 2011, 568–571.

²³ Knuuttila 2002, 50; 2004, 24–47.

²⁴ For the medieval views on the passions, see Knuuttila 2002; 2003; 2004; 2012; 2014; King 1999; 2010; 2012a; 2012b.

²⁵ Knuuttila 2002, 58–62; 2004, 218–226. Already Plato explained that pain was the unpleasant awareness of something in the body and joy was the pleasant awareness of something in it. (Knuuttila 2002, 49.)

Thomas Aquinas's view of the passions of the soul, which derived from Aristotle and Avicenna, was based on the thirteenth-century faculty psychology as the passions of the soul were held to be acts of the sensitive appetitive power. Following Avicenna and the compositional view of the passions, he expounded that the passions of the soul were caused by the evaluation of the estimative power and they were followed by bodily changes, such as fluctuations in the heart, the spirits and the humours. Aquinas explained that the passions of the soul were analogical motions to the state of motions of inanimate things (inclination, movement and rest), whereas Albert the Great explained that they were not motions but qualities. Aquinas's major contribution to the medieval views about the passions of the soul was his taxonomy of the passions. According to Aquinas, the concupiscible power had three pairs of passions of the soul: love/hatred, desire/aversion and pleasure/pain. Love and hatred were the contrary directions of a sensible thing evaluated by the estimative power to be either good or evil. Desire and aversion were motions towards and away from a good or evil thing, whereas pleasure and pain were related to encountering a good or evil thing. The irascible passions were hope/despair, courage/fear and anger. Aquinas thought that the irascible passions presupposed concupiscible passions. When a desired object was arduous, hope or despair arose, and when an avoided object was arduous, fear or courage arose. Sometimes a present evil was followed also by anger.²⁶ The medieval classifications of the passions of the soul were influenced by the view of the Stoics, who distinguished the passions by their objects (good/evil) and the temporal aspect (present/future). Pleasure was about a present good, whereas desire was about a future good. Sadness was about a present evil and fear was about a future evil.²⁷

Later, the Franciscan theologians gave up any clear distinction between the sensitive appetitive power and the will. Unlike Aquinas, who thought that only the sensitive appetitive power was divided into irascible and concupiscible powers, Scotus explained that the will also involved such division and it could have passions. The immediate concupiscible acts of the will were likes and dislikes, but they were not efficacious volitions like elections. An act of the intellect was the partial cause of these acts, but the will, which was free, was their efficient cause. Scotus argued that the will could have also pleasure and sadness, which were passions of the will separated from its acts. Unlike Scotus, Adam Wodeham thought that the passions of the rational part of the soul were cognitions. He

²⁶ Knuuttila 2002, 72–77; 2004, 239–255; King 2010, 176–180.

²⁷ Knuuttila 2004, 51–52; King 2010, 169.

criticized a view proposed by Walter Chatton and William Ockham which emphasized a real distinction between love and cognition, as well as the view that the passions of the soul were judgments. While Wodeham thought that distinct cognition precedes acts called love, fear and hope, he argued that these acts were also cognitive acts but not acts of knowing.²⁸

The will as the appetitive power in the intellectual part of the soul was strongly debated in medieval psychology, and theologians made many distinctions in regard to it. Following Anselm of Canterbury, theologians explained that the will had an inclination to the advantageous and to justice.²⁹ The will had also reactions, which were natural but not chosen,³⁰ and whereas the will could wish for a thing absolutely, it also could wish for a thing conditionally (either actually or latently).³¹ The common view was that, like the appetitive power of the sensitive part of the soul, an act of the will required cognition. Therefore, volitions required interaction between the will and intellectual cognition. The will wished for, wished against and chose objects represented by the intellect.

Unlike the lower appetitive power, the will was free, since the will was not under any necessity. The exact nature of the freedom of the will was intensely studied by medieval psychology.³² One of the discussions on this involved a debate about the wishing for beatitude. Thomas Aquinas explained that the will was a moved mover because it was moved by the intellect and it was able to move other powers of the soul, including the intellect and itself. The object of the will was immaterial good represented by the intellect. Aquinas thought that the will necessarily wished for beatitude and everything indispensable related to it when the intellect represented it to the will, because beatitude was the greatest good. Therefore, when the intellect represented beatitude to the will, the will could not but wish for it. In this respect, it was not free. However, the will was free in respect to all other things since it could choose freely and without coercion means to achieve beatitude. This freedom was based on reason, which could propose different means to gain ends.³³ Furthermore, John Duns Scotus thought that all men wished for beatitude and the act of the will required intellectual cognition; unlike Aquinas, however, Scotus thought that the will was a self-mover and a free cause of its volition. He explained that the

²⁸ Knuuttila 2002, 77–79; 2004, 265–282; King 2010, 180–183.

²⁹ For Anselm on the will, see Normore 2002, 29–47; Ekenberg 2005a, 301–313; 2005b; 2016. For the basics of the medieval views on the will, see Taina Holopainen 2014.

³⁰ Robiglio 2002, 56–60.

³¹ Saarinen 1994, 75–82; Robiglio 2002, 82–90.

³² Kent 1995, 94–149.

³³ Krezmann 1993, 146–149. For beatific enjoyment in the medieval discussions, see Kitanov 2006.

intellect was only a partial cause, whereas the will was the principal cause of the volition, since the will elicited its acts freely. Therefore, when the intellect represented beatitude to the will, the will did not wish it necessarily, because it was up to the will whether it moved itself to wish for beatitude. However, the will could not wish against beatitude because beatitude could not be an object of such volition.³⁴ When Peter Auriol described how the will moved itself freely to wish, he explained that the will moved itself through the intellect by controlling the judgment of the intellect.³⁵

Covering the thirteenth to the early fourteenth century, my study examines texts written over a period of approximately a hundred years. Many important theologians who wrote about psychological issues during that time are not discussed here because their works did not include discussions of the psychology of Christ's human soul or that subject was only mentioned here and there. There are also theologians who studied the doctrine of the incarnation, but did not approach it from the standpoint of psychology. However, most theologians who treated the psychology of the incarnation wrote about the knowledge, will and passions of Christ. I investigate the works by these theologians, attending especially to those who contributed to the discussion with original ideas. Theologically relevant questions about Christ are not examined if they are not psychological. For example, theologians wrote about Christ's grace and merit, considering them to be related to his will, but as these treatises did not directly contribute to the psychology of the will of Christ, I have left them outside my study.

The main sources of this study consider the psychology of the incarnation, propose ideas which were new in comparison with predecessors and open questions in philosophical psychology apart from popular repetition. These sources offer a rich picture of various positions which aimed at new solutions in thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions. As Peter Lombard studied the knowledge, the will and the passions of Christ in the third book of his *Sentences*, theologians treated these subjects in their commentaries on this work. These commentaries are the most important sources of my work, but I also attend to other theological works when they are relevant.³⁶

While I include twelfth-century texts, my main sources are from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Apart from the twelfth-century texts, the sources of this study can be divided into four groups based on the mendicant orders and periods between theologians. The first group concerns

³⁴ Wolter 1986, 42–45.

³⁵ Hoffmann 2015.

³⁶ For the commentaries on the *Sentences* in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, see Friedman 2002, 41–128.

Summa Halensis and the texts by Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure. These texts were composed by Franciscan theologians who formed the foundation of that order's intellectual tradition. Of Alexander of Hales's works, the sources used in this study are his *Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum*,³⁷ which is dated between 1220–1227, and *Quaestiones disputatae antequam esset frater*,³⁸ which he composed before he became a Franciscan friar in 1236. Alexander of Hales was formerly thought to be the author of *Summa Halensis*,³⁹ but the editors of the modern critical edition have questioned its authorship. Although Alexander possibly supervised the editing of the text, the specific author or authors of the work remain unknown. However, the work represents early Franciscan thought and it is an important source for understanding the development of early Franciscan theology. The final version of the *Summa Halensis* was edited by 1257.⁴⁰ Concerning Bonaventure, I shall use mostly his *Commentary on the Sentences*.⁴¹ Bonaventure first commented on the *Sentences* between 1250–1252 and revised his text as a Master of Theology.⁴²

The second group of texts are written by the Dominican theologians Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. This study uses Albert's

³⁷ *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, vols. 12–15. Quaracchi, Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–1957.

³⁸ *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, vols. 19–21. Quaracchi, Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960.

³⁹ *Summa theologica (Summa Halensis)*, vols. 1–4. Quaracchi, Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–1948.

⁴⁰ Alexander of Hales, the founder of the early Franciscan school, was born between 1180 and 1186 in Halesowen. He became Master of Arts before 1210 and regent Master of Theology in 1220/1221 in Paris. He entered the Franciscan order in 1236, attended the first Council of Lyon in 1244–1245 and died in 1245. The most significant contribution of Alexander to the medieval intellectual culture was his initiation of the practice of commenting on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. After Alexander, the *Sentences* became the standard textbook in theology. Students in Paris and Oxford who wanted to become Masters of Theology were obligated to lecture on the *Sentences*. (Cullen 2011, 62–63.)

⁴¹ *Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*. Opera omnia, tomus 1–4. Quaracchi: Ex typographia Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1889.

⁴² Bonaventure was born in 1217/1221 in Bagnoregio, Tuscany. He came to Paris in the 1230s, where he studied under Alexander of Hales. Bonaventure joined the Franciscan order in 1238/1243 and became Master of Arts in 1243. During his studies at the faculty of arts, the requirements of becoming of Master of Arts involved Aristotle's *Organon* and *De anima*. Hence, he was less influenced by Aristotle's works than the Dominicans Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, who were familiar with most of Aristotle's corpus. Bonaventure received his teaching license in 1243 and assumed the Franciscan chair in theology in Paris in 1257. He became Minister General of the Franciscan order in the same year. Bonaventure became a cardinal and the bishop of Albano in 1273 and he died in 1274. (Noone 2014; Pereira 2011, 182–184.)

Commentary on the Sentences,⁴³ *De bono*⁴⁴ and *De incarnatione Verbi*.⁴⁵ Albert wrote his *Commentary on the Sentences* around 1243 in Paris. The treatises *De bono* and *De incarnatione Verbi* also come from Albert's period in Paris.⁴⁶ Of Aquinas's works, the most important for this study are his *Commentary on the Sentences*,⁴⁷ the disputed questions *De veritate*⁴⁸ and *Summa theologiae*.⁴⁹ Aquinas commented on the *Sentences* between 1252–1256 and composed *De veritate* in the academic years 1256–1259. He started to write his *Summa theologiae* in 1265 and finished its third part in 1268, not managing to complete the *Summa* before his death.⁵⁰

⁴³ *Commentarii in II Sententiarum*. Opera omnia, vols. 27–28. Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vivés, 1894.

⁴⁴ *De bono*. Opera omnia, tomus 28. Monasterii Westfalonum: In aedibus Aschendorff, 1951.

⁴⁵ *De incarnatione*. Opera omnia, tomus 26. Monasterii Westfalonum: In aedibus Aschendorff, 1958.

⁴⁶ Albert the Great is best known as the teacher of Thomas Aquinas, but scholars have emphasized his importance as an independent thinker for medieval philosophy in general. Albert wrote texts in various fields of philosophy and theology. For example, his commentaries cover some Neo-Platonic works as well as those of Aristoteles. Albert was born around 1200 in Lauingen, Germany. He studied the arts in Padua in the 1220s and joined the Dominican order in 1220/1223/1230. After his studies in Padua, Albert went to Cologne, and he taught as a lector in various places in Germany within the Dominican order. The order sent Albert to Paris to continue his studies around 1240, and he became regent master in 1245. Thomas Aquinas became his student at this time. He taught in Paris until 1248, when he was sent to Cologne with Aquinas to open the *studium generale* for Dominicans. Albert was the prior of the German Dominicans in 1254–1257, and after that period he taught at the *studium generale* at Cologne, was bishop of Regensburg, travelled in Germany for many years as preacher of the Crusade, and lived in Würzburg. Albert died in 1280 in Cologne. (Führer 2016; Resnick 2013, 3–9; Anzulewicz 2013a, 34–35.)

⁴⁷ *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis*. T. 1–4. Parisiis: P. Lethielleux, 1929–1947.

⁴⁸ *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*. Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 22. Roma: Editori di San Tommaso, 1970–1976.

⁴⁹ *Summa theologiae*. Opera omnia iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 4–12. Roma: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1888–1906.

⁵⁰ Thomas Aquinas was born in 1224/1225 in a noble family at the family's castle in Roccasecca, Italy. At the age of five or six, he was sent to the Benedictine abbey of Monte Cassino. This is where Aquinas became familiar with the Bible and the texts of Augustine and Gregory. Aquinas began his studies at the *studium generale* in 1239 in Naples, where he studied, for example, Aristotle's natural philosophy and metaphysics, as well as the works of Averroes and Maimonides. Despite the opposition of his family, Aquinas joined the Dominican order in 1244 and was sent to Paris in 1245–1248, where he studied liberal arts and theology under the direction of Albert the Great. Aquinas was at a new Dominican *studium* in Cologne from 1248 to 1252, but he was sent again to Paris in 1252, where he became regent Master of Theology in 1256. Aquinas was at the General Chapter of the Dominicans at Naples and Orvieto, and he established a *studium* in Rome in 1259–1268. He went back to Paris in 1268, where he confronted the outbreak between mendicants and seculars who attacked the right of the mendicants to teach, conservatives who thought that Aristotle's works were a threat to the Christian faith, and the monopsychism of the Averroist masters. Aquinas was sent to found a new Dominican *studium* in Naples in 1272. Because of mystical experiences and extreme physical and nervous exhaustion, he stopped writing and teaching in 1273. He died in 1274 at the Cistercian abbey of Fossanova. (Torrell 2012, 15–28.) See also Stump 2003, 1–12. The dates of the other referenced works are as follows: *Summa contra Gentiles* (1259–1265), *Expositio super librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus*

The third group of sources first includes texts by the Franciscan and the Dominican theologians who wrote between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, and second, by the early fourteenth-century Dominicans who commented on Aquinas's views. Theologians like the Dominican Peter of Tarentaise and the Franciscan Richard Middleton are theologians who wrote between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, whereas Durand of St. Pourçain and Peter of Palude are early fourteenth-century Dominican theologians who commented on Aquinas's views. I shall especially use the commentaries on the *Sentences* of these authors. Peter of Tarentaise studied the *Sentences*⁵¹ between 1257–1259 and revised his commentary between 1259–1264. His commentary was influenced both by Aquinas and Bonaventure.⁵² Richard Middleton edited his commentary⁵³ between 1285–1295 and it was influenced by Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent.⁵⁴ Durand wrote three versions of *The Commentary on the Sentences*.⁵⁵ The first commentary (1307) was poorly received by the authorities of the Dominican order because of Durand's departure from Aquinas's doctrine, but the second version (finished in 1311) was more obedient to Aquinas's teaching. However, Durand returned to his radical thinking in the third version of his *Commentary on the Sentences* (finished 1318–1325). This study is based on that text, which is the most important source for an understanding of his thought.⁵⁶ Peter of Palude's commentary

(1261–1265 or 1265–1268), *Compendium theologiae* (1265–1267), *Sententia super De anima* (1267–1268), *Quaestiones quodlibetales* VII–XI (1256–1259), I–IV, XII (1268–1272), *Quaestiones disputate de malo* (1266–1272), *Lectura super Ioannem* (1270–1272), *Sententia super Metaphysica* (1270–1273). (Stump 2003, XVI–XX.)

⁵¹ *In IV libros Sententiarum Commentaria tomus III*. Apud Arnaldum Colomerium: Tolosae, 1652.

⁵² Peter of Tarentaise was a Dominican theologian who is also known as Pope Innocent V. Peter was born in the Tarentaise in the region of Savoy in 1224. He was made regent Master of Theology in 1257–1260 and in 1267–1269 in Paris. He became the archbishop of Lyon in 1272, a cardinal in 1273 and pope in 1276. Peter died in 1276. (Bataillon 2002; Friedman 2002, 48–49.)

⁵³ *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi tomus tertius*. Brixiae, 1591.

⁵⁴ Richard Middleton was a Franciscan theologian who was born around 1249. He studied in Paris and became a Master of Theology in 1284. In 1283, the Minister General of the Franciscan order appointed Richard to serve in a commission which examined the propositions of Peter John Olivi. Richard was regent master of the Franciscan *studium* in 1284–1287 in Paris, the teacher of the son of King Charles II of Sicily from 1288 to 1296, and he died in 1307/1308. (Cross 2011, 1132–1133; 2003, 573.)

⁵⁵ *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII*. Venetiis, 1571.

⁵⁶ The Dominican friar Durand of St. Pourçain was a controversial figure among the Dominican theologians because of his critical stance on Aquinas's views. In 1309, the Dominican order recommended that Aquinas's thinking was the preferred doctrinal line of the Dominicans, and thus Aquinas enjoyed a privileged status as the theologian whose ideas the Dominicans were required to defend. Durand was born in Auvergne in 1270/1275. His academic career began in 1303–1308 and he became Master of Theology in 1312 in Paris. As Durand criticized some of Aquinas's views, the Dominican order began investigations into Durand's texts in 1313–1314 and in 1316/1317. Despite the controversies with the Dominican friars, Durand enjoyed the Pope's favour and he taught at the papal curia in Avignon in 1313–

was written against the commentary by Durand.⁵⁷ The considerable part of his commentary consists of a text copied verbatim from Durand's commentary and his critical comments on Durand's text.⁵⁸

The fourth group of the sources consists of the texts by the early fourteenth-century Franciscan theologians John Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton. For Scotus, I am using his commentaries on the *Sentences*. The *Lectura* involves Scotus's early notes for the lectures he gave as a bachelor theologian at Oxford.⁵⁹ It is possible that the third book of the *Lectura* contains notes about the lectures which he gave at Oxford between 1303–1304 when he was in exile from Paris. The *Ordinatio* is the revision of the Oxford lectures.⁶⁰ Since it is Scotus's main work, the study is based on it in particular. The *Reportatio*⁶¹ is a student report of the lectures which Scotus gave in Paris between 1302–1303.⁶² Among Ockham's texts, I am analysing his *Exposition of Aristotle's Categories*,⁶³ *Commentary on the Sentences*⁶⁴ and *Quodlibeta septem*.⁶⁵ Ockham composed his work on the *Categories* between 1321–1324, commented on the *Sentences* between 1317–1318 and completed *Quodlibeta*

1317 and became the bishop of Limoux, Le Puy and Meaux. Durand was the Pope's theological advisor in 1318, 1322 and 1326. In the last period of his tenure as the Pope's advisor, Durand was one of the theologians who investigated the orthodoxy of William of Ockham. He died in 1334. (Iribarren 2011, 279–280; 2005, 1–11; Friedman 2003, 249.)

⁵⁷ *Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum*. Venundantur Parisiis a Claudio Chavallon, 1517.

⁵⁸ Peter of Palude studied at Paris when Durand of St. Pourçain was regent master there. He lectured on *Sentences* in 1310–1312, was regent master in 1314–1317 and edited his lectures into *ordinatio* in 1310/1311–1315. Peter was a member of the committees that evaluated Durand's *Commentaries* in 1314 and 1316/1317. (Friedman 2002, 72.) For more about Peter of Palude's life, see Dunbabin, 1991.

⁵⁹ *Lectura*. Opera omnia, vol. 19–21. Civitas Vaticana: Typis Vaticanis, 1993–2004.

⁶⁰ *Ordinatio*. Opera omnia, vol. 8–10. Civitas Vaticana: Typis Vaticanis, 2001–2007; *Ordinatio IV*, suppl. dist. 49, qq. 9–10. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986.

⁶¹ *Reportatio Parisiensis*. Opera omnia, XI.1. Ed. by Wadding. Reprographischer Nachdruck der Ausgabe Lyon 1639. Hildesheim: Olms, 1969.

⁶² John Duns Scotus was born in the Scottish village of Duns in 1265/1266. He was ordained to the priesthood in the Franciscan order in 1291, began theological studies in the 1280s at Oxford, and lectured on the *Sentences* in the academic years of 1298–1299. He left Oxford for Paris in 1302, where he began to lecture on the *Sentences*, but was expelled from the city in June of 1303 because of the controversy between Pope Boniface VIII and King Philip IV of France. Scotus returned to Paris in the same or following year. He became Master of Theology in 1305 and Franciscan regent master in 1306. He was transferred to the Franciscan *studium* in Cologne in 1307, where he died in 1308. (Friedman 2002, 65–68; Williams 2002a, 1–11.)

⁶³ *Expositio in librum praedicamentorum Aristotelis* (OPh II). St. Bonaventure, New York: St. Bonaventure University, 1978.

⁶⁴ *Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum* (OTH VI–VII). St. Bonaventure, New York: St. Bonaventure University, 1982–1984.

⁶⁵ *Quodlibeta septem* (OTH IX). St. Bonaventure, New York: St. Bonaventure University, 1980.

septem between 1322–1325.⁶⁶ Also included among the sources of this study are Peter Auriol's commentary on the third book of the *Sentences*,⁶⁷ which he lectured on between 1316–1318,⁶⁸ and Walter Chatton's *Commentary on the Sentences*,⁶⁹ which he delivered in 1321–1323.⁷⁰

Scholarly interest in studying the medieval theological discussions from the point of view of philosophy has increased during the recent years. Two works in this trend have especially inspired my approach. The first is the two-volume study titled *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University* by Russell Friedman, which explores the psychological ideas that theologians applied in the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century discussions about the Trinity.⁷¹ Another work is *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation* by Richard Cross, which analyses metaphysical problems

⁶⁶ William Ockham was born around 1287 in Ockham, England. He joined the Franciscan order as a teenager and was sent to a Franciscan house in London, where he began his studies at a Franciscan provincial *studium*. Ockham began his studies in theology around 1310, either in London or at Oxford. He commented on the *Sentences* in 1317–1319 at Oxford, but he never graduated with a Master of Theology from there. He returned to the Franciscan *studium* of London in 1321, where his housemates were, for example, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham. In 1323, Ockham went to the Franciscan province's chapter meeting to defend his views, which some friars found to be suspicious. As Ockham was also charged with teaching heresy, in 1324 Pope John XXII ordered a commission in Avignon to study Ockham's texts, but Ockham's views were never condemned as heretical. In Avignon, Ockham took part in the debate on apostolic poverty, and he ended up claiming that the Pope's view was heretical. Ockham fled from Avignon to Pisa, and he was excommunicated because of his departure from Avignon in 1328. Ockham left Pisa for Munich around 1329, where he eventually died in 1347. (Spade 2015; Brown 2011, 1410–1411; Friedman 2002, 83.)

⁶⁷ *Commentarium in III librum Sententiarum*, Sarnano, Biblioteca comunale, MS E. 92.

⁶⁸ Peter Auriol was an innovative theologian who commented extensively on the views of his contemporaries, but formulated his views rather independently. Auriol was born in 1280 near the city of Cahors in France. He joined the Franciscan order before 1300, began his studies at the *studium* in Toulouse and studied theology in the 1300s in Paris. Auriol taught at Franciscan *studiums* in 1312 in Bologna and in 1314 in Toulouse. In 1316, he was sent by the Franciscan General Chapter to Paris in order to lecture on the *Sentences*. He had lectured on the *Sentences* already in Bologna or Toulouse and his *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum* was mainly finished when Auriol arrived in Paris. He lectured on the *Sentences* in Paris until 1318, when he became Franciscan regent master. He was made the Franciscan provincial minister of Aquitaine in 1320 and the archbishop of Aix-en-Provence in 1321. Auriol died in 1322. (Friedman 2015a; 2002, 81–83; Schabel 2011, 935–935.)

⁶⁹ *Reportatio super Sententias libri III-IV*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2005.

⁷⁰ Walter Chatton was a critic of William Ockham and Peter Auriol, but a follower of John Duns Scotus. Chatton was born in 1285–1290 in the town of Chatton in England. He joined the Franciscan order before the age of 14, was ordained as sub-deacon in 1307 and was sent to study theology at Oxford, where he met William Ockham who was lecturing there on the *Sentences*. Chatton lectured on the *Sentences* for the first time in 1321–1323 and it is possible that he visited Ockham and Adam Wodeham at the Franciscan *studium* in London during that period. Chatton became Franciscan regent master in 1330 at Oxford. He was summoned to Avignon in 1333 in order to examine the texts of Durand of St. Pourçain, for example, and to be an advisor to Pope Benedict XII. He was appointed as the bishop of the Welsh See of Asaph, but he died in 1343/1344 before the See of Asaph became vacant. (Keele 2014; Brower-Toland 2011, 1377; Etzkorn 2005, IX–XI.)

⁷¹ Friedman 2013.

surrounding the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century doctrines about the incarnation.⁷² In an analogous way, my study approaches the theological discussion about the incarnation from the viewpoint of medieval philosophical psychology.

The psychology of the incarnation in the high and late medieval periods has been studied by modern scholars in terms of three aspects: the knowledge of the human Christ, his will and his passions. This division is based primarily on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, where Lombard studies the knowledge, the will and the passions of Christ separately. Despite the fact that the psychology of the incarnation in the twelfth-, thirteenth- and fourteenth-century discussions has been studied from the 1950s to the present, there are no monographs that examine all of these aspects in one volume. In addition, the texts are approached from the point of view of theology rather than from the point of view of philosophical psychology, and there are also significant texts which have remained unexplored. New studies on the history of medieval psychology and the role of medieval metaphysical and psychological issues in the doctrine of the incarnation and the Trinity have added to the need for such a comprehensive work.

The most important studies on the discussion about the knowledge of Christ's human soul in the medieval times are works by Artur Landgraf,⁷³ Johannes Ernst,⁷⁴ Horacio Santiago-Otero,⁷⁵ John Murray,⁷⁶ William Forster⁷⁷ and Laurence Vaughan.⁷⁸ Landgraf and Santiago-Otero study the twelfth-century sources, whereas Murray, Foster and Vaughan treat the twelfth- and thirteenth-century discussions but focus on Aquinas. The extensive book by Ernst covers the discussions from the twelfth to the fourteenth century, and it also includes analyses of manuscripts which are not yet edited.

The most essential publications on the passions and the will of Christ are those by Paul Gondreau⁷⁹ and Corey Barnes.⁸⁰ Gondreau studies the passions of Christ, whereas Barnes addresses the will of Christ. Both of them focus especially on Thomas Aquinas, but also briefly cover ancient and medieval theologians who influenced Aquinas's thought. Aquinas's teachings on the passions of Christ are also treated in a chapter of the recent

⁷² Cross 2002a.

⁷³ Landgraf, 1954, 44–131.

⁷⁴ Ernst, 1971.

⁷⁵ Santiago-Otero, 1970.

⁷⁶ Murray, 1963.

⁷⁷ Forster, 1958.

⁷⁸ Vaughan, 1957.

⁷⁹ Gondreau, 2002.

⁸⁰ Barnes, 2012.

work by Nicholas Lombardo, which partly rests on the book by Gondreau,⁸¹ and his view about the will of Christ is discussed in a treatise by Andrea Robiglio.⁸² Scotus's view about the passions of Christ's human soul has been investigated, since Scotus treats passions mainly when he deals with questions about Christ's human soul. Recent texts about the topic include those by Knuuttila,⁸³ Drummond,⁸⁴ and Barnes.⁸⁵

The book *What Sort of Human Nature?* by Marilyn McCord Adams⁸⁶ and the article "The Psychology of the Incarnation in John Duns Scotus" by Simo Knuuttila⁸⁷ connect the different aspects of the psychology of the incarnation, as they study the discussions in relation to the knowledge, the will and the passions of Christ. The work by Adams is rather short, but it is a valuable analysis of the discussions about Christ's human nature by Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Lombard, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Scotus and Luther. The article by Knuuttila concerns Thomas Aquinas's and John Duns Scotus's views about the knowledge and the passions of Christ. Knuuttila remarks that their views about the psychology of the incarnation differ greatly, and this study was inspired by the question of why Aquinas's and Scotus's views were so different.

My study contributes to the recent scholarly discourse by providing an extensive analysis and new approach to medieval discussions on the psychology of the incarnation. It is based on sources which have not been studied before (for example, commentaries on the *Sentences* by Peter of Tarentaise, Richard Middleton, Durand of St. Pourçain, Peter of Palude, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton), and it approaches them from the point of view of philosophical psychology rather than from the point of view of doctrinal theology. Also, where the main attention of the books by Murray, Forster, Vaughan, Gondreau and Barnes is on Aquinas, the focus of this study is not limited to Aquinas. There are also methodological differences between the previous studies and my study. Whereas the books by Gondreau and Barnes involve much analysis of the theological background of Aquinas's view, I mirror the views of the theologians on philosophical psychology. I comment on recent scholarship on the subject when scholars have proposed considerably different views or when my interpretation differs from theirs.

⁸¹ Lombardo, 2011, 201–224.

⁸² Robiglio, 2002, 10–33; 56–60.

⁸³ Knuuttila 2011.

⁸⁴ Drummond 2012.

⁸⁵ Barnes 2012, 300–312.

⁸⁶ Adams 1999.

⁸⁷ Knuuttila 2011.

The subject of this study is historically interesting since it sheds light on the medieval Franciscan and Dominican intellectual traditions: the birth and the development of these traditions, as well as the mutual connections between them. It is also interesting philosophically because the medieval discussions were related to psychology in natural philosophy, and theologians proposed views which challenged ideas derived from philosophical sources. Although the study first and foremost takes part in the recent discourse about medieval philosophy, it also has wider significance. As the doctrine of the incarnation and its psychological implications are still topical,⁸⁸ this study provides a historical background and medieval solutions to be considered in these modern theological and philosophical debates. However, as the aim of this study is to provide accurate descriptions of the medieval views, it does not actively take part in this contemporary discussion.

This study is divided into three chapters. The first chapter concerns the theories of the knowledge of Christ's human soul. The main questions are what kind of knowledge the human Christ had and whether his soul knew everything that God knows. The thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians thought that Christ's human soul knew the Word of God and things in the Word of God, and that the soul had infused knowledge and experiences. Peter Lombard argued that Christ's human soul knew everything that God knew. In the subsequent discussions, this was thought to pertain to the knowledge about things in the Word of God. However, theologians were divided on the question of whether Christ's human soul was able to know everything that God knew. Alexander of Hales claimed that the human Christ was omniscient in a sense that he knew all things which were, are or will be, but he did not know all things which God can create. Bonaventure was the first to argue that Christ's human soul habitually knew everything that God knows. Scotus first proposed that Christ's human soul actually knew everything that God knows, but he ended up in the view that the soul knew everything habitually. Unlike Bonaventure and Scotus, Thomas Aquinas argued that Christ's human soul did not know everything, even habitually, as the soul did not know the unrealized divine possibilities. Theologians also proposed different views about the experience of Christ's human soul. For example, in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas argued that Christ had experiential certitude, which did not involve acquiring new intelligible species. In his *Summa theologiae*, however, he proposed the novel idea that Christ's human soul had experiential knowledge, as his passive intellect acquired new intelligible species through the senses and an

⁸⁸ For the modern discussions about the incarnation, see Hick 1978; Morris 1986; Swinburne 2003; Cross 2002a; Marmodoro and Hill 2011; White 2015.

active intellect. The acquired intelligible species were new in a relative sense only because Christ already had them due to divine infusion. Scotus also expressed a new view about Christ's experience when he explained that the experience of Christ's human soul involved intuitive knowledge. Peter Auriol was one of the first to argue that the experience of Christ's human soul was not intuitive knowledge, but knowledge acquired from memories.

In the second chapter, I study the discussion about Christ's will and ask what kind of human wills Christ had and how these wills were related to each other. Peter Lombard argued that Christ's human soul involved two human wills, as he divided Christ's human will into the will of reason and the will of sensuality. Later theologians took Lombard's basic division for granted, but they further divided the will of reason. The early Franciscan theologians added a new theme into the discussion by arguing that the will of reason was divided into will "as nature" and will "as reason". Since then, that division became standard, although theologians understood its parts differently. For example, Bonaventure explained that the will as nature and the will as reason were different ways of wishing. Aquinas's innovative explanation was that they were the acts of the will about a means and an end, while Scotus associated the will as nature with the inclination of the will. The theologians of the period remarked that Christ's prayer in Gethsemane implied that Christ both wished for death and wished to avoid it, but they argued that these wills were not contrary. As Christ's human will wished to avoid death, theologians studied how it was possible that Christ wished for something which did not take place. They also argued that Christ had free choice or free will, even though Christ's will was able to wish only for good, not evil.

In the third chapter, I turn to a study of the passions of Christ. I ask how Christ's human soul was passible, what passions he had and how he was simultaneously able to have pain, sadness and joy. All theologians thought that Christ had a passible soul. The early Franciscans argued that Christ's human soul and the powers of its rational part were passible in an emotional sense, whereas Aquinas explained that the soul was passible only accidentally and that the powers of the rational part of the soul did not have passions in a strict sense. The different views about the passibility of the soul had a great influence on thinking about the passions of Christ's human soul. Theologians agreed that Christ voluntarily assumed some but not all defects of human nature; among the assumed defects were pain, sadness, fear and anger. Following Peter Lombard, they argued that the pain, the sadness, the fear and the anger of Christ were sinless pre-passions, but they proposed differing views on how these were pre-passions. Theologians also studied what Christ feared and what kind of anger he had. All the theologians agreed that the powers of the sensitive part of Christ's human soul had pain and sadness, but their understanding about pain varied. They also argued that the pain of Christ touched his whole soul, including the powers of the rational

part of the soul, but as their views about the passibility of the soul varied, their teachings on how pain touched the whole soul differed as well. For example, the early Franciscan theologians, Bonaventure, Richard Middleton and John Duns Scotus argued that the will of Christ had sadness as a passion, but Aquinas said that the will did not have sadness as a passion and that the powers of the rational part of the soul were changed only accidentally when his flesh was injured. Theologians thought that when Christ had pain and sadness, he also had the greatest joy. Although Aristotle claimed that a person cannot feel pain and joy at once, theologians tried to explain how Christ was able to have them at the same time.

1 THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

“[...] it is possible to know many things but not to be thinking of them.”¹

“But he will not be able to take ignorance upon himself...”²

“Jesus kept on growing in wisdom...” (Luke 2:52)

These quotations from *Topics* by Aristotle, *Cur Deus homo* by Anselm of Canterbury and the Bible exemplify philosophical and theological challenges which the medieval theologians encountered when they discussed the knowledge of the human Christ. According to Aristotle, a person cannot think of many things at once, but Anselm’s claim that Christ did not assume ignorance challenged Aristotle’s idea because, according to some medieval theologians, freedom from ignorance implied that Christ’s human soul was thinking of many things at once. In addition, in medieval psychology as a branch of natural philosophy, the intelligible species were abstracted from the senses, but the medieval theologians assumed that Christ had intelligible species, which were not acquired from the senses. Anselm’s view also involved a theological challenge. Since in the Bible it was claimed that human Christ was growing in wisdom, unlike Anselm’s view seemed to suppose, it appeared that Christ did not know everything.

While thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions about passions in the soul of Christ were associated with his deficiencies, the discussions about Christ’s knowledge examined the perfections of the human nature. The views about Christ’s knowledge reflected changes in the philosophical ideas about the intelligible species, the connection between the intellectual and sensory cognitions, the number of simultaneous acts of the intellect, abstract and intuitive knowledge and experience. The discussions are also interesting because they make visible some differences between the Franciscan and Thomistic intellectual traditions. However, while scholars have argued that in discussions about the knowledge of Christ theologians were divided over whether they were in the Franciscan or the Dominican schools,³ and they have emphasized Aquinas’s influence on later debates,⁴ my study proves that the discussions were much more nuanced: the intellectual traditions were not so clearly defined and not all theologians agreed with Aquinas in all respects.

¹ Aristotle, *Topica* II.10, 114b33–35, transl. by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge.

² Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo* lib. 2, cap. 13, p. 333. Transl. by Briand Davies and G. R. Evans.

³ Vaughan 1957, 17–57.

⁴ Forster 1958, 110–122; Murray 1963, 94.

In this chapter, I focus on two questions in particular. First, what kind of knowledge did Christ's human nature have and, second, did Christ's human soul know everything that God knows? The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I make some remarks about the discussion in the twelfth century. Secondly, I focus on teachings regarding Christ's knowledge by Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas and some of his followers. Lastly, I expound on John Duns Scotus's and Peter Auriol's teachings.⁵

1.1. *The Knowledge of Christ in Twelfth-Century Sources*

Twelfth-century discussions about Christ's knowledge, especially Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, framed the discussions that would follow in the thirteenth century. A central question was whether Christ had only divine knowledge or human knowledge as well. Hugh of Saint Victor was the best-known advocate of the view that Christ had only divine knowledge. In his *De anima Christi*, Hugh held that the wisdom of Christ's human soul was the Word of God because his soul was united with it.⁶ As the wisdom of the divine nature was also the Word of God, Christ's human and divine natures were wise through the same wisdom: Christ's divine and human knowledge were identical.⁷ Hugh's view was widely debated in the twelfth century. Unlike Hugh, many theologians argued that the wisdom of Christ's human soul was not the Word of God but a created feature of the soul of Christ. One of the supporters of this view was Peter Lombard. According to Lombard, the knowledge of Christ's human soul and the knowledge of Christ's divine nature were not the same. Christ had human knowledge and divine knowledge because he had a human nature and divine nature.⁸

⁵ For medieval discussions on Christ's knowledge, see Knuuttila 2011; Adams 1999; Madigan 1997; Ernst 1971; Santiago-Otero 1970; 1975; Murray 1963; Forster 1958; Vaughan 1957. Murray (1963, 30–59), Forster (1958, 27–63), and Vaughan (1957, 18–40) also study the early 13th-century authors, who are not studied here.

⁶ On the hypostatical union in twelfth-century discussions, see Nielsen 1982, 193–370.

⁷ “Ergo, inquiunt, tantam sapientiam habet anima Christi, quantum Deus habet. Quid facit comparatio? ubi unus solus est? Una est sapientia Dei, qua sapiens est anima Christi, nec participando sapiens est, ut hoc vel illud in illa, et per illam sapiat, sed plenitudinem habendo, ut totum possideat. Non ergo dicamus tanta aut quanta; sed dicamus tota sapientia Dei in anima Christi est, et ex tota sapientia Dei anima Christi sapiens est...” Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sapientia animae Christi* PL 176, 853A. Hugh's text was a reply to Walter of Mortagne's (1100–1174) letter where Walter argued that Christ's human soul did not know as much as God knows. For Walter's arguments, see Santiago-Otero 1970, 57–69. Later on, Robert of Melun argued against Hugh's view, saying that it implied that Christ did not have a rational soul because the Word of God seemed to replace it. (*Sententiae* lib. 2, cap. 14, p. 31.) For Hugh of Saint Victor on Christ, see Coolman 2010, 83–102.

⁸ “His etenim euidenter traditur duos in christo esse principales sensus, siue geminam sapientiam. Neque ideo unitas et singularitas personae diuiditur, sed iuxta duas naturas, duas

Hugh assumed that Christ's human soul knew everything that God knows because Christ's human and divine knowledge were the same. While Lombard thought that Christ had created and uncreated knowledge, he argued that the human Christ knew everything that God knows but his uncreated knowledge was more complete than his created knowledge. Lombard explained that Christ's human soul did not know as clearly as God knows and its wisdom was not as worthy as God's wisdom.⁹ However, not all twelfth-century theologians held that the human Christ knew everything that God knows. For example, Gandolphus of Bologna argued that the human Christ knew everything which was, is and will be, but unlike God, he did not know which things and how many things (*quot et quanta*) God can create.¹⁰

Although theologians disagreed about the question of whether the human Christ knew everything that God knows, they thought that since the moment of his conception the knowledge of the human Christ was as perfect as the knowledge of a human being can be. However, according to Gospel of Luke, "Jesus kept on growing in wisdom and maturity." (Luke 2:52.) Did this indicate that the knowledge of Christ improved during his lifetime? Twelfth-century theologians usually denied that Christ progressed in knowledge. For example, Hugh of Saint Victor and Peter Lombard described that Christ did not grow in wisdom, but the knowledge of his

habet sapientias: Unam non creatam sed genitam, quae ipse est; alteram non genitam, sed creatam, et per gratiam ei collatam." Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 13, cap. 1, p. 87.

⁹"Quibus respondentes, dicimus animam Christi per sapientiam gratis datam, in uerbo dei cui unita est, quod perfecte intelligit, omnia scire quae deus scit, [...] nec ita clare ac perspicue omnia capit ut Deis; et ideo non aequatur Creatori suo in scientia, etsi omnia sciat quae et ipse. Nec eius sapientia aequalis est sapientiae Dei, quia illa multo est dignior, digniusque et perfectius omnia capit quam illius animae sapientia." Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 14, cap. 1, p. 90. The anonymous author of *Sententiae divinitatis* argues that the human Christ knew all things which exist and why they exist, and all things which do not exist and why they do not exist. However, the knowledge of the human Christ was not equal to divine knowledge because the human Christ received knowledge from God but God has knowledge inherently. (*Sententiae divinitatis* tract. 4, cap. 3, p. 82–83.)

¹⁰"[...] nihil fuit vel est vel futurum est, quod non sciat anima Christi vel quilibet beatus spiritus. Non tamen scit anima Christi vel quilibet beatus spiritus, quot et quanta possit fieri a Deo, quod scit dei verbum. [...] Scit tamen minus et paucior anima Christi quam verbum, quia etsi sciat, quicquid factum est vel fit vel est futurum, tamen non scit, quot et quanta possit facere dei verbum." Gandolphus of Bologna, *Sententiarum libri quatuor* lib. 3, no. 96, p. 347–348; Murray 1963, 20, n. 72. Roland of Bologna also argues that Christ's human soul did not know as much as the Word of God. (Roland of Bologna, *Sententiae* p. 170.)

disciples did when Christ taught them.¹¹ Anselm of Canterbury¹² and Bernard of Clairvaux¹³ claimed that Christ learned through experience, but the idea of experience was not associated with the discussion about Christ's knowledge until Richard of Saint Victor. In his *De emmanuele*, Richard argued that Christ grew in wisdom because he progressed in experience. Through experience, Christ learned, for example, what was good about sensitivity and bad about passibility.¹⁴ Richard explained that since Christ did not know these things before he experienced them, he progressed in wisdom because he experienced new things in the course of his life.¹⁵

1.2. Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure

Following Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales thought that Christ had divine knowledge and human knowledge, and like Richard of Saint Victor, he argued that the human Christ also had knowledge through experience. This indicates that Christ's human knowledge was divided. According to Alexander, the human Christ had five kinds of knowledge.

¹¹ "Quapropter id quod dicit Evangelista, quod *proficiebat Jesus aetate, sapientia, et gratia*, non ita accipitur quasi in semetipso melior factus, sed quia hominibus quam ipse habebat sed latebat sapientiam et gratiam, prout ratio temporum postulabat, magis semper ac magis aperuit. Ita apud homines ipse proficiebat, quando homines ipsi in ejus cognitione profecerunt." Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sacramentis christiane fidei* c. 6, PL 176, 384A–B. "Ad quod sane dici potest ipsum, secundum hominem, tantam a conceptione accepisse sapientiae et gratiae plenitudinem, ut deus ei plenius conferre non potuerit; et tamen uere dicitur profecisse sapientia et gratia: Non quidem in se, sed in aliis, qui de eius sapientia et gratia proficiebant, dum eis sapientiae et gratiae munera secundum processum aetatis magis ac magis patefaciebat." Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 13, cap. 1, p. 85. For the division of twelfth-century writers with respect to this question, see Forster 1958, 26.

¹² Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo* lib. 1, cap. 9, p. 14.

¹³ Bernard of Clairvaux, *De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae tractatus* cap. 3, p. 23–24; PL 182, 946D–947B. For Bernard on experience, see McDonnell 1997, 3–18; Stock 1975, 219–259.

¹⁴ "Qui igitur formam servi accepit, qui in similitudinem carnis peccati venit, profecto ab ipsa hora conceptionis per experientiam didicit, et novit quid esset bonum sensibilitatis, et malum passibilitatis, utpote qui carnem sensibilem et passibilem accepit. [...] Ab ipso itaque incarnationis exordio experiendo didicit, et per experientiam scivit quid esset juxta aliquid malum corruptibilitatis, et juxta aliquid quid esset bonum incorruptibilitatis, malum corruptibilitatis secundum poenam, bonum incorruptibilitatis secundum culpam." Richard of Saint Victor, *De emmanuele* lib. 2, cap. 16, PL 196, 650D–651A. According to Murray, Richard takes this position because he emphasizes the literal meaning of the Bible. (Murray 1963, 15–16.) For Richard on experience, see Palmén 2014, 72–74.

¹⁵ "Sic et Christus postquam semetipsum exinanivit et formam servi accipiens factus est obediens Deo Patri, per experientiam didicit, quod prius per experientiam nescivit juxta hunc modum didicit ex usu comestionis quid esset inter malum famis et bonum refectionis." Richard of Saint Victor, *De emmanuele* lib. 1, cap. 15, PL 196, 625C.

Christ's human knowledge

Knowledge proper to Christ's human soul
Knowledge proper to the apprehender
Knowledge proper to sinless human nature
Knowledge proper to fallen human nature
Experience of penalties in affective power
Experience of sensible things in cognitive power

As Christ had all these cognitions, he differed from a postlapsarian human being, who only had the knowledge proper to a fallen human being. This was one reason why the psychology of the incarnation differed from psychology, as it was a branch of natural philosophy, which concerned cognition proper to the postlapsarian human being. This implies that the categories of medieval psychology in natural philosophy were unable to explain all cognitive phenomena in the human Christ.

Alexander does not tell why Christ had these cognitions, but the *Summa Halensis* tries to do so when it explains that Christ had the knowledge proper to sinless human nature, because that proved that he was a true human being, and the knowledge proper to fallen human nature, because the redemption of the human race required experiences.¹⁶ Therefore, the doctrine of salvation explained why Christ had many kinds of cognitions, including cognitions which a normal postlapsarian human being does not have.

Alexander only describes knowledge proper to fallen human nature in detail, while his descriptions of other cognitions are quite indefinite. He expounds that the human Christ had knowledge proper only for him because of the hypostatic union, and he was aware of the mysteries of the incarnation, the redemption of the human race and his passion through such knowledge. The knowledge of the apprehender was about things that pertained to glory and the soul shared it with the angels and the blissful souls.

¹⁶ "Sed quia assumpsit humanam naturam ut genus humanum per verum hominem redimeret, respectu istius finis necessaria erat duplex in Christo scientia, naturalis scilicet et scientia experientiae: scientia naturalis sive naturae integrae et perfectae, ut verus homo probaretur; scientia vero experientiae, ut genus humanum per sensum poenae et experientiam redimeretur." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, cap. 1, p. 164. Also, Forster remarks that the *Summa Halensis* explained why Christ had these cognitions. (Forster 1958, 45–48.) When the *Summa Halensis* studies the division of Christ's human knowledge, it copies verbatim Alexander's text. (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, cap. 2, p. 166.) Following Peter Lombard, William of Auxerre argues that Christ had divine knowledge and human knowledge, and the human Christ knew everything that God knows but God's knowledge was more complete than the knowledge of the human Christ. William holds also that Christ did not progress in knowledge but the knowledge of his disciples did when Christ taught them. (William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* lib. 3, tract. 5, p. 71–75.)

Furthermore, Christ had similar knowledge as the prelapsarian human being. Alexander adds that Christ also had special grace, by means of which he knew the number and the progress of things, but he claims without further clarification that such grace was not knowledge.¹⁷ It appears that Alexander's reason to propose such grace was the perfection of Christ's human knowledge since it explains why Christ was not ignorant about things he experienced. Knowledge proper to Christ's human soul and knowledge proper to the apprehender included one continuous vision (*aspectus*),¹⁸ whereas knowledge proper to sinless human nature and knowledge proper to fallen human nature included a movement (*decursus*) from habitual knowledge to actual knowledge.¹⁹

Knowledge of fallen human nature was experiential knowledge and it explained how Christ's human soul grew in wisdom. Alexander states that Christ had two kinds of experiences. He had experience when he experienced sensible things through his cognitive power and the penalties of sin such as pain and sadness through his affective power. Alexander emphasizes that, unlike a postlapsarian human being, Christ was not ignorant about sensible things and affective penalties before experiencing them because he knew them through another knowledge in advance. Christ

¹⁷ "Est unus modus sciendi in Christo secundum divinam naturam [...] Alius est in Christo secundum gratiam unionis, quam scientiam nulla alia creature habuit; isto enim modo distinguitur ab omni alio sciente. Item est tertia scientia secundum gratiam comprehensoris; et in hac communicat angeli et animae sanctae. Item est scientia secundum naturam integram animae, secundum quam habuit Adam scientiam in statu innocentiae; et hanc habuit Christus perfectius quam alii puri homines. Item est scientia secundum poenalem naturam assumptam. Praeter istas est quaedam gratia data Christo ad cognoscendum res secundum numerum et progressum temporis, quae fuit a principio data animae Christi secundum intellectum, non dico ipsa cognitio. Secunda vero non fuit ab aeterno; secundum hanc habuit omnium cognitionem, scilicet illorum quae pertinebant ad mysterium incarnationis, passionis et redemptionis etc. [...] Secundum vero tertiam cognitionem, comprehensoris, habuit cognitionem omnium pertinentium ad suam gloriam et suorum, id est eorum qui ad illam ordinantur." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'* q. 42, memb. 1, p. 717; *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib 3, d. 13 (AE), p. 131–132. See also Vaughan, 1957, 41–42; Murray 1963, 46–47. As Murray correctly explains, beside the knowledge proper to Christ's human soul, the knowledge of Christ corresponded to the three states of the human being: the state of beatitude, the state before the Fall, and the state after the Fall. (Murray 1963, 47.) The idea of knowledge proper only to Christ was abandoned in the later discussion. (Forster 1958, 46.)

¹⁸ "Multiplex est in ipso scientia: una quae est Christi comprehensoris, alia secundum gratiam unionis; utraque scientia est sub uno aspectu, quia in ipso Deo videt omnia." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'* q. 42, memb. 5, p. 726; *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib 3, d. 14 (AE), p. 145.

¹⁹ "Aliae vero scientiae fuerunt in ipso, sicut scientia quae est in integritate humanae naturae, et secundum poenalitatem humanae naturae in se; et in hac non scivit uno aspectu omnia, sed fuit ibi decursus ab uno noto in aliud notum; non ab ignoto ad ignotum, sed a noto ad notum, sed secundum alium modum. Unum tenebat in cognitione secundum habitum, unum autem descendit ad actum; [et sic] fuit ibi decursus ab uno noto in aliud [notum]." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'* q. 42, memb. 5, p. 726. See also *Summa Halensis, Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, cap. 5, p. 170; Murray 1963, 49.

knew affective penalties beforehand by means of the knowledge which was proper only to the human Christ, and he knew sensible things through special grace.²⁰ However, Alexander's idea is obscure since he does not explain how Christ's human soul knew through special grace.

Alexander explains that Christ's human soul grew in wisdom because his soul acquired experiential knowledge. When referring to Aristotle's *Metaphysica* and *Analytica posteriora*, where Aristotle claims that memory arises from sense perceptions and experience is acquired from several memories,²¹ Alexander states that experiential knowledge involves a created habit. This implies that Christ acquired new habit by encountering new things.²² Although Christ acquired a habit, Alexander emphasizes that Christ was never ignorant about anything because he knew things in a nobler way before experiencing them.²³ Alexander holds that the human Christ was omniscient in the sense that he knew all things which were, are or will be, but he did not know all things which God can create.²⁴ It is worth noting that

²⁰ "Item est natura poenalis, et in hac didicit diversas poenalitates secundum experientiam in affectiva, quas tamen cognovit secundum alium modum, scilicet secundum gratiam cognitionis quae data est per gratiam unionis; unde praescivit secundum eam quae fuit ex gratia unionis. Sexta est ad cognoscendum per experientiam, non ut prior, quae affectivae est, sed cognitivae ex sensu; unde specialis gratia quam habuit ad sciendum, fuit ei data quoad experientiam in cognitive. Unde non loquimur de experientia in affectiva, sed in cognitive." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'* q. 42, memb. 1, p. 718. The *Summa Halensis* adds that experience of sensible things through cognitive power included that a sense had a similitude of a thing, whereas experience of penalties through the affective power included that a sense had the form of the thing. (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, cap. 2, p. 166.)

²¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysica* I.1, 980b26–981b14; *Analytica posteriora* II.2, cap. 19, 100a 4–10.

²² "Dico quod habitus quidam relinquebatur in anima qui non fuit prius, sed et alius et nobilior fuit prius;" Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'* q. 42, memb. 1, p. 719; *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib 3, d. 14 (AE), p. 142. The *Summa Halensis* emphasizes that Christ did not acquire new scientific knowledge (*scientia*) through several experiences because such acquiring implied ignorance but he knew things in a new way when he experienced them for the first time. (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, cap. 2, p. 167.)

²³ "Nota tamen quod, si novit uno modo quo prius non novit, non debet dici propter hoc ignorantia, [...] non enim potest dici quod aliquid modo novit quod non prius, quia sensibilia quae addidit per experientiam, prius novit per modum nobiliorem et perfectiorem; ignorantia autem est defectus perfectionis." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'* q. 42, memb. 1, p. 718.

²⁴ "Anima Christi dicitur omnisciens ratione omnium scitorum, non ratione omnium modorum omnia sciendi. Et dico quod scit omnia per modum existentis; verbi gratia scit quod Deus fecit vel facit hanc creaturam; non dico aliud, scit facere omnia per modum existens. Unde, cum dico 'omnisciens', respicio rem in existentia respectu praesentis vel praeteriti vel future; sed omnipotentia dicitur respectu omnis operabilis, sive de aliquot, sive de nihilo. [...] Nihil igitur est scibile per modum entis praesentis, praeteriti vel future, quod non sit scitum ab anima Christi. [...] Dicitur enim omnisciens et non omnipotens, quia cum dico 'omnisciens', hoc respicit rem existentem vel in praesenti vel praeterito vel future; sed omnipotentia respicit operabile, et non existens." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'* q. 42, memb. 3, p. 723. In *Glossa*, Alexander claims that the human Christ knew everything that God knows but he did not have operative knowledge about everything. ("Et ita tot scit, quod ipse Deus vel Filius Dei." *Glossa in quatuor libros*

Vaughan disagrees with my interpretation about experience, since he claims that, according to Alexander, Christ acquired knowledge in act but not in habit;²⁵ however, Vaughan does not take into account that Alexander explicitly claims in his *Quaestiones disputatae* that the experiential knowledge involved the acquiring of a new habit.

Following Augustine,²⁶ Alexander thinks that angels have morning knowledge and evening knowledge. The morning knowledge was about things in the Word of God and the evening knowledge was about things in themselves as created. Alexander argues that since Christ also had angelic knowledge, his soul knew things in the Word of God and things in themselves, but he emphasizes that the soul did not have evening knowledge. According to Alexander, the idea of evening knowledge includes that the knowledge about things in themselves involves the possibility of obscurity, which did not occur in Christ.²⁷ He does not explain what the possibility of obscurity connected with evening knowledge is, nor how the knowledge about things in the Word of God and the knowledge about things in themselves fit with the above-mentioned division of the cognitions.

Bonaventure's view about Christ's knowledge was influential, especially among the Franciscan theologians. He proposed new ideas like the view about habitual omniscience, which theologians continued to discuss until the early fourteenth century.²⁸ In his *Commentary on the*

Sententiarum Petri Lombardi lib 3, d. 14 (AE), p. 143. "Anima Christi habuit scientiam cognitivam omnium, sed non habuit scientiam operativam omnium; unde non habuit scientiam operativam creandi omnia..." *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib 3, d. 14 (AE), p. 145.) However, the *Summa Halensis* claims that the human Christ knew everything that God knows. (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, cap. 7, p. 172.)

²⁵ Vaughan 1957, 42–43.

²⁶ In *De Genesi ad litteram*, Augustine claims that angels have the morning and the evening knowledge because they know things in the Word of God and things in themselves. (Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* lib. 4, cap. 21–23, p. 120–123, PL 34, 311–313; lib. 5, cap. 18, p. 161; PL 34, 334.) See also Augustine, *De civitate Dei* lib. 11, cap. 6, p. 326–327, PL 41, 322; cap. 29, p. 349, PL 41, 343. For Augustine on the morning and evening knowledges, see Goris 2012, 163.

²⁷ "Dissimiler est in Christo et in angelis vespertinum et matutinum. Vespertina enim cognitio proprie est in creatura quae possibilitatem habet ad obscuritatem: [...] et haec possibilitas fuit in angelis. Unde haec fuit in natura altera a Christo tantum, quia haec possibilitas in ipso non fuit, propter unionem. Unde, etsi habuerit cognitionem rerum in genere suo, non tamen vespertinam; quia habere rerum cognitionem in genere suo non convertitur cum cognitio vespertina, nisi fiat additio, scilicet possibilitas ad obscuritatem. [...] Sed talem non habuit Christus; ergo nec vespertinam;" Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'* q. 42, memb. 2, p. 720–721. See also *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, cap. 2, p. 167–168.

²⁸ Bonaventure studies Christ's knowledge in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, *Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi* and *Breviloquium*. My study is based on the *Commentary on the Sentences*. Forster (1958, 63–74), Murray (1963, 59–65) and Hayes (2000, 112–116) study Bonaventure's views in his other works as well. For Bonaventure and Aquinas on angelic knowledge, see Goris 2012, 149–185.

Sentences, Bonaventure claims that the human knowledge of Christ was divided as follows.

Christ's human knowledge

Knowledge of the Word of God (knowledge of glory)
Knowledge of things in the Word of God (knowledge of glory)
Knowledge of things in themselves (knowledge of prelapsarian human nature)
Knowledge through experience (knowledge of postlapsarian human nature)

Unlike other human beings, the human Christ had all these cognitions because the perfection of his soul required them; lacking one of them would have indicated an imperfection in Christ's soul. Unlike Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure explains that the cognitions were related to different parts of the soul: knowledge of the Word of God and things in it were located in the superior part of the reason, knowledge of things in themselves was in the inferior part of the reason and knowledge through experience was in the sensible part of the soul.²⁹ Here Bonaventure uses Augustinian psychology to explain why Christ had these cognitions. According to Augustine, the reason was divided into the superior and inferior parts, which were two functions of the same power but not two powers. The superior part of the reason was about eternity, whereas the inferior part was about temporal things.³⁰ Contrary to Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure argues that the human Christ did not have knowledge proper only to his soul, because the hypostatic union did not include that the Word of God was united with a soul like the knowable is united with that which knows it. Bonaventure expounds that Christ's human soul had knowledge proper to him only in the sense that Christ's knowledge of the Word of God was more excellent than such knowledge possessed by all other souls.³¹

²⁹ "Ratio autem huius est perfectio ipsius animae Christi, quae non tantum debuit esse perfecta secundum superiorem portionem, verum etiam secundum inferiorem et secundum partem sensibilem, non tantum quantum ad statum patriae, verum etiam quantum ad statum viae, qui duplex est, videlicet innocentiae et naturae lapsae. Et secundum hoc Christus habuit triplicem cognitionem isti triplici statui convenientem, videlicet cognitionem gloriae, cognitionem naturae integrae et cognitionem poenalis experientiae, ut de quolibet statu aliquid in se haberet. [...] Patet etiam harum trium cognitionum sufficientia, necessitas et distinctio, quae potest sumi vel ex parte virium, scilicet superioris rationis, inferioris et sensualitatis;" Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 3, q. 1. (III, 319–320). Bonaventure claims that these cognitions also corresponded to the three states of the human being (the state of beatitude, the state before the Fall, and the state after the Fall) and three modes where things can exist (in the Word of God, in the intellect, and in their own nature). (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 3, q. 1. (III, 319–320).) See also Vaughan 1957, 46; Murray 1963, 60–61.

³⁰ Augustine, *De Trinitate* lib. 13, cap. 1, p. 381–385, PLL 42, 1013–1016. See also Bonaventure, 2 Sent. d. 24, pars 1, a. 2, q. 2. (II, 564).

³¹ "Et ideo alii voluerunt dicere, quod quamvis alii homines cognoscant Verbum increatum mediante habitu cognitionis creatae, et Christus etiam quantum ad scientiam comprehensionis, in qua communicat cum aliis hominibus; tamen quantum ad scientiam unionis, cum habeat

One of the questions discussed until the early fourteenth century was whether the knowledge of the Word of God in Christ requires the superadded light of glory, which somehow aided Christ's human intellect to see the Word of God. Here the discussion about the knowledge of Christ engaged the discussion about the divine illumination of the human intellect, which was a major theme in medieval psychology.³² Bonaventure argues that like all other human souls, also Christ's human soul requires the light of glory, because only a godlike soul is able to see God. He clarifies that the light of glory or the created wisdom is a habit that makes a soul godlike. The intellect does not have the light in itself, but God gives it. Christ's human soul also had the light of glory, which was a created habit that disposed the cognitive powers of the soul to be able to see the Word of God. Bonaventure argues that since Christ's human soul was more godlike than any other created soul, the soul knew the Word of God more completely than other souls.³³ He explains that when Christ's human soul saw the Word of God, it was passive rather than active; he bases this on the Aristotelian claim that thinking is receiving rather than acting.³⁴ However, the human Christ did not comprehend the Word of God because he did not know the Word of God completely (*totaliter*), since the Word of God was infinite. Nevertheless, he knew the whole (*totus*) Word of God, not only parts of it, since the Word of God was simple. Bonaventure expounds that it is difficult to understand how

ipsum Verbum sibi intime unitum, cognoscit absque omni alio habitu medio. Cum enim habeat sapientiam increatam sibi unitam, non per medium, sed per se ipsam, cognoscere potest se ipsa; et hoc est solius illius animae proprium, quae a Verbo est assumpta. [...] tamen hoc a veritate deviat, si quis intueatur. Verbum enim non unitur animae Christi in illa beata unione, sicut cognoscibile cognoscenti [...] sed est unio in unitate personae, quae potest esse absque cognitione; [...] Unde non est intelligendum, quod scientia unionis distinguatur a scientia comprehensionis, quasi non sit per aliquem habitum medium, sed quia excellentior et amplior deiformitas et claritas collata est animae Christi ex hoc, quod Verbo unita est, quam ex hoc, quod simpliciter est beata." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 1, q. 1. (III, 297). See also Forster 1958, 65.

³² For divine illumination in the medieval discussions, see Marrone 2001; Pasnau 2015; Toivo Holopainen 2014, 263.

³³ "Alium igitur modum unionis necesse est esse ad hoc, quod anima cognoscat Verbum sibi unitum in unitatem personae; hic autem est per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum, et ita per aliquam influentiam, quae ipsam animam cognoscentem faciat Deo similem ac deiformem, et ita per aliquem habitum ipsam animam informantem, qui quidem habitus non potest esse nisi aliquid creatum. [...] Et propterea dicere oportet tertio modo, quod anima Christi, sicut et animae aliorum Sanctorum, Verbum increatum cognoscit per sapientiam creatam, quae disponit ipsarum animarum potentias cognitivas et conformes reddit, ut illud lumen aeternum cognoscant. [...] Anima autem Christi, quia a Verbo est assumpta, maiorem habet deiformitatem, ac per hoc perfectiorem et eminentiorem cognitionem, quam aliqua anima beata per gloriam." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 1, q. 1. (III, 297). See also Bonaventure, *De scientia Christi* q. 5, p. 29–30; Hayes 2000, 108.

³⁴ "[...] dicendum, quod anima in cognoscendo Deum plus est in suscipiendo quam in agendo, immo omnis potentia animae respectu Dei se habet in ratione passivi. - nedum potentia cognitiva active, quae de sua ratione dicit quodam modo passionem, sicut dicit Philosophus et Priscianus." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 1, q. 3 (III, 305).

the soul knew the whole Word of God, but did not know it totally. He clarifies, for example, that in a corresponding way, a weak eye can see the entirety of a little white thing but it cannot comprehend the excellence of its whiteness.³⁵

Following Augustine's view of angelic knowledge, Bonaventure explains that Christ not only knew the Word of God, but also all created things in the Word, which was the basis for knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*) all other things. Since Christ knew the Word of God through the light of glory, which was a habit, the soul also knew things in the Word of God through the same habit.³⁶ The most important of Bonaventure's contributions to the discussion about Christ's knowledge is his idea that the human Christ knew habitually everything that God knows. Bonaventure thinks that the question about the omniscience of Christ's human soul pertains to the knowledge of things in the Word of God. Contrary to Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure argues that, unlike any other created soul, Christ's human soul knew in the Word of God habitually everything that God knows because his soul had an inborn readiness to know all things in the Word of God. However, the soul did not know actually all things. Bonaventure describes that the soul was able to know habitually all things in the Word of God because the soul knew perfectly the Word and the Word was willing to reveal everything to the human Christ.³⁷ He holds that the

³⁵ "Et propterea est tertius modus communior, probabilior et certior, quod nec anima Christi nec aliqua creatura comprehendere potest immensitatem Verbi increati sive ipsius Dei, et tamen ipsum totum cognoscit. - Et possunt ista duo simul stare, immo necesse est ponere, quamvis difficile sit intellectui nostro capere. Si enim vere ponimus Deum simplicem, immo quia necessarium est sic credere et ponere; si cognoscitur, iam non secundum partem et partem, sed totus cognoscitur. Rursus, si Deum ponimus immensum, quia hoc credimus et fatemur; necesse est ponere, quod nunquam ab intellectu finito comprehendatur totaliter; et sic Deus a quacumque creatura ipsum cognoscente totus cognoscitur, sed tamen non totaliter. Si autem quaeratur, quomodo illud posset intelligi: dicendum, quod difficillimum est intelligere, quia plus reperitur in creaturis de dissimilitudine quam de similitudine. - Intelligamus tamen gratia exempli aliquem oculum, cuius aspectus non sit omnino clarus; et intelligamus aliquod parvum album, tamen intensum in luminositate et claritate coloris: oculus ille videbit illud album totum, tamen eminentiam illius albedinis non comprehendit; sic suo modo in proposito intelligendum est." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 300). See also Bonaventure, *De scientia Christi* q. 6, p. 34–36. See also Adams 1999, 33–34; Hayes 2000, 108–109.

³⁶ "Quoniam ergo Verbum aeternum est sufficientissima ratio cognoscendi omnia alia a se [...] ad hoc, quod aliquis cognoscat res in Verbo, non oportet in ipso esse geminam cognitionem ipsius Verbi et ipsius rei cognitae; geminam, dico, quantum ad habitum cognoscendi, propter hoc, quod habens deiformitatem gloriae, per quam cognoscit ipsum Verbum, habet unde assimiletur ipsi Verbo, quod est perfecta ratio cognoscendi omnia alia, et ita, cognoscendo Verbum, habet habitum, quo possit cognoscere alia, ita quod habitus ille, prout dicitur esse Verbi et aliorum a Verbo, non differt nisi sola comparatione." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 2, q. 1 (III, 308). See also Adams 1999, 32–33; Hayes 2000, 109–110.

³⁷ "Et propterea est tertius modus distinguendi, quod contingit aliquid cognosci cognitione habituali et cognitione actuali, [...] Si igitur loquamur de cognitione quantum ad actum considerationis, sic dicendum est, quod anima Christi nunquam tot cognoscit, quod cognoscit ipsum Verbum. Per nullam enim gloriam potest adeo sublevari creatura, ut simul et in actu

human Christ knew in the Word of God continuously and actually only things which pertain to glory, whereas other things he knew habitually.³⁸ Even though Christ's human soul was not able to know actually all things at once, it was able to know actually whatever thing in the Word of God whenever the soul wanted to know actually it because it was able to voluntarily actualize the habitual cognition about things in the Word of God.³⁹ However, Bonaventure does not explain how the will could wish to know something which the intellect had not actually considered before.

According to Bonaventure, the human Christ not only knew things in the Word of God, but also in themselves through the infused intelligible species which God located in Christ's human soul at the moment of his conception. Christ shared this knowledge with angels and prelapsarian human beings.⁴⁰ The idea of intelligible species was a much-discussed theme in psychology as well as a branch of natural philosophy, where they were studied as being acquired through the activity of the agent intellect and the senses. Although the idea of infused intelligible species was based on this discussion, these differed from acquired intelligible species because God infused them in the intellect. Hence, the discussion about the psychology of the incarnation shows that a human intellect can have intelligible species

iudicet de infinitis, cum hoc sit infinitae virtutis. Si vero loquamur de cognitione habituali, sic concedi potest, quod scit omnia quae cognoscit ipsum Verbum sibi unitum. - Et hoc patet sic: quia, cum anima Christi cognoscat ipsum Verbum habitu glorioso ita perfecte, quod non potest ipsum perfectius cognoscere; et ipsum Verbum aeternum promptam habeat voluntatem ad aperiendum illi animae omnia quae in ipso relucent, nec aliquid in ipso relucent, quod non sit natum cognosci ab anima Christi: anima Christi habet aliquid, quo facilis est ad cognoscendum omnia quae Verbum cognoscit." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 2, q. 3. (III, 316). Unlike in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, in *De scientia Christi* Bonaventure claims that the soul knew through comprehensive knowledge all past, present and future things and in ecstasy all things which God did not create. In comprehensive knowledge, there was an actual knowledge but in ecstasy there was readiness to know. (Bonaventure, *De scientia Christi* q. 7, p. 39–40.) The idea of ecstasy was based on Pseudo-Dionysios's *De mystica theologia* PG 3, 998–999. See also Forster 1958, 72–73; Hayes 2005, 64–67; 2000, 110–111; 112–116. When Bonaventure claims that the human Christ knew all actual things and non-actual things through two different cognitions, he joins his view about Christ's omniscience with that of Alexander of Hales's view of Christ's restricted omniscience.

³⁸ "[...] in anima Christi hoc verum est, quod plura cognoscit in habitu, quam consideret in actu; et ideo concedendum est, quod non omnia considerat in actu, quae habet in habitu, quantum ad ea quae non sunt de substantia gloriae." (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 311). See also Hayes 2000, 110.

³⁹ "Item, actualis consideratio rerum cognitarum in Verbo in Christo subiacet voluntati: ergo potest modo considerare aliquid creatum, quod non sit de essentia gloriae, modo etiam non considerare: ergo si habet illius rei habitum, non necesse est, quod habitus semper sit coniunctus actui respectu cuiuscumque cognoscibilis." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 310).

⁴⁰ "[...] praeter cognitionem, quam habuit anima Christi in ipso Verbo, quae est cognitio gloriosa, habuit cognitionem a Verbo, quae est cognitio gratiae gratis datae, quam etiam cognitione cognoscit Christus res in se ipsis per species ei inditas ab ipso conditionis primordio, sicut fuit in intellectu Adae, vel etiam in intellectu angelico." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 3, q. 1. (III, 319).

which are not acquired through the activity of the agent intellect and the senses.

According to Bonaventure, because Christ's human soul had all infused intelligible species which a human being can have from the moment of conception, it did not progress in this knowledge. However, the experiential knowledge progressed when the external senses apprehended things which they had not perceived before.⁴¹ Following Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure emphasizes that Christ's human soul knew things before the soul perceived them. When an exterior sense of Christ perceived a thing for the first time, the soul already knew a thing through the infused intelligible species, but it knew the object in a new way when it came to know it through experience.⁴²

Although Christ had all intelligible species, his agent intellect also abstracted them. Bonaventure explains that, unlike the agent intellect of the normal human being, Christ's agent intellect did not abstract the intelligible species in order to acquire new knowledge, since the intellect already had the infused intelligible species of all things, but in order for the intellect to form judgement about sensible things. He claims that when the agent intellect abstracts the intelligible species for this end, the intellect does not acquire new knowledge but it begins to think about sensed things. It abstracts the intelligible species so that the intellect can consider a thing, which the senses perceive.⁴³ Bonaventure argues that because the intellect cannot have two intelligible species of the same thing at once, Christ intellect was not able to acquire new intelligible species since God infused all intelligible species into Christ's human soul.⁴⁴

⁴¹ "Quoniam ergo habitus et species impressae fuerunt ipsi animae Christi in omnimoda plenitudine; hinc est, quod Christus proficere non potuit cognitione simplicis notitiae. Quia vero sensus exterior ad aliquid convertebatur de novo, ad quod prius conversus non fuerat; hinc est, quod cognitione experientiae proficiebat. [...] Et sic anima Christi quamvis non proficeret secundum cognitionem simplicis notitiae, proficiebat tamen secundum cognitionem experimentalem." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 3, q. 2. (III, 322). See also Vaughan 1957, 48–49.

⁴² "[...] Christus non proficiebat veniendo in notitiam rei prius incognitae, sed quod prius cognoscebat uno modo, scilicet per simplicem notitiam, cognoscebat alio modo, scilicet per experientiam." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 3, q. 2. (III, 322).

⁴³ "Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus agens in Christo potuit abstrahere; dicendum, quod abstractio speciei a conditionibus materialibus quaedam ordinatur ad generandum habitum, quaedam vero consistit in iudicio eius quod apprehensum est per sensum, iudicio, inquam, facto ab intellectu. Et prima non fuit in Christo, cum intellectus eius haberet habitus et species rerum, illa autem abstractio ordinaretur ad acquisitionem habitus et scientiae nondum adeptae, et ita haberet annexum defectum ignorantiae. Secunda vero in Christo fuit, sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod aliquid didicerit de novo, vel in scientia profecerit, sed solum quod aliquid consideravit intellectu excitato a potentia inferiori." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 3, q. 2. (III, 322). See also Vaughan 1957, 48–49; Murray 1963, 62; Hayes 2000, 111–112.

⁴⁴ "Item, anima Christi habuit species rerum cognoscibilium; sed qua ratione habuit species unius cognoscibilis, eadem ratione et omnium; sed impossibile est, duas formas eiusdem speciei esse et in eodem et secundum idem: ergo impossibile fuit, quod anima Christi novas

1.3. Thomas Aquinas, Richard Middleton, Durand of St. Pourçain and Peter of Palude

Thomas Aquinas's view of Christ's knowledge differs from that of Bonaventure because Aquinas thinks that Christ's human soul did not know everything that God knows. Furthermore, Aquinas bases his doctrine on Aristotelian psychology more than Bonaventure. According to Aquinas, the human Christ knew the Word of God, things in the Word of God and things in themselves. His soul also had experiential certitude or experiential knowledge.

Christ's human knowledge

Knowledge of the Word of God
Knowledge of things in the Word of God
Knowledge of things in themselves
Experiential certitude (<i>Commentary on the Sentences</i>)
Experiential knowledge (<i>Summa theologiae</i>)

Aquinas claims, like Bonaventure, that knowledge of the Word of God required the light of glory because seeing the Word of God was beyond the natural capacity of the soul. The light of glory explained how the intellect of the human being could know the divine essence which it could not know by its natural capacity, as the intellect of the human being could know naturally only sensible things. Aquinas explains that the light of glory perfected Christ's intellect so that it was able to see the Word immediately.⁴⁵ In Aristotelian psychology, when the passive intellect is aware of the sensible realm, it is activated by the agent intellect and the intelligible species. Aquinas argues, however, that knowledge of the Word of God did not require an intelligible species or activity of the agent intellect. Therefore, Christ's soul saw the Word immediately. Aquinas explains that the intelligible species were not needed because an intelligible species cannot represent completely the divine essence and the light of the agent intellect was not required because the Word of God was actually knowable. He explains that

formas sive novas species reciperet: ergo non potuit in cognitione proficere." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 3, q. 2. (III, 322). See also Murray 1963, 63.

⁴⁵ "Sed quia illa visio excedit omnem facultatem naturae creatae, ideo ad illam visionem non sufficit lumen naturae, sed oportet ut superaddatur lumen gloriae." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 co. "Sic igitur dicendum est, quod anima Christi in cognitione qua verbum videbat, indiguit habitu, quod est lumen, non ut per quod fieret aliquid intelligibile actu, sicut est in nobis lumen intellectus agentis; sed ut per quod intellectus elevaretur creatus in id quod est supra se." Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 20, a. 2 co. "[...] anima Christi videt verbum sine medio quod sit similitudo rei visae, sicut species in oculo est similitudo visibilis, vel sicut speculum est similitudo rei speculatae; non autem videt sine medio quod sit dispositio videntis." Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 20, a. 2 ad 1. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a q. 12 a. 5 co; ad 2.

as the light of the agent intellect makes sensible things which are potentially knowable actually knowable, it is not needed when an object is actually knowable.⁴⁶ Aquinas thinks that although Christ's human soul saw the divine essence, his soul did not comprehend it: the created intellect was not able to attain the whole intelligibility of God as the light of glory which perfected the intellect was created and finite, and God is infinite.⁴⁷ However, Christ's human soul saw the divine essence more perfectly than any other creature because the soul had the light of glory more completely.⁴⁸

Aquinas's answer to the question of Christ's ability to know everything that God knows was different from Bonaventure's account. The difference was significant because later the Dominican theologians mostly favoured the view of Aquinas, while the Franciscan theologians followed that of Bonaventure. Hence, the view about the omniscience of Christ was one distinguishing factor between the Franciscan and the Thomistic intellectual traditions. According to Aquinas, Christ's human soul did not know in the Word of God everything that God knows. It knew everything

⁴⁶ "In cognitione autem qua anima Christi, vel quaelibet anima, videt verbum per essentiam, non potest esse habitus quantum ad speciem, quae sit similitudo cogniti. Cum enim omne quod recipitur in aliquo, sit in eo per modum recipientis, essentiae divinae similitudo non potest in aliqua creatura recipi, quae perfecte repraesentet ipsam, propter infinitam distantiam creaturae ad Deum. [...] Et ideo quicumque intellectus cognosceret Verbum per similitudinem aliquam, non diceretur videre essentiam Verbi. Et ita patet quod anima Christi et quaelibet alia anima quae videt verbum per essentiam, non videt ipsum mediante aliqua similitudine. Similiter non potest ex parte luminis in illa visione esse habitus quantum ad effectum lucis intellectualis, qui est intelligibilia facere in actu; quia res immateriales secundum se sunt intelligibiles in actu," Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 co. "[...] anima Christi videt verbum sine medio quod sit similitudo rei visae, sicut species in oculo est similitudo visibilis, vel sicut speculum est similitudo rei speculatae;" *De veritate* q. 20, a. 2 ad 1.

⁴⁷ "Est autem impossibile quod aliqua creatura comprehendat divinam essentiam, sicut in prima parte dictum est, eo quod infinitum non comprehenditur a finito. Et ideo dicendum quod anima Christi nullo modo comprehendit divinam essentiam." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 10, a. 1 co. "Nullus autem intellectus creatus pertingere potest ad illum perfectum modum cognitionis divinae essentiae, quo cognoscibilis est. Quod sic patet. Unumquodque enim sic cognoscibile est, secundum quod est ens actu. Deus igitur, cuius esse est infinitum, ut supra ostensum est, infinite cognoscibilis est. Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest Deum infinite cognoscere. Intantum enim intellectus creatus divinam essentiam perfectius vel minus perfecte cognoscit, in quantum maiori vel minori lumine gloriae perfunditur. Cum igitur lumen gloriae creatum, in quocumque intellectu creato receptum, non possit esse infinitum, impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus Deum infinite cognoscat. Unde impossibile est quod Deum comprehendat." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a q. 12, a. 7 co. See also *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 co; *De veritate* q. 20, a. 4 co. The idea of God's incomprehensibility was part of Aquinas's view of negative theology. Aquinas argued that God was incomprehensible not only in this life but also in Heaven since God always exceeded every kind of knowledge. For Aquinas on God's incomprehensibility, see Rocca 2004, 27–48. For Aquinas on Dionysian mysticism, see Blankenhorn 2015, 215–441.

⁴⁸ "Huic autem verbo Dei propinquius coniungitur anima Christi, quae est unita verbo in persona, quam quaevis alia creatura. Et ideo plenius recipit influentiam luminis in quo Deus videtur ab ipso verbo, quam quaecumque alia creatura. Et ideo prae ceteris creaturis perfectius videt ipsam primam veritatem, quae est Dei essentia." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 10, a. 4 co.

which was, is or will be, but it did not know things which were possible but never actual, that is to say, divine unrealized possibilities.⁴⁹ Things that were possible but never actual were things which God could create, but he did not, which existed only in God's power. Aquinas argues that Christ's human soul did not know the divine unrealized possibilities because it did not comprehend the divine power and did not know things which were in God's power as it did not comprehend the divine essence. However, Christ's human soul knew all things that creatures can do but never do because it comprehended the essences of all creatures in the Word of God.⁵⁰ Hence, the human Christ did not know possible things that God could create, but he knew all possible things that creatures could do.

The distinction between knowledge of things that are actual sometimes and knowledge of things that never are actual corresponds to the distinction between God's knowledge of vision (*scientia visionis*) and knowledge of simple understanding (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*). Aquinas claims that God knows things that are actual sometimes by the knowledge of vision and He knows things that are never actual by the knowledge of simple understanding. The human Christ knew everything that God knows by the knowledge of vision, but he did not know everything that God knows by the knowledge of simple understanding.⁵¹

Distinct from Bonaventure, Aquinas thinks that everything that Christ's human soul knew in the Word of God, it knew actually and continuously. Because the soul knew many things in the Word of God, this

⁴⁹ For Aquinas on unrealized divine possibilities, see Knuuttila 1993, 132.

⁵⁰ "Respondeo dicendum quod, cum quaeritur an Christus cognoscat omnia in verbo, dicendum est quod ly omnia potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, proprie, ut distribuat pro omnibus quae quocumque modo sunt vel erunt vel fuerunt, vel facta vel dicta vel cogitata a quocumque, secundum quodcumque tempus. Et sic dicendum est quod anima Christi in verbo cognoscit omnia. [...] Alio modo ly omnia potest accipi magis large, ut extendatur non solum ad omnia quae sunt actu secundum quodcumque tempus, sed etiam ad omnia quaecumque sunt in potentia nunquam reducta ad actum. Horum autem quaedam sunt solum in potentia divina. Et huiusmodi non omnia cognoscit in verbo anima Christi. Hoc enim esset comprehendere omnia quae Deus potest facere, quod esset comprehendere divinam virtutem, et per consequens divinam essentiam; virtus enim quaelibet cognoscitur per cognitionem eorum in quae potest. Quaedam vero sunt non solum in potentia divina, sed etiam in potentia creaturae. Et huiusmodi omnia cognoscit anima Christi in verbo. Comprehendit enim in verbo omnis creaturae essentiam, et per consequens potentiam et virtutem, et omnia quae sunt in potentia creaturae." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 10, a. 2 co; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2 co; *De veritate* q. 20, a. 4 co; q. 20, a. 5 co.

⁵¹ "[...] Deus perfectius cognoscit suam essentiam quam anima Christi, quia eam comprehendit. Et ideo cognoscit omnia non solum quae sunt in actu secundum quodcumque tempus, quae dicitur cognoscere scientia visionis; sed etiam omnia quaecumque ipse potest facere, quae dicitur cognoscere per simplicem intelligentiam, ut in primo habitum est. Scit ergo anima Christi omnia quae Deus in seipso cognoscit per scientiam visionis, non tamen omnia quae Deus in seipso cognoscit per scientiam simplicis intelligentiae. Et ita plura scit Deus in seipso quam anima Christi." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 10, a. 2, ad 2. See also Thomas Aquinas *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2 co; *De veritate* q. 20, a. 4 ad 1.

indicates that it knew many things actually at the same time. However, this involves a philosophical problem, as Aristotle claims in his *Topics* that one can understand only one thing at once.⁵² How is Aquinas's view compatible with Aristotle's idea? Aquinas argues that according to Aristotle, the intellect can understand only one thing at once when the intellect knows through the intelligible species because only one intelligible species can inform the intellect at once. However, the intellect can understand many things at once when many things are known through one intelligible species or in one thing. For example, when the intellect understands the quiddity of the human being through one intelligible species, it can understand the ideas of the animal and rationality at the same time. Similarly, according to Aquinas, Christ's human soul was able to know many things at the same time by one act of the intellect because the soul knew many things in the one Word of God.⁵³

The human Christ also knew things in themselves because the soul had infused intelligible species. Unlike Bonaventure, Aquinas explains that knowledge of things in the Word of God differed from knowledge of things in themselves because the medium of knowing (*medius cognoscendi*) was different. In the first case, the medium was the Word of God, whereas in the second case the medium was the infused intelligible species.⁵⁴ Aquinas argues that although the soul knew things in the Word of God, it also knew them through infused intelligible species because the perfection of Christ's passive intellect required them. This indicates that Aquinas's view of Christ's knowledge of things in themselves is based on the Aristotelian idea of the passive intellect. He expounds that the passive intellect is a potential for all intelligible beings, but it is imperfect when it stays in potentiality. Because Christ's human nature was perfect, Christ's passive intellect was actual through the intelligible species, which the Word of God located in Christ's intellect. God gave to Christ's intellect all the intelligible species

⁵² Aristotle, *Topica* II.10, 114b33–35.

⁵³ “[...] ratio quam assignant Philosophi, quare intellectus noster non potest simul plura intelligere, est haec, quia oportet quod intellectus figuretur specie rei intelligibilis. Impossibile est autem quod simul figuretur pluribus speciebus, sicut impossibile est quod corpus simul figuretur pluribus figuris. Et ideo si aliqua cognoscuntur per unam speciem, illa nihil prohibet simul cognosci; sicut homo intelligens quidditatem hominis, simul intelligit animal et rationale. Et propter hoc etiam intelligens propositionem, simul intelligit praedicatum et subjectum, quia intelligit ea ut unum. Et ideo anima Christi cum intelligit omnia quae sunt in uno, scilicet Verbo, etiam simul et uno intuitu omnia cognoscit actu.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4 co.

⁵⁴ “Dicendum ad primam quaestionem quod cognitio rerum in proprio genere et cognitio rerum in Verbo differunt, non quantum ad res cognitatas, sed quantum ad medium cognoscendi quod est id in quo res cognoscitur; quia cognitio quae est rerum in Verbo, habet medium cognoscendi ipsum verbum; cognitio autem rerum in proprio genere, habet medium cognoscendi rerum similitudines quae sunt in intellectu.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 1 co.

which a soul was able to have.⁵⁵ The passive intellect knew by the infused knowledge everything that can be known through the light of the agent intellect in human sciences and other things only revealed through divine revelation.⁵⁶ In the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas claims that Christ knew also all past, present and future particulars,⁵⁷ but in his *Commentary on the Sentences* he states without clarification that Christ did not know all the deeds (*gestum*) of individual human beings⁵⁸ and in *De veritate* he explains that Christ did not know all future contingents and all thoughts of hearts.⁵⁹

According to Aquinas, the infused knowledge was habitual knowledge.⁶⁰ His description about the habit of the infused knowledge differs in his *Commentary on the Sentences* and the *Summa theologiae*. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas argues that Christ's human soul had only one habit although he had many intelligible species because Christ's knowledge about things in themselves was the clearest possible knowledge of things in themselves what a creature can have.⁶¹ In the *Summa theologiae*, he claims that although Christ's infused knowledge was the most perfect

⁵⁵ "[...] decebat quod natura humana assumpta a verbo Dei, imperfecta non esset. Omne autem quod est in potentia, est imperfectum nisi reducat ad actum. Intellectus autem possibilis humanus est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia. Reducitur autem ad actum per species intelligibiles, quae sunt formae quaedam completivae ipsius, [...] Et ideo oportet in Christo scientiam ponere inditam, in quantum per verbum Dei animae Christi, sibi personaliter unitae, impressae sunt species intelligibiles ad omnia ad quae est intellectus possibilis in potentia," Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 9, a. 3 co; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 5 co; *De veritate* q. 20, a. 3 co; a. 6. co.

⁵⁶ "Et ideo secundum eam anima Christi primo quidem cognovit quaecumque ab homine cognosci possunt per virtutem luminis intellectus agentis, sicut sunt quaecumque pertinent ad scientias humanas. Secundo vero per hanc scientiam cognovit Christus omnia illa quae per revelationem divinam hominibus innotescunt, sive pertineant ad donum sapientiae, sive ad donum prophetiae, sive ad quodcumque donum spiritus sancti." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 11, a. 1 co. See also *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 1 co; *De veritate* q. 20, a. 6 co.

⁵⁷ "Quia igitur Christus habuit plenitudinem prudentiae, secundum donum consilii, consequens est quod cognovit omnia singularia praeterita, praesentia et futura." *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 11 a. 1 ad 3.

⁵⁸ "[...] hoc genere cognitionis non cognovit ipsam essentiam increatam, nec alia omnia quae ad perfectionem intellectivae partis non pertinent, neque secundum naturam neque secundum gratiam, sicut sunt gesta particularium hominum et huiusmodi: quae tamen omnia cognovit in Verbo." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3 d. 14 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 1 co.

⁵⁹ "Sed quaedam sunt ad quae naturalis cognitio nullo modo se extendere potest; sicut est ipsa divina essentia, futura contingentia, cogitationes cordium, et alia huiusmodi." *De veritate* q. 20, a. 6 co.

⁶⁰ "Et sic patet quod modus connaturalis animae humanae est ut recipiat scientiam per modum habitus. Et ideo dicendum est quod scientia indita animae Christi fuit habitualis, poterat enim ea uti quando volebat." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 11, a. 5 co. See also *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 4 co; *De veritate* q. 20, a. 2 co.

⁶¹ "Unde cum anima Christi habuerit limpidissimam cognitionem inter omnes creaturas, scientia ejus fuit magis unita et per formas magis universales quam aliqua scientia creaturae. [...] Quia ergo anima Christi habuit scientiam magis universalem quam aliquis angelus, ideo non habuit diversos habitus quibus cognosceret, sed uno habitu omnia cognovit quae ad hanc scientiam pertinent, quamvis diversis speciebus." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 4 co.

knowledge, it involved many habits because it is natural for a human being to have many habits when he has many intelligible species.⁶² It seems that Aquinas made this change in *Summa theologiae* because he emphasized that the infused knowledge of Christ was related to the mode of the knowledge of the normal human being, albeit a normal human being does not have such infused knowledge.⁶³

Because the infused knowledge was habitual knowledge, unlike knowledge of things in the Word of God, the knowledge was not always actual. That is to say, the soul did not actually know everything that the soul was able to know by means of infused knowledge.⁶⁴ In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas seems to think that Christ's intellect actualized his habitual knowledge when reason considered conclusions from principles like effects from causes,⁶⁵ and the actual knowledge required that the possible intellect used phantasms as its object.⁶⁶ In the *Summa theologiae*, he adds that command of the will actualized the habitual knowledge⁶⁷ and this knowledge did not necessarily require phantasms. When Aquinas claims that the infused knowledge did not require conversion to phantasms, he departs from the standard Aristotelian view in psychology, as it was within a branch of natural philosophy that intellectual cognition needed sensory cognition. Aquinas thinks that the infused knowledge of Christ's human soul differed from the knowledge of the normal human being in this respect because Christ's human soul was blessed.⁶⁸ However,

⁶² “[...] scientia indita animae Christi habuit modum connaturalem animae humanae. Est autem connaturale animae humanae ut recipiat species in minori universalitate quam Angeli, ita scilicet quod diversas naturas específicas per diversas intelligibiles species cognoscat. Ex hoc autem contingit quod in nobis sunt diversi habitus scientiarum [...] Et ideo scientia indita animae Christi fuit distincta secundum diversos habitus.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 11, a. 6 co. “[...] scientia animae Christi est perfectissima, et excedens scientiam Angelorum, quantum ad id quod consideratur in ea ex parte Dei influentis, est tamen infra scientiam angelicam quantum ad modum recipientis. Et ad huiusmodi modum pertinet quod scientia illa per multos habitus distinguatur, quasi per species magis particulares existens.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 11 a. 6 ad 1.

⁶³ See also Murray 1963, 90–91.

⁶⁴ “Unde non oportuit quod semper esset in actu.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 11, a. 5 ad 1.

⁶⁵ “[...] secundum quam homo ea quae habitu tenet, in actum ducens, ex principiis considerat conclusiones sicut ex causis effectus; et sic collativa scientia fuit in Christo.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 3 co.

⁶⁶ “Et quia Christus cognovit intellectu possibili, cuius est objectum phantasma, ideo cognovit ea cum continuo et tempore, utens phantasmatis quasi objectis intellectus, non quidem sicut ab eis speciem accipiens, sed sicut species circa ea ponens; sicut in eo contingit qui habet habitum et actu aliqua considerat.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3 qc. 2 co.

⁶⁷ “Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus reducitur in actum ad imperium voluntatis, nam habitus est *quo quis agit cum voluerit*.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 11, a. 5 ad 2.

⁶⁸ “Ex hoc autem anima hominis viatoris indiget ad phantasmata converti, quod est corpori obligata, et quodammodo ei subiecta et ab eo dependens. Et ideo animae beatae, et ante

Aquinas's argument is obscure since he does not explain how the infused knowledge was related to the blessedness of Christ's soul.

In his *Commentary on the Sentences* and *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas not only proposes different views with regard to the infused knowledge, but he also changes his mind concerning the progression of Christ's human soul in the knowledge. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas argues that Christ had experiential certitude (*certitudo experimentalis*), but he does not explain in detail what it was. He only mentions that a soul has experiential certitude about a thing when a soul perceives it. Aquinas argues that Christ progressed in experiential certitude because the knowledge of things in themselves became more certain when the soul perceived things which it already knew through the infused intelligible species. He holds that when Christ perceived things for the first time, he did not acquire more knowledge in the sense that the soul became aware of things which the soul did not know before. The soul knew all things it encountered since it had all intelligible species from the moment of conception; only the certitude of things already known increased.⁶⁹ Aquinas explains that the acquiring of experiential certitude included the act of the agent intellect. When Christ acquired experiential certitude, the light of his agent intellect did not abstract new intelligible species, but agent intellect turned towards species which were in the phantasy.⁷⁰

In his *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas proposes a new view of the progression of Christ in knowledge. The soul progressed in knowledge because it acquired new experiential knowledge. Aquinas argues that as the perfection of Christ's passive intellect required knowledge through infused intelligible species, Christ's agent intellect required acquired or experiential

resurrectionem et post, intelligere possunt absque conversione ad phantasmata. Et hoc quidem oportet dicere de anima Christi, quae plene habuit facultatem comprehensoris." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 11 a. 2 co.

⁶⁹ "[...] scientia Christi nunquam crevit quantum ad genus cognitionis, quia illud genus cognitionis sequitur naturam humanam, quae in ipso semper permansit; nec iterum quantum ad numerum scitorum, quia omnia scivit a primo instanti suae conceptionis quae ad hanc scientiam pertinent; crevit autem quantum ad aliquem modum certitudinis. Cum enim anima nostra secundum naturam sit media inter intellectum purum, qualis est in Angelis, et sensus, dupliciter certificatur de aliquibus. Uno modo ex lumine intellectus, qualis est certitudo in demonstrationibus eorum quae nunquam visa sunt. Alio modo ex sensu, sicut cum aliquis est certus de his quae videt sensibiliter. [...] et haec vocatur certitudo experimentalis. Et quantum ad hanc crevit scientia Christi in quantum quotidie aliqua videbat sensibiliter quae prius non viderat; non autem crevit quantum ad essentiam." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 5 co.

⁷⁰ "[...] per lumen intellectus agentis in Christo, non fuit aliqua species de novo recepta in intellectu possibili ejus, sed fuit facta conversio nova ad species quae erant in phantasia, sicut est in eo qui habet habitum scientiae eorum quae imaginatur vel videt." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 5 ad 3.

knowledge through acquired intelligible species.⁷¹ He argues that Christ's agent intellect would have been useless if it had not abstracted new intelligible species. This is because an operation proper to the active intellect is to make intelligible species actual by abstracting them from phantasms. The agent intellect that does not perform its operation is useless. Since Christ had the agent intellect and he did not have anything useless, Christ's agent intellect abstracted the intelligible species which his passive intellect received, and then the soul acquired the experiential knowledge.⁷² Acquired knowledge differed from infused knowledge because the former is from phantasms but the latter is given by God.⁷³ Christ progressed in the acquired knowledge because the agent intellect abstracted more and more intelligible species from phantasms in the course of Christ's life. The more the agent intellect abstracted intelligible species, the more the habit of acquired knowledge advanced. Therefore, according to Aquinas, Christ progressed in knowledge in the sense that the habit of acquired knowledge increased.⁷⁴ He further explains that Christ also knew things which he did not experience through things which he did experience. For example, Christ knew causes which he did not experience through effects which he did experience.⁷⁵

⁷¹ "[...] scientia acquisita ponitur in anima Christi [...] propter convenientiam intellectus agentis, ne eius actio sit otiosa, qua facit intelligibilia actu, sicut etiam scientia indita vel infusa ponitur in anima Christi ad perfectionem intellectus possibilis." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 12, a. 1 co. "Deinde considerandum est de scientia animae Christi acquisita vel experimentalis." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 12 pr.

⁷² "Unde necesse est dicere quod in anima Christi non solum intellectus possibilis, sed etiam intellectus agens fuerit. Si autem in aliis Deus et natura nihil frustra fecerunt, ut philosophus dicit, in I de caelo et mundo, multo minus in anima Christi aliquid fuit frustra. Frustra autem est quod non habet propriam operationem [...] Propria autem operatio intellectus agentis est facere species intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo eas a phantasmatis, [...] Sic igitur necesse est dicere quod in Christo fuerunt aliquae species intelligibiles per actionem intellectus agentis in intellectu possibili eius receptae. Quod est esse in ipso scientiam acquisitam, quam quidam experimentalem nominant." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 9, a. 4 co.

⁷³ "[...] alia ratio est de habitu acquisito, et de habitu infuso. Nam habitus scientiae acquiritur per comparisonem humanae mentis ad phantasmata, unde secundum eandem rationem non potest alius habitus iterato acquiri. Sed habitus scientiae infusae est alterius rationis, utpote a superiori descendens in animam, non secundum proportionem phantasmatum. Et ideo non est eadem ratio de utroque habitu." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 9 a. 4 ad 3.

⁷⁴ "Sed quia inconveniens videtur quod aliqua naturalis actio intelligibilis Christo deesset, cum extrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatis sit quaedam naturalis actio hominis secundum intellectum agentem, conveniens videtur hanc etiam actionem in Christo ponere. Et ex hoc sequitur quod in anima Christi aliquis habitus scientiae fuit qui per huiusmodi abstractionem specierum potuerit augmentari, ex hoc scilicet quod intellectus agens, post primas species intelligibiles abstractas a phantasmatis, poterat etiam alias abstrahere." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 12 a. 2 co.

⁷⁵ "[...] scientia rerum acquiri potest non solum per experientiam ipsarum, sed etiam per experientiam quarundam aliarum rerum, cum ex virtute luminis intellectus agentis possit homo procedere ad intelligendum effectus per causas, et causas per effectus, et similia per similia, et contraria per contraria. Sic igitur, licet Christus non fuerit omnia expertus, ex his

Why did Aquinas change his mind about the experiential knowledge in *Summa theologiae*? It seems that Aquinas thought that the view proposed in his *Commentary on the Sentences* was incomplete as related to Aristotelian psychology, because, according to Aristotelian psychology, the proper act of the agent intellect was abstraction of the intelligible species from phantasms, and without abstraction the agent intellect was useless.⁷⁶ The view of Christ's acquired knowledge was significant because Aquinas was the first to apply the idea of the acquired knowledge, which was a much-discussed theme in psychology as it was part of the natural philosophy, to the psychology of the incarnation.

Later on, Franciscan Richard Middleton based his view on the knowledge of Christ on Bonaventure's and Aquinas's views, whereas Dominicans Durand of St. Pourçain and Peter of Palude followed especially Aquinas. While Forster claims that Richard was in substantial agreement with the Thomistic teaching,⁷⁷ I think that he puts too much emphasis on the similarity between Middleton's and Aquinas's views, because Middleton was clearly influenced also by Bonaventure's works. Like Bonaventure and Aquinas, Richard Middleton also argues that the human Christ had a clear vision about the Word of God which was the ultimate perfection of the intellect.⁷⁸ Such vision required the light of glory since the vision exceeded the natural capacity of the intellect. Richard explains that the human intellect can know naturally only sensible material things because the human intellect is rooted in a form which perfects sensible matter. Since the Word of God is pure existence (*purum esse*), the human intellect or any other created intellect cannot know it immediately and clearly without the supernatural light of glory.⁷⁹ Following Bonaventure, he states that Christ's intellect, including

tamen quae expertus est, in omnium devenit notitiam." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 12, a. 1 ad 1. See also Madigan 2007, 32.

⁷⁶ Vaughan (1957, 96; 137) and Madigan (2007, 35) also think that Aquinas's reason for changing his mind was his willingness to follow Aristotelian psychology.

⁷⁷ Forster 1958, 119.

⁷⁸ "Respondeo, quod anima Christi clare cognoscit verbum. [...] Ultimata autem perfectio in actu intelligendi, non est, nisi sit respectu nobilissimi intelligibilis, et nobilissimo modo [...] Nobilissima autem intelligibile est ipsum verbum. Nobilissimus autem modus intelligendi, non est nisi sit cum claritate cognitionis." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 1, q. 1, p. 127.

⁷⁹ "Respondeo, quod anima Christi cognoscit verbum, per aliquod lumen creatum suis naturalibus superadditum. [...] Intellectus autem noster, quia radicatur in forma perficiente materiam sensibilem, quamdiu corpori coniunctus est, non potest cognoscere, nisi res existentes in materia sensibili, vel illud, quod ex ipsis concludere potest, quia tamen mediante organo non cognoscit, ideo res existentes in materia sensibili potest considerare abstrahendo, non inquantum sunt in materia sensibili, quod patet cum intelligit aliquid universale rerum sensibilium. [...] sed ipsum verbum incarnatum, purum esse est, et ita excedit naturalem modum essendi cuiuslibet creaturae. Nulla nam creatura est purum esse. Restat ergo, quod a nullo intellectu creato, quicumque sit ille, sive sit intellectus animae Christi, sive alius, cognosci potest immediate, et clare per sola naturalia illius intellectus. Cum ergo anima

his agent intellect, was purely passive when it saw the Word of God, and he explains that the light of glory disposed of Christ's intellect to receive the vision from the Word of God, which was the present and immediate object of the vision. Richard expounds that the vision was a passion, which emphasizes that the intellect received rather than actively elicited the vision.⁸⁰ The vision did not involve the intelligible species because if it had involved it, Christ would have been able to know the Word of God even when the Word was not present, since, according to Richard, the intelligible species is a sufficient reason for knowing a thing even when a thing is not present.⁸¹ The human Christ did not comprehend the Word of God because Christ's human soul did not attain the whole intelligibility of infinite God, as the soul was not able to elicit or receive the infinite act of the intellect.⁸²

According to Richard, the human Christ also had knowledge of things in the Word of God.⁸³ He knew the Word of God and things in it through the same act because the subject of these cognitions were the same intellect, he knew the Word of God and things in it at the same time and through the same basis for knowing which was the Word of God.⁸⁴ Following

Christi, ipsum verbum cognoscat immediate, et clare, oportet concedere, quod hoc est per aliquid lumen super naturale, ex quo ad praedictam cognitionem suum lumen naturale non sufficeret, ut ostensum est." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 1, q. 2, p. 128–129.

⁸⁰ "Ideo videtur aliis dicendum, quod intellectus animae Christi, et quicumque intellectus beatus in videndo verbum, pure passivum est. Unde cum intellectus per lumen gloriae sufficientes sit dispositus ad recipiendum in se istam passionem, quae est visio verbi, quae passio est perfectio, et salus ipsius intellectus, et ipsum verbum, cum sit praesens, et intimum intellectui, potens sit per se ipsum immediate movere ipsum intellectum, sicut obiectum movet passivam potentiam, non requiritur aliqua species creata, per quam, praedicta motione intellectu moveatur, vel per quam praedicta visio in ipso intellectu efficiantur, et secundum hanc opinionem, quamvis ipsa visio verbi sit in intellectu animae Christi, non tamen est ab ipso intellectu, sed tantum a verbo sicut a praesenti, et immediato obiecto, nec ex hac opinione sequitur, quod intellectus agens in videndo Deum, sit ociosus; quia tantum illud, quod est in anima, possibile est: sed illud, quod est in ea activum respectu visionis divinae, est passivum, quia illa passio nobilior est omni actione, quae per virtutem creatam possit effici." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 1, q. 3, p. 131.

⁸¹ "Ad istam questionem dicunt aliqui, quod anima Christi per aliquam speciem creatam videt verbum, [...] Sed contra, si hoc esset verum, intellectus animae Christi per illam speciem videret verbum, etiam dato per impossibile, quod verbum sibi non esset essentialiter praesens, quia ea, quorum species est sufficiens ratio cognoscendi, ea aequaliter cognoscuntur absentia, sicut praesentia, dum tamen species eorum praesens sit apud intellectum." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 1, q. 3, p. 131.

⁸² "Respondeo, quod anima Christi cognoscendo verbum, non comprehendit eum [...] Nulla enim creatura potest elicere actionem infinitam intensive, nec pati intensive infinitam passionem: ergo anima Christi non potest intelligere verbum, quantum ex parte sua, est intelligibile." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 1, q. 4, p. 132.

⁸³ "Respondeo, quod anima Christi videt aliquas creaturas in verbo." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 2, q. 1, p. 133.

⁸⁴ "Respondeo, quod anima Christi eodem actu videt verbum, et creaturas, quas videt in verbo, quia actus videndi non numerantur, nisi vel penes subiecta, vel penes mensuram, vel penes rationes videndi, non enim numerantur penes pluralitatem visiorum, quae per unam rationem videntur, sed visionis, quia anima Christi videt verbum, et creaturas in verbo, unum

Aquinas, Richard clarifies that Christ knew actually things which were, are and will be, but not everything that God knows because the human Christ did not know actually all divine unrealized possibilities, as he did not comprehend the Word of God and he did not have an infinite power.⁸⁵ However, contrary to Aquinas but taking a step toward Bonaventure, Richard claims that the soul knew actually some of the divine unrealized possibilities, but not all of them. In addition, the human Christ did not know all future thoughts of human beings and angels because the number of such thoughts are infinite.⁸⁶ Richard also repeats Bonaventure's view that the human Christ knew habitually things in the Word of God, but he does not express whether he favours it. He describes Bonaventure's and Aquinas's views accurately when he says that, according to Bonaventure, the human Christ was able to know actually endlessly more and more things in the Word of God, but according to Aquinas, Christ was not able to know actually more things in the Word of God than he already knew.⁸⁷

est subjectum in numero, scilicet, intellectus animae Christi. Una etiam mensura quia simul videntur [...] per eandem etiam rationem, per quam videt verbum, videt creaturas quas videt in verbo..." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 2, q. 1, p. 133.

⁸⁵ "Respondeo, quod anima Christi non videt actu in verbo omnia, quae videt verbum. [...] verbum autem cum se videat, quantum ex parte sua visibile est, clarius videt se, quam videatur a Christi anima, quae non videt ipsum: quantum ex parte sua visibile est, ut superius ostensum est: ergo plures effectus suos fieri possibiles videt in se, quam videat Christi anima. Praeterea maior perfectio virtutis in intensione, seu vigore requiritur ad videndum tria simul in actu, et aequa clare in aliquo uno, quam ad videndum duo tantum, et maior ad videndum quatuor, et sic deinceps: ergo ad videndum in actu infinita simul in aliquo uno, utpote in verbo, requiritur in vidente infinita perfectio virtutis in intensione, seu vigore, sed talis infinitas virtutis, non est in anima Christi, cum sit creatura: ergo in verbo non videt actu infinita, sed verbum in se ipso videt actu infinita, ut in primo libri ostensum est: ergo anima Christi non videt actu in verbo omnia, quae videt verbum." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 2, q. 3, p. 136.

⁸⁶ "[...] unde credo, quod actu videt in verbo simul omnia praesentia, praeterita, et futura. Loquendo de illis rebus futuris, quantum una alii non succedet sine fine, quod dico propter cognitiones hominum, et angelorum respectu rerum in proprio genere, quarum una alii poterit succedere sine fine. Unde si anima Christi omnia talia futura actu videret in verbo, actu videret in ipso, ultra omnem determinatum numerum, et si sic actu videret infinita in verbo, videret etiam anima Christi in verbo multa fieri possibilia, quae nunquam fieret." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 2, q. 3, p. 136; q. 4, p. 138.

⁸⁷ "Ad istam questionem dicunt aliqui, quod animae Christi de novo potest videre in verbo aliquid in actu [...] Praeterea quamvis videre infinita in actu requirit infinitam perfectionem intensive in vidente, tamen posse videre in actu semper plus, et plus ultra omnem determinatum numerum, ita quod semper actu visa sint finita, non requirit infinitam perfectionem intensive in vidente, et ideo dicunt, quod quamvis anima Christi non possit in verbo actu videre infinita, tamen potest in verbo videre ultra omnem determinatum numerum. Ita tamen quod totum semper acceptum sit finitum, ex quo sequitur, quod in verbo plura videat in habitu quam in actu. [...] Videtur ergo istis esse dicendum, quod [...] non potest in verbo aliquid de novo videre in actu, nisi desineret videre aliquid eorum, quae modo videt in verbo. Determinatus enim est apud Deum, et apud intellectum animae Christi numerus eorum, quae potest simul in actu videre in verbo, et omnia illa simul videt in actu." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 2, q. 4, p. 137.

Christ also knew things in themselves because he had infused intelligible species. According to Richard, the content of knowledge of things in the Word of God and knowledge of things in themselves overlapped, but cognitions differed from each other because the basis for knowing differed, since things were known in the Word of God and through infused intelligible species.⁸⁸ Christ had the intelligible species of all past and present things, as well as future things which were limited in number, but not future things which were not limited in number, such as future thoughts.⁸⁹ The infused knowledge of Christ involved only one habit, but several intelligible species and acts. However, Christ's intellect did not have many acts at once because the intellect was not able to know perfectly many things at the same time.⁹⁰ Richard holds that Christ's knowledge of things in themselves did not involve discursive thinking, that is to say, Christ did not acquire knowledge of conclusion through knowledge of principles and he did not form syllogisms. Instead, Christ knew principle and all conclusions virtually included in it at the same time by the same act.⁹¹ Hence, Christ's

⁸⁸ "Quantum ad primum sciendum, quod cognitio creaturarum in proprio genere distinguitur a cognitione creaturarum in verbo, non penes rem cognitam: quia eadem creatura, quae cognoscitur in verbo, cognosci potest etiam in genere proprio, et e converso: sed distinguuntur penes rationes cognoscendi, quia in cognitione creaturarum in verbo, verbum est immediata ratio cognoscendi creaturas. In cognitione verbo creaturarum in proprio genere, aliqua creatae species informans intellectum [...] est ratio cognoscendi creaturam..." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 3, q. 1, p. 139.

⁸⁹ "[...] non profecit anima Christi in cognitione, [...] secundo modo, quia omnium praeteritorum, praesentium, et futurorum, quorum unum non succedat alii sine fine, sibi fuerunt species concreatae, per quas potuit de illis cognitionem habere. Sed tertio modo, quamvis non profecit, tamen aliquando proficiet, quia non omnia talia futura actu intelligit, quia procedent ultra omnem determinatum numerum..." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 3, q. 2, p. 140. "[...] aut si loquantur omnibus futuris, intelligi debent de cognitione quantum ad habitum, non quantum ad similitudines cognoscibilium, quamvis enim intellectus eius fit habituatus ad cognoscendum quodlibet futurum, tamen non habet actu similitudines omnium futurorum, quorum unum alii succedet sine fine." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 3, q. 2, p. 140.

⁹⁰ "Mihi autem videtur dicendum, quod scientia, qua anima Christi cognoscit res in proprio genere, non est per plures habitus distincta. [...] ideo non est sibi concreatus, nisi unus habitus scientiae respectu cognitionis praedictae." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 3, q. 4, p. 143. "Respondeo, quod non omnia, quae scit anima Christi in proprio genere, unico actu secundum numerum intelligit, quia ea intelligit per plures rationes secundum numerum, cum ea intelligat per creatas earum similitudines, per plures autem rationes secundum numerum, non est unicus simplex intelligendi actus, nec ea intelligit pluribus actibus intelligendi simul, [...] posset forte omnia, quae scit in proprio genere simul intelligere pluribus actibus, sed tunc quodlibet eorum intelligeret imperfecte." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 4, q. 1, p. 144.

⁹¹ "Respondeo, quod anima Christi, non cognoscit res, et in proprio genere discurrendo. Cognoscere enim discurrendo est a cognitione principia procedere ad acquirendum cognitionem conclusionis prius ignote, ita quod alia sit cognitio principii, et alia cognitio conclusionis ex prima cognitione causata. Anima autem Christi propter suam claritatem, et virtutem ita perfecte cognoscit principium, quod simul et unico actu videt in ipso conclusiones virtualiter ibidem contentas, et ita patet, quod quamvis discursum intelligat, et optime

intellect did not either compose or divide.⁹² Richard expounds that Christ progressed in experiences during his lifetime, but he does not explain in detail whether the experience of Christ involved the acquiring of the intelligible species or experiential certitude (like Aquinas thought), or only the perception of the external senses (like Bonaventure thought).⁹³

As Aquinas thinks that the knowledge of things in the Word of God was always actual, and infused and acquired knowledge were actual sometimes, this implies that at least two of Christ's cognitions with the same content were actual at once. Aquinas does not explain how this was possible, but Richard Middleton tries to do so. Richard claims that Christ's intellect had two simultaneous acts when the intellect knew things in the Word of God and things in themselves. He explains that the intellect can have two acts at once when acts do not belong to the same universal species or when one of the acts is more perfect, directive or otherwise related to another act. Richard argues that Christ's intellect was able to have two acts at once because Christ's knowledge of things in the Word of God and knowledge of things in themselves did not belong to the same universal species⁹⁴ and the first knowledge ruled the second one. Richard does not explain how the knowledge of things in the Word ruled the knowledge of things in themselves, but as he follows Bonaventure's view that the first-mentioned knowledge was in the superior part of the reason and the last-mentioned knowledge was in the inferior part of the reason, this indicates that the knowledge of things in the Word ruled the knowledge of things in themselves, like the superior part of the reason rules the inferior part of the reason.⁹⁵

Although Durand of St. Pourçain adopted some ideas from Aquinas, his understanding about Christ's knowledge also differed from

formationem syllogismorum intelligat, non tamen intelligit discurrendo, vel syllogizando..." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 4, q. 3, p. 148.

⁹² Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 4, q. 3, p. 148.

⁹³ "Quarto autem modo profecit, quod multa quae ante per experientiam nesciebat, postea per experientiam cognovit, et sic ea pluribus modis, quam ante cognovit." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 3, q. 2, p. 140.

⁹⁴ "[...] anima Christi simul videt creaturas in verbo, et in genere proprio, [...] dico, quod quamvis in intellectu non possunt simul esse duo actus intelligendi eius generis proximi, nisi forte, cum unus est alterius perfectivus, vel directivus, vel relatus ad alium, tamen simul possunt esse in eo duo actus intelligendi, qui non sunt eiusdem generis, sed visio creaturarum in verbo, et in proprio genere, quamvis sint visiones duae [...] tamen non sunt eiusdem generis proximi, et ideo possunt in intellectu animae Christi simul esse," Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 3, q. 3, p. 141.

⁹⁵ "Praeterea visio qua intellectus animae Christi videt creaturas in verbo, regit illam visionem, qua ipse videt creaturas in proprio genere, quia prima visio sibi convenit ratione superioris portionis, et secunda ratione inferioris," Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 3, q. 3, p. 141.

Aquinas.⁹⁶ However, Durand did not base his view on the Franciscan sources. Rather, he agreed with Aquinas on the basic views about the knowledge of Christ's human soul, but he interpreted some of them in a new way. This shows that the Thomistic intellectual tradition was not uniform and it was not challenged only by Franciscan theologians who supported the Franciscan intellectual tradition, but also by Dominican theologians who worked within the Thomistic tradition.

According to Durand, Christ had the beatific knowledge and knowledge of things in themselves. Like Aquinas, Durand claims that Christ's beatific knowledge required the light of glory which disposed of his intellect to receive the beatific vision from God.⁹⁷ It is noteworthy that in the fourth book of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Durand seems to think, however, that the intellect does not need the light of glory to see God, as the immediate presence of the divine essence is enough.⁹⁸

Christ also knew things in the Word of God. Unlike Bonaventure but like Aquinas, Durand argues that the human Christ did not know everything that God knows, but he explicates the idea differently than Aquinas. He holds that the intellect can have a twofold knowledge of things. The intellect can know what a thing is (*quid sint*) and whether a thing is (*an sint*).⁹⁹ The first knowledge is about the quiddity or the essence, whereas the second is about the actual existence of the thing.¹⁰⁰ For example, Durand explains that in the winter one can know what a rose is, but one cannot know whether a rose exists. One can also know that a rose exists without knowing what a rose is.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ For Durand of St. Pourçain on Christology, see Iribarren 2009.

⁹⁷ "Nunc est ita quod lumen naturale intellectus, et lumen gloriae non se habent aequae immediate ad uisionem beatam, quia quamuis utrumque se habeat passiuè ad uisionem beatam, tamen non aequae immediate, quia lumen naturale, intellectus est ratio recipiendi remota, lumen uero gloriae est dispositio propinqua et immediate." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, p. 237r.

⁹⁸ "Tertius modus est quod ad uidendum Deum clare et manifeste non requiritur [...] aliquod lumen creatum elevans intellectum [...] sed sufficit quod diuina essentia immediate repraesentetur intellectui creato..." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 4, d. 49, q. 2, p. 414r.

⁹⁹ The distinction of knowing what a thing is and whether a thing exists is based on Aristotle's *Analytica posteriora* II. 1–2, 89b23–90a5. Like Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise also claims that the human Christ did not know everything that God knows because Christ knew all past, present, and future things but not all possible things. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, p. 100.)

¹⁰⁰ "Circa quod intelligendum de rebus possumus habere duplicem cognitionem, scilicet quid sint, et an sint. Prima est cognitio rei quantum ad quidditatem et essentiam. Secunda est cognitio rei quantum ad actualem existentiam." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 237r.

¹⁰¹ "[...] illae duae cognitiones sunt separate, quia una potest esse sine alia, potest enim cognosci de re quid sit, ignorando an sit, sicut de rosa potest sciri in hyeme quid est, et tamen ignoratur an est, et econtrario scitur de aliqua re an sit, et tamen ignoratur quod sit in speciali, sicut est etiam de multis rebus inuisis si offerentur his qui alias eas non uiderunt, nec audierunt,

According to Durand, Christ knew in the Word of God the essences of all things, even the essences of possible things, but not which of those things existed.¹⁰² Why did the soul know only the essences of the created things? Durand explains that the divine essence represents things as a cause represents effects. Since the divine essence is the necessary cause of the created essences, the divine essence necessarily represents the created essences. However, the divine essence does not necessarily represent the existence of the things because it effects the existence freely.¹⁰³ Therefore, the human Christ knew in the Word of God what things are, but not whether they are. For example, he knew in the Word of God what a human being was and what a donkey was, but he did not know whether a human being or a donkey existed.¹⁰⁴ Durand claims that the human Christ did not know in the Word of God as much as God knows because he knew only the essences of the things, while God knows also which individuals exist. Since there are more individuals than essences, God knows more things than Christ knew in the Word of God.¹⁰⁵ Durand does not explain in detail how Christ's human soul knew the existence of things. He claims that knowing when the

tales scient, quia res illae sunt, sed nescient quid sunt." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 4, d. 49, q. 3, p. 415v.

¹⁰² "Dicendum ergo quod anima Christi uidendo deum cognoscit in ipso omnia entis, et possibilis, quantum ad id quod sunt, de nullo tamen cognoscit ex natura talis uisionis, an sit, an non." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 237r. Walter Chatton also argues that a soul can know the essence but not the existence of a thing in the Word of God. (Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 101–102.)

¹⁰³ "Cuius ratio est ista, intellectus creatus uidens clare diuinam essentiam, uidet in ipso omnia quae per ipsam naturaliter, et ex necessitate repraesentantur, alio uero non, sed essentia diuina naturaliter, et ex necessitate repraesentat omnes res entes, et possibilis, quantum ad illud quod sunt. Non autem quantum ad actualement existentiam (scilicet an sint, an non) ergo omnis intellectus creatus tam Christi quam cuiuscunque alterius, uidendo deum, cognoscit in ipso de omni re ente uel possibili quid sit, non autem an sit. [...] Quod autem repraesentet eas naturaliter, et ex necessitate probatur sic, diuina essentia repraesentat res creatas, sicut causa repraesentat effectum. Sed diuina essentia est causa secundum potentiam omnium rerum naturaliter ex necessitate quantum ad id quod sunt, licet non sit actu causa producens nisi libere. Est enim in potestate diuinae libertatis producere quamlibet rem, sed non est in libertate diuinae naturae posse producere quamcunque rem, immo ex naturali perfectione diuinae essentiae est habere potentiam omnia producendi." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 237r.

¹⁰⁴ "[...] intellectus uidens diuinam essentiam, uidet in ea omnia alia, quantum ad id quod sunt: scit enim de quocunque ente possibili quid est, ut quid est homo, et quid est asinus: non tamen scit utrum homo uel asinus sint in rerum nature ex natura talis uisionis: nec in hoc intellectus Christi excedit alios intellectus beatos, nisi in limpiditate videndi." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 237r.

¹⁰⁵ "[...] scientia animae Christi non aequatur scientiae diuinae, per hoc quod uidet omnia quantum ad id quod sunt, neque quantum ad numerum scitorum, neque quantum ad claritatem cognitionis, non quantum ad numerum scitorum, quia Deus non solum scit de rebus quid sint secundum naturam speciei et quidditatis, sed scit de unaquaque specie rei quot indiuidua sunt actualiter, uel erunt pro quacunque differentia temporis, [...] numerus autem indiuiduorum excedit numerum quidditatum secundum speciem." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 237v.

Judgement Day will be is to know its existence and Christ knew it because God revealed it to him. However, Durand does not describe how Christ knew the existence of other things.¹⁰⁶

It is noteworthy that Durand seems to think that the distinction between knowing the essence of the thing and knowing the existence of the thing is not the same as the distinction between abstract knowledge and intuitive knowledge. When Durand studies whether one can have evident knowledge about the truths of the sacred doctrine, he claims that intuitive knowledge is immediate knowledge of a thing as it is present in its actual existence.¹⁰⁷ One kind of intuitive knowledge is sense perception. For example, when one sees that a rose held in the hand exists, that is intuitive knowledge of a rose. Abstract knowledge is indirect knowledge of a thing which is not present in its actual existence. Knowledge of the essence of the thing is abstract knowledge because it is not known whether a thing exists. However, when one knows that a thing exists, it does not necessarily entail intuitive knowledge. Durand holds that one knows abstractly that a thing exists when it is known indirectly through demonstration. For example, an astronomer who is sitting in a room knows that a lunar eclipse exists at a specific moment because he knows that the earth, the moon and the sun are related, so that the lunar eclipse takes place. However, he does not know intuitively that the lunar eclipse exists, because he does not know this directly but through a demonstration.¹⁰⁸

According to Durand, Christ also knew things in themselves, but his understanding about this knowledge differs from Aquinas's one.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ "[...] illa cognitio de die iudicii quando futura sit, est cognitio an sit, vel quando erit; et talem cognitionem nullus beatus praeter Deum habet ex natura visionis divinae, ut dictum fuit: nihilominus quamvis anima Christi hoc modo non habuit cognitionem de die iudicii, habuit tamen per revelationem: dicitur tamen nescire, quia non fecit nos scire." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII*, lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 237v.

¹⁰⁷ For more about Durand on intuitive knowledge, see Piché 2009, 423–429.

¹⁰⁸ "Vocant cognitione intuitivam illam quae immediate tendit ad rem sibi praesentem obiectivae, secundum eius actualem existentiam: sicut cum uideo colorem existentem in pariete, uel rosam, quam in manu teneo. Abstractivam autem uocat, omnem cognitionem, quae habetur de re, non sic realiter praesens in ratione obiecti immediate cogniti. Unde secundum istos cognitio abstractiva dicitur non solum per abstractionem quidditatis ab esse, et a non esse [...] sed etiam dicitur abstractiva illa cognitio, per quam cognoscitur de re quod ipsa sit in rerum natura, dum tamen ipsa, ut sic, non sit praesens in ratione obiecti immediate cogniti. Verbi gratia, si eclipsis Lunae sit in rerum natura, et Astrologus existens in domo, sciat Lunam tunc actualiter eclipsari, quia scit adesse tempus et horam inter positionis terrae inter solem et Lunam, dum tamen non uideat eclipsim in se, dicitur habere de eclipsi cognitionem abstractivam, et non intuitivam." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 1, in prolog., q. 3, p. 7r.

¹⁰⁹ Christ knew by means of this knowledge all natural things, the divine mysteries, and the thoughts and acts of human beings. (Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII*, lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 237v.) According to Peter of Tarentaise, Christ knew by means of this knowledge all natural things and everything

The difference becomes apparent if we look at Durand's texts about the intellect in general. Durand criticizes the Aristotelian view of the intellect, arguing, for example, that the soul has only the passive but not the active intellect.¹¹⁰ He also argues that the passive intellect does not need intelligible species.¹¹¹ Therefore, according to Durand, a soul does not have the active intellect and the intellect does not have intelligible species. Because of his refutation of intelligible species, Durand's view of knowledge of things in themselves cannot be the same as Aquinas's view based on infused intelligible species. Durand claims that Christ knew things in themselves because he had an infused habit, not infused intelligible species.¹¹² However, he does not explain what kind of habit the infused knowledge was.

How did Christ progress in knowledge? Like Aquinas's *Commentary on the Sentences*, Durand also claims that Christ progressed in knowledge when his soul acquired experiential certitude. For example, an astronomer who is aware of a lunar eclipse by means of a demonstration knows a lunar eclipse more certainly when he perceives it. Durand claims that when Christ saw things for the first time, he progressed in experiential certitude, even though he knew things he perceived in advance by infused knowledge.¹¹³

Unlike Aquinas in his *Summa theologiae*, Durand thinks that Christ did not have acquired knowledge. He explains that Christ was able to

pertaining to revelation. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, p. 100.)

¹¹⁰ "[...] fictitium est ponere intellectum agentem." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 1, d. 3, q. 5, p. 27r. "Cum ergo intellectus agens non agat in phantasmata aliquid imprimendo vel aliquid abstrahendo, neque secundum rem, neque secundum rationem, nec agat in intellectum possibilem, nec sine phantasmate nec cum phantasmate ut deductum est, videtur quod non debeat ipsum ponere, nec Augustinus magnus philosophus unquam posuit ipsum ut prius dictum fuit." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 1, d. 3, q. 5, p. 28r. For Durand on the agent intellect, see also Friedman 2003, 251–252; Spruit 1994, 281–282.

¹¹¹ "Non uidetur ergo quod in intellectu nostro sit aliqua species ad repraesentandum sibi suum obiectum, nec in sensu ut prius probatur est, ergo etc." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 2, d. 6, q. 6, p. 139v. For Durand on the intelligible species, see also Friedman 2003, 252; Pasnau 1997, 17–18; Spruit 1994, 282–283.

¹¹² "Christus habuit habitum scientiae infusae per quam cognoscit quicquid naturaliter est cognoscibile ut dictum fuit prius ergo per ea quae a sensibus accepit non fuit in ei acquisitus habitus nouus scientiae." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 4, p. 238r.

¹¹³ "Alio modo est profectus in scientia quantum ad aliquem modum certitudinis. Sicut cum aliquis certus de alia conclusione per demonstrationem puta de eclipsi) eam postea sensibiliter intuetur. Per hoc enim noua certitudo additur et praecedens confirmatur. Et haec uocatur certitudo experimentalis, et quantum ad hoc creuit scientia in quantum quotidie aliqua uidebat, quae prius non uiderat, licet ea sciret per scientiam sibi infusam." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 4, p. 238r. Peter of Tarentaise also follows this view of Aquinas, as he explains that Christ did not acquire intelligible species because he already had all intelligible species infused by God. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, p. 102.)

have acquired knowledge and infused knowledge if infused knowledge and acquired knowledge were not alike, but if they were, Christ did not have both of them. Since Durand assumes that infused knowledge and acquired knowledge were identical, he claims that Christ only had infused knowledge.¹¹⁴ Durand also thinks that Christ's acquired knowledge would have been incomplete because Christ did not perceive all sensible things during his lifetime, and he claims that such view was absurd as Christ did not have incomplete knowledge.¹¹⁵

Peter of Palude defended Aquinas's view that Christ had acquired experiential knowledge. He argues that as acquired knowledge and infused knowledge were not identical, Christ could have both of them at once.¹¹⁶ However, unlike Aquinas, Palude thinks that Christ did not get acquired knowledge through an abstraction of the agent intellect and through the senses, but God also poured forth acquired knowledge into Christ's intellect. Palude explains that Christ had two kinds of infused knowledge: infused knowledge *per se*, which cannot be acquired through the senses, and infused knowledge *per accidens*, which can be acquired through the senses. Infused knowledge *per se* was through infused intelligible species which the soul cannot acquire through the senses, whereas infused knowledge *per accidens* was through intelligible species which the soul can acquire through the senses. Palude thinks that the idea of infused acquired knowledge saves the perfection of Christ's knowledge. Because God poured forth acquired knowledge into Christ's intellect, Christ was not ignorant about things which he did not perceive.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ "Si enim ponatur quod omnis scientia infusa sit alterius rationis a scientia acquisita tunc potest probabiliter sustineri quod praeter scientiam infusam fuit in Christo alia scientia naturali modo acquisita. [...] Si autem scientia infusa et acquisita sint eiusdem rationis maxime eiusdem obiecti tunc tenendus est secundus modus, scilicet quod in Christi non fuit aliqua scientia modo naturali acquisita. Suppositio autem videtur probabilis..." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 4, p. 238r. "[...] igitur uidetur probabiliter quod in Christo non fuerit aliqua scientia modo humano acquisita." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 4, p. 238r.

¹¹⁵ "Tertio, quia scientia quae acquiritur per experientiam ex hoc quod sensibilia sunt praesentia sensibus, sed sensibus Christi pauca ualde sensibilia fuerunt praesentia comparatione eorum quae nunquam sensu percepit, ergo scientia hoc modo acquisita fuisset in Christo ualde imperfecta, quod non est dicendum." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 4, p. 238r.

¹¹⁶ "Secundo probat de scientia acquisita et experimentalis [...] quod scilicet potuit esse in Christo: quia nichil prohibet nisi illa cognitio naturalium infusa sit eiusdem rationis cum acquisita: [...] Si enim morales infuse different ab acquisitis respectu eiusdem obiecti: pari ratione et intellectuales infuse. Ulterius si fortitudo donum infusum circa idem obiectum differt ab acquisita, pari ratione metaphisica in Christo infusa a metaphisica acquisita." Peter of Palude, *Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum* d. 14, q. 2, p. 77r.

¹¹⁷ "[...] in Christi fuit solum scientia infusa: sed infusa est duplex scilicet per se: ut quae non potest acquiri ex sensibus, et per accidens: ut quae potest acquiri, et sic nullam Christus scientiam per experientiam acquisivit: nec aliqua in eo ignorantia ponatur: [...] Christus

1.4. John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol

John Duns Scotus's view about the knowledge of Christ partly followed Bonaventure's view, but it also involved new elements. According to Scotus, Christ had knowledge of the Word of God, knowledge of things in the Word of God, abstract knowledge and intuitive knowledge.¹¹⁸

Christ's human knowledge

Knowledge of the Word of God
Knowledge of things in the Word of God
Abstract knowledge
Intuitive knowledge
Perfect intuitive knowledge
Imperfect intuitive knowledge

Scotus thinks that when Christ's intellect had knowledge of the Word of God, the intellect had an act. Christ's intellect either passively received the act from the Word of God or it elicited it actively. Scotus does not take a clear stand on whether the soul received or elicited an act, but following Bonaventure and Richard Middleton, he seems to favour the view that Christ's intellect received it¹¹⁹ because the Word of God caused it supernaturally in Christ's intellect.¹²⁰ However, contrary to Bonaventure, Scotus argues that Christ's intellect was able to receive the act about the Word of God without a preceding light or a habit.¹²¹ Unlike Bonaventure,

habuit praeter scientiam divinam et beatificam alias duas infusas specie differentes: sicut anima separate habet duas scientias de eodem, unam quam acquisivit per species acquisitas, aliam infusam tunc per species infusas." Peter of Palude, *Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum* d. 14, q. 2, p. 77r–77v.

¹¹⁸ For Scotus on Christ's knowledge, see also Knuuttila 2011, 740–742; Adams 1999, 78–85; Forster 1958, 120–122.

¹¹⁹ "[...] cum igitur intellectus sit receptivus visionis Verbi, quae sibi est conveniens nec sibi determinet aliquem gradum illius visionis et est in potentia obedientiali ad illam, igitur quicumque intellectus cuiuscumque illuminationis et visionis est receptivus, - et per consequens intellectus animae Christi potest perfici summa et perfectissima visione qua potest perfici." John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 306; *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 13, q. 1–2, p. 427–428; 431; 434.

¹²⁰ "Tunc ad formam argumenti: non sequitur nisi quod intellectus animae Christi possit naturaliter videre Verbum; sed non sequitur quod visio possit sibi inesse ex naturalibus suis sive quod possit sibi inesse ex causa aliqua naturali, quia non potest sibi inesse nisi a Verbo immediate causante istam visionem, quod – quando causat – supernaturaliter causat." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 433. For the supernaturality of the beatific vision, see Wolter 1990a, 131–147.

¹²¹ "Itaque potest dici quod intellectus animae Christi potest passive recipere visionem Verbi primo et immediate." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 431; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 312. See also Adams 1999, 79–80. In *Lectura*, Scotus, however, adds that the perfection of Christ's intellect required that the intellect did not have only the act but also the habit about knowledge of the Word of God. He holds that the intellect that has an act and a habit is more perfect than the intellect that has only an act but not a habit. (John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 312–313.)

Scotus does not associate the light of glory with a habit. He claims that, being distinct from the light of glory, a habit does not dispose the intellect to receive an act but a habit results from an act. A habit explains how the intellect can know things which it does not actually consider, because a habit remains when an act changes. According to Scotus, the vision about the Word of God did not involve a habit because the vision was always actual.¹²² Although the intellect was able to receive the act about the Word of God without the light of glory, Scotus thinks that if the intellect had actively elicited the act, the intellect would not have been able to elicit it without divine aid.¹²³ Following a standard medieval view, Scotus clarifies that the human Christ did not comprehend the Word of God because his intellect did not grasp the whole intelligibility of God.¹²⁴

Like Bonaventure, Scotus holds that the human Christ knew in the Word of God everything that God knows, but he proposes two different views regarding whether the soul knew everything actually or habitually. As I have shown above, Aquinas thought that Christ knew things in the Word of God actually and Bonaventure argued that the soul knew everything that God knew. Scotus mixes Aquinas's theory of continuous actual knowing with

¹²² "Similiter, ad recipiendum ipsam visionem non requiritur aliquis habitus prior ipsa visione, quia habitus non disponit potentiam ad recipiendum actum, immo actus prius natus est recipi quam habitus. Tamen quia habitus in nobis acquisitus habet hanc perfectionem quod est immanens in anima transeunte actu secundo ut sic, intellectus, qui non potest habere perfectissimam notitiam plurium obiectorum simul (quia non in actu), habet saltem notitiam eorum permanentem, sicut potest, et ita in habitu; sed si aliquis actus esset ex natura sua ita permanens in actu sicut habitus respectu illius, non oporteret ponere habitum, quia actus talis haberet perfectionem actus primi et secundi. Sed visio beata ex natura sua est forma ita permanens in intellectu sicut habitus qui ponitur prior: uterque enim permanet semper ex praesentia perpetua obiecti beatifici, et neuter posset aliter permanere." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 432.

¹²³ "[...] si tamen intellectus comparatur in ratione activi respectu huius visionis, requiritur aliquid prius in intellectu." John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 314. "Si autem quaeratur utrum sine tali habitu vel lumine [...] possit intellectus creatus non tantum passive se habere ad talem visionem, sed etiam active se habere ad eliciendum talem visionem [...] tunc potest dici (sicut ad quartam quaestionem distinctionis praecedentis dictum est) quod si est necessaria connexio causarum secundarum etc." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 434. "Si primum istorum teneatur, tunc dicendum est quod ad fruitionem tantam quanta posset elici a voluntate cum summa gratia, non potest voluntas agere sine summa gratia, licet possit illam recipere sine ea. Si autem secundum teneatur, tunc dicendum est quod Deus posset supplere actionem summae gratiae, ut voluntas sine illa posset secundum causalitatem suam agere ad summam fruitionem, Deo supplente actionem gratiae ut causae secundae." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 13, q. 1–4, p. 419.

¹²⁴ "Breviter tamen, solus ille intellectus comprehendit aliquod intelligibile, cuius tanta est perfectio in intellectualitate et intelligendo quanta est perfectio vel intelligibilitas in intelligibili ut possit intelligi; et ideo est ibi commensuratio et adaequatio; [...]. Quia ergo nullus intellectus creatus potest habere tantam intellectualitatem, neque in actu primo neque in actu secundo, quanta est intelligibilitas Dei, immo in infinitum oporteret quod esset intellectualitas perfectior quae deberet commensurari huic intelligibili ex parte intelligibilitatis eius, ideo nullus intellectus creatus, etsi videat quodcumque quod est visibile ex parte Dei, potest ipsum comprehendere." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 438–439. See also John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 316–317.

Bonaventure's theory of unrestricted omniscience, as he claims that Christ's intellect knew all things in the Word of God either because the intellect had an infinite number of distinct acts at once or because the intellect had one infinite act. Scotus examines the view that the intellect had one infinite act only in passing, and he pays more attention to the idea that Christ had an infinite number of acts at once.¹²⁵ This idea is interesting because it challenges two Aristotelian ideas. First, it confronts Aristotle's idea that the intellect can understand only one thing at a time.¹²⁶ Secondly, it challenges Aristotle's opinion that actual infinity is impossible.¹²⁷

Scotus explains that according to the view about actual knowing, Christ's intellect could have many acts simultaneously because, like the intellects of all human beings, it was able to receive many visions about all objects in the Word of God at once, since the intellect can receive knowledge of any object.¹²⁸ This view not only holds that Christ's intellect had many acts, but goes further to claim that Christ's intellect had an infinite number of acts at the same time. How is this conceivable? Scotus argues that as two non-contrary properties can be in something at the same time, an infinite number of non-contrary properties can also be in something at once, because the reasons for the impossibility and impossibility are the same whether two properties or infinitely many properties are considered. Therefore, if the intellect can have two acts at once, it also can have an infinite number of acts. Christ's intellect was able to have infinitely many acts at once because the intellect had at least two acts when it saw things in the Word of God.¹²⁹ Christ's intellect passively received the acts from God

¹²⁵ "Ista conclusio posset poni duobus modis: Uno modo, quod anima Christi haberet unam visionem Verbi ut primi obiecti, et omnium relucens in Verbo ut obiectorum secundariorum, ad quae obiecta secundaria non haberet respectus distinctos; nec propter hoc sequeretur infinitas actus fundantis istos respectus, quia non essent nisi in potentia." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 452. For Scotus on the omniscience of Christ, see also Adams 1999, 80–82. It is worth noting that already Peter of Tarentaise reported a view about the actual omniscience of Christ, but he did not explain who proposed such a view. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, p. 100.)

¹²⁶ Aristotle, *Topica* II.10, 114b33–35.

¹²⁷ Aristotle, *Physica* III.6, 206a14–206b33.

¹²⁸ "Quod declaratur, quia quicumque intellectus est receptivus notitiae cuiuscumque obiecti, quia est totius entis, et per consequens ad quodcumque intelligibile habet desiderium naturale; et si quodcumque cognosceret, in hoc perficeretur naturaliter. Et sicut dico de notitia, ita dico de visione in Verbo, quia illa est perfectissima notitia possibilis haberi de obiecto; quilibet ergo intellectus est receptivus cuiuslibet visionis in Verbo, - et hoc loquendo divisim; igitur et coniunctim quilibet intellectus est receptivus simul plurium visionum in Verbo respectu omnium obiectorum." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 449.

¹²⁹ "Cuiusmodi potest quodlibet inesse: si enim possunt duo simul inesse, quia non opponuntur, et infinita talia simul eidem possunt inesse, quia nulla alia est ratio impossibilitatis vel impossibilitatis respectu infinitorum quam respectu duorum; quodcumque enim illorum potest per se inesse, et quodcumque cum quocumque potest simul inesse, quia non opponuntur, - et quocumque simul possunt inesse, quia ex pluralitate inhaerentium non sequitur nova impossibilitas; et sic sequitur propositum. Sed sic est in

but did not elicit them, because the intellect cannot elicit an infinite number of acts simultaneously. Scotus holds that if Christ's intellect had elicited infinitely many acts about infinitely many objects, the power of the intellect would have dispersed infinitely; it would have been infinitely small and thus nothing.¹³⁰

Although Scotus describes the view about actual knowing in detail, he is doubtful about it. In the *Ordinatio*, he claims that the view contradicts the texts of Aristotle and the saints because it implies actual infinity,¹³¹ and in the *Reportatio* he argues that the human Christ did not know everything actually.¹³² Following Bonaventure, Scotus defends the

proposito: sicut enim visio in Verbo respectu cuiuscumque obiecti potest inesse animae Christi, ita et visiones duorum obiectorum simul, quia non repugnant, aliter non posset videre se beatam et aliquid aliud in Verbo, - et ita cum semper videat se beatam in Verbo, numquam posset aliud videre; ergo nec quaecumque multitudo ponit novam impossibilitatem (patet), nec novam oppositionem, quia si oppositio esset, illa esset alicuius ad aliquid respectu cuiuscumque intellectus." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1-2, p. 449-450; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 330-331. Unlike Scotus, Durand of St. Pourçain argued that the intellect can have only one act at the same time because every act of the intellect is incompatible with every other act of the intellect. (Friedman 2009, 434-435.) For Durand of St. Pourçain and Thomas Wylton on simultaneous acts of the intellect, see Friedman 2009.

¹³⁰ "Sed est ne possibile quod anima Christi habeat infinitas visiones ita quod eas eliciat, ut sic intellectus animae Christi sit causa partialis simul cooperans cum infinitis obiectis ad eliciendum infinitas visiones simul? Videtur primo quod non, [...] intellectus animae Christi quanto cooperatur pluribus obiectis respectu plurium effectuum producendorum, minor erit, quia secundum hoc est magis dispersa; ergo si sit dispersa cooperando infinitis obiectis respectu infinitorum effectuum, in infinitum erit minor, - et per consequens nulla erit." John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1-2, p. 335. "Ideo si non placet dicere quod intellectus animae Christi possit habere simul infinitas visiones, respectu quarum concurrat in ratione causae effectivae, respondeatur tunc ad argumentum iam factum (quia forte solubile est) et dicatur quod possibile tantum est quod anima Christi formaliter habeat infinitas visiones respectu quarum habet rationem potentiae passivae recipientis eas, et sic tantum passive et formaliter potest habere infinitas visiones, non autem active." John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1-2, p. 335-336; *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1-2, p. 453-454.

¹³¹ "Alio modo posset poni quod respectu cuiuscumque obiecti esset propria visio, ita quod essent infinitae visiones simul in intellectu receptae a Verbo causante. Et secundum istam viam secundum oporteret ponere aliqua infinita esse, - quod videtur contradicere multis auctoritatibus Philosophi et sanctorum." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1-2, p. 453. "Si ista tertia via non placet, neque quod infinita videat elicitive (neque simul recipiendo infinitas visiones infinitorum, vel unam visionem infinitorum), - potest dici quod omnia habitualiter videt in Verbo..." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1-2, p. 454. In his *Lectura*, Scotus does not claim that an opinion is against the texts of Aristotle and the saints, but claims that if this opinion does not please, one can argue that the human Christ knew everything habitually. (John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1-2, p. 336.)

¹³² "[...] actualiter, quod videat omnia actu elicito, ita quod habeat propriam visionem cuiuslibet visi; tamen in Verbo, sicut multa videntur in speculo, quae habent propriam visionem ibi; et secundum hanc viam sequitur quod intellectus animae Christi actu videt infinita, et quod habet infinitas visiones distinctas in actu simul, quod tamen negatur communiter. Secundo potest intelligi, quod omnia videat actualiter, non per proprias, et distinctas visiones, sed quod illa visio sit una formaliter, et multae virtualiter, et habet unum obiectum adaequatum, ut essentia divina, et infinita secundaria. Sed illa opinio ponit quod est una in actu, et infinitorum intellectuum; [...] ponit unam infinitam in actu intensive, quia illa una eminentes continet omnes illas visiones proprias, quas posuit opinio prior, et non videtur probabile quod aliqua sit visio in actu infinita intensive alicuius creaturae." John Duns Scotus,

view that the human Christ knew everything habitually. He explains that Christ's human soul was able to see everything in the Word of God because the act of the intellect about the Word of God shined on everything included in the Word of God. Scotus argues that the act about the Word of God was like a habit, because in a manner of a habit it was the first act of the intellect through which the intellect was able to know everything habitually.¹³³ Christ's intellect knew a thing actually when his will commanded the intellect to direct its attention to a certain thing in the Word of God.¹³⁴

Christ also knew things in themselves and he had experiential knowledge. Scotus's view about these cognitions is innovative because he argues that knowledge of things in themselves is abstract knowledge and experiential knowledge is intuitive knowledge. Abstract and intuitive knowledge were much-debated themes in early fourteenth-century psychology, and the discussion about the knowledge of Christ was one of the first contexts where these ideas were introduced. Scotus thinks that whereas intuitive knowledge is about the actual existence of a thing, abstract knowledge does not concern actual existence.¹³⁵

According to Scotus, Christ had abstract knowledge since it had the infused intelligible species required by the perfection of Christ's intellect. A soul was said to have abstract knowledge of universals and particulars. Christ knew all universals abstractly, because the soul had the

Reportatio lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 473. Also, Forster (1958, 121–122) and Adams (1999, 82) remark that Scotus ended up proposing that Christ knew everything habitually.

¹³³ “Si ista tertia via non placet, neque quod infinita videat elicitive (neque simul recipiendo infinitas visiones infinitorum, vel unam visionem infinitorum), - potest dici quod omnia habitualiter videt in Verbo, non tamen actualiter, exponendo distinctionem hoc modo, scilicet quod per aliquem actum vel habitum videt Verbum, et per illum actum sunt omnia relucetia in Verbo ut praesentia actu primo, et per hoc sibi habitualiter nota, quia, generaliter loquendo, illud dicitur ‘habitualiter notum’ respectu cuius habitus est actus primus sufficienter ostendens. Non est ergo aliquis unus habitus in anima illa, qui unica ratione sua ostendat objecta infinita, sed illud quo videt Verbum primo, est actus primus quo sibi relucet omnia quae lucent in Verbo, - et hoc, quia Verbum est sibi manifestum obiectum, ut speculum voluntarium repraesentans omnia.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 454–455; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 336; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 473–474. Scotus's teacher, William of Ware, also argues that the human Christ knew habitually everything that God knows. (William of Ware, *Quaestiones in quatuor libros sententiarum* lib. 3, MS M2, fol. 168rb.) See also Ernst 1971, 263–268.

¹³⁴ “[...] dico quod Verbum cuilibet alii beato est speculum repraesentans determinata, ultra quae non potest ille ordinate velle videre alia; sed huic animae est speculum repraesentans omnia; et ideo haec anima potest ordinate velle videre quocumque infinitorum ad quod est in potentia propinqua ad videndum,” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 456.

¹³⁵ “Cognitio autem abstractiva est illa qua absolute cognoscitur res ut abstrahit ab omni differentia temporis; sed cognitio intuitiva est illa qua cognoscitur res ut in se praesentialiter existit. Loquamur primo de cognitione abstractiva, qua cognoscitur res non ut concernit aliquam existentiam.” John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 349; *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 467. For the abstract and intuitive knowledges of Christ, see also Adams 1999, 83–85. For more on Scotus on abstract knowledge and intuitive knowledge, see Williams 2016; Pasnau 2002a, 296–300; Wolter 1990b, 98–122.

infused intelligible species of all universals.¹³⁶ Scotus then explains that particulars are known abstractly, either through the intelligible species of the universals or through the intelligible species proper to the particulars.¹³⁷ When particulars are known properly, they are known through the intelligible species proper to particulars. Thus, since Christ's intellect knew particulars properly, it had the infused intelligible species proper to particulars. However, Christ knew only some but not all particulars abstractly because the intellect did not have infinitely many intelligible species about infinitely many possible particulars at the same time.¹³⁸ The infused abstract knowledge was habitual because Christ's finite intellect was able to turn simultaneously towards only a limited number of objects and not towards all objects at the same time.¹³⁹

The experiential knowledge of Christ was intuitive knowledge. Scotus claims that intuitive knowledge is about the existence of a thing, and he expounds that there are two kinds of intuitive knowledge: perfect and imperfect. Perfect intuitive knowledge concerns a thing as it

¹³⁶ "De cognitione igitur abstractiva loquendo, quae scilicet est obiecti sive singularis sive universalis, potest dici quod ista anima novit omnia universalis sive quidditates habitualiter per species infusas, quia cum ista notitia sit perfectionis in intellectu creato, pro eo quod intellectus creatus est passivus respectu cuiuscumque obiecti intelligibilis (quia non habet in se perfectionem omnium intelligibilium, et carere perfectione sibi possibili respectu alicuius obiecti est ponere intellectum aliquo modo imperfectum), videtur probabile attribuere huic intellectui perfectionem respectu omnis intelligibilis, qualis attribuitur angelis, cum nec illa repugnet intellectui creato, nec sit imperfectio in eo, nec etiam est impossibilis perfectioni illius cognitionis in Verbo quae ponitur competere huic animae..." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 465; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 349.

¹³⁷ "Sed hoc modo, scilicet per abstractionem et habitualiter, vel non novit omnia singularia sub propriis rationibus, - puta si non habet species infusas nisi quidditatum, quia illae non sunt rationes cognoscendi singularia sub propriis rationibus: sicut enim universale non dicit totam entitatem singularem, nec per consequens cognoscibilitatem eorum, ita nec illud quod est propria ratio cognoscendi universale, non est propria ratio cognoscendi singulare distincte et proprie." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 466. Also Aristotle explains that a person can have knowledge of universals and particulars. (Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora* I.1, 71a17–24.) For the knowledge of individuals in medieval philosophy, see Bérubé 1964.

¹³⁸ "Vel si ponatur abstractiva et habitualiter cognoscere singularia quantum sunt cognoscibilia ab intellectu creato, concedendum est cuiuslibet singularis speciem propriam esse in illo intellectu, et ita plures species eiusdem speciei, et etiam infinitas species respectu infinitorum singularium possibilem." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 466. "Quod si alicui non videtur attribuenda esse huic animae confusa cognitio singularium nec distincta infinita per species infinitas, potest dicere quod haec anima novit habitualiter et abstractiva aliqua singularia per proprias species infusas, - et alia non novit habitualiter, potest tamen ea nosse habitualiter si illa fiant in existentia reali..." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 466–467; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 475–476. See also Adams 1999, 83–84.

¹³⁹ "Neque tamen quidditates neque singularia oportet ponere illam animam nosse simul actualiter, quia notitia actualis aliquorum in genere proprio est secundum virtutem naturalem ipsius intellectus in se; non autem potest intellectus finitus ad quocumque obiecta simul distincte percipienda converti virtute naturali." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 467; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 475.

exists in the present, whereas imperfect intuitive knowledge involves either an opinion about the future or a memory about the past.¹⁴⁰

According to Scotus, the intellect knows things through perfect intuitive knowledge when things are actually present in themselves (*in se*) or actually present in the Word of God (*in Verbo*). The human Christ had both kinds of perfect intuitive knowledge. Christ knew things intuitively in the Word of God when he saw things in the Word of God and in themselves when he came across things in the world. For example, Christ knew intuitively that Peter was sitting when Peter's sitting in itself was present for Christ. Christ did not have perfect intuitive knowledge of all things in themselves because Christ did not come across all things in the world.¹⁴¹ Scotus argues that God was not able to pour forth perfect intuitive knowledge of things in themselves into Christ's intellect by giving infused intelligible species because the intelligible species represent objects as abstracted from the existence.¹⁴² Since Christ did not know everything in themselves through perfect intuitive knowledge and God was not able to give such knowledge, Christ progressed in the perfect intuitive knowledge of things in themselves.¹⁴³

According to Scotus, imperfect intuitive knowledge involves either an opinion about the future or a memory about the past. He does not explain in detail what kind of knowledge is an opinion about the future, but

¹⁴⁰ "Loquendo autem de alia cognitione, scilicet intuitiva, quae est de natura vel singulari ut concernit actualem existentiam, dico quod illa est vel perfecta, qualis est de obiecto ut existens est praesentialiter, - vel imperfecta, qualis est opinio de futuro vel memoria de praeterito." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 467; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 351–354.

¹⁴¹ "Primo modo non novit omnia in genere proprio [...] quia obiectum isto modo non est cognoscibile nisi ut actualiter praesens in se vel in aliquo in quo habet esse perfectius quam in se; sed cognitum hoc modo non est in genere proprio; non esset igitur nata cognosci 'sessio Petri' nisi praesens esset sessio Petri in se; et ita cum multa obiecta nec fuerunt nec esse poterunt praesentia illi intellectui secundum existentiam actualem illorum, non poterit habere cognitionem intuitivam illorum." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 467–468. "Et ideo non potest Christus habere cognitionem intuitivam de re nisi vel in Verbo vel in existentia propria; et quia non semper cognovit res in propria existentia in genere proprio, ideo secundum hoc profecit et cognitionem intuitivam acquisivit." John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 352.

¹⁴² "Et si dicatur quod potuit habere cognitionem omnium existentium pro quacumque differentia temporis per species infusas, - hoc falsum est, tum quia species infusae repraesentant obiectum ut abstrahit ab existentia actuali (quia eodem modo repraesentant, sive obiectum existat sive non existat, et per consequens non sunt ratio cognoscendi existens ut existens)..." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 468. See also John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 351–352.

¹⁴³ "Et quoad hoc necesse est dicere quod profecerit sicut alia anima, et obiecta alia aliquo modo cognoscit." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 469. "[...] et quia non semper cognovit res in propria existentia in genere proprio, ideo secundum hoc profecit et cognitionem intuitivam acquisivit." See also John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 352–353.

instead focuses on memory.¹⁴⁴ Scotus thinks that imperfect intuitive knowledge follows from perfect intuitive knowledge because those things that are known through perfect intuitive knowledge cause experiences and memories in the intellect.¹⁴⁵ A soul can know an object which it knew in the past because a present thing causes the intelligible species in the memory. Scotus thinks that the memory is not aware of a past thing immediately because the past apprehension of a thing is the immediate object of the memory, whereas a thing is the immediate object of the past apprehension. Therefore, a past thing is the indirect object of the memory.¹⁴⁶ Christ progressed also in the imperfect intuitive knowledge.¹⁴⁷

Against Aquinas, Scotus argues that Christ did not have acquired knowledge. He explains that infused and acquired knowledge of the same thing were two accidents of the same kind, but the intellect was not able to have two accidents of the same kind. Hence, Christ had either infused knowledge or acquired knowledge, but not both.¹⁴⁸ Scotus goes on to argue that even if the soul can have two cognitions of same kind, the intellect cannot have two perfect cognitions about the same object because then one

¹⁴⁴ "Sed quantum ad intuitivam cognitionem imperfectam, qualis est opinio de futuro et memoria de praeterito, quae relinquitur ex ista perfecta..." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 469; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 353–354. For Scotus on memory, see Wolter 1990b, 98–122. For the influence of the book *Memory and Recollection* by Aristotle on medieval philosophy, see Bloch 2007, 137–228.

¹⁴⁵ "Sed quantum ad intuitivam cognitionem imperfectam, qualis est opinio de futuro et memoria de praeterito, quae relinquitur ex ista perfecta, quia de talibus pluribus, perfecte intuitive cognitis, derelicta sunt plura experimenta et plures memoriae in intellectu, quibus cognosci possunt illa obiecta (quantum ad condiciones exsistentiae) non ut praeterita, sed ut praesentia," John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 469; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 353–354.

¹⁴⁶ "Et si obiciatur quod ex re praesente non derelinquitur nisi species intelligibilis impressa in intellectu et in parte sensitiva (ut in virtute phantastica) species imaginabilis, - hoc falsum est, quia de re praesente non tantum derelinquitur species intelligibilis in intellectu qua cognoscitur sub nulla differentia temporis, sed alia in potentia memorativa; et istae potentiae cognoscunt obiectum sub alia et alia ratione: una cognoscit obiectum ut exsistit praesentialiter, alia cognoscit ipsum ut in praeterito apprehensum, ita quod apprehensio praeteriti est immediatum obiectum memoriae et immediatum obiectum illius apprehensionis praeteritae est obiectum mediatum recordationis." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 470.

¹⁴⁷ "Hoc modo per experientiam dicitur Christus multa didicisse, id est per cognitiones intuitivas (hoc est illorum cognitorum quantum ad exsistentiam) et per memorias derelictas ab eis." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 470. "Unde cognitio ista memorativa est intuitiva imperfecta, derelicta ex cognitione intuitiva perfecta. Et ideo nec hanc omnium in genere proprio habuit Christus; et sic non prius quam crucifigeretur vidit se crucifixum nisi in Verbo. Et secundum hoc potest salvari illud dictum antiquorum doctorum quod 'Christus profecit scientiā experientiae', quia profecit scientiā intuitivā." *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 353–354.

¹⁴⁸ "Contra conclusionem arguitur ex dictis opinantis, quia secundum eum 'duo accidentia eiusdem speciei non possunt simul esse in eodem'; cognitio rei infusa et acquisita eiusdem rei in genere proprio sunt eiusdem speciei." *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 462. See also Adams 1999, 82–83.

of the cognitions would be redundant.¹⁴⁹ He adds that also the blissed soul has the passive and agent intellect, but it does not acquire knowledge,¹⁵⁰ and, unlike Aquinas, Scotus argues that the perfect person can have powers which are not actual.¹⁵¹

When Peter Auriol studied Christ's human knowledge, he built on the Franciscan emphases but also adopted some ideas from Aquinas. Following Scotus, Auriol thought that Christ's intellect had knowledge of the Word of God, knowledge of things in the Word of God, abstract knowledge and intuitive knowledge. Unlike Scotus, however, he argued that Christ also had acquired experiences.

Christ's human knowledge

Knowledge of the Word of God
Knowledge of things in the Word of God
Abstract knowledge
Intuitive knowledge
Perfect intuitive knowledge
Imperfect intuitive knowledge
Experience

According to Auriol, the human Christ knew the Word of God and things in the Word of God by two acts. His innovative but quite obscure view was that these acts were related like acts are related in syllogistic thinking. The soul knew things in the Word of God like a conclusion is known in premises and like a particular proposition is known when a universal proposition is known. Like premises and a conclusion, which are known by two acts, the human Christ saw the Word of God by a prior act and things in the Word of God by a secondary act. Auriol goes on to explain that the act

¹⁴⁹ "Praeterea, contra conclusionem in se, arguo sic: etsi duae cognitiones eiusdem speciei possint simul esse in eodem, non tamen duae cognitiones perfectae eiusdem obiecti et secundum eandem rationem, quia aut utrâque illarum perfecte cognoscitur obiectum quantum cognoscibile est, et tunc altera cognitio superflueret, - aut non, et tunc neutra perfecta." *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 463.

¹⁵⁰ "Contra rationem etiam arguitur, quia tunc beatus - cum habeat intellectum agentem et possibilem - poterit acquirere scientiam, et potentia augmentativa et aliae potentiae, quae erunt in beato eiusdem rationis quae in nobis, poterunt habere actus suos; et ita beatus modo potest augeri, sicut et Adam in statu innocentiae potuit augeri." *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 463–464.

¹⁵¹ "Ex his instantiis et aliis similibus patet quod haec propositio falsa est 'potentiae in quibuscumque perfecte possunt in actus suos': hoc enim verum est solum de imperfecto quod est in potentia ad terminos actionum illarum potentialium; sed si ab alio agente, praeveniente istas potentias, inducti sint termini ad quos possent esse actiones istarum potentialium, non poterunt agere ad istos terminos, - non propter imperfectionem sui, sed propter positionem termini ab alio praeveniente; nec propter hoc negandae sunt esse in natura, quia sunt simpliciter perfectiones naturae (sive habeant terminos perfectionis suae sive ab illa sive aliunde)." *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 464.

about the Word of God involved knowledge about things, like knowledge of the universal proposition “all triangles have three angles” involves knowledge of the particular proposition “this triangle has three angles”. Hence, according to Auriol, the act about things in the Word of God only explicated what the act about the Word of God involved.¹⁵²

Similar to the above-mentioned Franciscan theologians like Bonaventure and Scotus, Auriol also argues that Christ’s human soul knew habitually all things in the Word of God.¹⁵³ Christ’s human soul knew habitually an infinite number of things because the soul had knowledge of the Word of God, which virtually includes infinitely many propositions. When the intellect saw the Word of God, it was able to know infinitely many things, one after another, even though it was not able to know all things in the Word of God at once.¹⁵⁴ Auriol seems to think that Christ’s created intellect was not able to elicit one act about infinitely many things or infinitely many simultaneous acts, even though it was able to elicit infinitely many acts one after another.¹⁵⁵ The intellect also did not receive passively

¹⁵² “Dico, quod non eodem actu videtur divina essentia et creaturae licet eadem similitudine ut specie et habitu. [...] videre aliquid in Verbo est dupliciter vel exemplariter, vel per rationem exemplaris, [...] alio modo per rationem continentiae et inductive. [...] Exemplum aliqua cognoscuntur in propositionibus et aliqua ex propositionibus. Nam propria dicitur passio cognosci in subiecto sed alio actu. Similiter angelus cognoscit conclusiones in principiis sed alio actu. Item Aristoteles [...] cognoscens quod omnis triangulus habet tria cognoscit de isto particulari quod iste habet tria et cognoscit hoc in priori propositione quia sine medio. Unde dicit, quod statim inducens cognoscit unde ibi non acquiritur nisi explicatio et ideo nova scientia non acquiritur. Sic in proposito, actus quo creaturae videntur fertur in Verbo, sed non cognito isto actu quia esset beatificus nec in Verbo ut exemplar, sed in Verbo cognito priori actu sicut conclusio cognoscitur principio cognito per alium actum. Ergo virtute Verbo cogniti priori actu habetur ista cognitio. Nam sicut in una propositione continentur aliae ut in ista, omnis figura plana et cetera habet tres, continentur omnes propositiones de particularibus triangulis. Sic omnis creatura virtute continetur in essentia et eius cognitio in cognitione illius. Tunc cum fertur actus secundus super creaturam non est nisi explicatio eius quod in virtute prius continebatur. Et istud est cognoscere in Verbo, et ex Verbo.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, MS M₁, fol. 63r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 430–431. Auriol’s idea is based on Aristotle’s *Analytica posteriora* I.1, 71a17–24. Unlike Auriol, William Ockham seems to think that a soul can know the Word of God and things in the Word of God by the same act. (William Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum quartum sententiarum* lib. 4, q. 15 (OTh. VII, 327). Walter Chatton also argues that the human Christ saw the Word of God and things in the Word of God by the same act. (Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 99.)

¹⁵³ My study on Peter Auriol’s *Commentary on the Sentences* is based on the manuscript Sarnano, Biblioteca comunale, MS E. 92.

¹⁵⁴ “Dico quod anima Christi habuit notitiam infinitorum in habitu per lumen gloriae. Nam prior notitia continet in virtute infinitas conclusiones, et ex illa potest infinita inferre successive.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, MS M₁, fol. 63r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 431.

¹⁵⁵ “Dico ad quaestionem quod anima Christi non potest habere infinitos actus tales quibus infinita cognoscat, et ratio quia aut actus talis eliceretur [...] {ad} <ab> ipsa anima. [...] Si autem est ab anima elicitive tunc impossibile est quod plura intelligat actu elicito vel quod eliciat infinita. Sed quae est ratio si potest intellectio elicere successive infinitos actus, quare non simul. Nec potest habere unicum actum infinitum quia esset infinitae perfectionis.” Peter

from the Word of God one act about infinitely many things or infinitely many acts because, according to Auriol, the intellect was not only a passive receiver but also active when it knew things in the Word of God.¹⁵⁶ However, Auriol does not explain in detail how the intellect was active in this cognition. In addition, not even God was able to effect infinitely many acts in Christ's intellect, because actual infinity is a contradiction and God cannot create a contradiction.¹⁵⁷

Following Aquinas and Scotus, Auriol thinks that Christ had knowledge of things in themselves because the perfection of Christ's human soul required it.¹⁵⁸ The knowledge of things in themselves was the abstract knowledge which Christ had because he had infused intelligible species. Following Scotus, Auriol argues that abstract knowledge is about universal and particulars, and Christ had the infused intelligible species of all universals. However, unlike Scotus, Auriol appears to think that the soul knew all particulars through the intelligible species of the universals, but not through the intelligible species proper to particulars.¹⁵⁹

As Friedman has argued, Auriol thinks that in the knowledge of the normal human being, phantasms are needed when an object is apparent

Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, MS M₁, fol. 63r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 431.

¹⁵⁶ "Dico ad quaestionem quod anima Christi non potest habere infinitos actus tales, quibus infinita cognoscat et ratio, quia aut actus talis eliceretur a Verbo, ita quod imprimeretur in ipsa anima, [...] primo modo non potest dari quia sic intellectus esset solum passivus." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, MS M₁, fol. 63r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 431.

¹⁵⁷ "Sed primum est mihi dubium, quia ponere actus infinitos actus repugnat..." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, MS M₁, fol. 62v, the 1605 printed edition, p. 430. "Et ad confirmationem dico per interemptionem maioris cum dicit quod quantum contingit esse in potentia tantum potest Deus reducere ad actum. Nam pono continuum infinitas habere partes per continuam divisionem in infinitam quam Deo non posset reducere ad actum quia actum contradictio." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, MS M₁, fol. 62v, the 1605 printed edition, p. 430.

¹⁵⁸ "Nulla imperfectio est ponenda in anima Christi. Sed si tollitur scientia rerum per species proprias et habitus ponitur imperfectio in anima Christi: ergo." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M₁, fol. 64r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 433.

¹⁵⁹ "Circa primum iste doctor distinguit scientiam sive rationem quoniam quaedam est notitia intuitiva quaedam abstractiva. Abstractiva autem est respectu plurium et particularium quae est de quidditate simpliciter non concernendo {essentiam} <existentiam?>. Dico etiam quod est respectu particularium sicut si intelligam patrem meum non concurrente eius existentia. De ista dico quod nulla fuit in Christo experimentaliter acquisita quoniam Christus habuit omnium tam universalium quam particularium dum tamen sufficiant species universalium ad cognoscendum particularia. Quicquid enim non repugnat debet poni in anima Christi fuisse ab instanti suae conceptionis. [...] Sed individua oportet cognosci per proprias species, hoc repugnat habere scientiam omnium particularium quia cum sint infinita vel non repugnat oportet quod Christus haberet infinitas species vel oportet dicere quod non novit omnia quaedam." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M₁, fol. 64v, the 1605 printed edition, p. 434.

to the intellect.¹⁶⁰ When Auriol studies the knowledge of the human Christ, he claims that Christ's intellect was able to know without turning to phantasms since he had infused intelligible species.¹⁶¹ This suggests that the knowledge of the normal human being requires phantasms but Christ's infused knowledge did not. However, Auriol's view begs a question because he does not explain how an object became apparent for Christ's intellect without phantasms.

Although Auriol's understanding about intuitive knowledge differs from that of Scotus,¹⁶² he takes for granted Scotus's opinion about Christ's perfect and imperfect intuitive knowledge.¹⁶³ Unlike Scotus, however, he thinks that Christ not only had perfect and imperfect intuitive knowledge, but also acquired experiences which differed from intuitive knowledge. When Auriol studies the experience of Christ, he begins by defining it. Auriol's view is based on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* and *Analytica posteriora*, where Aristotle explains that memory rises from sense perceptions and that experience is acquired from several memories. Hence, according to Aristotle, we do not first experience and then have memories, but memories precede experience.¹⁶⁴

Auriol argues that experience is a habit, which is not a memory or scientific knowledge (*scientia*). Memories differ from experience because memories cause the habit of the experience.¹⁶⁵ Scientific knowledge also differs from experience, because the cause of scientific knowledge is a demonstration but memories are the cause of experience.¹⁶⁶ According to Auriol, experienced things are between particulars and universals. The habit

¹⁶⁰ Friedman 2015b, 161–162. For Auriol on intelligible species, see Friedman 2015b, 157–164.

¹⁶¹ Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 458.

¹⁶² For Auriol's view about intuitive cognition, see Friedman 2015a; Tachau 1988, 104–112.

¹⁶³ “Hic sunt quaedam bene dicta et quaedam mihi dubia. Credo(?) bene dictum tunc(?) de notitia intuitiva et abstractiva. [...] Sed dubium est mihi aliud dictum sed est extra propositum. Quod enim dicit, quod obiectum imprimit duas species unam in imaginatione secundam in memoria, illa non est via philosophica quia secundum commentatorem res solum imprimit speciem suam imaginationi.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M₁, fol. 65r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 434–435. Auriol only criticizes Scotus's view that a thing causes a species in the imagination and in the memory. According to Auriol, a thing impresses a species only in the memory.

¹⁶⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysica* I.1, 980b26–981b14; *Analytica posteriora* II.2, cap. 19, 100a 4–10.

¹⁶⁵ “Prima est quod ex memoriis multiplicatis acquiritur notitia experimentalis alia a memoria. [...] Notitia causans et causata non est eadem. Notitia experimentalis et memoria se habet huiusmodi: ergo, etc.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M₁, fol. 65r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 435.

¹⁶⁶ “Dico ex memoriis et in hoc differ ab habitu scientiae qui est ex demonstrationibus.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M₁, fol. 66r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 436–437.

of experience rises from the similitude of particulars and it grasps a universal in grasping the similitude. However, all conditions of universals are not available through experience. For example, one can experience that certain herbs cure a certain illness, but one cannot experience that those herbs cure that illness because of this cause. One who knows a universal also knows a cause why those herbs cure that illness. Hence, according to Auriol, the experience is not totally about universals and particulars.¹⁶⁷

Auriol thinks that Christ acquired experiences because God was not able to pour forth experience into Christ's human soul in the first instant of its existence. He argues that experience requires memories, but God cannot give memories for the soul in the first moment of its existence because memory is knowledge of the past and the soul cannot remember a thing which the soul did not know the day before.¹⁶⁸ Auriol expounds that God can give the habit of experience, but the habit cannot be actual without memories, since it is a contradiction to have an actual experience but not memories. He explains that God did not give the habit of experience to Christ because the habit of experience was useless without memories and God did not give anything useless to Christ.¹⁶⁹ Auriol concludes that Christ

¹⁶⁷ "Videndum est ergo quod experiuntur est medium inter universale et particulare. Nam experimentum est habitus ortus ex particularibus fundatus super simile tunc capiendū illam similitudinem capit universale. Sed omnes conditiones universalis non potest experiiri, ut de tali herba <quod> curat talem infirmitatem ex tali causa. Unde nunquam sciet dicere quod laborantibus talis tempore et tali aegritudine et tali causa ita haec herba curam efficiet sed non ergo ut sic non habet universale cum conditiones universalis non habet. Nec etiam habet mere particulare sed quasi quoddam implicitum. Tunc ista videretur esse intentio Aristotelis ubi dicit quod est universalis propositio experimenti ut dicere illa herba sanat illa et illa, ergo omnis talis. Sed quod sanat hanc aegritudinem ex tali causa procedente hoc est artis et scientiae, ergo isto modo potest poni respectu universalium et tunc patet solum ratio." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M₁, fol. 66r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 436.

¹⁶⁸ "Dico quod in Christo iste habitus experimentalis fuit acquisitus. Probo, Christo non est datum a primo instanti quod capere non potuit. Sed Christus ab instanti suae conceptionis hunc habitum capere non potuit vel si cepisset frustra cepisset, ergo etc. Probatio minorem est, dico quod memoria non possit sibi dari a principio. Probo, quia memoria dicit notitiam praeteriti Deus autem non potest [facere] ut hoc quod heri nescivit meminere. Unde impossibile est Deo istas memorias imprimere. Sed habitus est frustra nisi sit ex memoriis [...] ergo etc." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M₁, fol. 66r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 437.

¹⁶⁹ "Iste habitus non potest dari non habenti memoriam [...] sed habitus experimentalis est notitia nonnisi ex memoriis, igitur ubi non dans memoriam, etc. Sed an Deus possit istum habitum infundere non habenti memoriam. [...] Dico quod Deus non potest quia implicat contradictionem. Et primo de actu nam experimentum non solum vocatur notitia singularis sed notitia huius ex hoc, igitur intra conceptum notitiae experimentalis huius est ex hoc idest ex memoria. Dicitur ergo quod sit notitia huius singularis et non sit ex hoc est contradictio cum includatur intra conceptum eius. Unde bene Deus posset dare notitiam eius sed ista non esset experimentum. [...] Et dico de habitu experimentalis posset enim Deus eum dare sine habitu memorum. Sed quia exire possit in actum sine illo est contradictio. Sed quia Deus nihil facit frustra et habitus sit sine actu [...] non dabit istum habitum sic sine actu." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M₁, fol. 66r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 437.

progressed in perfect intuitive knowledge, imperfect intuitive knowledge and experiences. Hence, following Scotus, he thinks that Christ had abstract knowledge and progressed in intuitive knowledge. Like Aquinas, Auriol furthermore states that Christ also had acquired experiences, but unlike Aquinas, who claims that Christ's intellect had experiential knowledge, Auriol thinks that Christ had experiences by means of his senses.¹⁷⁰

¹⁷⁰ "Istum ergo habitum acquisivit, unde non solum profecit in notitia intuitiva perfecta nec imperfecta ut proficeret in memoriis solum. Immo dico quod ex istis memoriis fuit in eo aliquid acquisitum in sensu humano. Unde ista notitia in Christo fuit dicta notitia sensus humani. [...] unde dico, quod vere profecit non solum apparente." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M₁, fol. 66r, the 1605 printed edition p. 437.

2 THE WILLS OF CHRIST

“We likewise proclaim in him [...] two natural volitions or wills [...] without division, without change, without separation, without confusion. The two natural wills are not – by any means – opposed to each other [...] but his human will is compliant; it does not resist or oppose but rather submits to his divine and almighty will.”¹

According to the above text from the third Council of Constantinople (680–681), Christ had two wills – namely, the divine will and the human will – which were not opposed since the human will was subjected to the divine will.² Thirteenth- and fourteenth-century theologians took this Christological doctrine for granted, but they were especially interested in some basic questions about Christ’s human will that needed further explication. First, they asked what kind of human will Christ had? This question was associated with aspects of the appetitive powers. Medieval theologians differed from the seventh-century scholars in their understanding, positing that Christ’s human will was divided into several wills and the wills had even oppositional tendencies, and thus they asked how the appetitive powers of the human being can be directed towards opposing things at the same time. Theologians also studied briefly Christ’s free choice. Before studying the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions, I briefly present some earlier Christological themes concerning the human wills of Christ in those patristic and early-medieval sources, which are important for understanding the later discussion.³ Although some emphases about the wills of Christ were peculiar to the Franciscan and Thomistic intellectual traditions, these traditions were not as visible in this discussion as in the discussions about the knowledge of Christ.

¹ Denzinger 2012, 556, p. 193.

² For more about the patristic discussion about Christ’s wills, see Barnes 2012, p. 6–18.

³ The term ‘will’ (*voluntas*) was ambiguous in the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions. It can mean the appetitive powers of the sensitive and rational parts of the soul, the appetitive power of the rational part of the soul, an inclination, or an act. When I use the terms ‘will’, ‘the will of reason’ and ‘the will of sensuality’, I mean the appetitive power(s) of the rational or the sensitive part of the soul if nothing else is said.

2.1. Christ's Wills in the Patristic and Early Medieval Sources

One of the most influential source for the later theologians about the doctrine of Christ's wills was John of Damascus's *De fide orthodoxa*.⁴ According to John, Christ's divine and human wills corresponded with his divine and human natures: the divine will was the will of his divine nature and the human will was the will of his human nature.⁵ The human will always wished what the divine will wished it to wish and when the human Christ naturally refused death, the divine will wished that he refused it.⁶ Although John thinks that the human Christ refused death, he also claims that his human will wished it. Christ's prayer in Gethsemane (Matt. 26:39) exemplifies this.⁷ When Christ prayed "Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me, nevertheless, not in accordance with my will but yours," the human will wished the death.⁸ It appears that Damascus thought that the human will wished freely for death, because the human will was free and had free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), as all rational natures have.⁹ However, the human Christ did not choose and deliberate, because choosing and deliberating implied ignorance and Christ was not ignorant about anything.¹⁰

In the medieval discussions about the will, Anselm of Canterbury was a significant theologian. When he studied the will in general, he made some significant distinctions, which framed later discussions about the will. Anselm holds that the will (*voluntas*) can mean the power of the

⁴ When Damascus studies the will in general, he makes a rather obscure differentiation between the notions of *thelesis* and *bulesis*, which came to be much used and discussed later on. For Damascus, *thelesis* is the natural and rational appetite for all necessities of life. *Bulesis* is a natural and rational appetite for definite ends, whether in our power or not, and for possible and impossible ends. ("Quare thelesis (id est voluntas) quidem est ipse naturalis et vitalis et rationalis appetitus omnium naturae constitutivorum, simplex virtus. [...] Bulesis (id est voluntas) autem est qualitativa naturalis thelesis (id est voluntas), scilicet naturalis et rationalis appetitus alicuius rei. [...] Cum igitur naturaliter motus fuerit ipse rationalis appetitus ad aliquam rem, dicitur bulesis (id est voluntas). Bulesis (id est voluntas) enim est appetitus et desiderium cuiusdam rei rationalis. Dicitur bulesis (id est voluntas) et in hiis quae sunt in nobis, et in hiis quae non in nobis sunt, hoc est et in possibilibus et in impossibilibus. [...] Est autem bulesis (id est voluntas) finis, non eorum quae sunt ad finem." John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 135–137.) See also John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 140–141. Damascus adopted this division from Maximus the Confessor's work *Opuscula theologica et polemica ad Marinum* PLG 91, 11C–14A.

⁵ John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 58, p. 213–214; p. 217; cap. 36, p. 140.

⁶ John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 58, p. 217; cap. 62, p. 253.

⁷ For example, Augustine also claims that Christ's prayer implied that Christ had the human will. (Augustine, *Enarrationes in psalmos* ps. 32, sermo 1, n. 2, p. 248, PL 36, 278; ps. 93, n. 19, p. 1319, PL 37, 1206–1207.) On patristic interpretations of Christ's prayer, see Bathrellos 2004, 140–147.

⁸ John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 62, p. 253–255; cap. 68, p. 268–269.

⁹ John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 62, p. 254–255. On free will, see *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 138; cap. 41, p. 153; cap. 62, p. 254–255. According to Damascus, only rational beings have free choice. In this respect, he follows Aristotle, who claims that irrational beings do not choose. (Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* III.2, 1111b11–14.)

¹⁰ John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 138–139; cap. 58, p. 225.

will, the act of the will or the affection of the will. A human being has only one power of the will. The will as power can move itself, other powers of the soul and external things like a pen and an axe. Since the will also can move itself, Anselm calls the will an instrument that moves itself. When the will has an act, the reason first considers the object of the will. The affection of the will is an inclination to wish something also when the reason is not considering the object of the will. The will has affection for the advantageous (*commodum*) and affection for justice (*justitia*). Anselm claims that all that the will wishes, it wishes either for the sake of the advantageous or justice. Affection for the advantageous is the reason why the will wishes for beatitude and affection for justice is the reason why the will wishes for rectitude and to be right.¹¹

Anselm also studies Christ's wills. In his *Cur Deus homo*, Anselm describes that Christ's prayer in Gethsemane expressed his natural desire for safety, by which his human flesh escaped pain of death.¹² However, Christ's human will also wished for death. Anselm claims that God wished against (*nolle*) redemption of the human race in any other way except that a man should perform an action as such great as Christ's death. Since Christ wished for the salvation of the human race, it followed that Christ wished for the death by means of which the human race was reconciled. God did not force Christ to die, but Christ wished for death voluntarily.¹³

In the twelfth century, Christ's wills was widely discussed.¹⁴ One of the most important works was Hugh of Saint Victor's *De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo*, which argued that Christ's human will was divided into the will of reason (*voluntas rationis*), the will of pity (*voluntas pietatis*) and the will of the flesh (*voluntas carnis*).¹⁵ The aim of the division was to

¹¹ Anselm of Canterbury, *De concordia praescientiae* q. 3, cap. 11, 283–284; p. 281; Taina Holopainen 2014, 553. For Anselm on the will, see also Normore 2002, 29–47; Ekenberg 2005a, 301–313; 2005b; 2016. On the freedom of free choice, see Anselm of Canterbury, *De libertate arbitrii* cap. 3, p. 210–213; Taina Holopainen 2014, 557–558. About the acts of the will, see Anselm of Canterbury, *Fragmenta philosophica* p. 335; Taina Holopainen 2014, 554.

¹² Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo* lib. 1, cap. 9, p. 15; Saarinen 1994, 49. See also Barnes 2012, 28–31.

¹³ Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo* lib. 1, cap. 9, p. 15–17.

¹⁴ For Christ's wills in the twelfth-century discussions, see also Barnes 2012, 26–47.

¹⁵ Hugh of Saint Victor, *De quatuor voluntatibus in christo* PL 176, 841B–841C. See also Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sacramentis christiane fidei*, lib. 2, pars prima, cap. 11, PL 176, 404B–404D. For Hugh of Saint Victor on Christ's wills, see also Gondreau 2002, 74–76; Coolman 2008; Barnes 2012, 34–35. Following Hugh, the Victorian author of *Summa sententiarum* clarifies that Christ's human nature had the natural appetite and will of reason. (*Summa sententiarum septem tractatibus distincta* tract. 1, cap. 17, PL 176, 75D–76A.) The author of *Ysagoge in theologiam*, whose name is Odo, also thinks that Christ had the natural appetite and will of reason. (Odo, *Ysagoge in theologiam* lib. 2, p. 171.) Roland of Bologna argues that Christ's human will involved the will of the flesh and the will of reason. (Roland of Bologna, *Sententiae* p. 184–185.) Peter Abelard does not divide Christ's human will, and he thinks that the human Christ did not really wish his death. Abelard holds that the human

explain how the human Christ was able to wish for his death and to avoid it, and how he was compassionate towards human beings. However, although Hugh's division is notable, his remarks are scanty. As Barnes remarks, it is not clear whether Hugh thinks that the human wills were, for example, different powers or different aspects of the same powers.¹⁶

Hugh explains that the divine will and the will of reason, which was obedient to the divine will, wished the death, but the will of the flesh wished naturally against it.¹⁷ Furthermore, when Christ saw the destruction of Jerusalem (Luke 19:41), the will of pity wished against the destruction but the divine will and the will of reason wished for it.¹⁸ Hugh argues that although the divine and human wills wished different things, the wills were just because each of them followed and desired what was fitting for them to follow and desire. The divine will followed justice, the will of reason followed obedience, the will of pity followed compassion, and the will of the flesh followed nature. The divine will wished justly for the death since it followed justice, and the will of the flesh wished justly against the death since it followed nature. Christ's wills were not contrary. Hugh thinks that the wills are contrary when one will wishes against a thing because another will wishes for that same thing. Christ's wills were not contrary because the will of the flesh wished against the death since it followed nature, not because the divine will wished the death, while the divine will wished for the death since it followed justice, not because the will of the flesh wished against it.¹⁹

The twelfth-century discussion on Christ's wills had an influence on the later discussion, mainly through Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. Lombard's teaching on Christ's wills was based especially on John of

Christ tolerated rather than wished for his death because the will was not able to wish for death as such. The will tolerated the death because of the salvation of the human race, which the will wished. Therefore, the human Christ did not wish his death *simpliciter*. (Peter Abelard, *Scito te ipsum* p. 10; *Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad romanos* lib. 2, cap. 6, p. 179; lib. 4, cap. 15, p. 312.) The anonymous Abelardian author of *Sententie parisienses* also says that Christ's human will approved the death because of the redemption of the human race, but the will did not wish the death *simpliciter*. The author explains that the will would have wished against the death if redemption could be gained by another means. Hence, Christ's human will did not wish the death but approved it, and the will did not wish the death *simpliciter*. Although the will approved the death, the will wished against the death conditionally. (*Sententie parisienses* pars 1, p. 32–33.)

¹⁶ Barnes 2012, 34.

¹⁷ Hugh of Saint Victor, *De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo* PL 176, 841D.

¹⁸ Hugh of Saint Victor, *De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo* PL 176, 842B–842C.

¹⁹ Hugh of Saint Victor, *De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo* PL 176, 842C–843A. Hugh seems to think that Christ's wills also wished that other wills wished what was proper for them to wish. For example, the divine will wished that the will of the flesh wished against death and the will of pity wished that the divine will wished for the penalty of other human beings. (Hugh of Saint Victor, *De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo* PL 176, 841D; 845B.)

Damascus's and Hugh of Saint Victor's views.²⁰ Lombard also divided Christ's human will and claimed that the wills were not opposed. A new point in his teaching was the explanation of how Christ prayed or wished for something in Gethsemane that did not take place.²¹ Lombard argues that Christ had the affection of reason and the affection of sensuality, both of which were called human wills.²² Lombard does not clarify why he calls the human wills affections, but it seems that he had adopted the term from Augustine, since he refers to his works when he discusses the will of Christ.²³ When Lombard studies human affectivity in general, he claims that a human soul has free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) and the sensitive appetitive power.²⁴ Free choice can choose good only when it is aided by grace.²⁵ As God, angels and saints confirmed by grace have free choice but they cannot choose evil, the freedom of free choice is not the ability to choose good and evil. The freedom is the ability to desire and to choose without compulsion or necessity of what is declared by reason.²⁶ Following Bernard of Clairvaux, Lombard argues that there are three kinds of freedoms: freedom from necessity, sin and misery. The free choice of good and evil beings has freedom from necessity, but only the free choice restored by grace has

²⁰ For Lombard on Christ's wills, see also Adams 1999, 23–24; Barnes 2012, 37–47.

²¹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, cap. 1, p. 105. Already the author of *Summa sententiarum* studied whether Christ prayed or asked for something that did not take place. He expounds that it seems that Christ did this when he prayed to avoid death or when he prayed for the salvation of all human beings. The author claims, however, that it was not suitable that Christ's prayers were not heard or that he prayed for something that did not please God. (*Summa sententiarum septem tractatibus distincta* tract. 1, cap. 17, PL 176, 76A–76B.)

²² Peter Lombard's student, Peter of Poitiers, holds that the human Christ had reason and sensuality. The sensuality of the human being has inferior and superior parts. The superior part of sensuality is the seat of the movements of the defects, like hunger and thirst, while the inferior part of sensuality is the seat of illicit movements like pride, lust and irascibility. According to Peter, Christ had only the superior part of sensuality because he was free from sin. Following Lombard, Peter argues that since Christ had reason and sensuality, he had the will of reason and the will of sensuality. The will of reason wished for death, but the will of sensuality wished not to die. Since the will of sensuality was the servant of the will of reason, the will of sensuality wished only in a qualified sense (*cum adjuncto*), whereas the will of reason wished *simpliciter*. However, the will of reason wished to avoid death in the sense that it effected the will of sensuality to wish to avoid it. (Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiarum libri quinque* lib. 4, cap. 15, PL 211, 1196D–1197D.) Peter remarks that in Gethsemane, Christ wished to avoid the death conditionally. (Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiarum libri quinque* lib. 2, cap. 17, PL 211, 1007C; Saarinen 1994, 69–70.) Simon of Tournai also follows Peter Lombard's account of human wills when he claims that Christ had the will of sensuality and the will of reason. He explains that the will of reason wished death because of the redemption of the human race. (Simon of Tournai, *Disputationes* d. 97, q. 1, p. 281.)

²³ Augustine, *In Joannis evangelium tractatus* tract. 123, p. 679–680, PL 35, 1969; *Sermo* 344, n. 4, PL 39, 1514.

²⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 2, d. 24, cap. 3, p. 452–453; cap. 5, p. 454. According to Lombard, free choice is the faculty of the will and reason. For more about free choice by Peter Lombard, see *Sententiae* lib. 2, d. 24, cap. 3, p. 452–453; d. 25, cap. 1–3, p. 461–463.

²⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 2, d. 24, cap. 3, p. 452–453. See also Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 2, d. 25, cap. 1, p. 461.

²⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 2, d. 25, cap. 4, p. 464.

freedom from sin.²⁷ Such free choice is freer than the free choice not restored by grace because the free choice which cannot sin is freer than the free choice which can sin.²⁸

According to Lombard, although the divine will and the will of reason wished Christ's death and the will of sensuality did not wish it, Christ's flesh did not desire against God and spirit (Gal. 5:17.). Lombard explains that God wished it, and it pleased the will of reason that the will of sensuality did not wish for death, because such wishing revealed that Christ had true human nature.²⁹ Lombard adds that only the will of sensuality wished for things which did not take place (e.g. avoiding death in Gethsemane), but everything that the will of reason wished for took place.³⁰

William of Auxerre's description of Christ's human wills in his *Summa aurea* was based on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, but it was also influenced by the works of Aristotle and Augustine.³¹ Following Aristotle, who takes that the will belongs to the rational part of the soul,³² William emphasizes the primacy of the will of reason in relation to the will of sensuality. He argues that the will of reason is will in a proper sense because it is free, but the will of sensuality is not, as it is not free. Therefore, according to William, the will of reason and the will of sensuality do not belong to the same genus.³³

Like Hugh of Saint Victor and Peter Lombard, William says that the will of reason and the will of sensuality were not contrary even though they wished for different things, but William offers a new explanation. Referring to Augustine, William argues that since the diversity of the wills rests on the diversity of the things wished,³⁴ contrary wills wish for contrary things. This implies that the will of reason and the will of sensuality are contrary because they wish for contrary things: the will of reason wished for death but the will of sensuality wished not to die. William accepts that the contrary wills wish for contrary things, but this takes place

²⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 2, d. 25, cap. 8, p. 466. The division is based on Bernard of Clairvaux's work *Liber de gratia et libero arbitrio* p. 168–171; Taina Holopainen 2014, 558.

²⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 2, d. 25, cap. 4, p. 463.

²⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, cap. 2, p. 106. When Augustine describes his well-known doctrine about the inner conflict of the human being who does not want what he wants, Augustine refers to this biblical text. See Augustine, *Confessiones* lib. 8, cap. 5, p. 120, PL 32, 753–754. See also Saarinen 1994, 26–31.

³⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, cap. 2, p. 109.

³¹ Barnes also studies William of Auxerre's view of Christ's wills. (Barnes 2012, 47–56.)

³² Aristotle, *De anima* III.9, 432b4–5; *Topics* IV.5, 126a13.

³³ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* lib. 3, tract. 6, cap. 1, p. 78. Also Stephan Langton claims that the human Christ had the will of reason and the will of sensuality. He adds that the will of sensuality is the will in an improper sense, as, according to Aristotle, the will is in the rational part of the soul. (Stephan Langton, *Sententiae* lib. 3, dist. 17, p. 123–124.)

³⁴ Augustine, *De Trinitate* lib. 11, cap. 6, p. 345–347, PL 42, 992.

only when the wills are in the same subject (*in eodem susceptibili*). The will of reason was in the rational part of Christ's human soul and the will of sensuality was in the animal part of the soul. Therefore, the will of reason and the will of sensuality were not contrary even though the wills wished for contrary things. William also proposes another difference between Christ's human wills, which explains why the wills were not contrary. He thinks that the will of sensuality escaped death as such (*secundum se*), whereas the will of reason wished the death because of (*propter*) the redemption of the human race, but not as such. Since the will of reason and will of sensuality did not wish contrary things as such, the wills were not contrary.³⁵

When William turns to study Christ's prayer in Gethsemane, he holds that reason can be the spokesperson of sensuality as reason proposes the desire of sensuality to God. When Christ prayed to let the cup pass from him, it was partly the petition of reason and partly the petition of sensuality. It was the petition of reason because reason proposed it and it was the petition of sensuality because reason raised the plight of sensuality.³⁶ However, according to William, reason was not a neutral spokesperson of sensuality. Reason added to the petition of sensuality the clause "if it is possible" to provide an instruction for us of how to subject the will of sensuality to the divine will and how to ask something from God conditionally.³⁷

2.2. *The Division of Christ's Human Will*

The thirteenth-century views about the passions of Christ supposed a more nuanced teaching about the division of the human wills than the twelfth-century theologians had put forward. For example, since the thirteenth-century theologians thought that the will of the reason was touched by pain about death, they needed to explain how the will of the reason avoided death although it also wished for it. That required further additions to the will of the reason. These additions were significant since they were

³⁵ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* lib. 3, tract. 6, cap. 1, p. 78–79.

³⁶ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* lib. 3, tract. 6, cap. 3, p. 83. According to William, the will of reason also causes the movements of sensuality indirectly through the imagination. William describes that when Christ wished, the representation of his future death fell from the intellect to the imagination and from the imagination to the estimative power. Then, the future death fell from Christ's estimative power to the sensuality and fear followed necessarily. William claims that then the will was not the proper but the accidental cause of the fear. The will gave an opportunity for fear since fear resulted in sensuality when the will caused the representation of death in the imagination and in the estimative power. (William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* lib. 3, tract. 6, cap. 2, p. 80–81.) Here William applies the Avicennian faculty psychology to Christ. For Avicenna's faculty psychology, see Knuuttila 2004, 219–222; Hasse 2000, 80–223.

³⁷ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* lib. 3, tract. 6, cap. 3, p. 83–84.

adopted to the psychology of the will in general. In this chapter, I shall study how the medieval theologians divided the wills of Christ.

The thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians adopted Peter Lombard's view that Christ's human will was divided into the will of reason and the will of sensuality, which were two powers of the soul.³⁸ Following William of Auxerre, they thought mostly that the will of reason was the will in a proper sense since it was free, but the will of sensuality was the will in a loose sense since it was not free.³⁹

However, Aquinas argues that the sensitive appetitive power of the human being is free, as it takes part in the freedom of the will when it is obedient to reason, and he claims that it is a will due to participation. The appetitive power of the animal is not a will because it is not free, but only follows natural instincts.⁴⁰ As I shall explain in detail in the next chapter, Aquinas's emphasis that the human sensitive appetitive power could be obedient to the reason was essential for his teaching about the passions of Christ's human soul because Christ's passions followed from the command

³⁸ *Summa theologiae* (*Summa Halensis*) lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 177; Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 366); Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 5, p. 304; a. 2, p. 302; lib. 2, d. 24, a. 8, p. 406; Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1 co; *Summa contra Gentiles* lib. 4, cap. 36; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 18, a. 1 co; Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, p. 122; Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 2, q. 4, p. 185; Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242r; John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 565; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 424; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 484; Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, MS M1, fol. 78r, the 1605 printed edition p. 461–462.

³⁹ *Summa theologiae* (*Summa Halensis*) lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 178; Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 367); Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 3, p. 302; *De homine* q. 65, a. 2, p. 550; John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 565; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 424; Wolter 1986, 41–42. For example, according to *Summa Halensis*, the will of sensuality is not free because God defines it to desire what sustains life and to escape what destroys life. (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 178.) Albert argues that the will of human sensuality is not free since it does not act but is acted on, either by the command of reason or natural instinct. (Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 3, p. 302.) Albert thinks that, for example, John of Damascus's *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 138, Aristotle's *De anima* III.9, 432b4–5 and Topics lib. 4, cap. 5, 126a13 seem to imply that sensuality is not a will.

⁴⁰ “Sed iste appetitus in aliis animalibus non habet rationem voluntatis, quia aguntur instinctu naturae potius quam agant, ut dicit Damascenus, et ita non habent liberum motum, quem voluntas requirit. Tamen in homine potest etiam dici voluntas appetitus sensibilis, inquantum est obediens rationi, ut dicitur in 1 Eth.; et ideo participat aliquantulum libertatem voluntatis, sicut et rectitudinem rationis, ut possit dici voluntas participative, sicut et dicitur ratio per participationem. Et ita in Christo quantum ad humanam naturam dicimus duas voluntates, scilicet sensualitatis et rationis.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2 co; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 18, a. 2 co. Scotus (*Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 484.) and Durand of St. Pourçain (*Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242r.) also claim that the will of sensuality is a will through participation.

of his reason.⁴¹ Aquinas thinks that the sensitive appetitive power differs from the appetite of reason because they follow different kinds of apprehensions about different kinds of goods. The appetite of reason follows the apprehension of the intellect and reason about a universal good. The appetite of sensuality follows the apprehension of the senses about a particular good.⁴² Aquinas adds that the will differs from the sensitive appetitive power also because the will can determine its own inclination, but the sensitive appetitive power has an inclination defined by something else,⁴³ and because, unlike the sensitive appetitive power, the will can move all powers of the soul except the powers of the vegetative part.⁴⁴

Bonaventure was one of the first to add that Christ has five more wills of sensuality, which correspond with five external senses because he thought that each external sense had a corresponding sensitive appetitive power. He notes, however, that Peter Lombard mentioned only the sensitive appetitive power, which corresponds to the cognition of sensuality, because, according to Augustine, the cognition of sensuality completes the cognition of the exterior senses.⁴⁵ The idea that a human being has sensitive appetitive powers related to the exterior senses was a view favoured especially by the

⁴¹ For how, according to Aquinas, the sensitive appetitive power can follow reason, see Chapter 3.3.

⁴² Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2 co; *Summa theologiae* I^a q. 80, a. 2 co; I^a-II^a q. 8, a. 1 co.

⁴³ Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 22, a. 4 ad 1; Kretzmann 1993, 147.

⁴⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a q. 82, a. 4 co. However, according to Aquinas, the will is not only a mover. As Aristotle claims, the will is a moved mover. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a-II^a q. 9, a. 1 sed contra; *Sentencia De anima* lib. 3, cap. 9, p. 244; Aristotle's *De anima* III.10, 433b10–21.) The intellect moves the will because the intellect presents an object for the will. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a-II^a q. 9, a. 1 co; I^a q. 82, a. 4 co.) The will can move also itself. When the will wishes an end, it can move itself to wish means. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a-II^a q. 9, a. 3 co.) The will moves itself through the deliberation of reason, which is wished by the will. (Thomas Aquinas, *De malo* q. 6 co.) Giles of Rome also argues that the attention of the intellect activates the will to wish, but the will can control the attention. (Giles of Rome, *Quodlibeta* 3, q. 15, p. 178.) Giles's view remains that of Aquinas but, as Hoffmann claims, it is more voluntaristic than Aquinas's one because the will directs the attention of the intellect according to its own liking. (Hoffmann 2010, 421.) Hervaeus Natalis also argues that the will moves itself through the deliberation of reason. (Hervaeus Natalis, *In quattuor Petri Lombardi Sententiarum volumina scripta subtilissima* lib. 2, d. 25, q. 2, p. 28v.) The views of Aquinas, Giles and Natalis indicate that the Dominican masters favoured a view that the will cannot move itself directly, but only through reason.

⁴⁵ “[...] dicendum, quod cognitio sensitiva exterior non habet perfectionem absque interiori. Sicut enim vult Augustinus, non est perfecta visio ex concursu organi et obiecti, nisi adsit interior intentio copulans unum cum altero, sicut dicitur in libro de Trinitate undecimo. Illam autem intentionem vocat Augustinus sensualitatem, dicens, quod sensualitas est illa, ‘per quam intenditur in corporis sensus’; et penes hanc attenditur appetitus carnis. Et ideo Magister ex parte cognitionis sensitivae unam tantum ponit voluntatem, scilicet voluntatem sensualitatis; si enim acciperet secundum sensus exteriores, iam non una, sed quinque essent voluntates secundum quinque differentias sensuum exteriorum.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 367).

Franciscan theologians. Franciscans like John Duns Scotus⁴⁶ and Peter Auriol⁴⁷ followed Bonaventure's view that Christ had many sensitive appetitive powers related to external senses, whereas Aquinas argued that Christ had only one sensitive appetitive power. Following Avicenna, Aquinas holds that the sensitive part of the soul does not have many appetitive powers related to the exterior senses because the exterior senses do not apprehend things as suitable and unsuitable, but the sensitive appetitive power follows the apprehension of a thing as suitable and unsuitable. Since only the estimative power apprehends things as suitable and unsuitable, the sensitive part of the soul has only one appetitive power, which is related to the estimative power.⁴⁸

Contrary to Lombard, the thirteenth- and the fourteenth-century theologians argued that the will of reason was divided further. *Summa Halensis* was one of the first to divide Christ's will of reason into the will "as nature" and the will "as reason". The will of reason was divided into the will as nature inasmuch as the will was united with flesh, and the will as reason inasmuch as the will in all respects conformed to divinity.⁴⁹ *Summa*


⁴⁶ "Sed communiter loquendo, accipiendo voluntatem pro appetitu, sic puto quod in Christo, sicut in nobis, fuerunt tot appetitus quot sunt potentiae apprehensivae distinctae in nobis; et ita sicut alia est apprehensio gustus et visus, alia tactus et odoratus, ita est alia virtus propria appetitus huius et illius, et alia delectatio propria consequens hanc apprehensionem et illam." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 565–566. According to Scotus, the sensitive appetite commonly names only one power, which is the appetite related to the imagination. The appetite related to the imagination is called the sensitive appetite because it can desire and feel pain regarding the objects of all the particular senses. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 565–566. See also *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 424.) Also, Peter of John Olivi thinks that a human being has many sensitive appetitive powers related to external senses. (Toivanen 2011, 426–427.)

⁴⁷ "Secundo voluntas humana dividitur quia quaedam est voluntas, quae est affectio sequens apprehensionem rationis, quaedam affectio consequens apprehensionem sensuum. Et tertio ista subdividitur. Quedam enim affectio sequitur apprehensionem sensus exterioris, quaedam sensus interioris. Quarto, prima istarum subdividitur, quia tot sunt affectiones, quot sunt apprehensiones sensuum exteriorum." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 78r, the 1605 printed edition p. 461–462.

⁴⁸ "[...] appetitus sensibilis non surgit nisi quando apprehenditur ut conveniens. Hoc autem non fit per sensum exteriorem qui apprehendit formas sensibiles, sed per aestimationem quae apprehendit rationes convenientis et nocivi quas sensus exterior non apprehendit. Et ideo in parte sensitiva non est nisi unus appetitus secundum genus, qui tamen dividitur, sicut in species, in irascibilem et concupiscibilem, quarum utraque sub sensualitate computatur." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2 ad 2; qc. 3 ad 4; *Summa theologiae* I^a q. 81, a. 2 co.

⁴⁹ "Praenotandum est quod Christus dicitur habuisse diversas voluntates quatuor modis. Primo modo, iuxta duas naturas divinam et humanam dicuntur in Christo diversae voluntates, divina scilicet voluntas et humana. Secundo modo, secundum humanam naturam dicuntur in Christo diversae voluntates, voluntas scilicet rationis et voluntas sensualitatis. Tertio modo, dicuntur in Christo secundum rationem diversae voluntates, quia ratio habet quamdam voluntatem ut natura est unibilis corpori, et habet voluntatem ut ratio est per omnia conformis divinitati, et secundum hoc dicerentur diversae voluntates in Christo: voluntas naturalis et voluntas rationis." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 177. In his *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, Alexander briefly makes the claim that Christ's human will involved the natural will, which belonged to reason and sensuality, and the natural will

Halensis does not explain why it divides the will of reason into the will “as reason” and the will “as nature”, but a clear benefit of the division was that it helped to understand how Christ’s will of reason was also able to wish for death and wish for an avoidance of death, which was a prerequisite in explaining how the whole soul of Christ, including its rational part, was touched by pain.⁵⁰ Although *Summa Halensis* did not clarify the division in detail, the idea was significant since it implied that the rational part of Christ’s human soul had will which was moved naturally but not freely. This distinction was also adopted to philosophical language about the will.⁵¹ Since the early Franciscans, a commonly accepted division of Christ’s wills was as follows.



Theologians specifically discussed what the will as nature and the will as reason were. Bonaventure associates the will as nature with *thelesis* and the deliberative will with *bulesis* in John of Damascus’s terminology, and argues that the will as nature and the will as reason are two modes of wishing. He emphasizes that they do not differ because of an object. Whereas the will as nature wishes good and avoids evil naturally and without deliberation, the deliberative will wishes good or evil after deliberation.⁵² In a peculiar

of reason was moved either by sensuality or by God. (Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 17 (AE), n. 9, p. 176–177.) Barnes also studies the account of *Summa Halensis* about Christ’s wills. (Barnes 2012, 56–66.)

⁵⁰ For the pain and sadness of the rational part of the soul, see Chapter 3.6.

⁵¹ Taina Holopainen 2014.

⁵² “Item, voluntas secundum Damascenum dividitur prima divisione in thelesim et bulesim, hoc est in naturalem et deliberativam; istae duae differentiae constat quod fuerunt in Christo, sicut et praedictae.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 366). “Alio modo potest dividi appetitus sive potentia in naturalem et deliberativam, ita tamen, quod non sit differentia in obiectis, sed in modo appetendi; ut cum appellamus synderesim esse voluntatem naturalem, quae quidem naturaliter inclinatur et instigatur ad bonum honestum et murmurat contra malum; et voluntatem deliberativam appetitum, quo post deliberationem aliquando adhaeremus bono, aliquando malo. Et sic divisio potentiae per naturalem et deliberativam non variat eam secundum essentiam potentiae, sed secundum modum movendi. [...] Concedendum est igitur, quod naturalis voluntas et deliberativa potest esse eadem potentia, quae quidem secundum alium et alium modum movendi sic et sic appellatur. Eadem enim est potentia, qua appetit beatitudinem, et qua appetit virtutem, sive facere hoc bonum vel illud ad beatitudinem ordinatum; quae, ut appetit beatitudinem, dicitur naturalis, quia immutabiliter appetitus eius ad beatitudinem inclinatur; ut vero appetit hoc vel illud bonum facere, deliberativa dicitur, et secundum iudicium rationis potest ad contrarium inclinari.” Bonaventure, 2 Sent. d. 24, a. 2, q. 3. (II, 566). The will as nature desires immutably beatitude and the deliberative will can

manner, Bonaventure also studies the division of Christ's wills proposed by Hugh of Saint Victor. He expounds that the will of reason and the will of pity mentioned by Hugh were not two powers but different modes of the rational will to wish.⁵³ The will of reason is to wish absolutely, whereas the will of pity is to wish conditionally.⁵⁴ Why is the will of pity conditional wishing? Bonaventure explains that when the will absolutely wishes a thing, at the same time the will may conditionally wish for an opposite thing. The will can wish for the penalty of another human being and also wish for the opposite of the penalty if such wishing pleases God.⁵⁵ Bonaventure's view implies that the will of the rational part of the soul was able to wish not only absolutely but also under a condition. Bonaventure did not invent the distinction between absolute and conditional wishing, but his innovation was to use it to explain Hugh's distinctions.⁵⁶ It is worth mentioning that when Barnes explains Bonaventure's distinctions, he claims that the *bulesis/thelesis* division is the same as the will of reason/will of pity division,⁵⁷ although elsewhere Barnes notes that Bonaventure separates the will of pity from *thelesis*.⁵⁸ However, I think that there is no reason to suppose that the divisions are the same, because Bonaventure describes them differently and he does not explicitly claim that they are the same.

Albert the Great did not associate the will as deliberative with *bulesis*, and he argued that different objects explain the division between the will as deliberative and the will as nature. According to Albert, the will as nature and the will as deliberative are two ways to consider the will of

wish to do this or that as related to beatitude. For Bonaventure on Christ's wills, see also S  pinski 1948, 135–178; Adams 1999, 43–44; Hayes 2000, 117–122; Barnes 2012, 89–110.

⁵³ Note that here the will of reason is not the power but the mode of the power to wish.

⁵⁴ “[...] ex illis auctoritatibus non potest argui, quod in Christo sint plures voluntates quam tres, nisi accipiat divisio voluntatis secundum modos volendi; per quem modum rationalis voluntas multiplicari habet in voluntatem rationis et pietatis, hoc est secundum conditionalem et absolutam,” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 367). See also Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 366).

⁵⁵ “Aliquid ostendit se velle voluntate absoluta, sed oppositum velle, quantum in se est, ut mala, quae infligit. Et haec tenemur velle voluntate absoluta et deliberativa; tamen oppositum possumus velle voluntate pietatis, ut dicit Hugo. [...] Unde Hugo distinguit in nobis triplicem voluntatem, scilicet rationis, pietatis et carnis, et in Christo quadruplicem, extendens nomen voluntatis. [...] Et ideo voluntate rationis debemus etiam velle malum poenae, quod scimus Deum velle; sed voluntate pietatis possumus conditionaliter, sive quantum est in nobis, si Deo placet, non velle.” Bonaventure, 1 Sent. d. 48, a. 2, q. 2. (I, 858). William of Auxerre does not call the conditional wishing the will of pity but also he thinks that a compassion involves conditional wishing. (Saarinen 1994, 76–77.) Barnes claims that Bonaventure did not clarify what the will of reason and the will of pity are. (Barnes 2012, 106.) It is true that he did not explain these terms when he studied the wills of Christ, but he did it elsewhere.

⁵⁶ For conditional willing, see Saarinen 1994, 69–71; 76–81.

⁵⁷ Barnes 2012, 99–100.

⁵⁸ Barnes 2012, 109.

reason.⁵⁹ Following John of Damascus, he expounds that the will as nature or *thelesis* and the will as deliberative are about possible external things which we can do. The will as nature is about the necessities of life, whereas the will as deliberative is about things, which are chosen and not necessities of life. The domain of *bulesis* includes all kinds of external things, which are possible and even impossible.⁶⁰

Like Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas thought that the will as nature and the will as reason were *thelesis* and *bulesis*, and like Albert the Great, he argued that they were related to different objects. However, Aquinas emphasizes that they were the acts of the will about an end and means.⁶¹ Aquinas's use of an end-means distinction was an Aristotelian

⁵⁹ "Rationis vero aut est ut natura, aut ut deliberativa. Sed non facit mentionem de illa quae est rationis ut est natura: quia secundum substantiam et esse potentiae non differt ab illa quae est rationis ut deliberativa, sed potius est quidam modus considerationis ejusdem potentiae: quod enim sit ut natura, hoc accidit cuilibet potentiae animae rationalis in quantum est natura hominis." Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 5, p. 304. See also Barnes 2012, 86. For Albert the Great on the sensitive appetitive powers and the will, see Reilly 1934, 59–63; 75–79.

⁶⁰ "Naturalis enim est de constituentibus et salvantibus naturam. Deliberativa vero est de his quae secundum prohaeresim eliguntur. Tamen ex verbis Damasceni voluntas non naturalis nec etiam deliberativa est eorum quae possibile est fieri non per nos, et etiam impossibile, sicut quod volumus nos nunquam mori, quod tamen est impossibile: et haec etiam voluntas est possibile quae non fiunt per nos, sicut quod volumus esse reges, quod quidem possibile est, sed non fit per nos. Has tres voluntates nominat tribus modis. Prima enim dicitur thelesis, hoc est naturalis voluntas. Secunda autem proprie dicitur voluntas rationalis. Tertia vero dicitur boulesis, hoc est, qualiscumque voluntas, eo quod generalis est appetitus possibile et impossibile, sive per nos, sive non per nos operandorum." Albert the Great, *De homine* q. 65, a. 1, p. 548–549. "Objectum enim ejus aut est intra, aut extra. Intra, sicut potentiae animae quas omnes voluntas inclinat ad actum [...] Si est extra, aut est de constituentibus et salvantibus naturam: et tunc est illa quae vocatur thelesis a Damascendo. [...] Aut est de non pertinentibus ad naturam, sed hoc duobus modis, scilicet possibile, et impossibile. [...] Si vero operandorum per nos, tunc est proprie voluntas rationalis: quia tunc est de quibus ratio habet antecederet inquirere et disponere et ordinare et consulere. Voluntas autem generalis ad tres ultimos modos, hoc est, impossibile, et possibile per nos operandorum, et possibile non per nos operandorum, secundum Damascenum et Gregorium Nyssenum dicitur boulesis, nisi quandoque restringatur ad aliquod horum trium per specialem rationem." Albert the Great, *De homine* q. 65, a. 2, p. 551. The division of the objects is based on John of Damascus's *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 136–137. Damascus takes the division of the objects from Aristotle's *Ethica Nicomachea* III.2, 1111b20–26.

⁶¹ In *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas claims that the will has three acts in relation to an end: willing (*voluntas*), enjoying (*frui*) and intending (*intendi*). The act of willing is about an end as such. (*Summa theologiae* I^a–IIae q. 8, a. 2 co). Intending is about an end as related to means. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–IIae q. 12, a. 1 ad 4.) Enjoying is the rest of the will in the last end. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–IIae q. 11, a. 3 co; a. 4 co.) The will also has three acts in relation to means: choosing, consenting (*consentire*) and using (*uti*). The choice is the act of free choice. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–IIae q. 13, a. 1 co.) The will chooses freely because the will can choose or not choose, and it can choose this or that. The freedom of free choice is based on reason, which can apprehend the same thing as good and as evil. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–IIae q. 13, a. 6 co.) Consent is about means deliberated on by reason. Aquinas explains that when reason deliberates that there are many means to achieve an end and all means please the will, the will consents to the means. After the consent, the will chooses one of the means. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–IIae q. 15, a. 3 ad 3.) The will involves the act of use when it moves the powers of the soul

feature of his view, since Aristotle applied the distinction when he analysed the concepts of will and free choice.⁶² The advantage of this emphasis was that it provided a clear and simple explanation of the division, which also was firmly rooted in Aristotelian psychology. In *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas claims that the will as nature was an act about an end, whereas the will as reason was an act about a means to an end.⁶³ As Aquinas argues in his *Summa theologiae* that the will wishes means only in relation to an end but not means as such,⁶⁴ the will as nature was an act only about an end but not about means as such. The will as reason was an act of free choice, which was a choice about a means to an end.⁶⁵ When Aquinas claims that the will as reason is *bulesis*, he thinks that *bulesis* is about a means to an end. He takes this to be John of Damascus's view as well, even though Damascus explicitly claims that *bulesis* was about an end.⁶⁶

In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, we find a sketchier view. Aquinas claims that the will as nature was not only about an end but also about means as such. He does not explain that the will as nature and as reason are acts of the will. This seems to be a later but illustrative clarification.⁶⁷

into an act. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–IIae q. 16, a. 1 co.) For Aquinas on the acts of the will, see also Donagan 1982, 644–654; Stump 2003, 287–297. For Aquinas on the appetitive powers, see Kretzmann 1993, 144–149. For Aquinas on Christ's appetitive powers, see Barnes 2012, 113–179; Adams 1999, 64–67.

⁶² Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* III.2, 1111b26–29; III.2, 1113b3–5.

⁶³ “Si ergo voluntas accipiatur pro actu, sic oportet in Christo ex parte rationis ponere duas voluntates, idest, duas species actuum voluntatis. Voluntas enim, ut in secunda parte dictum est, et est finis, et est eorum quae sunt ad finem, et alio modo fertur in utrumque. [...] Et ideo alterius rationis est actus voluntatis secundum quod fertur in aliquid secundum se volitum, ut sanitas, quod a Damasceno vocatur thesis, idest simplex voluntas, et a magistris vocatur voluntas ut natura, et alterius rationis est actus voluntatis secundum quod fertur in aliquid quod est volitum solum ex ordine ad alterum, sicut est sumptio medicinae, quem quidem voluntatis actum Damascenus vocat bulesim, idest consiliativam voluntatem, a magistris autem vocatur voluntas ut ratio.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 18, a. 3 co. Although Aquinas explicitly claims that the will as nature and the will as reason were acts of the will, Gondreau seems to think that the will as nature was the inclination of the will whereas the will as reason was a fully elicited desire. (Gondreau 2002, 314–316.)

⁶⁴ “[...] in ea quae sunt ad finem, in quantum huiusmodi, non potest ferri, nisi feratur in ipsum finem.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–IIae q. 8, a. 3 co.

⁶⁵ “Et sic simplex voluntas est idem quod voluntas ut natura, electio autem est idem quod voluntas ut ratio, et est proprius actus liberi arbitrii [...] Et ideo, cum in Christo ponatur voluntas ut ratio, necesse est ibi ponere electionem, et per consequens liberum arbitrium, cuius actus est electio, ut in prima parte habitum est.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 18, a. 4 co.

⁶⁶ “[...] et alterius rationis est actus voluntatis secundum quod fertur in aliquid quod est volitum solum ex ordine ad alterum, sicut est sumptio medicinae, quem quidem voluntatis actum Damascenus vocat bulesim, idest consiliativam voluntatem, a magistris autem vocatur voluntas ut ratio.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 18, a. 3 co. “Est autem bulesis (id est voluntas) finis, non eorum quae sunt ad finem.” John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 135–137.

⁶⁷ “[...] voluntas ut natura nunquam in Christo movebatur in aliquid sicut in finem, nisi quod Deus vult. [...] voluntas ut natura, mota in aliquid non sicut in finem quod quidem non eodem modo se habet in bonitate et malitia secundum se consideratum et in ordine ad finem non conformabatur divinae voluntati in volito;” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q.

Aquinas explains that the will as nature is naturally moved towards a good thing as such, whereas the will as reason is moved towards a thing that is good in relation to something else. Aquinas emphasizes that the separation does not imply that a human being has two wills as powers. The root of the separation is the reason, which apprehends a thing to be good as such and to be good as related to something else. Therefore, the division is accidental for the will.⁶⁸ It is worth noting that Aquinas's description about the will as nature in the *Commentary on the Sentences* is similar to that of Bonaventure, as Aquinas claims that the will as nature is moved towards a thing naturally and without deliberation. In *Summa theologiae* and his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas holds that Christ's will of pity in Hugh of Saint Victor's terminology was will as nature because it escaped a nasty thing as such, which happened to another human being.⁶⁹

Aquinas's view that the will as reason and the will as nature were related to an end and means was popular among the Dominican and Franciscan theologians, undoubtedly because it was a simple and clear way to explain the distinction. Following Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard Middleton and Durand of St. Pourçain also argue that will as nature and will as reason are about a thing as such and a thing in relation to something else, but only Peter of Tarentaise explicitly claims that they are acts of the will. Peter explains that will as reason is the will as it is moved rationally and it has an act about an object which is good in relation to something else, whereas that will as nature is the will as it is moved naturally and it has an act about an object which is good as such.⁷⁰ Richard Middleton holds that the will as nature is the will ruled by the natural command of reason, whose object was a thing which was good as such. The will as deliberative was the will ruled by the non-natural command of reason, whose object was a thing which was good in relation to an end or circumstances.⁷¹ According to

1, a. 2, qc. 1 co. Also, Barnes remarks that in his *Commentary on the Sentences* Aquinas does not explain that the will as reason and the will as nature are acts of the will. (Barnes 2012, 137–138.)

⁶⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 ad 1; a. 2, qc. 1 co.

⁶⁹ “[...] voluntas pietatis non videtur esse aliud quam voluntas quae consideratur ut natura, inquantum scilicet refugit alienum malum absolute consideratum.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 18, a. 3 ad 3; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 ad 6.

⁷⁰ “[...] tertio modo secundum diuersas operationes eiusdem potentiae, scilicet est nature, vel ut ratio: [...] Differentia vero naturalis et deliberatiuae voluntatis, non est nisi penes diuersas considerationes, vel officia vel actus eiusdem. [...] Eadem enim potentia prout mouetur modo naturali, scilicet in bonum absolute consideratum, dicitur voluntas naturalis; prout mouetur per modum rationis, scilicet in bonum secundum ordinem ad aliud, dicitur voluntas rationalis.” Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, p. 122.

⁷¹ “[...] et appetitum naturalis voluntatis, qui est a voluntate, ut est natura regulata per naturale dictamen rationis, cuius obiectum est bonum absolute: et appetitum voluntatis deliberatiue, qui est a voluntate regulata per aliquam regulam non naturalem rationi, cuius

Durand of St. Pourçain, Christ's will of reason is called the will as nature when it considers an object which as such is suitable or unsuitable for a nature. The will is called the will as reason when it considers an object which is good or evil in relation to an end and it follows the deliberation of reason.⁷²

John Duns Scotus's new idea was to associate the will as nature with the inclination of the will. As he thinks that the will as nature is the inclination of the will but not the act of the will, and he does not associate it with a means or end, Scotus's view differs from Aquinas's one. Scotus claims that the will of reason included the natural will and the free will, and he argues that they were not two separate powers. He clarifies that the term "natural will" can be taken in three different senses.⁷³ The natural will in the first sense is not a power or an elicited act but the inclination of the will towards its own perfection. It is a passive inclination because it inclines the will to receive its perfection. Scotus explains that the will is called "natural will" since it is inclined to its perfection and "free will" because of a feature (*ratio*) which characteristic for it.⁷⁴ He relates the natural will with the will

obiectum est bonum in relatione, vel ad finem, vel ad circumstantias, vel ad aliquid aliud." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 2, q. 4, p. 185.

⁷² "[...] haec autem secundum nomen diuiditur in uoluntatem ut est nature et ut est ratio non tanquam in duas potentia, sed fortitur haec duo nomina uel duos modos quibus potest ferri in suum obiectum, quando enim uoluntas fertur in aliquid secundum quod est conueniens uel nociuum naturae secundum se, sic uocatur uoluntas ut nature, quando autem fertur in aliquid secundum bonitatem uel malitiam, quam habet in ordine ad finem, sic uocatur uoluntas ut ratio, quia sequitur deliberationem rationis, quia cum eiusdem potentiae sit ferri in aliquid secundum se et in ordine ad finem, ideo eadem est potentia uoluntatis quae fertur his duobus modis in suum obiectum." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242r.

⁷³ For Scotus on the natural wills, see Wolter 1986, 41–42; González-Ayesta 2012, 38–52. For Scotus on the division of Christ's wills, see also Barnes 2012, 301–302. González-Ayesta argues plausibly that when Scotus identifies the natural will with the intellectual appetite and the affection for what is advantageous, this holds in a fictional case where the will has only affection for the advantageous but not affection for justice. However, in a real situation the will has both affections. (González-Ayesta 2012, 42–48.)

⁷⁴ "[...] dico quod uoluntas naturalis [...] non est uoluntas ut potentia, sed tantum importat inclinationem potentiae ad recipiendum perfectionem suam, non ad agendum ut sic; [...] unde naturalis potentia non tendit, sed est tendentia illa qua uoluntas absoluta tendit - et hoc passive - ad recipiendum. Sed est alia tendentia, in potentia eadem, ut libere et active tendat eliciendo actum, ita quod una potentia et duplex tendentia (actiua et passiva). Tunc ad formam dico quod uoluntas naturalis, secundum illud quod 'formale' importat, non est potentia uel uoluntas, sed inclinatio uoluntatis et tendentia qua tendit in perfectionem passive recipiendam." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 570–571. "Sed quid de uoluntate naturali et libera, sunt ne duae potentiae? Dico quod 'appetitus naturalis', in qualibet re, generali nomine accipitur pro inclinatione naturali rei ad suam propriam perfectionem, [...] Tunc dico quod sic est de uoluntate, quia uoluntas naturalis non est uoluntas, nec uelle naturale est uelle, sed ly 'naturalis' distrahit ab utroque et nihil est nisi relatio consequens potentiam respectu propriae perfectionis; unde eadem potentia dicitur 'naturalis uoluntas' cum respectu tali necessario consequente ipsam ad perfectionem, et dicitur 'libera' secundum rationem propriam et intrinsecam, quae est uoluntas specificae." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 566–568. "[...] primo uidendum est quid est appetitus naturalis, et dico quod non est actus elicited," John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 184. See also

as nature when he holds that the will as nature is a will as it desires its perfection.⁷⁵ He adds also that the will as nature is the will as it is inclined to an object proper to it because an object perfects the will and to the object of another appetitive power because of its affection for the advantageous.⁷⁶ It is worth noting that González-Ayesta claims that the natural will is an inclination to the objects that perfect the will,⁷⁷ whereas Wolter explains that the natural will is an inclination to an act.⁷⁸ I think that González-Ayesta's reading is more plausible than Wolter's one, because, as I show above, Scotus explains, for example, that the advantageous and justice are the perfections of the will to which the will is inclined. It seems that the advantageous and justice are the objects rather than the acts of the will.

The natural will in the second sense is the will as having only natural properties, and it is opposed to the supernatural will, which is the will informed by gratuitous gifts.⁷⁹ Scotus argues that the natural will in this sense is free because it is the natural property of the will that it wishes freely. Therefore, the natural will and the free will are not two powers.⁸⁰ In the third sense, the natural will is the will as it elicits an act, which is uniform with the natural inclination to advantageous. Also then the natural will and the free

John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 424–425; p. 428; *Ordinatio* lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 184. According to Scotus, the will also has an active and free inclination when the will elicits an act.

⁷⁵ “[...] ergo voluntas ut natura necessario appetit suam perfectionem quae maxime est beatitudo, et hoc appetitu naturali.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 184.

⁷⁶ “Voluntas ut natura dupliciter accipitur: Uno modo, ut tendit naturaliter in obiecta propria huius potentiae ut haec, circumscribendo alia, et tantum intelligendo hanc potentiam ut est perfectibilis circa obiecta et ipsa obiecta sua. [...] Alio modo dicitur voluntas ut natura, intelligendo omnem ordinem eius ad quodcumque consequens naturam voluntatis, - et hoc proprie non ut libera, sed ut est tantum appetitus intellectivus, sive ut habens affectionem commodi, non iustitiae. Et sic habet ordinem ad compatiendum appetitui inferiori non tantum in ordine illius obiecti ad primum obiectum voluntatis ut voluntas, sed - circumscripto illo ordine - circa quodcumque sic compatitur, et ita in hoc se habet ac si ad aeternum referri non posset. [...] Breviter igitur voluntas ut natura, primo modo, est voluntas ut tantum naturaliter inclinata ad sua propria obiecta; secundo modo est voluntas inclinata ad obiecta alterius appetitus, cui coniungitur mediante inclinatione illius. Primo modo est tantum portio superior, secundo modo tantum inferior. Ita generaliter potest accipi voluntas ut natura, quod includit utrumque, et sic pertinet ad utramque portionem.” *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 517. See also *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 484.

⁷⁷ González-Ayesta 2012, 52.

⁷⁸ Wolter 1986, 42.

⁷⁹ “Aliter potest voluntas dici ‘naturalis’ ut distinguitur contra potentiam sive voluntatem supernaturalem; et sic ipsa in puris naturalibus suis existens distinguitur contra se ipsam ut informata donis gratuitis.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 568. See also John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 425; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 484.

⁸⁰ “Secundo modo accipitur ‘voluntas naturalis’ in quantum voluntas est in propriis naturalibus; et sic voluntas est libera, quia ex puris naturalibus vult aliquid libere. Et sic manifestum est quod non est alia potentia.” John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 425.

will are the same power, because the will is free when it elicits an act uniform with the natural inclination to the advantageous.⁸¹

According to Scotus, the natural will as the inclination of the will includes affection for the advantageous and affection for justice. The idea of two affections was based on Anselm of Canterbury. Scotus clarifies that the will is inclined towards things that are good for a person himself because of affection for the advantageous and inclined towards justice because of affection for justice. The affection for justice is the inner freedom of the will, since the will can wish that which is just and not advantageous for oneself because of that affection.⁸² Scotus explains that if the will had only affection for the advantageous, the will could not but elicit the act of wishing for the advantageous. Hence, the affection for justice provides that the will can also refrain from wishing (*non velle*) for the advantageous.⁸³ According to Scotus, the natural will as the inclination of the will includes both affections because the advantageous and justice are perfections of the will. However, affection for the advantageous rather than affection for justice is called the natural inclination because the advantageous rather than justice follows nature.⁸⁴

⁸¹ “Adhuc tertio modo accipitur ‘voluntas naturalis’ ut elicit actum conformem inclinationi naturali, quae semper est ad commodum; et sic est libera [in] eliciendo actum conformem sicut in eliciendo actum oppositum, quia in potestate eius est elicere actum conformem vel non elicere (voluntas supernaturalis tantum actum conformem).” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 568. See also John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 425–426; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 484.

⁸² “Hoc etiam probatur, quia in voluntate, secundum Anselmum, assignantur duae affectiones, scilicet affectio iustitiae et affectio commodi, [...] Nobilior est affectio iustitiae quam commodi, non solum intelligendo de acquisita et infusa, sed de innata, quae est ingenua libertas, secundum quam potest velle aliquod bonum non ordinatum ad se. Secundum autem affectionem commodi, nihil potest velle nisi in ordine ad se, - et hanc haberet si praecise esset appetitus intellectivus sine libertate sequens cognitionem intellectivam sicut appetitus sensitivus sequitur cognitionem sensitivam. Ex hoc volo habere tantum quod, cum ‘amare aliquid in se’ sit actus liberior et magis communicativus quam ‘desiderare illud sibi’, et conveniens magis voluntati in quantum habet affectionem iustitiae saltem innatae, alius autem conveniat voluntati in quantum habet affectionem commodi,” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 26, q. 1, p. 35–36. For Scotus on the affections of the will, see Wolter 1986, 39–41; Boler 2002, 136–138; Ingham 2010, 141–153; Taina Holopainen 2014, 553.

⁸³ “[...] dico quod voluntas, quae est potentia libere agens, non necessario vult commodum, sicut nec necessario vult iustum, actu elicto; tamen si ista una potentia consideretur ut habet affectionem commodi et non habet affectionem iustitiae, id est in quantum appetitus non-liber, - non esset in potestate eius sic non velle commoda, quia sic praecise esset tantum appetitus naturalis naturae intellectualis, sicut appetitus bruti est appetitus naturalis naturae sensitivae.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 2, d. 39, q. 1–2, p. 463. González-Ayesta similarly describes the interplay between these two affections. (González-Ayesta 2012, 42.)

⁸⁴ “[...] respondeo: inclinatio naturalis est duplex, - una ad commodum, alia ad iustum, quorum utrumque est perfectio voluntatis liberae; una tamen inclinatio magis dicitur naturalis quam alia, quia immediatius consequitur naturam - ut distinguitur contra libertatem - commodum quam iustum,” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. III, Dist. 15, q. 1, p. 502. See also John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 484. Peter Auriol claims that the will of reason was divided into the natural will and the deliberative will. He explains that they were not two powers and the natural will was affection that was planted in the human nature.

According to Scotus, the natural will as the inclination of the will necessarily desires beatitude because beatitude is the greatest perfection of the will.⁸⁵ Whatever else it desires, it desires because of beatitude.⁸⁶ When the intellect presents beatitude for the will, the will also actually wishes for beatitude in most cases because it usually elicits acts corresponding to the natural inclination.⁸⁷ However, the will in act does not wish beatitude necessarily but freely, because the will can elicit and refrain from eliciting the act of wishing when the intellect presents beatitude for the will.⁸⁸ Although Scotus thinks that the will elicits its act about beatitude freely, he

(Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 78r, the 1605 printed edition p. 461–462.) Since Auriol claims that affection for the advantageous and affection for justice were planted in the human nature, it seems that he thinks, like Scotus, that the natural will is affection for the advantageous and affection for justice. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 79r, the 1605 printed edition p. 464.)

⁸⁵ “De isto appetitu non libero sed naturali patet, quia voluntas necessario sive perpetuo et summe appetit beatitudinem et hic in particulari. [...] Cum ergo tamen summa perfectio voluntatis sit beatitudo, sequitur quod voluntas ut natura summe appetit eam.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 184; 186.

⁸⁶ “[...] dicendum quod loquendo de appetitu naturali, voluntas quidquid appetit, appetit propter beatitudinem, quia secundum appetitum naturalem appetit quidquid appetit secundum quod est perfectio eius. [...] et ideo cum appetite naturali appetat quidquid appetit in ordine ad bonum appetentis et hoc est beatitudo eius, sequitur quod quidquid voluntas appetit naturali appetitu, quod illud appetat propter beatitudinem.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 194.

⁸⁷ “[...] etsi voluntas viatoris ut in pluribus velit beatitudinem in universali apprehensam et particulari, quando intellectus iudicat vel non dubitat in illo particulari esse beatitudinem, tamen non necessario vult beatitudinem nec in universali nec in particulari.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 188. “Quod autem ut in pluribus voluntas velit beatitudinem, hoc ideo est quia voluntas ut in pluribus sequitur inclinationem appetitus naturalis; [...] Sed este iste actus voluntatis quo ipsa vult beatitudinem naturalis? Dico quod non proprie, quia non est inclinatio naturalis ad beatitudinem quae dicitur velle naturale voluntati ut natura est: potest tamen dici actus naturalis quatenus est conformis inclinatio naturali.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 190.

⁸⁸ “[...] voluntas respectu cuiuscumque actus volendi aut nolendi libera est, et a nullo obiecto necessitatur. Non potest tamen voluntas nolle aut odire beatitudinem, nec velle miseriam. Unde deberet argui sic. quod voluntas non potest resilire ab illo obiecto in quo nulla est ratio mali nec defectus boni; ergo non potest voluntas odire et detestari beatitudinem – quod verum est. Et ex hoc non sequitur quod necessario velit beatitudinem.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 194. See also Wolter 1986, 42–45; Boler 2002, 135. Aquinas differently thinks that the will wishes beatitude necessarily when beatitude is proposed for the will by the intellect because beatitude is completely good. The will wishes beatitude necessarily because the will cannot not to wish (*non potest non velle*) it and it is not able to wish the opposite of beatitude (i.e. the misery). The will wishes all other good things unnecessarily because they are not good from every point of view. They also involve something evil. Therefore, according to Aquinas, the will can approve or reject such things. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a-II^aae q. 82 a. 1 co; *Super Sent.* lib. 2, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2 co; *De veritate* q. 22, a. 5 co.) However, Aquinas thinks that the will can control whether it wishes or does not wish beatitude because the will can wish that the intellect does not consider beatitude. When the intellect does not consider beatitude, the will does not wish beatitude although the will cannot but wish beatitude when the intellect is aware of it. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a-II^aae q. 10 a. 2 co; *De malo* q. 6 co.) Also Giles of Rome argues that when the intellect represents an end, which is completely good, the will cannot but want an end. (Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3, q. 15, p. 178; Hoffmann 2002, 420–421.)

argues that the will cannot wish against (*nolle*) beatitude and it cannot wish (*volle*) the opposite of beatitude (i.e., misery). The will can only elicit the act of wishing against misery. Even though the will cannot but wish against misery, it wishes freely against misery because the will can elicit the act of wishing against and it can restrain from eliciting the act of wishing against. Similarly, although the will cannot wish against beatitude, it freely wishes for beatitude because it can wish or not wish (*velle sive non velle*) for it.⁸⁹ The will cannot wish for misery and it cannot wish against beatitude because misery cannot be the object of wishing and beatitude cannot be the object of wishing against. Hence, if the will elicits an act related to beatitude, it is necessarily an act of wishing, and if the will elicits an act in relation to misery, it is necessarily an act of wishing against.⁹⁰

2.3. *The Conformity and the Fulfilment of the Wills in Christ*

When Christ prayed “O my Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me, yet not what I want but what you want” (Matthew 26:39; Luke. 22:42), thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians thought that Christ’s human will diverged from the divine will in his divine nature and asked for something which did not take place.⁹¹ A standard view was that the divine will and the will as reason wished the death, but the will of sensuality and the will as nature did not wish it. Since the will of sensuality and the will as nature did not wish for death but the divine will wished for it, were Christ’s human wills contrary to his divine will, and, consequently, did Christ sin? The medieval theologians argued that he did not sin, since Christ was free from sin and Christ’s wills were not contrary but conformed to each other.

⁸⁹ “Respondeo, quod nec necessario volo beatitudinem, nec necessario nolo miseriam. Unde non sequitur: ‘Non volo esse miseriam, ergo nolo miseriam’ sive ‘nolo me esse miserum.’ Nec sequitur: ‘Non possum velle esse miserum, ergo de necessitate nolo esse miserum,’ quia nolle est actus voluntatis positivus sicut velle, et ita liberum unum sicut alium. Ideo neutrum necessario elicio circa quodcumque obiectum, et ideo possum non elicere nolle circa malum sicut velle circa bonum; tamen sicut circa malum ostensum non possum elicere actum voluntatis nisi nolle, ita circa bonum apprehensum et oblatum non possum elicere actum voluntatis nisi velle.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 192.

⁹⁰ “Respondeo, quod a voluntate excluditur actus volitionis respectu miseriae, et actus nolitionis respectu beatitudinis, quia miseria non est nata esse obiectum volitionis nec beatitudo nolitionis. [...] Dico ergo quod voluntas sic determinatur ad volendum beatitudinem et nolendum miseriam, quia si eliciat aliquem actum circa obiecta ista, necessario et determinate elicit actus volendi respectu beatitudinem et actum nolendo circa miseriam. Non tamen absolute determinantur ad unum actum eliciendum nec ad aliam.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 192.

⁹¹ Theologians thought that when Christ prayed “Father, forgive them, for they don’t know what they’re doing” (Luke 23:34.) or “I ask not only on behalf of these, but also on behalf of those who will believe in me through their message, that they may all be one” (John 17:20–21.) also then he wished something which did not take place. Christ’s human will departed from the divine will also when he cried over Jerusalem (Luke 19:41).

How, then, can the wills of a sinless person wish for different or even opposed things but still conform to each other? The views of the theologians about the conformity of the wills in Christ aimed to provide an answer to this question.

In the *Summa Halensis*, there are two views why the will of sensuality and the will of reason were not contrary, even though they wished for contrary things (i.e. life and death). According to one view, the will of sensuality and the will as reason were not contrary since they did not wish for morally contrary things, but they were contrary since they wished for naturally contrary things. Things are morally contrary when one thing is good and another thing is evil. Since both Christ's life and Christ's death were good, the wills did not wish for morally contrary things and they were not morally contrary. However, because life and death are natural contraries and the will of reason wished for death and the will of sensuality wished for life, the wills were contrary in this sense.⁹² The second view, which the *Summa Halensis* favours, is that of William of Auxerre: Christ's human wills were not contrary, as the will of sensuality was in Christ's sensuality and the will of reason was in his reason, and as they did not wish the same, because the former wished for life and the latter for death.⁹³ According to the *Summa*

⁹² "Dicendum ergo quod in Christo fuerunt diversae voluntates, sed non contrariae: nec voluntas sensualitatis contraria voluntati rationis, nec voluntas humana contraria voluntati divinae, nec voluntas naturalis contraria voluntati rationis, [...] quamvis quidam distinguant quod est contrarietas naturae duplex: naturalis et moralis. Contrarietas moralis est, quae est de contrariis in moribus; contrarietas autem in moribus determinatur secundum rationem boni et mali. Quia ergo in Christo utrumque erat bonum, scilicet vivere et mori, voluntas sensualitatis et rationis non fuerunt contrariorum in moribus, cum utrumque sit bonum. Contrarietas vero naturalis est illa, quae est de contrariis in natura; contraria autem in natura attenduntur secundum contrarias dispositiones in natura. Unde secundum hoc vivere et mori sunt contraria; et voluntas sensualitatis et rationis secundum hoc fuerunt contrariorum et secundum hoc voluntates contrariae. Non tamen ex hoc sequitur quod inordinatio fuerit in Christo, quia ordinatio et inordinatio attenduntur secundum rationem moralem, id est secundum rationem boni et mali." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 178. According to Alexander of Hales, the appetite of the sensuality did not want but the appetitive of the will wanted the death. (Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 16, d. 4, memb. 2, p. 269.)

⁹³ "Sed dicendum est rectius secundum Ioannem Damascenum quod Christus habuit diversas voluntates, sed non contrarias. Contraria enim nata sunt fieri circa idem; quia ergo non erat circa idem voluntas moriendi et vivendi nec secundum idem in Christo, quia unum circa sensualitatem, aliud circa rationem, non erit contrarietas voluntatis sensualitatis et rationis." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 178. *Summa Halensis* adds that even though the will of sensuality and the will of reason wished for contrary things, Christ's flesh did not desire in opposition to the spirit (Gal. 5:17). The flesh desires in opposition to the spirit when it desires a thing and the spirit does not wish for the flesh to desire that thing. This did not take place in the case of Christ because his spirit wished that his flesh desired life. (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 178.) Alexander of Hales argues that sensuality can wish for a thing which reason does not wish (*non velle*), wish for a thing because reason wishes that sensuality wish for that thing, or wish for a thing which is opposite to that which reason wishes. When this occurs, the flesh desires against the spirit. Alexander claims that this did not take place in Christ, because, according to Augustine, everything in Christ was in peace. (Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 17 (AE), n. 4, p. 175.) Following the *Summa Halensis*, Bonaventure

Halensis, the will as nature and the will as reason were not contrary either since the will as nature wished for life as such but the will as reason wished for death in relation to the redemption of the human race.⁹⁴

When the *Summa Halensis* turns to study Christ's prayer, following William of Auxerre it claims that when Christ prayed in Gethsemane, reason proposed what sensuality desired. Opening a new point, the *Summa Halensis* expounds that the prayer involved matter and form. The matter was "let this cup pass from me" and the form was a conditional clause "if it is possible". In making the prayer, reason took the matter from sensuality but the form from itself.⁹⁵ As the *Summa Halensis* claims that all Christ's prayers were heard in respect to the form of the prayer, it thinks that the desire of the sensuality was not heard.⁹⁶

Bonaventure expounds that the conformity of the wills is based on the conformity of the things wished for and on the conformity of the reason for willing (*ratio volendi*). The reason for willing is in conformity when the wills wish for the same thing in the same way or when the inferior will wishes for a thing in a way that matches how the superior will wishes for the inferior will to wish for a thing. The benefit of Bonaventure's division was that it helped to explain in a simple way how the wills can wish for even contrary things without the wills being contrary. Bonaventure clarifies that the perfect conformity of the wills involves that the wills wish for the same thing and that the reason for willing is the same, whereas conformity requires

claims that Christ's flesh or sensuality did not wish against the spirit or reason since sensuality had an act which reason wished it to have. (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 370).)

⁹⁴ "Praeterea, voluit absolute sive in spiritu quod voluit sensualitas, scilicet vivere; cum conditione nostrae redemptionis voluit oppositum, scilicet mori. Voluntate ergo naturali voluit idem cum sensualitate, scilicet vivere; rationali vero voluntate, consideratione nostrae redemptionis, voluit mori; nec sunt voluntates contrariae, sed diversae." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 178.

⁹⁵ "Dicendum 'quod illa petitio vel oratio fuit rationis et sensualitatis, sed aliter et aliter', quia sensualitatis ut moventis, rationis ut proponentis. Unde dicunt quod in hac petitione 'ratio fuit sicut advocatus sensualitatis'. Unde et in petitione notanda est materia petitionis et forma: materia petitionis fuit ut transiret calix; forma vero fuit conditionalis, si possibile esset secundum dispositionem divinam. Materiam ergo petitionis vel orationis sumpsit ratio a sensualitate, sed formam petitionis vel orationis ex se sive ex sua intentione adiunxit." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 2, cap. 1, p. 180. See also Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 2, q. 3. (III, 375); Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 2, q. 3, p. 184; Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 242v; Peter of Palude, *Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum* d. 17, q. 2, p. 90v. About the conditional willing, see Knuuttila & Holopainen 1993, 121–125.

⁹⁶ "Dicendum quod in omnibus est exauditus, quantum est de se, secundum formam petitionis." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 2, cap. 2, p. 180.

only that the reason for the willing is the same.⁹⁷ The wills can conform to each other even if they wish contrary things.⁹⁸

Christ's wills conformed to each other even though they wished for different things, because the will of sensuality wished in the way in which the rational will wished for it to wish, the rational will wished in the way in which the divine will wished for it to wish, and the wills of sensuality and pity wished in the way in which the divine will wished for them to wish.⁹⁹ As Bonaventure explains that the will of sensuality, the rational will and the divine will wished even for contrary things,¹⁰⁰ Barnes's claim that "Bonaventure allows only a non-identity in the thing willed" (i.e. the wills of Christ wished for only different but non-contrary things)¹⁰¹ begs the question.

Bonaventure argues that Christ's prayer was heard or fulfilled when the human will and the divine will wished for the same thing. Because the will of reason wished the same as the divine will, all prayers which arose from such volition were heard, but prayers which arose from the will of pity and the will of the flesh were not always heard.¹⁰² It is worth noting that as

⁹⁷ "Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod conformitas voluntatis ad voluntatem in duobus consistit, videlicet in volito et in ratione volendi. Conformitatem in volito dico, quando diversae voluntates unum et idem volunt. Conformitatem in ratione volendi dico, quando idem eodem modo volunt, vel altera earum vult illud eodem modo, quod superior vult eam velle. Cum igitur ad perfectam conformitatem ista duo concurrant, alterum eorum est de necessitate conformitatis, videlicet conformitas in modo, alterum vero aliquando de necessitate, aliquando de congruitate, aliquando praeter necessitatem et congruitatem, videlicet conformitas in volito." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 368).

⁹⁸ "Possibile est enim, quod voluntates sint conformes, ita quod una subsit alteri; et tamen non volunt idem, quia voluntas superior non vult inferiorem velle, quod ipsa vult, sed magis velle contrarium." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 362).

⁹⁹ "Quoniam igitur conformitas in ratione volendi fuit in omnibus voluntatibus Christi, quia sic volebat sensualitas, sicut volebat ratio eam velle; sic volebat etiam ratio Christi, sicut divina voluntas volebat ipsam velle: ideo concedendum est, quod in Christo fuit voluntatum concordia et consonantia, quamvis ex parte voliti non esset identitas, quia unaquaeque voluntas quod suum erat volebat. [...] Et sic patet, quod licet diversa essent volita, voluntates tamen in Christo habuerunt consonantiam." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 368–369). See also Bonaventure, *Breuiiloquium* pars 4, cap 8, p. 249.

¹⁰⁰ "Unde in praedicto verbo insinuatur duplex voluntas in Christo, una videlicet rationis, quae erat similis et subiecta divinae voluntati; altera vero sensualitatis, quam ratio subiiciebat voluntati divinae, licet ipsa sensualitas contrarium appeteret; et ita, quamvis non esset similis, erat tamen subiecta, ac per hoc non erat contraria." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 369).

¹⁰¹ Barnes 2012, 103.

¹⁰² "Dicendum, quod cum oratio sit petitio procedens ex voluntate et desiderio; secundum quod voluntas humana fuit in Christo secundum triplicem differentiam, sic et oratio. Nam quaedam oratio fuit exprimens sive procedens a voluntate rationis, quaedam a voluntate pietatis, quaedam a voluntate carnis. - Oratio procedens a voluntate rationis procedebat a voluntate, quae quidem requirebat exaudiri; et talis oratio in omnibus est exaudita, tum propter hoc, quod ista voluntas erat per omnia conformis voluntati divinae; [...] Oratio autem procedens a voluntate pietatis et voluntate carnis non fuit in Christo exaudita per omnia, tum quia hac voluntate non conformabatur Deo in omni volito, [...] Concedendum est enim, quod Christus exauditus fuit in omni petitione, qua petiit, ut exaudiretur, hoc est in omni eo, quod petiit voluntate rationis sive voluntate absoluta. [...] Concedendum est nihilominus, quod non

the will of pity was the mode for the rational will to wish, Bonaventure thinks that even the rational will wished for things which did not take place.

Albert the Great's contribution to the discussion was that he used four Aristotelian causes in explaining how Christ's wills conformed.¹⁰³ Like Bonaventure, also Albert explained how the conformity of the wills did not require that Christ's wills wished for the same thing. He claims that there are four kinds of conformity of the human will and the divine will, which correspond to material, formal, final and efficient causes. When the human will and the divine will wish for the same thing, the conformity of the wills corresponds to a material cause. This is the lowest grade of conformity. When the human will and the divine will wish for something because of love, the conformity of the wills coincides with a formal cause. When the human will and the divine will wish for something because of the same end, the conformity corresponds to a final cause. Albert explains that such conformity does not require material conformity of the wills because the human will and the divine will can wish for different things because of the same end. When the human will wishes for that which the divine will wishes it to wish, the conformity of the wills corresponds to an efficient cause. Then the human will and the divine will can also wish for different things.¹⁰⁴

Albert holds that the conformity of Christ's human and divine wills pertained to the material and the efficient causes. Christ's human will and the divine will conformed with each other in accord with the material cause when the human will wished the death because of the redemption of the human race. When the human will wished not to die as death was against nature, the human will and the divine will were uniform, according to the efficient cause, because the human will wished what the divine will wished

in omni eo, quod petiit voluntate carnis vel pietatis, fuit exauditus, [...] Non enim petebat, ut exaudiretur, sed ut nos erudiremur; sicut petiit, calicem a se transferri, et suis crucifixoribus condonari, unum ex voluntate carnis ad ostensionem naturae assumptae, alterum ex voluntate pietatis ad ostensionem benignitatis et misericordiae." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 373–374).

¹⁰³ For Albert of Great on the conformity of the wills, see also Barnes 2012, 80–85. For how Albert's and Bonaventure's views are related, see Barnes 2012, 104.

¹⁰⁴ "[...] dicendum quod conformitas est quadruplex qua voluntas nostra conformatur voluntati divinae, scilicet in volito: et haec secundum materiam est, et est minima, ut velim hoc quod Deus vult: [...] Est etiam conformitas secundum formam volendi, ut ex eadem charitate velimus quod volumus, ex qua Deus vult quod vult: [...] Tertia conformitas est in fine volendi, ut propter idem velimus propter quod Deus vult, id est, propter gloriam suam: et haec iterum est laudabilis, et facit ad meritum, etiamsi sit difformitas in materia voliti: [...] Quarta conformitas est in causa efficiente volendi, quando scilicet volo id quod Deus vult me velle [...] ergo vult me velle quod ipse non vult: et haec non sunt contraria." Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 1, p. 299. See also Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae* pars 1, tract. 20, q. 80, memb. 3, p. 897. For example, Durand of St. Pourçain applies Albert's view. (Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242r.) See also Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 ad 1.

for it to wish since God gave a natural appetite to Christ's human nature.¹⁰⁵ Albert explains that when Christ's will as nature wished not to die, it was not fulfilled and such willing was not a perfect wishing but *velleitas*.¹⁰⁶ When explaining Albert's view about the fight between the wills, Barnes claims that Albert allowed for some contrariety of wills in Christ, because Christ's wills wished for contrary things (dying and not dying) and the wills were contrary when they wished for contrary things.¹⁰⁷ However, Barnes's reading is dubious because when he argues this, he refers to the text where Albert explains the fight between the wills. Albert openly denies such a fight in Christ, and he explains that the fight not only includes that objects are contrary but other features as well, like firm resistance of the inferior will against the superior will. In addition, Albert does not claim anywhere that Christ's wills were contrary.¹⁰⁸

Like Albert the Great, Aquinas thinks in his *Commentary on the Sentences* that Christ's human and divine will conformed with each other because they wished for the same thing or the human will wished for what the divine will wished it to wish, but he puts forward a new view on how the wills wished for the same thing. Aquinas claims that the will can wish for a means to an end where the will rests completely, as well as a means to an

¹⁰⁵ "[...] duplex est conformitas ad voluntatem divinam. Una secundum causam materiale, quae est in volito, et hac conformavit se Christus voluntati divinae, secundum quod voluit mortem, secundum quod erat ordinata ad redemptionem. Alia est secundum causam efficientem, scilicet quando nos volumus id quod deus vult nos velle, et hac conformavit se Christus voluntati divinae, quando voluit non mori, secundum quod mors contraria est naturae. Eo ipso enim quod deus dedit ei talem naturam, eo ipso dedit ei appetitum naturae et voluit ipsum dolere de separatione." Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 4, q. 2, a. 2, p. 208–209; *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 1, p. 299–300.

¹⁰⁶ "[...] quod nihil prohibet, quod secundum voluntatem rationis ut natura est, homo ille in quantum homo, aliquid appetierit quod non est consecutus: et etiam oravit quod non est datum, eo quod non oravit ut ex deliberatione hoc volens, sed potius ut nostram infirmitatem ostendens." Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 4, p. 303. "[...] et hoc notatur cum dicit: Si non potest hic calix transire nisi bibam illum, fiat voluntas tua. Et hoc quidam antiquorum, scilicet Antisiodorensis, vocat velleitatem, et non voluntatem perfectam." Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 4, p. 303.

¹⁰⁷ Barnes 2012, 85; 88–89; 110–112. As Albert does not explicitly allow contrariety of wills in Christ, Barnes's claim that Albert's and Bonaventure's view differed in this respect is dubious. (Barnes 2012, 112.)

¹⁰⁸ According to Albert, the flesh fights against the spirit when the inferior will has a firm resistance against the superior will because it is reinforced by the spark of sin (*fomes*). Because Christ did not have such reinforcement, his inferior will did not fight against reason but followed it. Albert expounds that, according to one opinion, the will of sensuality did not fight against the will of reason and the will as nature did not fight against the will as reason because the wills did not concern the same thing. As Barnes claims, here Albert seems to refer to the opinion of William of Auxerre and the *Summa Halensis*. (Barnes 2012, 85.) Albert argues that this opinion is absurd because it entails that a sinful human being would have no fight between the wills. While arguing against this opinion, Albert adds that the fight between the wills not only involves firm resistance but also that things wished for were contrary and that things wished for drag the wills after themselves. (Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 4, p. 303.)

end where the will does not rest in that way.¹⁰⁹ The will can also wish for means as such, but not as complete ends. The will may wish for means as such if nothing is discovered to be against such wishing. Aquinas goes on to argue that the will as nature wishes perfectly for an end and wishes imperfectly and conditionally for means as such, whereas the will as reason wishes perfectly for a means to an end.¹¹⁰

According to Aquinas, Christ's will as nature and the divine will conformed with each other since they always wished for the same end. Christ's will as reason wished for a means to an end which the divine will also wished; therefore, the wills conformed as well. When the will as nature wished not to die (*non pati*) because the death as such was evil, it wished conditionally and imperfectly a different thing than the divine will, which wished for the death in relation to the redemption of the human race.¹¹¹ However, the will as nature, the will of sensuality and the divine were uniform because the will as nature and the will of sensuality wished what the divine will wished for them to wish.¹¹² The will of sensuality also wished

¹⁰⁹ "Finis autem, ut dicit Philosophus, VII Eth., se habet in voluntariis sicut principium in speculativis. Unde quando voluntas reducit aliquod consiliabile in finem in quo totaliter quiescit, sententialiter acceptat illud; si autem reducat in finem in quo non totaliter quiescit, trepidat inter utrumque." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 co. For Aquinas on the conformity of wills, see also Barnes 2012, 144–168.

¹¹⁰ "Sed si consideretur hoc quod est ad finem sine ordine ad finem, movetur voluntas in ipsum secundum bonitatem vel malitiam quam in eo absolute inveniet. Sed quia voluntas non sistit in motu quem habet circa huiusmodi, cum non feratur in ipsum sicut in finem; ideo non sententiat finaliter secundum praedictum motum suum de illo, quousque finem in quem illud ordinat, non consideret; unde voluntas non simpliciter vult illud, sed vellet, si nihil repugnans inveniretur. Voluntas autem ut natura movetur in aliquid absolute, ut dictum est. Unde si per rationem non ordinetur in aliquid aliud acceptabit illud absolute, et erit illius tamquam finis; si autem ordinet in finem, non acceptabit aliquid absolute circa hoc, quousque perveniat ad considerationem finis quod facit voluntas ut ratio. Patet igitur quod voluntas ut natura imperfecte vult aliquid, et sub conditione, nisi feratur in ipsum sicut in finem; sed eorum quae ordinantur ad finem, habet voluntas ut ratio ultimum iudicium et perfectum." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 co.

¹¹¹ "His visis, potest patere qualiter voluntas rationis, divinae voluntati in Christo conformatur in volito; quia voluntas ut natura nunquam in Christo movebatur in aliquid sicut in finem, nisi quod Deus vult. Et cum voluntas ut ratio nunquam moveatur in aliquid nisi ex ratione finis, patet quod etiam voluntas ut ratio conformabatur divinae voluntati in volito. Sed voluntas ut natura, mota in aliquid non sicut in finem quod quidem non eodem modo se habet in bonitate et malitia secundum se consideratum et in ordine ad finem non conformabatur divinae voluntati in volito; quia sic Christus volebat non pati. Deus autem mori eum volebat; mors autem secundum se mala erat, sed relata ad finem, bona. Hoc autem, ut dictum est, non est perfecte velle aliquid, sed sub conditione; unde a Magistris velleitas appellatur. Patet igitur quod secundum voluntatem rationis conformabatur divinae voluntati in volito quantum ad omne quod perfecte et absolute volebat, non autem quantum ad id quod volebat imperfecte." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 co. The idea that Christ's human will wished conditionally for death was expressed already in the twelfth century. For example, see *Sententie parisienses* pars 1, p. 32–33; Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiarum libri quinque* lib. 2, cap. 17, PL 211, 1007C. See also Saarinen 1994, 69–71.

¹¹² "Similiter etiam nec voluntas sensualitatis conformabatur divinae voluntati in volito in his quae erant nociva naturae: quia sensualitatis non est ordinare ad finem, ex quo illa habebant quod essent bona et Deo accepta. Tamen sensualitatis voluntas et rationis conformabatur

what the will of the reason wished it to wish, because the will of sensuality wished for a thing when the will of the reason ordered the will of sensuality to wish for it.¹¹³ Furthermore, the will as reason and the will as nature were not contrary because their objects were not contrary. The will as nature wished not to die because the death as such was evil and the will as reason wished the death because the death was good in relation to an end. Aquinas argues that since the death which was evil as such and the death which was good in relation to an end were not contrary, the will as nature and the will as reason were not contrary.¹¹⁴ He goes on to explain that because the will as nature and the will as reason wished absolutely an end and a means to an end, all prayers based on such wanting were heard. However, since the will as nature, which wished means as such, and the will of sensuality did not wish absolutely, prayers based on them were not heard.¹¹⁵ Aquinas's view that the wills of Christ were not contrary because their objects were not contrary supposes that the wills are contrary when they wish for contrary

divinae voluntati in actu volendi, quamvis non in volito; quia quamvis Deus non vellet hoc quod sensualitas vel voluntas ut natura volebat in Christo, tamen volebat illum actum utriusque, in quantum, secundum Damascenum, permittebat unicuique partium animae pati et agere quod sibi erat naturale et proprium, quantum expediebat ad finem redemptionis, et ostensionem veritatis naturae." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 co.

¹¹³ "[...] nunquam motus sensualitatis in aliquid ferebatur nisi praeordinaretur a ratione: et sic quamvis voluntas rationis non vellet illud volitum in quod sensualitas tendebat, volebat tamen quod sensualitas in id tenderet, sicut dictum est de voluntate divina et humana." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2 co. Aquinas argues that the sensitive appetitive power did not fight against reason because that fight would have required that the sensuality and the reason wish for different things, that the sensuality wish for it without the control of reason, and that sensuality delay or impede the movement of reason. Christ did not have such a fight since the last two conditions never took place in him. (Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2 co.)

¹¹⁴ "[...] secundum voluntatem rationis, Christus diversa volebat, non tamen uno modo, sed alterum absolute, alterum autem sub conditione et imperfecte. Et ideo non erat contrarietas in voluntate, quia contrarietas in habitu vel in actu est ex contraria ratione objecti. Ratio autem secundum quam unum contrariorum volebat voluntas ut ratio, et alterum volebat ut natura, non habet contrarietatem. Quod enim aliquid ex ordine ad finem bonitatem habeat, quod sine illo ordine in se malum esset, non habet aliquam repugnantiam secundum quam, ut dictum est, in diversa ferantur voluntas ut ratio et voluntas ut natura." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 3 co.

¹¹⁵ "Et ideo hoc solum Christus absolute voluit quod secundum rationem voluit ut finem, vel in ordine ad finem; et omnis talis sua oratio fuit exaudita. Quod autem secundum sensualitatem voluit, absolute non voluit. Et ideo ratio non ad hoc orando proposuit ut impetraret. [...] Similiter quod volebat ratio ut natura, si in eo non sicut in fine quiescebat, non simpliciter volebat, ut prius dictum est; et ideo haec etiam non ad hoc proposuit orando ut impetraret. Et propter hoc huiusmodi orationes non fuerunt exauditae." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 4 co. Aquinas argues that when Christ prayed for the salvation of the whole human race, he wished for this by means of the will of pity, as part of the will as nature. Because the will as reason did not wish for the salvation of all human beings, the prayer was not heard. Aquinas goes on to explain that God wishes for the salvation of all humans by his antecedent will, but God does not wish for it by his consequent will. Therefore, Christ's human will wished imperfectly and conditionally what God's antecedent will wished, and Christ's human will wished absolutely and perfectly what God's consequent will wished. (Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3 qc. 4 ad 2; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 ad 2.)

things. This indicates that, unlike Bonaventure, Aquinas thinks that the wills cannot wish for contrary things and be in conformity.

Like in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, in *Summa theologiae* Aquinas explains that the will of sensuality turned away from pain and the bodily injuries and the will as nature escaped the death, which was against nature and evil as such. However, the divine will and the will as reason wished for the death and the pain because of the salvation of the human race. Therefore, according to Aquinas, the will of sensuality and the will as nature did not wish for the same thing as the divine will and the will as reason, whereas the will as reason and the divine will wished for the same thing.¹¹⁶ Although the wills did not wish for the same thing, the wills were not contrary. Unlike in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, in *Summa theologiae* Aquinas holds that the contrariety of the wills requires two conditions. First, it requires that the wills wish for things that are contrary in the same respect (*secundum idem*). For example, if a king wishes to hang a robber because of the good of the state but the robber's relative wishes that the robber is not hung because of personal love, the wills are not contrary as a king and a robber's relative do not wish for contrary things (to hang and not to be hung) in the same respect. The wills would be contrary if the relative's will wished to impede the good of the state in order to preserve a personal good. Second, the contrariety of the wills requires that the contrariety pertains to the same will. For example, when the will of reason wishes for one thing and the will of sensuality wishes for another thing, the wills are not contrary. Aquinas clarifies that the will of sensuality and the will of reason are contrary only when the movement of the sensuality reaches the will of reason, so that the will of sensuality changes or delays the will of reason.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ "Manifestum est autem quod voluntas sensualitatis refugit naturaliter dolores sensibiles et corporis laesionem. Similiter etiam voluntas ut natura repudiat ea quae naturae sunt contraria, et quae sunt secundum se mala, puta mortem et alia huiusmodi. Haec tamen quandoque voluntas per modum rationis eligere potest ex ordine ad finem, [...] Voluntas autem Dei erat ut Christus dolores et passiones et mortem pateretur, non quod ista essent a Deo volita secundum se, sed ex ordine ad finem humanae salutis. Unde patet quod Christus, secundum voluntatem sensualitatis, et secundum voluntatem rationis quae consideratur per modum naturae, aliud poterat velle quam Deus. Sed secundum voluntatem quae est per modum rationis, semper idem volebat quod Deus." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 18, a. 5 co.

¹¹⁷ "Ad hoc igitur quod sit contrarietas voluntatum in aliquo, requiritur, primo quidem, quod secundum idem attendatur diversitas voluntatum. Si enim unius voluntas sit de aliquo fiendo secundum quandam rationem universalem, et alterius voluntas sit de eodem non fiendo secundum quandam rationem particularem, non est omnino contrarietas voluntatum. Puta, si rex vult suspendi latronem in bonum reipublicae, et aliquis eius consanguineus velit eum non suspendi propter amorem privatum, non erit contrarietas voluntatis, nisi forte se in tantum extendat voluntas boni privati ut bonum publicum velit impedire ut conservetur bonum privatum; tunc enim secundum idem attenderetur repugnantia voluntatum. Secundo autem requiritur ad contrarietatem voluntatis, quod sit circa eandem voluntatem. Si enim homo vult

In Aquinas's view, Christ's will of sensuality and will as nature were not contrary to the divine will and the will as reason in Christ's suffering because the will of sensuality and the will as nature did not reject the purpose why the divine will and the will as reason wished the death (i.e. the salvation of the human race). The will as nature wished the salvation of the human race and the will of sensuality was indifferent about it. The wills were not contrary either, because the wills did not impede each other. For example, it pleased the divine will and the will as reason that the will as nature and the will of sensuality wished what they wished.¹¹⁸

When Aquinas goes on to study in *Summa theologiae* whether Christ prayed for something which did not take place, he explains that Christ's will as reason wished absolutely and *simpliciter*, whereas the will as nature and the will of sensuality wished *secundum quid* because they wished conditionally.¹¹⁹ They would have wished for a thing if the deliberation of the reason did not find anything to resist such wishing. Such wishing of the will as nature was called *velleitas*. Aquinas claims that everything that Christ prayed or wished for absolutely took place because the will as reason and the divine will wished for the same thing but what Christ wished conditionally did not take place.¹²⁰

unum secundum appetitum intellectus, et aliud secundum appetitum sensitivum, non est hic aliqua contrarietas, nisi forte appetitus sensitivus in tantum praevaleat quod vel immutet vel saltem retardet appetitum rationis; sic enim iam ad ipsam voluntatem rationis perveniet aliquid de motu contrario appetitus sensitivi." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 18, a. 6 co.

¹¹⁸ "[...] licet voluntas naturalis et voluntas sensualitatis in Christo aliquid aliud voluerit quam divina voluntas et voluntas rationis ipsius, non tamen fuit ibi aliqua contrarietas voluntatum. Primo quidem, quia neque voluntas eius naturalis, neque voluntas sensualitatis, repudiabat illam rationem secundum quam divina voluntas, et voluntas rationis humanae in Christo, passionem volebant. Volebat enim voluntas absoluta in Christo salutem humani generis, sed eius non erat velle hoc in ordine ad aliud. Motus autem sensualitatis ad hoc se extendere non valebat. Secundo, quia neque voluntas divina, neque voluntas rationis in Christo, impediabatur aut retardabatur per voluntatem naturalem, aut per appetitum sensualitatis. Similiter autem nec e converso voluntas divina, vel voluntas rationis in Christo, refugiebat aut retardabat motum voluntatis naturalis humanae, et motum sensualitatis in Christo. Placebat enim Christo secundum voluntatem divinam, et secundum voluntatem rationis, ut voluntas naturalis in ipso et voluntas sensualitatis secundum ordinem suae naturae moverentur." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 18, a. 6 co.

¹¹⁹ Aquinas asserts in the *Summa theologiae* that Christ's will as nature wished for an end conditionally. However, in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, where Aquinas thinks that the will can also wish for means as such, he claims that the will wished for an end absolutely but means as such conditionally.

¹²⁰ "Tunc ergo alicuius orantis exauditur oratio, quando eius voluntas adimpletur. Voluntas autem simpliciter hominis est voluntas rationis, hoc enim absolute volumus quod secundum deliberatam rationem volumus. Illud autem quod volumus secundum motum sensualitatis, vel etiam secundum motum voluntatis simplicis, quae consideratur ut natura, non simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid, scilicet, si aliud non obsistat quod per deliberationem rationis invenitur. Unde talis voluntas magis est dicenda velleitas quam absoluta voluntas, quia scilicet homo hoc vellet si aliud non obsisteret. Secundum autem voluntatem rationis, Christus nihil aliud voluit nisi quod scivit Deum velle. Et ideo omnis absoluta voluntas Christi, etiam humana, fuit impleta, quia fuit Deo conformis, et per consequens, omnis eius oratio fuit exaudita. Nam et secundum hoc aliorum orationes adimplentur, quod sunt eorum voluntates

When Peter of Tarentaise and Richard Middleton explained how the wills were uniform, they primarily followed Aquinas's teaching in his *Commentary on the Sentences*. Like Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise argues that Christ's wills as nature and as reason were not contrary since they did not wish for contrary things, because the will as nature avoided the death as evil as such and the will as reason wished for it as something good in relation to the redemption of the human race.¹²¹ Richard Middleton's view combined other above-mentioned view as well. Like Aquinas, Bonaventure and Albert the Great, Middleton holds that the will as deliberative was in harmony with the divine will because the will as deliberative and the divine will wished for the same thing, but, following Bonaventure and Albert the Great, he adds that the will as deliberative also wished as the divine will wished for it to wish, because the will as deliberative wished because of charity.¹²² Furthermore, like Aquinas, Middleton describes that the will as nature was uniform with the will as deliberative even though the will as nature escaped the death and the will as deliberative wished for it because the death which was evil as such and the death which was good in relation to the redemption of the human race were not contrary, and the will as nature wished what the will as deliberative wished for it to wish.¹²³ Richard adds that Christ's sensitive appetitive power was at peace with the will as deliberative since the

Deo conformes," Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 21, a. 4 co. Following Aquinas, Durand of St. Pourçain claims that the will as reason wished absolutely and the will as nature and the sensitive appetitive power wished *secundum quid*, as they wished if nothing restrained wishing. Such wishing was *velleitas*. (Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri III* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 242v.)

¹²¹ "Voluntas ut natura ferebatur in obiectum passioni absolute secundum eius absolutam considerationem, unde horrebat eam ut malum. Voluntas ut ratio ferebatur in illud in comparatione ad bonum redemptionis, unde appetebat ut bonum. Quod autem in se aliquid sit malum, ex ordine vero ad aliud sit bonum, non sunt contraria [...] unde nec voluntas rationalis et naturalis contrariae erant in Christo." Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, p. 123–124.

¹²² "[...] in Christi voluntas rationis deliberatiua nunquam in aliquo discordauit a diuina voluntate, immo concordauit cum ea, et in volito, quia volebat quicquid videbat diuina voluntatem velle, et in forma volendi, quia quicquid volebat, volebat ex charitate: et sic volebat, sicut Deus volebat eam velle." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 1, q. 4, p. 182.

¹²³ "[...] in Christo naturalis voluntas rationis in aliquo non discordauit a voluntate deliberatiua, quia discordantia siue repugnantia motuum voluntatis non est sine discordantia, seu repugnantia formalium rationum ipsorum obiectorum, sed formalis ratio sub qua voluntas naturalis in Christi refugiebat mortem, et illa sub qua voluntas deliberatiua volebat mortem non discordabant: quia voluntas naturalis refugiebat mortem inquantum secundum se erat quoddam malum naturae: voluntas autem deliberatiua volebat eam inquantum apprehendebatur, ut utilis ad redemptionem generis humani secundum ordinationem diuinam. Esse autem aliquid secundum se malum naturae, et illud esse bonum in ordine ad aliquem finem nullam importat discordiam seu repugnantiam. Praeterea qui vult quod alius vult eum velle, ab eo non discordet in volendo: sed illud quid volebat voluntas naturalis in Christo voluntas deliberatiua volebat eam velle, quia volebat, quod secundum suum naturalem motum moueretur: ergo in volendo voluntas naturalis non discordabat a deliberatiue." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 1, q. 3, p. 182.

sensitive appetitive power desired or avoided according to the command of the will and the movement of the sensual appetitive power did not impede the will as deliberative.¹²⁴

Giles of Rome applies the idea of God's antecedent and consequent will in his explanation. Following Aquinas, he claims that the will as reason is the will *simpliciter* and the will as nature is the will *secundum quid*, but he adds that God's antecedent will is the will *secundum quid* and God's consequent will is the will *simpliciter*. Giles thinks that Aristotle's example of a merchant who throws goods into the sea in distress to save his life exemplifies the will as reason and the will as nature.¹²⁵ The act of throwing was voluntary *simpliciter* because the will as reason wished for it in relation to an end. The act of throwing was involuntary *secundum quid* because the will as nature did not wish for the throwing as such.¹²⁶

Giles explains that Christ's human wills were similar to the divine will because the divine and the human wills *simpliciter* and the divine and the human wills *secundum quid* wished for the same thing. God's antecedent will and Christ's will as nature did not wish Christ's death, whereas God's consequent will and Christ's will as reason wished for the death.¹²⁷ According to Giles, although Christ's will as reason and the will of sensuality wished for different things, they were not contrary. The will of sensuality and the will of reason are contrary when the will of sensuality desires something against the right reason and it causes an impediment in the will of reason. Giles argues that this did not take place in Christ because when the will of sensuality wished for one thing and the will of reason wished for a contrary thing, the will of reason wished for the will of sensuality to

¹²⁴ "[...] in Christi appetitus sensibilis non discordauit in aliquo a voluntate rationis deliberatiua, quia quamuis non appeteret illud, quod voluntas deliberatiua volebat refugiendo mortem corporis quam illa volebat: tamen illud quod appetebat, et refugiebat ad imperium voluntatis appetebat vel refugiebat, nec per motum suum appetitum voluntatis deliberatiue retardabat, vel impediabat, et ideo illi concordabat." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 1, q. 4, p. 183.

¹²⁵ Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* III.1, 1110a8–19.

¹²⁶ Giles of Rome, *Lectura super librum tertium Sententiarum (reportatio)* d. 17, q. 28, p. 206; *Super librum III Sententiarum (reportatio monacensis)* q. 28, p. 425–426.

¹²⁷ "Intelligendum tamen quod, comparando uniformiter voluntatem Christi ad voluntatem divinam, conformatur in volito, comparando simpliciter ad simpliciter et secundum quid ad secundum quid, quia voluntas antecedens Dei est voluntas secundum quid [...] et hac voluntate vult Christum non mori, quia humane nature vult bonum absolute, et sic similiter voluntate naturali, que est secundum quid, vult Christus non mori. Similiter voluntate consequente vult Deus Christum mori, et hec est voluntas simpliciter; ita Christus, voluntate simpliciter et ut est deliberabilis, vult Christum mori." Giles of Rome, *Lectura super librum tertium Sententiarum (reportatio)* d. 17, q. 28, p. 206–207; *Super librum III Sententiarum (reportatio monacensis)* q. 28, p. 426.

wish for an opposing thing, and the will of sensuality did not cause an impediment in the reason.¹²⁸

Durand of St. Pourçain also uses the idea of God's antecedent and consequent wills. He holds that all of Christ's human wills wished what God's consequent will wished for them to wish because everything that God's consequent will wishes take place. However, only the will as reason wished what God's antecedent will wished for it to wish because the will as reason was superior.¹²⁹ He also adds that only the will as reason and the divine will wished for the same thing.¹³⁰

Like Aquinas, John Duns Scotus also argues that Christ's will wished *simpliciter* for the death, but wished conditionally and *secundum quid* against it. Departing from Aquinas, however, he explains that Christ's will wished *simpliciter* when the will was not distracted and *secundum quid* when it was distracted. Christ wished *secundum quid* for the cup to pass from him because his wishing was distracted, as the condition "if it is possible" was

¹²⁸ Giles of Rome, *Lectura super librum tertium Sententiarum (reportatio)* d. 17, q. 29, p. 207; *Super librum III Sententiarum (reportatio monacensis)* q. 29, p. 426.

¹²⁹ "De uoluntate autem sequente deliberationem patet, quod fuerit eodem modo conformis uoluntati diuinae. Quia uoluntas diuina consequens quae est uoluntas simpliciter semper impletur [...] ergo quicquid Deus uoluit tali uoluntate Christum uelle Christus uoluit et non solum Christus, sed quicumque alius, uoluntas autem antecedens innotescit nobis per praecepta, prohibitiones et consilia, et huic uoluntati quanto magis uoluntas humana conformatur tanto melior efficitur, sed uoluntas deliberatiua Christi fuit optima, ergo fuit uoluntati antecedenti maxime conformis." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242r–242v. Durand explains that since God gives the natural inclination of the thing, the will as nature and the sensitive appetitive power wished what God wished them to wish. (Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242r–242v.)

¹³⁰ "Si autem loquamur de conformitate que attenditur secundum obiectum uoluntatis, sic uoluntas naturalis et uoluntas per participationem non conformantur in Christo uoluntati diuinae [...] Voluntas deliberatiua conformis erat uoluntati diuinae," Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242v. Peter of Palude describes three opinions about the conformity of Christ's wills without telling which one he favours. The first view is the above-mentioned view of Durand. According to the second opinion, Christ's will as nature and the will as deliberative wished for contrary things. The wills were contrary *secundum quid* but not *simpliciter*, because the will as nature wished conditionally not to die as such and the will as deliberative wished for death in relation to the redemption of the human race. Aquinas argued in his *Summa theologiae* that the will as deliberative wished *simpliciter* and the will as nature wished *secundum quid*, but Palude states that, according to this opinion, the will as deliberative wished *secundum quid*, since it wished for the death because of a supposition (i.e. the redemption of the human race), and the will as nature wished *simpliciter*, since it wished not to die as such. The sensitive appetitive power and the will of reason were not contrary because the sensitive appetitive power was moved according to the command of the will and the passion of the sensitive appetitive power did not confuse and impede the will. In terms of the third opinion, Palude explains that all of Christ's human wills conformed with the divine will according to an efficient cause, because all human wills wished what God wished them to wish but only the will as deliberative and the divine will wished for the same thing (i.e. death). (Peter of Palude, *Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum* d. 17, q. 1, p. 90r–90v.)

not fulfilled. However, he wished *simpliciter* to drink from the cup because this wishing did not involve a condition that distracted the will.¹³¹

Scotus claims that what Christ's free will wished *simpliciter* happened and the opposite of the wished thing never took place. However, the free will wished conditionally for things which did not take place and wished conditionally against things which did take place. For example, it wished conditionally against the death, which was a prerequisite for the sadness of the will about the death.¹³² Christ's natural will as inclination was not always fulfilled because it was inclined to the good of the person, but the opposite took place.¹³³

¹³¹ "In proposito etiam non videtur Christus nolle mortem nisi cum determinatione distrahente, scilicet 'si bene fieri posset aliud', quae ideo distrahit quia condicio non exstat. Conceditur autem secundum istam viam 'velle mori' sine omni condicione distrahente, quia si addatur 'propter honorem Dei' vel 'propter iustitiam' vel 'propter salutem hominum', finis actus non distrahit ab actu in talibus; igitur hoc non est simpliciter nolitum quod aliquis facit vel patitur, sed secundum 'quid'..." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 528. "Dico tamen quod mihi videtur quod nec hic oravit pro aliquo, nec aliquid optavit quin evenit. Nam cum primo oravit, Matth. 26: Mi Pater, si possibile est, transeat a me calix iste, non oravit quod calix ab eo transiret, sed sub condicione distrahente, scilicet 'si possibile esset' [...] Cum quo stat quod simpliciter voluit oppositum (ut de proiectione mercium in mari); unde subdit: Verumtamen non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu vis; et iterum oravit dicens: Si non potest transire calix iste nisi bibam illum, fiat voluntas tua. Hic optavit voluntatem Patris simpliciter, sine condicione distrahente, quia non fuit possibile calicem transire nisi biberet illum. Ideo fuit simpliciter volitum 'calicem bibere', et sic factum est sicut oravit." John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 17, q. 2, p. 430. "Dices: illud est secundum quid volitum, et sic Christus secundum quid volens. Contra, illud est simpliciter volitum, quod sine condicione distrahente est volitum: sed proiciens merces nulla condicione distrahente vult proicere merces. [...] Sed alia conditio, ut velle saluare merces distrahit, quia vult sub hac condicione, si posset aliter saluari, sed illa conditio expressa est falsa." *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478–479. See also *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 484–485. For more about Scotus on conditional wishing, see Chapter 3.6.

¹³² "Secundum autem voluntatem liberam, nihil voluit quod non evenit, nec aliquid contigit cuius oppositum voluit; immo sibi complacuit simpliciter in hoc quod evenit. Secundum quid tamen non complacuit hoc est voluit si voluntas Dei esset (sicut est de proiectione mercium in mare)." John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 429. "Hic optavit voluntatem Patris simpliciter, sine condicione distrahente, quia non fuit possibile calicem transire nisi biberet illum. Ideo fuit simpliciter volitum 'calicem bibere', et sic factum est sicut oravit." John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 17, q. 2, p. 430. See also John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 484–485; Barnes 2012, 305–306; Chapter 3.6.

¹³³ "Voluntas eius, ut natura est (hoc est inclinatio eius naturalis), non semper fuit impleta, quia inclinatio naturalis fuit huius voluntatis in bonum huius personae, - cuius oppositum evenit." John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 428. See also John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 484. Scotus also asks whether Christ's created will was a master of its acts since it followed the divine will. Scotus says that it was. He clarifies that the Word of God did not have influence on Christ's created will any more than if Christ's human nature was not united with the Word of God. Therefore, Christ's created will was the master of its acts and the will elicited its acts as freely as any other created will. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 569; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 426; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 484.) See also Barnes 2012, 302–305. How does the Trinity have an effect on the created will? Scotus answers that there are two opinions about this. According to one opinion, the will is the immediate and complete cause of its act. The Trinity only creates the will and allows the will to move itself, but it does not take part in the causation of the act. Accordingly, the Trinity had an effect on Christ's human will in the sense that the Trinity created the will but did not cause the act of the will. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 569;

Scotus appears to think that Christ's will wished actually when it wished *simpliciter* without distraction but habitually when it wished *secundum quid* and conditionally with distraction.¹³⁴ This indicates that Christ's actual wishing was fulfilled because what the will wished *simpliciter* took place. Peter Auriol seems to follow Scotus when he argues that Christ's human will as actual was in conformance with the divine will. He specifies that Christ's human will had two kinds of acts: acts which were at rest and those which were not acts *simpliciter* and at rest. It is not clear what these acts are, as Auriol does not describe them in detail. However, since Auriol thinks that the desire of the will is the movement towards an object and the pleasure of the will is rest in an object, it is possible that the act of the will which is not at rest and an act which is at rest correspond to desire and the pleasure of the will.¹³⁵ He clarifies that acts which were not acts *simpliciter* and at rest were not always in conformance with the divine will, and Christ's will engaged in such an act when he asked that the cup pass from him. However, all acts at rest were similar with the divine will, and they were fulfilled.¹³⁶

Among the aforementioned theologians, William Ockham was the first to claim that Christ's appetitive powers did not conform.

Lectura lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 426–427.) According to another opinion, not only the will but also God causes the act of the will immediately. When Christ's created will elicited its acts freely, God co-operated with the will and both the will and God caused the act of the will. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 570; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 426–427.) For Scotus on the partial causes of the act of the willing, see Kent 1995, 143–149.

¹³⁴ “Tertio, videndum est de portione superiore ut libera est, et de nolitione condicionali vel habituali (et dico 'habitualement' in cuius actum voluntas prona est ex se exire nisi aliud obstet).” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 520–521; *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 505. “In proposito etiam non videtur Christus nolle mortem nisi cum determinatione distrahente, scilicet ‘si bene fieri posset aliud’, quae ideo distrahit quia condicio non exstat. Conceditur autem secundum istam viam ‘velle mori’ sine omni condicione distrahente, quia si addatur ‘propter honorem Dei’ vel ‘propter iustitiam’ vel ‘propter salutem hominum’, finis actus non distrahit ab actu in talibus; igitur hoc non est simpliciter nolitum quod aliquis facit vel patitur, sed secundum ‘quid’...” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 528. See also Chapter 3.6.

¹³⁵ Peter Auriol, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum* d. 1, sect. 7, p. 394.

¹³⁶ “[...] dico tunc quod si quaeris de actu sic dico quod voluntas nulla quae sit alicuius in Christo fuit nunquam discors. Est enim quidam actus voluntatis non simpliciter et in quietitudine et libramine, et sic non semper secundum tales actus fuit voluntas diuinae conformis ubi velle ponit aliquid sicut transeat a me calix iste quod non erat secundum voluntatem diuinam. Sed de actu quieto ubi sistebat non fuit nunquam talis actus, quin esset concors ordinationi diuinae. Tunc ad primum dico, quod voluntas humana ultimata et quieta sistens semper fuit in Christo completa, et exaudita.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 78r, the 1605 printed edition p. 462. According to Auriol, Christ's interior sensitive appetitive powers did not always conform to divine will because the divine will wished for sadness and the death, but the interior sensitive appetitive power did not wish them. However, the sensitive appetitive powers and the divine will conformed in the sense that the sensitive appetitive powers wished what the divine will wished for them to wish. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 78r, the 1605 printed edition p. 462.)

According to Ockham, when Christ was thirsty on the cross (John 19:28), his sensitive appetitive power desired to drink, but the right reason wished against drinking since he was going to die soon anyways. Ockham says that there was conflict between the sensitive appetitive power and Christ's human will, but adds that this was not vicious because Christ's human will did not wish viciously.¹³⁷

2.4. *The Free Choice of Christ*

While the free choice of Christ was a minor theme in the debates about the psychology of the incarnation, it was a much-discussed theme in medieval philosophy. However, in these Christological discussions, theologians proposed views which were also interesting from the point of view of the psychology of the will. For example, the discussions show that, according to the medieval theologians, the freedom of free choice or the will was not an ability to wish for good or evil. In addition, the discussions demonstrate that choosing did not require deliberation, even though Aristotle explained that choice was deliberated desire.¹³⁸ Thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians agreed that Christ had free choice or free will.¹³⁹ They were interested in the following three questions: whether

¹³⁷ "Si quaeras iuxta praedicta utrum in Christo fuit aliqua rebellio inter vires inferiores et superiores, respondeo quod non fuit aliqua rebellio vitiosa. Quia quantumcumque in appetitu sensitivo eius fuisset inclinatio et desiderium ad actum fornicandi – ponamus – dummodo non haberet volitionem respectu illius actus nec umquam peccaret. Quia, ut patet alibi, in sola volitione consistit peccatum et nullo modo in actu exteriori nisi quadam denominatione extrinseca. [...] Sed quantum ad illos actus qui communiter non dicuntur vitiosi etiam denominatione extrinseca, cuiusmodi sunt comedere, bibere, quiescere etc., fuit rebellio inter illos appetitus sive vires. Dixit enim in cruce: Sitio. Et postquam ieiunavit quadraginta diebus esurivit et per consequens per appetitum sensitivum desideravit cibum et potum. Et tamen secundum rectam rationem noluit bibere in cruce quando statim fuit mortuus, et secundum rectam rationem noluit comedere quando tentator accessit ad eum. Igitur in istis sensibilibus actibus fuit rebellio inter illos appetitus. Et eodem modo fuisset in hominibus si stetissent in statu innocentiae, sed illa rebellio non fuisset virtuosa nec vitiosa." William Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 270–271).

¹³⁸ Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* III.3, 1113a11.

¹³⁹ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 18 (AE), n. 13, p. 196; *Summa theologiae* (*Summa Halensis*) lib. 2, inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, tit. 3, memb. 3, cap. 5, p. 483; Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 12, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 269); Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 18, a. 2, p. 315; Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 ad 5; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 18, a. 4 co; Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, p. 189; Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 2, p. 243v; Peter of Palude, *Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum* d. 18, q. 1, p. 91v; John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 566–568; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 424–425. According to Alexander of Hales, free choice is the whole motive part of the soul or the part of the image of the Trinity in the motive part of the soul. (Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 33, d. 2, memb. 2, n. 54, p. 584–585.) The *Summa Halensis* holds that free choice is a habituated power. (*Summa theologiae* lib. 2, inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, tit. 3, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 1, p. 468.) Bonaventure thinks that the deliberative will and reason are two parts of free choice, which is

Christ's free choice had an act in the first instant of his being, whether the free choice was free even though it was not able to sin, and whether Christ chose and deliberated?

According to Peter Lombard, beginning from his conception, Christ merited for himself the impassibility of flesh and soul because he had the perfect will and he was obedient to God.¹⁴⁰ Alexander of Hales claims that this implies that Christ's free choice had a movement beginning from his conception (*ab instanti suae conceptionis*), but he argues that Christ's free choice did not have movement at the first instant of his being because Christ did not begin to be and be moved at the same instant because being precedes moving.¹⁴¹ Following Alexander, the *Summa Halensis*,¹⁴² Bonaventure¹⁴³ and Albert the Great¹⁴⁴ argued that Christ did not use free

the habit of reason and the will. (Bonaventure, 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1. (II, 909–910); 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2. (II, 596); Thompson 1958; Prentice 1957, 40–43.) Albert the Great argues that free choice is power of its own. (Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 2, d. 24, a. 5, p. 401; *Super ethica* lib. 3, l. 4, p. 154; Reilly 1934, 76–79; Saarinen 1994, 96–100; Hoffmann 2006, 74–77; 81–88.) Aquinas claims that free choice is the will, as it chooses. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a q. 83, a. 4 co.) Durand of St. Pourçain holds that free choice is the property of reason and the will or qualified reason and will, but not the will or reason as such. (Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri III* lib. 2, d. 24, q. 1, p. 169v.) When theologians discussed the freedom of the will, they used the term “*liberum arbitrium*” until 1270, but after that they used the term “free will”. (Kent 1995, 98–110.)

¹⁴⁰ “Meruit ergo a conceptione non modo gloriam impassibilitatis et immortalitatis corporis, sed etiam impassibilitatem animae. Per quid? Per obedientiam et uoluntatem perfectam, quam non tunc primum habuit nec maiorem, cum pati coepit et mori.” Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 18, cap. 2, p. 113.

¹⁴¹ “[...] christus ab instanti suae conceptionis meruit: ergo tunc habuit motum liberi arbitrii. – Contra: prius est esse quam movere; ergo, si tunc primo habuit esse, ergo nondum motum. – Dicendum quod ‘ab instanti’ potest dicere terminum extra sumptum, et sic vera est; vel terminum intra sumptum, et sic falsa est. Unde dico quod anima in aliqua sui operatione est sicut extra tempus.” Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 18 (AE), n. 13, p. 196. For the medieval views on the sin of the angels in the first moment of existence, see Schmutz 2002, 169–198.

¹⁴² “Si dicatur principium intra sumptum, non est dicere quod a principio conceptionis meruerit, quia tunc principium illud dicit illud instans quo producebatur in esse per Spiritum Sanctum. Si vero initium vel principium dicatur extra sumptum, tunc est dicere quod Christus meruit a principio conceptionis, quia statim post quam conceptus est, habuit plenum usum liberi arbitrii et fuit vir perfectus quantum ad animam per plenitudinem scientiae et gratiae et usum rationis, et perfectus quantum ad corpus fuit quantum ad distinctionem membrorum et formationem, licet non quantum ad quantitatem,” *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 3, memb. 2, cap. 1, p. 183.

¹⁴³ “[...] Christus meruit statim post principium conceptionis, non autem in ipso primo instanti. Et ratio huius est, quia operatio debet sequi esse substantiae; ideo necesse fuit, animam Christi prius esse quam agere, praecipue eo actionis genere, quod spectat ad usum voluntatis deliberativae; talis autem est actus meritorius. Et ideo si dicatur alicubi, Christum a primordio suae conceptionis meruisse; dicunt verum esse, secundum quod a dicit ordinem ad principium extra sumptum, non intra. [...] Uterque tamen istorum modorum satis est rationabilis, sed primus facilius est et communior et secundum ipsum plana ad obiecta responsio.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 18, a. 1, q. 1. (III, 381).

¹⁴⁴ “Dicendum, quod circa illud sunt duae opiniones, quarum illa videtur mihi probabilior, quae concedit rationes inductas, et dicit quod Christus non meruit ab instanti conceptionis, sed post instans illud continuo meruit.” Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 18, a. 6, p. 320.

choice in the first instant of his being because being precedes acting but immediately after that instance. However, Durand of St. Pourçain states that Christ's knowledge was the reason why the free choice did not choose in the first instant of being. He argues that the act of Christ's human will related to his merit required actual, infused or experiential knowledge, but Christ did not have them at the first instant of his existence because the actual knowledge required the perfect bodily organs and the perfect senses. Christ's human will was not able to have an act in the first instant of being because his bodily organs and senses were imperfect at that moment.¹⁴⁵

Contrary to the aforementioned theologians, Aquinas argues that Christ used his free choice at the same instant as when he was conceived. He clarifies that if one cannot have an act at the first instant of being, it is because of three reasons: first, one does not have perfection which is required for the act; second, an external thing impedes the act; and third, the nature of the act is successive. As Christ did not lack any perfection which a meritorious act required, there was no impediment and the act did not involve succession. Therefore, Christ used his free choice in the first instant of his being.¹⁴⁶ Scotus argues that Christ had the act of the merit at the first instant

¹⁴⁵ "[...] si Christus meruit in instanti suae conceptionis aut meruit actione beata, aut alia. Non actione beata, [...] nec per aliam, quia actus uoluntatis in quo consistit meritum sequitur actum cognitionis, in Christo autem praeter cognitionem beatam non fuit nisi duplex cognitio scilicet infusa et experimentalis. Neutra autem istarum cognitionum fuit in Christo secundum actum in primo instanti suae conceptionis propter imperfectionem organorum et uirium sensitiuarum quarum actus sunt necessarii ad usum scientiae infusae et experimentalis [...] ergo in Christo non potuit esse in primo instanti suae conceptionis aliquis actualis motus uoluntatis quod meretur. [...] Si autem anima Christi in primo instanti suae conceptionis potuit exire in actum scientiae infusae, non uideo quin potuerit exire in actum uoluntatis meritorium, sicut ponit praecedens opinio," Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 2, p. 243v. Durand thinks, however, that if Christ had been able to have actual infused knowledge when he was conceived, his will would have been able to have an act.

¹⁴⁶ "Unde, cum possibile sit ipsum in primo instanti suae conceptionis actum meritorium perfecisse, dicendum est Christum in primo instanti conceptionis meruisse. Quod enim aliqua res in primo instanti in quo est non possit suam actionem habere, non potest contingere nisi tribus modis. Primo, ex hoc quod deest sibi aliqua perfectio quae requiritur ad agendum; [...] Alio modo, propter aliquod impediens extrinsecum; [...] Tertio, ex natura operationis quae successionem habet; [...] Constat autem quod in Christo non deficiebat aliqua perfectio ex parte ipsius agentis, quae est necessaria ad meritorium actum. Et iterum nihil erat quod impedire posset. Ipse etiam motus caritatis quo movebatur indivisibilis erat et non successivus; et ideo in ipso instanti conceptionis mereri potuit. Quidam autem dicunt, quod in ipso instanti conceptionis non meruit quantum ad usum virtutum; [...] Sed prima opinio mihi magis placet, et secundum eam respondeo ad argumenta in contrarium facta." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 3 co. "Talis autem est operatio voluntatis et intellectus, in qua consistit usus liberi arbitrii. Subito enim et in instanti perficitur operatio intellectus et voluntatis, multo magis quam visio corporalis, eo quod intelligere, velle et sentire non est motus qui sit actus imperfecti, quod successive perficitur; sed est actus iam perfecti, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo dicendum est quod Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis habuit usum liberi arbitrii." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 34 a. 2 co. Following Aquinas, Richard Middleton argues that Christ's human will had an act in the first instant of his being because of three reasons. First, the will was perfect because Christ's

of being because he had perfect power and grace, the Trinity for which Christ wished well was present through the intellect, there were not impediments, and the act of the will did not take place successively.¹⁴⁷

Thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians thought that Christ was sinless, which indicated that Christ's free choice was able to choose only good. Alexander of Hales was one of the first to argue that although Christ's free choice was able to choose only good, it was free. Following Bernard of Clairvaux, Alexander claims that there are three kinds of freedom: the freedom of nature, which is freedom from coercion, the freedom of glory, which is freedom from misery, and the freedom of grace, which is freedom from sin.¹⁴⁸ Alexander holds that Christ not only had freedom of nature but also freedom of grace, because grace determined his free choice to choose only good. Therefore, although Christ was able to choose only good, he was free since he was free from coercion and sin. However, Alexander does not clarify whether Christ was free from misery.¹⁴⁹

nature and grace were perfect. Second, nothing prevented the will from having an act because Christ did not have the impediments which the bodily organs of ordinary foetuses have. Third, the free act of the will is not successive but it takes place in an instant of time. Richard explains that an act of will is successive only accidentally when the corrupted flesh impedes the act of the soul or when the intellect is weak. Although our acts of the will can be successive due to these reasons, the act of Christ's human will was not, because Christ's flesh did not impede the act of the will and his intellect was not weak. (Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, p. 189.)

¹⁴⁷ "[...] omne habens actum primum perfectum, et obiectum praesens in ratione obiecti, et non impeditur, et actus secundus sit permanens et non successivus, potest agere pro quocumque instanti: ista omnia concurrunt, nec plura requiruntur ad actum; sed omnia haec fuerunt in Christo in primo instanti suae conceptionis, quia potentia perfecta, gratia, obiectum praesens per intellectum, scilicet tota Trinitas, cui posset velle bonum propter se, et non impeditur, et actus volendi est permanens (quia actus beatificus stans est); igitur etc." John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, p. 11. For Scotus on the sin of the angels in the first moment of existence, see Hoffmann 2012, 304–305. When Scotus explains how Christ had merit, he first proposes one view but ends up with another. According to the first position, the will merits when it wishes good for God following affection for justice but against the affection for the advantageous. As Christ's senses and the inferior part of reason were aware of many objects which were against the affection for the advantageous and which the inferior part of the will was able to wish for, the inferior part of the will had merit when the will wished for these things for the sake of God. However, Scotus's own position is that all acts of the superior part of the will were also meritorious, including the blessed act of Christ's will, which was not against affection for the advantageous. He expounds that all Christ's acts were meritorious because all acts accepted by God as good and praiseworthy were meritorious. Therefore, not only the acts of the will, which were against the affection for the advantageous, but all of Christ's human acts were meritorious. (John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, p. 5–9. See also John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, p. 486–487.)

¹⁴⁸ "[...] dicendum est quod triplex est libertas, naturae scilicet, gratiae et gloriae. [...] Haec libertas gratiae est contra servitutem culpae, [...] libertas vero gloriae contra servitutem miseriae; libertas naturae contra coactionem [...] Nihilominus tamen libertas naturae est in homine omni, scilicet libertas a coactione." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 33, d. 1, memb. 1, n. 15, p. 571. See also Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 33, d. 2, memb. 1, n. 38, p. 578–579.

¹⁴⁹ "Quam cito enim ponis diversam potentiam [et] substantiam a Creatore, necesse est ponere libertatem quoad naturam, licet ex gratia possit esse determinatio, ut in Christo." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 33, d. 1, memb. 1, n. 17, p. 572. Also,

Following Anselm of Canterbury's view that the will is an instrument that moves itself, Bonaventure explains that free choice is free because it can move itself to wish, not because it can wish for a thing and its opposite. Therefore, the will which can wish only good but not evil is free, as the freedom is an ability to move itself but not an ability to wish for opposites.¹⁵⁰ Bonaventure thinks that the will wishes freely when the deliberative will moves the will to wish. The will is not free when it is forced to wish something unwillingly. This takes place when the will wishes for a thing against the act of the deliberative will because an external power moves the will.¹⁵¹

However, unlike Bonaventure, Albert the Great thinks that free choice is free because it can choose this, not to choose this, or to choose something else.¹⁵² Although Christ's free choice was able to choose good and not able to choose evil, it was free since it was able to choose this good, not to choose this good and to choose some another good.¹⁵³ Like Albert, Thomas Aquinas explained that Christ's free choice, which perfect grace made wish only good, was free because it was able to choose or not to choose this good thing and to choose this or that good thing. The free choice chooses an evil means only because of an intellectual defect, which is the reason why means is regarded as good when it is evil in reality.¹⁵⁴ Although Aquinas

according to the *Summa Halensis*, Christ's free choice was not able to sin because of perfect grace, but was still free as it was free from coercion. (*Summa theologica* lib. 2, inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, tit. 3, memb. 3, cap. 5, p. 483.)

¹⁵⁰ "Si loquamur de ipso, secundum quod liberum, sic concedo, quod potest esse non solum respectu contingentis, sed etiam necessari, sicut patet in Deo et in Christo et in Angelis et in hominibus beatis. Cum enim duplex sit necessitas, videlicet coactionis et immutabilitatis, necessitas coactionis repugnat libertati arbitrii, necessitas vero immutabilitatis non, pro eo quod arbitrium dicitur liberum, non quia sic velit hoc, ut possit velle eius oppositum, sed quia omne quod vult, appetit ad sui ipsius imperium, quia sic vult aliquid, ut velit, se velle illud; et ideo in actu volendi se ipsum movet et sibi dominatur, et pro tanto dicitur liberum, quamvis immutabiliter ordinetur ad illud." Bonaventure, 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2. (II, 612). "Dicendum, quod absque dubio anima Christi non potuit depravari aliqua culpa. [...] Plenitudo gratiae facit, quod ipse Christus secundum humanam naturam habuit gratiam confirmationis; sed illa gratia adeo liberum arbitrium firmat, ut nullo modo possit infirmari per culpam." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 12, a. 2, q. 1. (III, 266). See also Adams 1999, 39–40.

¹⁵¹ Bonaventure, 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 2, a. 1, q. 5. (II, 619).

¹⁵² "Dicendum, quod liberum ex natura non obligatur nec ex habitu ad hoc vel ad illud: et haec est libertas inseparabilis in Deo, et Angelo, et homine: nihil enim agunt quin possint illud non agere, et quin possint aliud agere..." Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 2, d. 25, a. 4, p. 429–430.

¹⁵³ "Et ideo patet ex hoc quod non est diffinitio libertatis arbitrii, posse velle bonum, vel malum: sed potius accidit ei posse velle malum ex defectu: sed libertas ejus consistit in hoc quod possit velle hoc, et non velle hoc, et posse velle diversum ab hoc. In hoc enim cognoscitur liberum, quod non agit per necessitatem naturae, et hoc modo flexibile habuit Christus liberum arbitrium..." Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 18, a. 2, p. 315. See also Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 2, d. 25, a. 4, p. 429–430.

¹⁵⁴ "[...] ad rationem liberi arbitrii non pertinet ut indeterminate se habeat ad bonum vel ad malum: quia liberum arbitrium per se in bonum ordinatum est, cum bonum sit objectum voluntatis, nec in malum tendit nisi propter aliquem defectum, quia apprehenditur ut bonum;

does not mention it, his view about the perfection of Christ's knowledge also explained why the free choice of Christ was not able to choose evil means.

The discussions about Christ's free choice indicate that, according to medieval theologians, choosing did not require deliberation, even though Aristotle explained that choice was deliberated desire.¹⁵⁵ Already John of Damascus had argued that Christ did not choose because choosing implied ignorance, but the theologians did not accept Damascus's view unconditionally. The *Summa Halensis* argues that Christ chose because choosing does not always indicate ignorance. In one sense, choosing involves taking one of two things, but in another sense it is about taking one of two things which is unknown before choosing. When a chosen thing is unknown before choosing, deliberation precedes the choosing and choosing implies ignorance. The author argues that since Christ was not ignorant, he chose only in the first sense and he did not deliberate.¹⁵⁶

Aquinas also argues that choice does not always imply ignorance.¹⁵⁷ He states that when a person deliberates about means, he does not know by which means an end can be achieved. Therefore, deliberation implies ignorance. Aquinas argues that the choice can include deliberation but does not require it. The choice follows from the judgment of the reason. When the reason doubts what to do, the reason deliberates about the means by which an end can be achieved and makes judgment after the deliberation. When the reason does not doubt, it makes a judgment without deliberation

cum non sit voluntas aut electio nisi boni, aut apparentis boni: et ideo ubi perfectissimum est liberum arbitrium, ibi in malum tendere non potest, quia imperfectum esse non potest. Sed hoc ad libertatem arbitrii pertinet ut actionem aliquam facere vel non facere possit, et hoc Deo convenit; bona enim quae facit potest non facere; nec tamen malum facere potest." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 2, d. 25, q. 1, a. 1 ad 2; a. 2 co; "[...] quod liberum arbitrium Christi non erat determinatum ad unum secundum numerum, sed ad unum secundum genus, scilicet ad bonum, quia in malum non potest; sed tamen hoc potest facere et non facere; et hoc non excludit libertatem arbitrii, quia posse peccare non est libertas arbitrii nec pars libertatis [...] Et haec quidem determinatio ex perfectione liberi arbitrii contingit secundum quod per habitum gratiae et gloriae terminatur in eo ad quod est naturaliter ordinatum, scilicet in bono." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2 ad 5; *Summa theologiae* I^a-II^aae q. 13, a. 6 co.

¹⁵⁵ Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* III.3, 1113a11.

¹⁵⁶ "Ad primo autem obiectum dicendum quod 'eligere' dicitur dupliciter, sicut supra dictum est. Uno modo dicitur 'eligere' definire seu determinare inter aliqua duo: et hoc modo electio est in Christo. Alio modo dicitur 'eligere' rem prius ignotam determinare seu definire: unde hoc modo dicitur electio determinatio rei dubiae in alteram partem; et quia eligere hoc modo importat ignorantiam, non dicitur de Christo, sicut nec consilium, et hoc modo intelligitur quod dicit Damascenus." *Summa theologica* lib. 2, inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, tit. 3, memb. 3, cap. 5, p. 483. See also *Summa theologica* lib. 2, inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, tit. 3, memb. 3, cap. 1, p. 479.

¹⁵⁷ "Damascenus excludit a Christo electionem secundum quod intelligit in nomine electionis importari dubitationem. Sed tamen dubitatio non est de necessitate electionis, quia etiam Deo competit eligere [...] cum tamen in Deo nulla sit dubitatio. Accidit autem dubitatio electioni, inquantum est in natura ignorante." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 18, a. 4 ad 1.

and then also choice follows without it. According to Aquinas, Christ chose in the first instant of his being without deliberation because his soul was full of knowledge from the first moment of his conception.¹⁵⁸

Like Aquinas, Scotus also argues that choice does not always require deliberation. He explains that when practical reason makes a judgment, reason does not reason anymore and the will elicits an act. If practical reason is able to make a judgment without any preceding reasoning, the will elicits an act without reasoning. When this is possible, practical reason makes a judgment and the will elicits an act in the same instant. Scotus states that because Christ had perfect abstract knowledge in the first instant of his being, his reason was able to make a judgment without reasoning and the will was able to choose in the first instant of his being.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ “[...] electio praesupponit consilium, non tamen sequitur ex consilio nisi iam determinato per iudicium; illud enim quod iudicamus agendum post inquisitionem consilii, eligimus, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo, si aliquid iudicetur ut agendum absque dubitatione et inquisitione praecedente, hoc sufficit ad electionem. Et sic patet quod dubitatio, sive inquisitio, non per se pertinet ad electionem, sed solum secundum quod est in natura ignorante.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 18, a. 4 ad 2. “[...] simul cum terminatur consilium vel deliberatio, potest esse electio. Illi autem qui deliberatione consilii indigent, in ipsa terminatione consilii primo habent certitudinem de eligendis, et ideo statim eligunt. Ex quo patet quod deliberatio consilii non praeexigitur ad electionem nisi propter inquisitionem incerti. Christus autem in primo instanti suae conceptionis, sicut habuit plenitudinem gratiae iustificantis ita habuit plenitudinem veritatis cognitae, secundum illud, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Unde, quasi habens omnium certitudinem, potuit statim in instanti eligere.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 34, a. 2 ad 2. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2.

¹⁵⁹ “[...] discursus sive syllogizatio practica est ad hoc quod habeatur actus electivus voluntatis; et facto iudicio per conclusionem practicam, voluntas elicit; et quando voluntas elicit, ratio practica non discurrit, sed sententiat, scilicet facta conclusione practica de eliciendo. Si igitur ista sententia ultimata possit haberi sine discursu praecedente et in instanti, ita perfecte posset voluntas libere eligere seu elicere sine discursu sicut cum tali discursu. Sed perfectus in cognoscendo non discurrit [...] Cum ergo Christus fuerit perfectus in cognitione omnium – abstractive saltem – a principio, perfecte cognovit sine tali syllogizatione; et ideo in primo instanti potuit esse electio, quae electio est actus simplex de se.” John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, p. 12.

3 THE PASSIONS OF CHRIST

According to the Bible, in the events of Holy Week, Christ's human soul felt passions like fear and sadness. These events played a crucial role for the identity of Christians in the Middle Ages, as Christians thought that they were called to follow Christ's life in their lives.¹ The passions of Christ emphasized that even the ideal Christian life involved passions. In this respect, the medieval view differed, for instance, from Clement of Alexandria's view that Christians should seek freedom from passions (*apatheia*) because Christ was free from them.² However, the idea that Christ had passions was not without problems. For instance, as Aristotle had argued that a soul was not really moved,³ how could Christ's human soul have passions? In addition, since Seneca explained that a wise man cannot be sad,⁴ how could Christ, the wisest man in the created universe, be sad? And, since Aristotle seemed to claim that there was not sadness in the intellect⁵ and the same person cannot feel pain and joy at the same time,⁶ how, then, could Christ's human soul be full of pain and how could he feel great pain and joy at the same time? Furthermore, theological authors had also proposed challenging views; for example, Hilary of Poitiers claimed that Christ did not feel true pain.⁷

The passions of Christ were one of the much-debated themes in thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions about the psychology of the incarnation. In their responses to problems like the aforementioned, the medieval theologians explained that Christ had a passible soul and affective movements like pain, sadness, fear and anger, which they called pre-passions rather than passions. They added that the powers of the sensitive part of the soul had pain and sadness, but disagreed about whether the powers of the rational part had sadness. They also thought that the superior part of Christ's reason had beatific vision and joy, and they asked how Christ's human soul could have pain, sadness and joy at the same time. The discussions about the passions of Christ exemplify some significant differences between the Franciscan and Thomistic intellectual traditions, and they shed light on the earlier roots of ideas, like the passions of the will, which have been regarded as fourteenth-century ideas.

In this chapter, I focus on the passibility of Christ's human soul, on his pre-passions, and on anger, fear, pain and sadness. In studying

¹ For the imitation of Christ in the Middle Ages, see Constable 1995, 143–248.

² Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus* 1.2.4.

³ Aristotle, *De anima* I.4, 408a30–408b1.

⁴ Seneca, *De clementia* 2.5.5.

⁵ Aristotle, *Topica* I.15, 106a38.

⁶ Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* VII.14, 1153b19–21; 1154b13–15.

⁷ Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* lib. 10, PL 10, 361A.

Christ's pain and sadness, I address first the views of pain and sadness in the powers of the sensitive part of the soul, and then the views of sadness in the powers of the rational part of the soul. At the end of the chapter, I examine how Christ was able to have pain, sadness and joy at the same time.

3.1. *The Passibility of Christ's human soul*

Thirteenth-century theologians began their study about the passions of Christ by first defining what a passion was and whether Christ's human soul was passible. Following the doctrine of the Fourth Lateran Council, theologians taught that Christ's human nature was passible, which implied that his soul was also passible.⁸ The idea that Christ's human soul was passible was not without problems, since Aristotle had argued that a soul was not moved except accidentally, as what it dwells in was moved.⁹ Theologians also treated the passibility of the powers of Christ's human soul, in particular the passibility of the powers of the rational part.¹⁰ Since their understandings about a passion were different, their views about the passibility of Christ's human soul and its powers varied as well. In this section, I shall discuss how theologians defined a passion when they studied Christ's human soul, how Christ's human soul was passible and which powers of the soul were passible. First, I make a brief survey of the concept of the passion in the ancient and early medieval texts, which were the most important sources in later discussions, and then I examine the views of the passibility of Christ's human soul and its powers in the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions.¹¹

⁸ Denzinger 2012, 801, p. 266.

⁹ Aristotle, *De anima* I.4, 408a30–408b1. Theologians also remarked, for example, that, according to Aristotle and Augustine, a passive thing was inferior to an active one (Aristotle, *De anima* III. 5, 430a17–20; Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* lib. 12, cap. 16, p. 402–403, PL 34, 467), but as Christ's human nature was not inferior to any creature, it seemed that it was not passible. (Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, disp. 1, memb. 1, p. 226; *Summa Helensis, Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 58; Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, p. 267; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 4 arg. 1.)

¹⁰ The views of the theologians about how a soul was related to its powers varied. For example, Aquinas argued that the powers were the properties or the accidents of the soul because they were united with a soul accidentally and therefore really distinct from it, whereas John Duns Scotus held that the powers and the soul were formally distinct. (Cross 2002b, 268–269; Pasnau 2002b, 143–170; King 2008, 264–266.)

¹¹ In the twelfth century, there was already a lively debate about the passibility of Christ's human nature. For example, in *De sacramentis* Hugh of Saint Victor claims that Christ assumed passible flesh. (Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sacramentis christianae fidei* lib. 2, pars prima, cap. 7, PL 176, 389B–389C.) In *De quatuor voluntatibus*, he proposes that Christ's flesh had passion and his mind had compassion. As this suggests, he thinks that not only Christ's flesh but also his mind was passible. (Hugh of Saint Victor, *De quatuor voluntatibus in christo* PL 176, 844B.) According to Peter Lombard, Christ assumed a passible human nature as he assumed passible flesh and a passible soul. (Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d.

The ancient and early medieval sources used by the medieval theologians do not propose one coherent idea of passions, but rather a bunch of disparate or loosely connected views. From the viewpoint of the medieval discussions, Aristotle's most important ideas are that the notion of passion has many meanings or uses, that passion is one of the categories, and that there are passions of the soul. In his *Metaphysica*, Aristotle states that 'passion' has many meanings, but does not elaborate on how these different meanings are related to each other. He claims that a passion can be a quality with respect to which a thing is changed, the act of the quality, or the change of the quality, and he goes on to explain that a passion is especially a harmful change, a great misfortune or sadness.¹²

In his *Categoriae*, Aristotle studies passions in chapter eight, which is about the category of the quality, and in chapter nine, which is about categories of action and the passion. In chapter eight, Aristotle claims that the third group of the quality consists of a passible quality and a passion. A passible quality is a quality which in one sense causes a passion related to the senses, and in another sense is a quality caused by a passion, which is permanent and hard to change. If a cause is easily rendered ineffective or removed, an effect is not a passible quality or a quality, but a passion.¹³ However, Aristotle's account of the third group of the quality is confusing because it is not clear how a passion is a quality.¹⁴ In chapter nine, he holds that an action and a passion are two categories, both of which allow contraries and grades. For example, an action like heating is the opposite of cooling, and a passion like being warm is the opposite of being cool and enjoying is the opposite of being sad. In addition, an action and a passion involve grades, because one can warm something more or less, and one can be warmed more or less.¹⁵

In his *De anima*, Aristotle studies the passions of the soul. He argues that the passions of the soul like anger, courage, desire and sensation are psychosomatic: the soul cannot have them without flesh because they entail flesh being moved. Therefore, the definition of the passions of the soul contains a material component. For example, the definition of the anger includes it being a boiling of blood and heat around the heart.¹⁶ Aristotle also

15, cap. 1, p. 92–93.) See also Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiarum* lib. 4, cap. 17 PL 211, 1204B–1204C. Although the twelfth-century theologians taught that Christ assumed a passible human nature, they did not incorporate studies of the concept of passibility in their Christological texts. For Christ's passibility in the twelfth century, see Landgraf 1953, 199–272.

¹² Aristotle, *Metaphysica* V.21, 1022b15–21.

¹³ Aristotle, *Categoriae* 8, 9a28–9b33.

¹⁴ Knuuttila 2004, 237. For passions in Aristotle's *Categories*, see also Knuuttila 2003, 261–262.

¹⁵ Aristotle, *Categoriae* 9, 11b1–15.

¹⁶ Aristotle, *De anima* I.1, 403a3–403a27.

describes joy, sadness and anger as movements which belong to a human being rather than a soul, because a soul is not moved except accidentally, as what it dwells in is moved.¹⁷

The most important source in the thirteenth-century discussions about passion and passibility was John of Damascus's *De fide orthodoxa*, where he proposes descriptions of passion, which he copied verbatim from Nemesius of Emesa's *De natura hominis*.¹⁸ Like the discussion in Aristotle, the notes on the passion in Nemesius and John do not form one coherent idea. They share Aristotle's insights that the word 'passion' has many different meanings, and they describe that there are passions of the soul, passions of the flesh and passions in a broad sense. The passion of the soul is the sensible movement of the appetitive power when good and evil are imagined or the movement of the irrational soul through suspicion of good and evil. Diseases and wounds are the passions of the flesh. A passion in a broad sense is a movement which one thing has from another thing (*ex alio in aliud*) or a movement which is against the nature of the moved thing. They elaborate that not all received movements are passions, but only those which are strong and sensible. Thus, small received movements, which are hidden to the senses, are not passions. They go on to explain that a passion in a broad sense is the opposite of operation. In the first description of the passion in a broad sense, a passion is the movement of the receiver, whereas an operation is the movement of that which moves another thing or brings about a movement in another thing. In the second description of the passion in a broad sense, a passion is a movement against the nature of the moved thing, whereas an operation is a movement according to the nature of the moved thing. Unlike in the first description, a movement is an operation or a passion regardless of whether it belongs to a mover or a moved thing.¹⁹

The ideas of the early Franciscans regarding passions and passibility were influenced especially by John of Damascus's *De fide orthodoxa*. Alexander of Hales was the first thirteenth-century theologian to incorporate theories about passions and the passibility of the soul in a study about the passions of Christ.²⁰ According to Alexander, passibility has four

¹⁷ Aristotle, *De anima* I.4, 408b1–408b19.

¹⁸ See Nemesius of Emesa, *De natura hominis* cap. 15, p. 93–94. On the sources of Nemesius's view, see Sharples 2008, 129–131, n. 641–651. For John of Damascus on the passions of Christ, see also Gondreau 2002, 60–66.

¹⁹ John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 132–134. According to John, Christ's flesh and soul were passible but his divine nature was not. His soul was passible, as it had a passion with the flesh. (John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 70, p. 270–270.)

²⁰ For Alexander of Hales on the passions of Christ's human soul, see also Gondreau 2002, 91–93. Gondreau also remarks that Alexander of Hales paid attention to these abstract terms. (Gondreau 2002, 93.)

meanings. In the first and the most general sense, passibility is an ability to receive (*receptibile*), in the second sense an ability to receive a suitable or an unsuitable passion which is moderate, and in the third sense an ability to receive a suitable or an unsuitable passion which is immoderate. Passibility in the fourth sense is not only the ability to have a passion, but the necessity to have it, and it is a penalty.²¹

Alexander takes for granted that Christ's human soul was passible because, according to Christian faith, Christ assumed a passible soul. The soul was passible in all four senses, passible as such, and passible as related to the flesh.²² When Alexander turns to study the passibility of the powers of Christ's human soul, he is especially interested in the passibility of the superior part of Christ's reason. He expounds that all powers of Christ's human soul were able to receive a passion²³ and holds that the superior part of reason was also able to receive a suitable or an unsuitable passion inasmuch as it was related to flesh. The passibility of the superior part of reason was based on a distinction between reason "as nature" and reason "as reason". Alexander claims quite vaguely that the superior part of reason as nature was united with the flesh and it apprehended things by natural knowledge, whereas reason as reason was united with God and

²¹ "Uno enim modo 'passibile' idem est quod receptibile; [...] Sic autem passibile dicitur a 'patin', graecum, id est ab informatione, quia informat eam. Haec est generalissima ratio 'passibilis'. – Secundo modo dicitur 'pati' recipere cum aliqua oppositione in receptibilibus existence; [...] Si receptum est conveniens vel inconveniens moderatum, sic dicitur 'passibile' secundo modo; si vero sit conveniens vel inconveniens immoderatum, sic dicitur tertio modo. Quarto modo dicitur 'passibile' quod necessarium ad passionem nec est ordinatum ad compatiendum [nisi] immoderatum. [...] quarto modo dicitur passibilitas 'necessitas ad compatiendum' sic non fuit passibilis anima in statu innocentiae, et sic est poena;" Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, disp. 1, memb. 1, p. 230–231. For Alexander of Hales on Christ's affectivity, see also Gondreau 2002, 89–93; Coolman 2007.

²² "Concedo conclusionem, et fidei nostrae est. Fides enim nostra dicit quod Christus assumpsit animam cum passibilitate." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 2, memb. 1, p. 240. "Anima enim eius, in quantum est spiritus creatus, habet passibilitatem, sicut habet vertibilitatem in quantum est creature, sicut dicit Damascenus. Praeter hoc autem ex unione ad carnem habet anima Christi compassibilitatem." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 2, memb. 1, p. 241. Alexander's view of the passibility of Christ's human soul presupposes his view about the passibility of Adam's soul. According to Alexander, Adam's soul before the Fall was passible in the first, second and third senses. Unlike Christ's human soul, Adam's soul was not passible in the fourth sense because Adam did not have passions necessarily. (Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, disp. 1, memb. 1, p. 231; 233.) Alexander describes that a soul is passible in the first sense because it can receive, for example, an intelligible species, which, according to Aristotle, is a passion. (Aristotle, *De anima* III.4, 429a13–20.) John of la Rochelle claims that Augustine also considered a soul as able to receive. According to Augustine, a soul is able to receive all kinds of intelligible and sensible species, just as prime matter is able to receive all kinds of natural forms. (John of la Rochelle, *Summa de anima* cap. 60, p. 48.)

²³ "Secundum ergo quod passio gaudium dicitur, possibilis fuit ad passionem secundum omnem vim animae suae Christus; et sic dicitur passio a 'patin', quod est informatio." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 2, memb. 3, p. 246.

apprehended things with deliberation and election.²⁴ Only the superior part of Christ's reason as nature had compassion with the flesh, while as reason it did not have this compassion but was passible in the sense that it had joy necessarily.²⁵ Alexander proposed this quite obscure distinction between the reason as reason and the reason as nature because he thought that it explained how the superior part of Christ's reason was touched by pain and joy at the same time.²⁶

Like Alexander of Hales, the *Summa Halensis* also thinks that passibility involves receiving but differs from Alexander by maintaining that immoderation or moderation was not a dividing factor in explicating different meanings of 'passion'. According to the *Summa Halensis*, a passion is a movement from something in something else (*ex alio in aliud*) and a movement can be suitable or unsuitable for the nature of the receiver. When a movement is suitable, it is a passion in a broad sense,²⁷ and when it is unsuitable, it is a passion in a strict sense.²⁸ The passion of the soul is the

²⁴ "Respondeo: Superior portio rationis consideratur dupliciter: quia ut est 'natura', scilicet ut est quaedam potentia animae in se, secundum se carni unita, et apprehendens ex cognitione innata, [...] Vel dicitur ratio ut 'ratio', scilicet quando apprehendit cum electione et deliberatione." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 2, memb. 3, p. 246. "Dico ergo quod secundum superiorem partem ratio unibilis est carni, quia secundum omnem partem unibilis est ei. Sic, secundum quod est natura quaedam, compassibilis est. Secundum vero quod ratio unitae sit deitati, ex illa ordinatione non est compassibilis dolore mortis, sed necessitatem habet ad gaudium." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 2, memb. 3, p. 246. According to Alexander, the powers of the inferior and the superior parts of Adam's soul were passible as they were able to receive a form and as they were able to receive a moderate passion, but only the powers of the inferior part of the soul were able to receive an immoderate passion. However, unlike the superior part of Christ's reason, the superior part of Adam's reason was not compassionate to the flesh, as it was illuminated by God. (Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 1, memb. 3, p. 235–236.)

²⁵ "Sed tunc quaeritur an fuerit passibilitas a 'pati'. [...] Dico ergo quod ratio superior in Christo, ut natura, fuit possibilis ad quoddam pati; sed ratio ut ratio disposita fuit ad passibilitatem quae est gaudium; vel non tantum etiam disposita, sed habuit necessitatem ad gaudium, propter unionem cum deitate. Dico ergo quod secundum superiorem partem ratio unibilis est carni, quia secundum omnem partem unibilis est ei. Sic, secundum quod est natura quaedam, compassibilis est. Secundum vero quod ratio unitae sit deitati, ex illa ordinatione non est compassibilis dolore mortis, sed necessitatem habet ad gaudium." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 2, memb. 3, p. 246.

²⁶ For the simultaneity of pain and joy in Christ, see Chapter 3.7.

²⁷ "Secundum Ioannem Damascenum, 'passio generaliter dicta est motus ex alio in aliud'. Hoc autem potest esse dupliciter: vel in aliud 'secundum naturam' vel in aliud 'praeter naturam'. Si vero in aliud secundum naturam sit mutatio vel motus, dicetur tunc passio et passibile a παθεῖν graeco, quod sonat informationem; et hoc modo dicitur anima passibilis, id est receptibilis ipsorum intelligibilium, scientiarum et virtutum, ad quod secundum naturam nata est. Hoc modo generalissime dicitur passibilitas respectu cuiusque creaturae, in quantum est receptibilis cuiuscumque perfectionis." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 59.

²⁸ "Si vero praeter naturam, tunc passio dicitur specialiter, secundum quod distinguit Ioannes Damascenus inter operationem et passionem," *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 59–60. This description of the passion evidently unites John of Damascus's view of a passion as a received movement with the view of a passion as a movement, which is against nature.

movement of the soul when good or evil is apprehended.²⁹ Christ's human soul had passions in a broad and in a strict sense, and the passions of the soul.³⁰ The soul had a passion in a strict sense as it was united with the flesh.³¹ Because it claims that Christ had perturbations as movements of sensuality and movements of the reason as nature but not as movements of the reason as reason, the *Summa Halensis* seems to hold that Christ had the passions of the soul in sensuality and in the reason as nature.³² Like Alexander of Hales, also the *Summa Halensis* holds that the powers of the rational part of Christ's human soul were passible since Christ's reason and will had sadness, which was a passion.³³

Bonaventure does not combine an analysis of the concepts of passibility and passion in his study about Christ's passions, but in other parts

²⁹ "Potest igitur dici quod suspicio proprie sumitur, et sic dubitationem importat, et sic non sumitur in ratione Remigii. Sumitur etiam nomine extenso, prout dicit apprehensionem sive cognitionem, et sic sumitur in ratione Remigii sub hoc sensu: 'passio est motus animae per apprehensionem boni vel mali', et sic sumitur in Christo." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 60. It is not clear who is the Remigius mentioned here. However, Nemesius of Emesa and John of Damascus propose this description. For the sources of this description in Nemesius of Emesa's *De natura hominis*, see Sharples 2008, 130, n. 646.

³⁰ "[...] 'passio est motus animae per apprehensionem boni vel mali', et sic sumitur in Christo." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 60. "Si vero in aliud secundum naturam sit mutatio vel motus [...] Hoc modo generalissime dicitur passibilitas respectu cuiusque creaturae, in quantum est receptibilis cuiuscumque perfectionis." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 59. "Si vero praeter naturam, tunc passio dicitur specialiter [...] Distinguendum est ergo secundum hunc modum quod, cum passibilitas sit potentia patiendi, potentia autem tripliciter consideratur: primo ut potentia indisposita ad patiendum, secundo ut disposita ad patiendum, tertio ut necessitas ad patiendum; dicendum ergo quod in Adam fuit potentia ad patiendum, sed indisposita in statu innocentiae; in nobis vero est potentia, quae est cum necessitate ad patiendum; in Domino vero Iesu fuit medio modo, scilicet potentia cum dispositione ad patiendum." (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 59–60.) Following Alexander, the *Summa Halensis* holds that passibility is an ability to receive (*potentia patiendi*) a passion in a strict sense and it can be non-disposed (*indisposita*), disposed (*disposita*) or necessitated to receive (*necessitas ad patiendum*) such a passion. The *Summa Halensis* claims without further clarification that the passibility of the prelapsarian human being was non-disposed and the passibility of the postlapsarian human being is necessitated to receive. Christ's human nature had an ability disposed to receive a passion in a strict sense, but it was not necessitated to receive because Christ's passibility was subject to his will, as his human nature received when his will wished it.

³¹ "Nam in animabus parvulorum est passibilitas per compassibilitatem [...] ita et anima Christi ex unione ad carnem habet compassibilitatem [...] Sic ergo est quaedam convenientia passibilitatis animae Christi et parvulorum. Est autem dissimilitudo, quia anima parvuli habet necessitatem ad pati, et hoc ex culpa contracta; anima autem Christi habet dispositionem ad pati, non ex culpa contracta, sed voluntarie assumpta." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 61.

³² "Perturbatio quandoque est motus sensualitatis, quandoque partis rationalis. Prout est motus sensualitatis, sic fuit in Christo. Prout est motus partis rationalis, potest esse duobus modis: vel in parte prout est natura, et sic potuit esse in Christo ex infirmitate vel dispositione assumpta; vel prout est ratio sive rationalis, et sic nequaquam." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 60.

³³ For more about the *Summa Halensis* on the passions of reason and the will, see Chapter 3.6.

of his *Commentary on the Sentences* he claims that a soul is passible as it can move itself.³⁴ He also says that the will is passible because it can have a passion as movement, which the will effects in itself when it moves itself, and as a penalty when the will sins.³⁵ When he studies the sadness of Christ, he further adds that the rational powers of Christ had sadness as a passion.³⁶

Albert the Great's view of a passion was influenced by Aristotle's works.³⁷ Unlike the Franciscans, Albert held that a passion in a broad sense and in a strict sense is the category of the passion, whereas a passion of the soul is the passible quality of the sensitive appetitive power which is effected by a passion or which effects a passion.³⁸ A passion in a broad sense is a received form and movement³⁹ and a passion in a strict sense

³⁴ For Bonaventure on the passions of Christ's human soul, see also Gonreau 2002, 96–98. Bonaventure explains that there are two opinions of how a soul suffers. According to one opinion, a soul suffers (*pati*) accidentally because it has compassion for the flesh. According to another opinion, adopted from Augustine's *De musica*, a soul suffers because of itself (*patitur ex se*), but a soul takes an occasion to suffer from the flesh. (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1 (III, 347).) Bonaventure supports the second opinion in explaining how a damned immaterial soul feels pain caused by a corporeal eternal fire. Following the Augustinian view of perception, which emphasizes the activity of the soul in sense perception, Bonaventure argues that a soul itself moves naturally to sense the heat caused by eternal fire, but the fire offers for the soul an occasion to itself move naturally to sense heat. As a soul itself moves naturally to sense heat, an immaterial damned soul can also have a passion and sensation about the corporeal eternal fire. (Bonaventure, 4 Sent. d. 44, pars. 2, a. 3, q. 2 (IV, 934).) The Augustinian account of sense perception differed from the Aristotelian account. According to Augustine, a soul is active in sense perception. Unlike Augustine, Aristotle emphasized the passivity of sense perception. For sense perception according to Augustine, see O'Daly 1987, 80–105; Silva 2008, 88; Silva and Toivanen 2010, 247–249; Toivanen 2013, 135–139.

³⁵ When Bonaventure studies sin, he claims that there are two kinds of passions of the will. The passion of the will can be the movement of the will, which takes place when the will moves itself, or a penalty, which the will does not cause directly but deserves when it effects a faulty act. (Bonaventure, 2 Sent. d. 35, a. 1, q. 2. (II, 825–826).) The view of the passion of the will as a movement is based on Anselm of Canterbury's idea that the will in an act is an instrument that moves itself. (Bonaventure, 2 Sent. d. 24, pars. 1, a. 2, q. 2. (II, 564).)

³⁶ For the sadness of Christ's will, see Chapter 3.6.

³⁷ For Albert the Great on the passions of Christ's human soul, see also Gonreau 2002, 94–96.

³⁸ “Et dicit Ioannes Damascenus, quod ‘passio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilis in imaginatione boni vel mali’. Et aliter: ‘Passio est motus irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali’. Et aliter: ‘Passio est motus ex alio in aliud’. Philosophus autem sic: ‘Passio est effectus illatioque actionis’. [...] Dicendum, quod primae duae diffinitiones dantur tantum de passione, secundum quod est species qualitatis illata in sensibilem partem animae et non inferens. [...] Duae autem ultimae dantur de ipsa passione, secundum quod est genus generalissimum, sub quo est ordinatio praedicamentaliū.” Albert the Great, *De bono* q. 5, a. 1, p. 195–196. “Secundum autem quod dicitur pati secundum qualitates passibiles, quae a passione inferuntur vel passionem inferunt, non omnis potentia animae erit passiva, sed affectiva sensibilis tantum.” Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 3, p. 222. See also *Summa theologiae* pars 2, tr. 14, q. 83, p. 129.

³⁹ “Dicamus ergo quod passio quae est praedicamentum, est effectus illatioque actionis. Duo enim sunt in passione, scilicet forma agentis a patiente suscepta, et quoad hoc est passio effectus actionis. Est etiam motus secundum quod est actus imperfecti et imperfectus in patiente; et hic motus continue fluit a movente in patiens quod movetur: et quoad hoc est passio continua illatio actionis.” Albert the Great, *Liber de sex principiis* tract. 3, cap. 1, p. 331.

is a received form and movement which corrupts nature.⁴⁰ Although John of Damascus thinks that passions are movements, Albert claims that passions are not movements in reality. He explains that John calls passions movements improperly, but that a passion is a movement in the sense that a movement causes a passion.⁴¹

According to Albert, a passion of the soul is the act of the appetitive power.⁴² Albert seems to think that a passion of the soul as passible quality is a passible act. He explains that a passible act is a passion because it is caused by an apprehended thing. It also has an aspect of action because a soul acts in the flesh when a soul has it. For example, when a soul has joy, the heart is widened.⁴³ Following Aristotle, Albert states that the subject of the passion of the soul is a soul-flesh composite (*conjectum*). When such a composite has the passion of the soul, the flesh is changed and the soul is changed somehow (*aliquo modo*), because the soul has compassion for the flesh.⁴⁴

Albert thinks that a soul is passible through its powers since all apprehensive and appetitive powers can receive a suitable or an unsuitable form from their objects and the sensitive appetitive power can have passible qualities.⁴⁵ Unlike the aforementioned Franciscans, Albert separated the

⁴⁰ "Proprie autem dicitur passio quod in naturam sive contra naturam agit ut contrarium et nocivum naturae, [...] Et hoc modo passio non dicitur a receptione simpliciter, sed dicitur a receptione contrarii et nocentis agentis ad corruptionem naturae vel esse..." Albert the Great, *Liber de sex principiis* tract. 3, cap. 2, p. 333.

⁴¹ Albert the Great, *De bono* q. 5, a. 1, p. 197; *Liber de sex principiis* tract. 3, cap. 1, p. 331. For more about Albert's criticism of the idea that passions are movements, see Knuuttila 2004, 238. For Albert on passions, see also Knuuttila 2002, 70–71.

⁴² Albert the Great, *De bono* q. 5, a. 1, p. 196.

⁴³ "Anima enim actionum unaquaeque passio dicitur: quas tamen secundum intentionem praedicamenti actionis sub actione locamus, sicut est amor, et odium, et tristari, et gaudere, quae omnia passibiles actiones animae vocamus: haec enim omnia passionem sunt secundum quod a conceptis sunt illatae. [...] Actiones autem sunt, quia in his agit anima in corpus et movet corpus secundum systolem et diastolem, sicut diximus." Albert the Great, *Liber de sex principiis* tract. 3, cap. 1, p. 332–333. An anonymous author of the *Liber de sex principiis*, on which Albert comments, claims that an act causes a passion but sometimes an act causes a passion, which is also an act, because a passion further causes another passion. Since the author claims that such a passion-act is a quality, he seems to think that it is a passible quality. (*Liber de sex principiis* PL 188, 1261B–1261C.)

⁴⁴ "[...] in anima enim hominis secundum partem sensibilem quae est in ea, alteratio contrarietatis secundum motum passionum invenitur, ut tristitiae et gaudii: quamvis enim motus passionum gaudii et tristitiae sint conjuncti et non animae, ut subjecti, ut dicit Aristoteles; tamen, ut dicit Averroes, in his compatitur anima corpori, et sic aliquo modo variatur," Albert the Great, *Liber de sex principiis* tract. 1, cap. 2, p. 309; tract. 2, cap. 3, p. 323–324. See also Averroes, *De anima* lib. 1, comm. 14, p. 20–21.

⁴⁵ "Et secundum quod pati determinatur per recipere quodcumque, sic omnes potentiae apprehensivae et motivae in comparatione ad sua obiecta erunt passivae, secundum quod motum dicitur passum et movens dicitur agens. Obiectum enim dicitur et est movens, et potentia est mota. Secundum autem quod dicitur pati secundum qualitates passibiles, quae a passione inferuntur vel passionem inferunt, non omnis potentia animae erit passiva, sed affectiva sensibilis tantum." Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 3, p. 222; a. 1,

passibility of the powers of the soul from the passibility of corporeal matter. He argues that while corporeal matter receives a corporeal form, the power of the soul receives an intention abstracted from material form. Therefore, matter receives *simpliciter* whereas a soul receives *secundum quid*.⁴⁶ Christ's human soul was passible because its powers received intentions of suitable and unsuitable forms⁴⁷ and the sensitive appetitive power had the passions of the soul. Albert adds that Christ's human soul was passible also because it was able to have pain when his flesh was violated.⁴⁸

Thomas Aquinas's view about the passibility of Christ's human soul was also distinctly Aristotelian.⁴⁹ His quite complex view about the passibility of the soul was an interpretation of Aristotle's view of how a soul was changed only accidentally. It differed from the Franciscan views, as Aquinas argued that a passion was a change, which involved not only receiving but also losing, and the soul itself was changed only accidentally.⁵⁰ Following John of Damascus, Aquinas clarifies that a passion in a broad sense includes receiving, but unlike the Franciscans, he adds that a passion in a strict sense is a change where a thing receives one quality and loses the

p. 220; *De bono* q. 5, a. 1, p. 196; *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 1, p. 220; a. 3, p. 222. For Albert the Great on the soul, see Park 1980, 503–510; Anzulewicz 2013b.

⁴⁶ “Dicimus, quod potentia patiendi in anima non est eiusdem rationis cum potentia patiendi in materia corporali. In materia enim corporali una materia numero potest esse sub forma agentis in ipsam, quae fuit prius sub forma contrarii, ita quod illae formae sint actus ipsius et perfectiones secundum esse et naturam ipsarum formarum. Sed potentia patiendi in anima non est ad receptionem formarum secundum esse et naturam formarum, sed secundum receptionem intentionis abstractae ab illis formis. [...] Et tale esse formae non est esse simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et ideo anima etiam non patitur simpliciter, sed secundum quid.” Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 2, p. 221. The debate of whether, according to Aristotle, perception involves a material change has been active. For example, Burnyeat argues that in Aristotelian theory perception does not involve a material change (Burnyeat, 1992), but Nussbaum, Putnam (1992) and Sorabji (1992) have argued that it does involve a material change. For more references to this debate, see Toivanen 2013, 195, n. 3.

⁴⁷ “Dicitur enim pati secundum receptibile formae convenientis vel non convenientis quocumque modo. [...] Et hoc modo anima Adae fuit passibilis et similiter anima Christi.” Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 1, p. 220; *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, p. 268.

⁴⁸ “Alia etiam ratione passibilis est anima iterum secundum quod passionem diffinit Damascenus, quod est motus animae suspensione boni vel mali. [...] Tertio modo dicitur passio sensus doloris ex dissolvendo continuum corpus conjunctum animae, [...] et hoc modo quaeritur hic de passione: et sic dicimus animam Christi compassam esse corpori.” Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, p. 268. For how the passibility of Adam's soul and Christ's human soul differed, see Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 2, p. 222; a. 7, p. 225–226.

⁴⁹ Gondreau also claims that Albert the Great's and Aquinas's views about the passions of Christ were especially based on Aristotle. (Gondreau 2002, 114–115.)

⁵⁰ There are many studies about passions on Aquinas, see, for example, Sarot 1994, 64–76; Murphy 1999; Knuuttila 2003; 72–77; 2004, 239–255; Miner 2009; Lombardo 2011; King 1999; 2012a; 2012b. For Aquinas on Christ's passions, see Adams 1999, 64–67; Gondreau 2002; 2009; Hoogland 2003, 1–80; Titus 2009; Lombardo 2011, 201–223. For Aquinas on passion and passibility, see Sarot 1992, 105–111; James 1997, 48–64; Gondreau 2002, 204–211; Miner 2009, 29–35.

opposite quality, and a passion in the strictest sense is a change where a thing receives a form not suitable to it while simultaneously losing the corresponding form suitable to it.⁵¹ Aquinas took the idea that a passion involves that something is removed and something is received from Avicenna.⁵²

Like Albert the Great, Aquinas also thinks that the passibility of the body differs from the passibility of the soul. He explains that only a corruptible body can have a passion in a strict sense because a change supposes that its subject subsists *per se*, a subject is a body since only a body is changed, and a subject can have opposing qualities.⁵³ Following Aristotle, Aquinas holds that a soul is changed only accidentally inasmuch as a soul is united with the flesh. A soul is united with the flesh as the form and the

⁵¹ “Respondeo dicendum quod pati dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiam si nihil abiiciatur a re, [...] Alio modo dicitur pati proprie, quando aliquid recipitur cum alterius abiectione. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim abiicitur id quod non est conveniens rei, [...] Alio modo, quando e converso contingit, [...] Et hic est propriissimus modus passionis. Nam pati dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem, quod autem recedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, maxime videtur ad aliud trahi.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a-II^ae q. 22 a. 1 co. “Communiter quidem dicitur passio receptio alicuius quocumque modo [...] Proprie vero dicitur passio secundum quod actio et passio in motu consistunt, prout scilicet aliquid recipitur in patiente per viam motus; et quia omnis motus est inter contraria, oportet illud quod recipitur in patiente, esse contrarium alicui quod a patiente abiicitur. Secundum hoc autem quod recipitur in patiente, patiens agenti assimilatur; et exinde est quod proprie accepta passione, agens contrariatur patienti, et omnis passio abiicit a substantia. Huiusmodi autem passio non est nisi secundum motum alterationis...” Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 1 co; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1 qc. 1 co. In *De veritate*, Aquinas adds also a third, the transferred sense of the passion. Then a passion means that something is impeded from having what belongs to it. (Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 1 co.) According to Aquinas, a quality according to which an alteration takes place is the third species of the quality and an alteration is the category of the passion. (Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia Metaphysicae* lib. 5, l. 20, n. 8–10.) Aquinas describes that a passive receiver is assimilated with an agent by means of the received thing and then an agent draws a passive one. An agent draws a passive one maximally when a passive one loses a suitable form. When this takes place, a passion removes something from the substance of the passive one (*omnis passio abiicit a substantia*). (Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 1 co; *Summa theologiae* I^a-II^ae q. 22 a. 1 co; *Sententia Metaphysicae* lib. 5, l. 20, n. 10.) Aquinas adopted these ideas from Aristotle. In his *Topics*, Aristotle holds that a passion corrupts the substance of the thing (Aristotle, *Topica* VI.6, 145a1–5.) and in his *De generatione et corruptione* he claims that an agent makes a passive one similar to it. (Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* VII.7, 324a10–1.)

⁵² Avicenna, *Liber de anima* pars. 2, cap. 3, p. 137.

⁵³ “Ad hoc autem quod sit alteratio, requiritur ex parte alterati quod sit res per se subsistens, aliter enim subjectum motus esse non posset; et quod sit corpus, quia solum tale movetur, ut in VI Phys. probatur; et ulterius quod habeat naturam contrarietati subjectam, quia alteratio est motus inter contrarias qualitates. [...] Sed ulterius ad rationem passionis requiritur quod qualitas introducta sit extranea, et qualitas abjecta sit connaturalis. [...] Unde patet quod illorum tantum corporum est proprie pati quae possunt extra naturam suam trahi; et haec sunt corruptibilia.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 1 co; *Summa theologiae* I^a-II^ae q. 22, a. 1 co. In *De veritate*, Aquinas adds that a soul also has a passion when its operation is impeded. (Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 1 co.)

mover of the flesh.⁵⁴ The soul of human Christ's was also passible in this way.⁵⁵

Aquinas's understanding of how a soul as a form is changed is important because it explains also how a soul as a mover is changed. A soul as the form of the flesh is changed accidentally when the flesh is changed, because then also the soul-flesh composite is changed and the soul is changed since it is part of this composite.⁵⁶ A soul as a mover is changed accidentally when a soul changes flesh and the change reaches the soul as the form of the flesh. Aquinas holds that a passion which originates in the flesh is a corporeal passion. For example, a corporeal passion like an injury of the flesh begins in the flesh, and the soul is changed accidentally as the form of the flesh. A passion which originates in a soul and ends in the flesh as a soul changes the flesh is a passion of the soul.⁵⁷ Aquinas's description

⁵⁴ "Quia cum anima sit quid incorporeum, sibi proprie non accidit pati, nisi secundum quod corpori applicatur. Applicatur autem corpori et secundum essentiam suam, secundum quod est forma corporea, et secundum operationem suarum potentiarum, prout est motor ejus." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 2 co. For Aquinas on a soul as a substance and the unity of the flesh and soul, see Pasnau 2002b, 45–99. For Aquinas on a soul as the form of the body, see Dales 1995, 107–112; 138–149; Bazán 1997; Pasnau 2011, 350–354; 2012, 501; McNerny and O'Callaghan, 2015.

⁵⁵ "[...] ideo passibilitas inerat illi animae ex parte illa qua conjungibilis erat corpori; [...] Conjungebatur autem corpori dupliciter: scilicet secundum essentiam, inquantum est forma et secundum potentias, non tamen omnes, sed quasdam;" *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 3 co. "Cum enim anima sit forma corporis, [...] corpore perturbato per aliquam corpoream passionem, necesse est quod anima per accidens perturbetur [...] Quia igitur corpus Christi fuit passibile et mortale [...] necesse fuit ut etiam anima eius hoc modo passibilis esset. [...] Passione autem animali pati dicitur anima secundum operationem quae vel est propria animae, vel est principaliter animae quam corporis. [...] propriissime dicuntur passionibus animae affectiones appetitus sensitivi, quae in Christo fuerunt, sicut et cetera quae ad naturam hominis pertinent." *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 4 co. Gondreau claims that in *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas "allows for the passibility of Christ's soul only on account of the passibility of his body, i.e., only because bodily suffering affects the soul to which the body is joined as matter to its form, and not because of the proper operations of his sensitive soul as such" (Gondreau 2002, 248). However, his claim begs a question because Aquinas does claim that the sensitive part of Christ's human soul had, for example, sadness, which as an act of the sensitive appetitive power was the proper operation of his sensitive soul. (*Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1 co; a. 3, qc. 2 co.)

⁵⁶ "[...] nam id quod est compositum ex materia et forma, sicut agit ratione formae ita patitur ratione materiae, et ideo passio incipit a materia, et quodam modo per accidens pertinet ad formam;" Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 2 co. "Passio autem cum abiectione non est nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem, unde passio proprie dicta non potest competere animae nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet compositum patitur." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–II^ae q. 22, a. 1 co. See also *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2 co.

⁵⁷ "Dupliciter ergo passio corporis attribuitur animae per accidens: uno modo ita quod passio incipiat a corpore et terminetur in anima secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma, et haec est quaedam passio corporalis; sicut cum laeditur corpus, debilitatur unio corporis cum anima, et sic per accidens ipsa anima patitur, quae secundum suum esse corpori unitur. Alio modo ita quod incipiat ab anima in quantum est corporis motor, et terminetur in corpus, et haec dicitur passio animalis; sicut patet in ira et timore et aliis huiusmodi, nam huiusmodi peraguntur per apprehensionem et appetitum animae, ad quae sequitur corporis transmutatio; sicut transmutatio mobilis sequitur ex operatione motoris secundum omnem modum quo

of the passions of the soul indicates that they are passions because they involve a corporeal change.⁵⁸ In this respect, Aquinas's view of the passions of the soul differs from that of Albert the Great, because Albert thinks that the passion of the soul is a passion because an apprehended thing causes it. Aquinas explains that Christ had passions of the body⁵⁹ and passions of the soul.⁶⁰

The idea that only the flesh can have a passion has received some attention in literature. However, for example, James does not mention the idea although she studies the concepts of passion and action.⁶¹ Gondreau claims that "most properly a passion appertains to the movement of the sensitive appetite",⁶² but unlike what Gondreau claims, a passion cannot pertain to the sensitive appetitive power most properly, as Aquinas thinks that only a flesh has a passion. However, among the powers of the soul the act of the sensitive appetitive power is related to a passion most properly, as I shall show below. Lombardo claims that "Aquinas locates the passions principally in the soul and describes them as *passiones animae*". He continues, "Nonetheless, the passions affect the soul only through the medium of the flesh, and therefore, in a somewhat secondary fashion."⁶³ As Aquinas thinks that a soul has a passion *per accidens*, Lombardo's claim that a soul has passions principally needs further clarification. Minor seems to think that a soul has a passion accidentally because the act of the sensitive appetite belongs to a soul and the flesh.⁶⁴ However, Aquinas's idea is that a soul is changed accidentally when the sensitive appetite has an act because then the soul moves the flesh and the soul is changed, as the soul is the form

mobile disponitur ad obediendum motioni motoris. Et sic corpore transmutato per alterationem aliquam, ipsa anima pati dicitur per accidens." Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 2 co; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 4 co. See also *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2 co.

⁵⁸ "[...] ira, et similiter quaelibet passio animae, dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo secundum propriam rationem irae, et sic per prius est in anima quam in corpore; alio modo in quantum est passio, et sic per prius est in corpore; ibi enim primo accipit rationem passionis: et ideo non dicimus quod anima irascatur per accidens, sed quod per accidens patiatur." Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 2 ad. 5.

⁵⁹ "Passione quidem corporali patitur per corporis laesionem. [...] Quia igitur corpus Christi fuit passibile et mortale, ut supra habitum est, necesse fuit ut etiam anima eius hoc modo passibilis esset." *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 4 co; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3 qc. 2 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 ad 1.

⁶⁰ "[...] propriissime dicuntur passiones animae affectiones appetitus sensitivi, quae in Christo fuerunt, sicut et cetera quae ad naturam hominis pertinent." *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 ad 1; a. 8 co. Gondreau seems to think that Aquinas was the first to claim that Christ had the passions of the soul as the movements of the sensitive appetitive power. (Gondreau 2002. 252–253.) However, already the *Summa Halensis* claimed that Christ had the passions of the soul and the movements of sensuality.

⁶¹ James 1997, 47–64.

⁶² Gondreau 2002, 205.

⁶³ Lombardo 2011, 45.

⁶⁴ Minor 2009, 32.

of the body. I think that Sarot provides the most detailed and accurate description of how a soul is changed accidentally when the flesh is changed.⁶⁵

Aquinas clarifies that when the change of the flesh is for the worse, it is a passion in a more proper sense than when the change is for the good. Since he concludes that sadness is more of a passion than pleasure, he seems to think that sadness involves a corporeal change for the worse but pleasure includes a corporeal change for the good.⁶⁶ Miner argues that Aquinas adopted the idea that a passion in a strict sense is for the worse through experience.⁶⁷ However, unlike Miner, I think that Aquinas adopted the idea from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* since, in his *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, Aquinas claims that a harmful change is a passion in particular.⁶⁸ McNerny explains that, according to Aquinas, all meanings of passion are based on the meaning of passion as a change of the flesh for the worse. He expounds that for Aquinas, 'passion' is an analogous term, and he claims that a passion as a corporeal alteration for the worse is *ratio*, which is common for all meanings of passion. All meanings of passion involve some element of that *ratio*.⁶⁹ However, McNerny's interesting interpretation is not without difficulties. Aquinas does not explicitly argue or even hint that 'passion' is an analogous term; it seems that he just adopted the idea that passion has many meanings from Nemesius of Emesa or John of Damascus.

Aquinas's teaching about the passibility of the powers differs from the Franciscans since he emphasizes that only the act of the sensitive appetitive power involves a passion in a strict sense. He argues that because only the powers of the vegetative and the sensitive part of the soul are connected with the flesh but the powers of the rational part of the soul are not, only the acts of the vegetative and the sensitive powers involve a passion in a strict sense.⁷⁰ The acts of the intellect and the will are passions only in a

⁶⁵ Sarot 1992, 108–109; 1994, 65–70. In addition, McNerny (1968, 30), Murphy (1999, 167) and Knuuttila (2004, 241) remark that a soul has passions accidentally.

⁶⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–II^ae q. 22, a. 1 co; I^a–II^ae q. 37 a. 4 co. See also Gondreau 2002, 221–222.

⁶⁷ Miner 2009, 33.

⁶⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia Metaphysicae* lib. 5, l. 20, n. 10.

⁶⁹ McNerny 1968, 30–33.

⁷⁰ "Quia cum anima sit quid incorporeum, sibi proprie non accidit pati, nisi secundum quod corpori applicatur. Applicatur autem corpori [...] et secundum operationem suarum potentiarum [...] In viribus autem animae quantum ad operationem applicantur corpori solum vires partis sensitivae et nutritivae. [...] Sed in viribus intellectivae partis, quamvis non sit proprie passio, quia immateriales sunt, tamen ibi est aliquid de ratione passionis..." *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2 co. "[...] et ideo huiusmodi passio non est in parte intellectiva, quae non est alicuius organi corporalis actus;" Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 co. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–II^ae q. 22, a. 3 co; *Sententia Ethic.* lib. 2, l. 5, n. 4. A passion in a broad sense explains why the acts of the sensitive rather than the vegetative part are passions. According to Aquinas, the powers of the sensitive part are moved, but the powers of the vegetative part are not moved. (Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 co; *Sententia Ethic.* lib. 2, l. 5, n. 3.)

broad sense since the potential intellect receives an intelligible species and an apprehended thing moves the will. However, according to Aquinas, the will rather than the intellect has a passion in a broad sense because good and evil move the will, whereas truth and untruth move the intellect. Aquinas explains that because goodness and evilness are in a thing, but truth and untruth are in a soul, a thing moves the will rather than the intellect.⁷¹

The acts of the senses and the sensitive appetitive power involve a passion in a strict and in a broad sense because the flesh is changed and the powers are moved when they have an act. According to Aquinas, however, the act of the sensitive appetitive power rather than the act of the senses is a passion in a broad sense because a thing as it is in itself moves the sensitive appetitive power, but a thing as it is in a soul moves the senses;⁷² it is a passion in a strict sense because the act of the senses involves a spiritual change of the flesh but the act or movement of the sensitive appetitive power includes only a natural change of the flesh.⁷³ It is noteworthy that scholars

⁷¹ “Sed in viribus intellectivae partis, quamvis non sit proprie passio, quia immateriales sunt, tamen ibi est aliquid de ratione passionis, quia in apprehensione intellectus creati est receptio; [...] In appetitu autem intellectivo, est adhuc plus de ratione passionis, quia voluntas movetur a re secundum quod est bona vel mala, quae sunt conditiones rei; intellectus autem movetur secundum apprehensionem veri vel falsi, quae non sunt rei per se, sed secundum quod sunt in anima; quia bonum et malum sunt in rebus, verum et falsum sunt in anima, ut dicitur in VI Meta.. Unde magis recipit anima a re secundum affectum, et vehementius movetur quam secundum intellectum;” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 co; *Summa theologiae* I^a-II^ae q. 22, a. 2 co; *In De divinis nominibus* cap. 2, l. 4; *Sententia Ethic.* lib. 2, l. 5, n. 3. When Aquinas claims that true and false are only in the soul, he refers to Aristotle, *Metaphysica* VI.4, 1027b25–28. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia Metaphysicae* lib. 6, l. 4, n. 1; 8–18; Schmidt 1966, 237–238; Wippel 2007, 65–112.

⁷² “Sed quia sensus non movetur a sensibili secundum conditionem moventis, cum forma sensibilis non recipiatur in sensu secundum esse materiale prout est in sensibili, sed secundum esse spirituale, quod est proprium sensui [...] ideo non proprie dicitur pati secundum has vires, nisi secundum quod excellentia sensibilibus corrumpit sensum, aut debilitat. Relinquitur ergo quod passio proprie dicatur secundum vires appetitivas sensitivas, quia hae vires et materiales sunt et moventur a rebus secundum proprietatem rei, quia non est appetitus intentionis, sed ipsius rei; et secundum hoc habet res convenientiam ad animam vel contrarietatem;” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 co; *Summa theologiae* I^a-II^ae q. 22, a. 2 co; *Sententia Ethic.* lib. 2, l. 5, n. 3.

⁷³ “[...] dupliciter organum animae potest transmutari. Uno modo, transmutatione spirituali, secundum quod recipit intentionem rei. Et hoc per se invenitur in actu apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae, [...] Est autem alia naturalis transmutatio organi, prout organum transmutatur quantum ad suam naturalem dispositionem, [...] Sed ad actum appetitus sensitivi per se ordinatur huiusmodi transmutatio, unde in definitione motuum appetitivae partis, materialiter ponitur aliqua naturalis transmutatio organi; [...] Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur in actu sensitivae virtutis appetitivae, quam in actu sensitivae virtutis apprehensivae, licet utraque sit actus organi corporalis.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a-II^ae q. 22, a. 2 ad 3; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 co. Aquinas explains that a sight involves only a spiritual change whereas other senses involve also a natural change. (*Summa theologiae* I^a q. 78, a. 3 co.) According to Aquinas, the act of the senses involves that a sense receives a sensible form, which has a spiritual but not material existence in a sense. For more about natural and spiritual reception, see Stump 2003, 250–254. There are many studies about Aquinas’s idea that the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a movement; for example, see James 1997, 62–63; Knuuttila 2004, 248–251; Miner 2009, 38–46; Gondreau 2002, 209–210;

have discussed whether, according to Aquinas, the acts of the senses involve a corporeal change. For example, Burnyeat has argued that they do not involve a corporeal change,⁷⁴ whereas Nussbaum and Putnam have claimed that they do.⁷⁵ I think that Nussbaum and Putnam are right, as Aquinas's view about the passibility of the powers indicates that the acts of the senses involve a corporeal change.

Aquinas describes that only the sensitive appetitive power has the passions of the soul because solely its act involves only a natural change of the flesh.⁷⁶ However, a corporeal passion can touch all powers of the soul because all powers are rooted in the essence of the soul, which is the form of the flesh. When the flesh has a corporeal passion and a soul as the form of the flesh is changed accidentally, then the powers are also changed accidentally since they are rooted in the essence of the soul.⁷⁷

Later on, the views of Franciscan theologians mentioned above and Aquinas were widely discussed. Following Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise proposes the triple senses of the passion and explains that Christ's human soul as the form of the flesh and as the mover of the flesh was changed accidentally. However, unlike Aquinas, Peter adds that Christ's human soul as a substance was also passible inasmuch as his will received the species of

Lombardo 2011, 37–40. Gondreau claims that the acts of the sensitive appetitive powers are movements because they involve "passage from the sense appetite's potential inclination towards some object to its actual inclination towards a specific object". (Gondreau 2002, 209–210.) Lombardo argues that the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a movement toward our *telos*. (Lombardo 2011, 37.) Minor claims that the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a movement because it is the change of the soul-flesh composite. (Minor 2009, 40.) Knuuttila argues, I think rightly, that a bodily movement caused by the act of the sensitive appetitive power is not a reason for why the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a movement. The act is a movement towards or away from an object. (Knuuttila 2004, 251.)

⁷⁴ Burnyeat 2001.

⁷⁵ Nussbaum and Putnam 1992, 52–54.

⁷⁶ "Passio vero animalis, cum per eam ex operatione animae transmutetur corpus, in illa potentia esse debet quae organo corporali adiungitur, et cuius est corpus transmutare; et ideo huiusmodi passio non est in parte intellectiva, quae non est alicuius organi corporalis actus; nec iterum est in apprehensiva sensitiva quia ex apprehensione sensus non sequitur motus in corpore nisi mediante appetitiva quae est immediatum movens. Unde secundum modum operationis eius statim disponitur organum corporale, scilicet cor unde est principium motus, tali dispositione quae competat ad exequendum hoc in quod appetitus sensibilis inclinatur: [...] Et sic in appetitiva sensitiva sola animalis passio proprie invenitur." Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 ad 11; *Summa theologiae* I^a–II^aae q. 22, a. 2 ad 3; I^a q. 64, a. 3 co. See also Sarot 1994, 71–72; Miner 2009, 34.

⁷⁷ "Potest tamen haec passio attribui alicui potentiae tripliciter: uno modo secundum quod in essentia animae radicanetur; et sic, cum omnes potentiae radicanentur in essentia animae, ad omnes potentias pertinet praedicta passio." Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 co; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 2 co; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 46, a. 7 co. Aquinas emphasizes that only the sense of touch can apprehend a corporeal passion. A corporeal passion can also impede the act of the incorporeal power. For example, since the act of the intellect requires phantasies, a corporeal passion can impede the act of the intellect when a corporeal passion injures the organ of the imagination. (Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 co.)

the unsuitable thing and lost the species of the suitable thing.⁷⁸ Applying Aquinas's view of passion in a strict sense to the will of Christ, Peter departs from Aquinas, who thought that only the flesh can have such passions. This shows that the question about the passibility of Christ's soul was partially responsible for the breaking up of the Thomistic tradition.

Richard Middleton also proposes three meanings of the passions. Since he argues that Christ's human soul had passions in all these meanings, he does not favour Aquinas's view that the soul was changed accidentally.⁷⁹ However, like Aquinas, Richard expounds that Christ's sensitive appetitive power rather than his senses had passions,⁸⁰ but following the early Franciscans and Bonaventure, he argues that Christ's will also had passions.⁸¹ Durand of St. Pourçain was more faithful to Aquinas. Like Aquinas, he distinguishes the passions of the soul from corporeal

⁷⁸ Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, p. 108–109. However, right after this he argues that only a corruptible body can have change, which is a movement between contrary qualities. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, p. 109.) This implies that when the will receives the species of the unsuitable thing and loses the species of the suitable thing, such process is not a change. However, Tarentaise does not explain how this process differs from a change. Also Aquinas thinks that a soul is subsistent (MacInerny and O'Callaghan, 2015), but he does not incorporate the idea in his theory of the passion. Thomas of Sutton also thinks that a passive one receives by means of a change. (Thomas of Sutton, *Quodlibeta* q. 1, p. 3–4; p. 8.) For more about Thomas of Sutton, see Klima 2011, 1294.

⁷⁹ Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, q. 1, p. 159. Unlike Aquinas, Richard adds that an accident is a passion in the most broad sense. He describes that as Aquinas thinks that Christ's human soul had a passion in a strict sense only when the flesh-soul composite was changed, according to Aquinas, the soul as such did not have joy and sadness. However, Richard thinks that Christ's human soul had a passion, as he argues, for example, that Christ's human soul had sadness. For more about Richard Middleton on the sadness of Christ, see Chapters 3.5. and 3.6.

⁸⁰ Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, q. 2, p. 159–160. According to Richard, the sensitive appetitive power rather than the senses had a passion, because the appetitive power is a drag on a thing and only the act of the sensitive appetitive power involves a natural change of the flesh. Unlike Aquinas, Richard argues that these reasons cannot be used in an argument for the claim that the will is more passible than the intellect. He explains that although the will moves towards a thing more than the intellect, the will is less passible than the intellect in the sense that the will moves itself, whereas a thing moves the intellect. Nor can the second reason be used, as the movement of the will is more spiritual than the movement of the intellect. (Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, q. 2, p. 160.)

⁸¹ Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, q. 3, p. 161. Richard explains that when the object of Christ's sensitive appetitive power and the will were the same, the sensitive appetitive power rather than the will had a passion because the sensitive appetitive power was more passible than the will. However, when the object of the will exceeded the object of the sensitive appetitive power more than the passibility of the sensitive appetitive power exceeded the passibility of the will, a passion was greater in the will than in the sensitive appetite. Therefore, Christ's will rather than his sensitive appetitive power had a passion because the sensitive appetitive power did not have as strong sadness as the will had when the will had sadness about God's dishonour. As Richard thinks that the will can have passions, he follows the early Franciscans' and Bonaventure's view about the passibility of the will, but when he claims that the will is not as passible as the sensitive appetitive power, he also comes closer to Thomas Aquinas.

passions and expounds that a corporeal passion can be taken in a broad, strict, and strictest sense.⁸² The passion of the soul is the movement of the appetitive power, which arises from the apprehension of a corporeal passion. The passion of the soul in the strictest sense is the movement of the appetitive power, which follows the apprehension of an unsuitable corporeal passion.⁸³ In line with Aquinas, Durand states that Christ's will had passions only in a broad sense.⁸⁴

The early fourteenth-century Franciscans like John Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton did not consider the passibility of Christ's human soul, but their views about the passibility of Christ's will varied. Following the early Franciscans and Bonaventure, Scotus and Ockham held that the will was passible.⁸⁵ Scotus taught that the passion of the will was an externally caused quality in the will which was not the act of the will.⁸⁶

However, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton argued that the will did not have passions. Like Aquinas, Auriol also argues that the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a passion, whereas the acts of the will, the intellect and the senses are not passions.⁸⁷ He holds that the act of the sensitive appetitive power causes a corporeal change⁸⁸ and explains that the

⁸² Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri III* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 239v.

⁸³ Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri III* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 239v.

⁸⁴ Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri III* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 240r.

⁸⁵ Ockham reiterates the three meanings of the passions but, unlike Aquinas, he claims that the intellect has a passion in a strict sense when it loses the habit of error and acquires the habit of knowledge. (William Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum* lib. 3, q. 7 (OTh. VI, 213). He also claims that the acts, joy and sadness of the will are passions of the will. (William Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem* quodl. 2, q. 17 (OTh. IX, 186–187). The acts of the sensitive appetitive power are also passions, but joy and sadness, which follow from the act of the sensitive appetite, are passions improperly. (William Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum* lib. 3, q. 12 (OTh. VI, 401–402). Joy and sadness are passions related to passible qualities. For example, sweetness and bitterness are passible qualities, which cause joy and sadness in a sense. Colours are passible qualities, which are caused by joy and sadness. (William Ockham, *Expositio in librum praedicamentorum Aristotelis* cap. 14 (OPh. II, 277–279). For Ockham on passions, see Etzkorn 1990, 269–270; Hirvonen 2002, 155–160; 2004, 52–65. For Ockham on the passions of the will, see Chapter 3.6.

⁸⁶ For Scotus on the passions of the will, see Chapter 3.6.

⁸⁷ "Responsio dico quod actus appetitus sensitivi vocantur passiones et tamen actus voluntatis nec intellectus nec apprehensivae sensitivae vocantur passiones. Tamen in appetitu sensitivo vocantur passiones." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, MS M1, fol. 67v, the 1605 printed edition p. 440. Auriol claims that the will and the sensitive appetitive power have, for example, sadness and joy, which are acts of the appetitive powers. (Peter Auriol, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum* d. 1, sect. 7, p. 394; *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, fol. 67v, the 1605 printed edition p. 439.) For Auriol on the acts of the will, see Knuuttila 2004, 272–274.

⁸⁸ "Nunc de tertia propositione. Hoc non oportet probare quia non est verecundia quin rubescat sic est malus. Sed dubium est, utrum tales transmutationes praecedant et sint primae ut cause vel post ut primo sit gaudium et post transmutatio. [...] Contra, videtur de alia parte

act is the first species, whereas a corporeal change is the third species of the quality. Because corporeal changes like heating and frosting effect movements like the increasing and rarefaction of the heart, which are passions, a corporeal change is a passive quality that effects a passion.⁸⁹ Unlike Aquinas, who explained that the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a passion since it entailed a passion in a strict sense (i.e. receiving and losing in the flesh), Auriol concludes that the act of the sensitive appetite is a passion because it causes a passion through a corporeal change.⁹⁰ The acts of the apprehensive powers and the will are not passions since they do not cause passions.⁹¹

Although Auriol's view is similar with Aquinas's one, Auriol criticizes Aquinas's argument that only the sensitive appetitive power has

quod transmutationes tales sint sequelae [...] Ideo tales quod dico transmutationes non sunt primae sequelae." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 68r–68v, the 1605 printed edition p. 441. According to Auriol, the act of the sensitive appetite does not include a corporeal change. He argues that the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a simple form because it is a vital act. As the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a vital form, it does not involve a corporeal change, which is not vital, and as an act is simple form, it does not contain two distinct realities like the movement of the sensitive appetite and a corporeal change, but only one of them. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 68r, the 1605 printed edition p. 440–441.)

⁸⁹ "[...] tales actus potentiarum sunt in prima specie qualitatis formaliter." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 68v, the 1605 printed edition p. 441. "[...] dico quod transmutationes quae ex iis sequuntur sunt in tertia specie qualitatis. Ad istas autem transmutationes sequitur quandoque motus localis ut dilatatio cordis rarefactio et huiusmodi etc. Et tales motus non sunt de genere qualitatis. [...] Hanc dico esse in tertia specie qualitatis ut est calefactio vel <in> irato vel frigeffectio et <in> timore quod idem est in tertia specie qualitatis quia infert passionem et ideo inducunt infirmitates ut est passio amoris et aegritudo amoris quae est quaedam dispositio derelicta ab isto et vocatur a medicis amor heroicus. Et ideo dicuntur passionem et aegritudines quia aegritudo eius terminus." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 68v, the 1605 printed edition p. 442.

⁹⁰ "Tunc patet propositum quare motus appetitus dicuntur passionem non a suspiciendo nec abiiciendo sed solum causaliter prout huiusmodi actus sequuntur quaedam passionem obiectivae. Sed multum protenduntur et sic in hoc quod inducunt passionem sunt passionem." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 68v, the 1605 printed edition p. 442. "Dico, quod non sunt passionem formaliter sed solum causaliter quia veras passionem causant." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 68v, the 1605 printed edition p. 442.

⁹¹ "Instabis dicens quod visionem concomitatur passio in sensu. Ergo et passio quod non potentia. Dico quod ut actus dicatur passio non sufficit concomitantia passionis sed exigitur causatio. Tunc actus non causat passionem sed potentia subiectum causat passionem. Unde obiectum excellens corrumpit visum non visio. Sed ex motu appetitus sunt causative huius passionem." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 68v, the 1605 printed edition p. 442. "Hic attende quod huiusmodi passionem dicunt actum formaliter transmutatio consecutive et causaliter. Quantum ad primum possunt poni in appetitu intellectivo. Inde in parte intellectiva est species sed quantum ad secundum non ut quod possunt dici passionem quod ex hoc dicebantur passionem quia causabant transmutationem corporealem conformem quam sequitur passio. Ista transmutatio non ponitur in parte intellectiva." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, MS M₁, fol. 69r, the 1605 printed edition p. 442.

passions. He holds that Aquinas's view about a passion involves two elements: 1) a passion is concurrent with a corporeal change, and 2) a passive one is dragged towards an active one. This dragging explains why an act of the appetitive power is a passion but an act of the apprehensive power is not a passion. A corporeal change is the reason why the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a passion, but the act of the will is not a passion. Auriol criticizes the second element of the passion in particular. He argues that from Aquinas's idea, it follows that where there is not dragging there is not passion. According to Auriol, since hatred and sadness do not involve dragging towards an object but rather escaping an object, it seems that they would not be passions. However, Aquinas claims that they are primary passions. In addition, love drags especially towards an object, but Aquinas claims that it is not a primary passion. Auriol goes on to explain that a thing is dragged towards an object when it is made similar to an object. Hence, where there is maximal likeness of the receiver and an agent, according to Aquinas's first criterion there would be maximal passion. Auriol argues that since the acts of the will and the apprehensive power involve maximal likeness with an object, it follows, unlike what Aquinas thinks, that these acts would be maximal passions. In addition, Auriol says that the definition (*ratio*) of the passion cannot involve both a dragging and a corporeal change. The definition of the simple form like a passion involves only one thing, and as the dragging and the change are two things the definition of the passion can involve only one of them.⁹²

Walter Chatton also thinks that among the appetitive powers, only the sensitive appetitive power has passions. Unlike Auriol, however, he describes that a corporeal change effects the act of the sensitive appetitive power. He holds that the acts of the senses and the sensitive appetitive power are passions because they are effected by a corporeal change, but the act of the sensitive appetitive power rather than the act of the sense is a passion because only the act of the sensitive appetitive power is inclined to pursue or avoid an object.⁹³

⁹² Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 67v–68r, the 1605 printed edition p. 440.

⁹³ “[...] et tunc dicitur ab aliquibus quod quia passio appetitiva infert passionem sensitivi, sicut patet de passione verecundiae, quae causat ruborem in facie. Non sic apprehensiva; ideo ista proprie dicitur passio, haec non. Sed teneo oppositum, quod passiones et transmutationes organorum causant passiones appetitivas et non e contra,” Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, p. 200. “[...] si quaeras utrum omnis sensatio sit passio, id est sit causata ad transmutationem organi, dico quod sic. [...] Si sic quod immediate inclinet ad prosecutiones et fugas, dico quod non, sed mediante passione appetitiva; et ideo requirunt virtutes moderativas. Unde primo modo omnes actus sensitivi sunt passiones, sed tertio modo soli appetitivi et non apprehensivi immediate et primo, sed mediate et virtualiter.” Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, p. 201–202.

3.2. *The Assumed Defects of Christ*

Medieval theologians thought that Christ voluntarily assumed some of the defects of human beings, but not all of them. They adopted the list of defects especially from Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. According to Lombard, Christ assumed the defects voluntarily, but we have them necessarily as a consequence of the Fall.⁹⁴ Christ had defects of the flesh, like hunger and thirst, and defects of the soul, like sadness, fear and pain.⁹⁵ However, Christ assumed only the defects of the penalty for original sin but not the defects of the sin, because he was free from sin. Lombard restricts the variety of Christ's defects even more and argues that Christ did not assume all defects of the penalty. Christ assumed only defects which did not diminish his excellence and were profitable.⁹⁶ The assumed defects were profitable because they demonstrated either his true humanity (such as fear and sadness), assisted in the fulfilment of his mission (such as passibility and mortality) or raised our hope of immortality (like his death).⁹⁷ Christ did not assume defects like ignorance, the difficulty to will good or any diseases.⁹⁸

Thirteenth-century theologians made only some minor additions to Lombard's view. They all accepted that Christ was totally free

⁹⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 1, p. 95–96. Lombard's view about the passions of Christ's soul was especially influenced by John of Damascus's *De fide orthodoxa*. (Gondreau 2002, 78–80.) For Lombard on the affectivity of Christ's human soul, see also Gondreau 2002, 80–88. Hugh of Saint Victor states that Christ had passions because he wished to assume them, and, therefore, Christ had passions voluntarily. (Hugh of Saint Victor, *De quatuor voluntatibus in christo*, PL 176, 845C–846B; Gondreau 2002, 74–76.) The author of the *Summa sententiarum* describes that, according to Pope Leo I (c. 400–461), Christ assumed our defects except sin. (Pope Leo I, *Sermo* 63, c. 4, PL 54, 355B–355C.) Christ voluntarily assumed the defects of the flesh, like hunger and thirst, and the defects of the soul, like sadness and fear. (*Summa sententiarum* tract. 1, cap. 17, PL 176, 75A–75C.) Peter Abelard expounds that Christ's flesh seemed to have sins because it had the penalties of sins, but he did not have sins. (Peter Abelard, *Scito te ipsum* p. 56; *Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad romanos* lib. 3, cap. 8, p. 211.) According to Robert of Melun, Christ assumed flesh, which was free from all kind of sins, but his flesh was similar to sinful flesh since it was mortal and passible, and thus thirsty, hungry and sleepy. (Robert of Melun, *Sententiae* lib. 2, cap. 18, p. 45.) According to Odo, Christ's human nature was free from sin, but Christ had hunger and thirst in order to prove that he had true flesh, and he had sadness and fear in order to prove that he had a true soul. (Odo, *Ysagoge in theologiam* lib. 2, p. 170.) See also Landgraf 1953, 222–223. Abelard was accused of claiming that Christ did not have fear of God, but Abelard answered that he had not claimed that. (Peter Abelard, *Apologia contra Bernardum* p. 360–361.) Unfortunately, Abelard's defence is not extant. (Buytaert 1969, 350–351.)

⁹⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 1, p. 93. See also Madigan 2007, 68; Rosemann 2004, 135–136; Adams 1999, 22–23.

⁹⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 1, p. 93; 95. When Peter claims that Christ did not assume defects which diminished his excellence, he seems to follow John of Damascus. According to John, Christ assumed natural passions and passions that did not demean his dignity. (John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 64, p. 259–260.)

⁹⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 1, p. 95. See also Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiarum* lib. 4, cap. 15, PL 211, 1196D–1197A; cap. 17, PL 211, 1204B–1204C.

⁹⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 1, p. 94–95. It is quite strange that according to medieval theologians, Christ did not have any diseases, even though defects emphasized his humanity.

from sin⁹⁹ and that he voluntarily assumed the penalties of the sin.¹⁰⁰ The *Summa Halensis* adds that the penalties of the sin included error and the spark of sin (*fomes*), which are causes of sin, and penalties like needing to die, be thirsty and be hungry, which are not. Christ had only the last penalties and not all of them, since he had penalties which all human beings have but not penalties which only some individuals have (like diseases).¹⁰¹ Bonaventure explained that postlapsarian human beings have defects necessarily from their parents. The offspring of the postlapsarian human being is subject to the culpability of sinful carnal desire and has penalties because its parents have such carnal desire when they beget it.¹⁰² However,

⁹⁹ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 15 (AE), p. 151; *Summa Halensis*, *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 1, p. 198; Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 333); Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 4, q. 4, p. 209–210; *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 5, p. 274; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 14 a. 3, co; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 3 co; Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 1, q. 3, p. 157; Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 239v.

¹⁰⁰ *Summa Halensis*, *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 1, p. 198; Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 334); Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 7, p. 277; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 14, a. 3 co; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 3 co; Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 1, q. 4, p. 158; Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 239v.

¹⁰¹ “Sed notandum adhuc quod, cum isti defectus sint poena, dupliciter dicuntur. Est enim quaedam poena a peccato et ad peccatum, cuiusmodi est error ex parte animae et fomes ex parte corporis; alius est defectus, qui est poena a peccato, cuiusmodi est in nobis necessitas ad moriendum, fames, sitis et huiusmodi. Item, iste defectus est duplex, quoniam quidam sunt defectus, qui insunt universaliter homini et de necessitate, ut necessitas ad moriendum, fames, sitis et similia; alii sunt defectus, qui non universaliter insunt omni homini, sed unus uni, alius alii, cuiusmodi sunt genera aegritudinum et defectus membrorum. Dicendum ergo quod Damascenus per hoc nomen ‘defectus’ intelligit defectus universales, non particulares, et defectus, qui sunt a peccato, non qui sunt ad peccatum, scilicet errorem et fomitem, quoniam sunt initium sive causa quoquomodo peccati.” *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 2, cap. 2, p. 66. Following John of Damascus and Peter Lombard, the *Summa Halensis* claims that Christ did not assume passions of the penalty which diminished his dignity (e.g. passion that disturbs reason and carnal desire), nor passions which were not related to the redemption of the human race (e.g. diseases). (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 2, cap. 2, a. 1, p. 204.) Alexander of Hales claims that Christ did not assume sin, but he assumed all passions which were natural for a human being and which did not demean his dignity. (Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 15 (AE), p. 151.)

¹⁰² “Dicendum, quod [...] ex alia et alia causa sunt isti defectus in nobis et in Christo; in nobis enim sunt ex necessitate contracti, sed in Christo sunt ex voluntate assumpti. [...] Nos enim istos defectus a parentibus trahimus propter legem propagationis et legem concupiscentiae, quae militat in illis membris; nam passibilis generat passibilem, et habens legem concupiscentiae in membris generat filium subiectum concupiscentiae, ex reatu cuius concupiscentiae insunt proli omnes poenalitates.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 334). Following the *Summa Halensis*, Bonaventure maintained that Christ assumed defects which resulted from original sin, but not defects which led to a fault, like a spark to committing evil and difficulty doing good. He had only natural defects which the whole human race shared, like thirst and hunger, but not personal defects which only some people have, like diseases. (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 333). See also Bonaventure, *Breuiiloquium* p. 4, c. 8, p. 248–249. For Bonaventure on the sinlessness and the defects of Christ’s human nature, see also Hayes 2000, 122–127.

God's Son had immaculate flesh made of the flesh of the Virgin Mary, which was passible but cleaned from all sin by the Holy Spirit, and this flesh was united with his rational sinless soul. Bonaventure held that Christ was able to have flesh which was free from the passibility of miseries because it was free from sin, but Christ voluntarily assumed the defects of the penalty of the sin because of his wish to save the human race.¹⁰³

Albert the Great was the first to explain that Christ assumed only the defects that God placed in the human nature. He states that human flesh is mortal and has hunger, and a soul feels pain and sadness because God planted various elements in our flesh. Christ assumed defects such as mortality, hunger, pain and sadness since they resulted from this divine act and were common to all human beings.¹⁰⁴ However, he did not assume, for instance, ignorance, the difficulty to do good, the spark of the sin and the battle of the flesh against the spirit because God did not place them in our nature; nor did he assume defects like illnesses, which only some people have.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ "In Christo autem secus est; ipse enim neutro modo fuit propagatus, nec secundum propagationem legis naturalis nec secundum corruptionem libidinis; sed Spiritus sanctus, adveniens in ipsam Virginem et ipsam fecundans, carnem eius ab omni foeditate corruptionis purificavit, passibilitatem tamen reliquit. Ex illa autem carne sapientia Patris, scilicet ipse Filius Dei, aedificavit sibi corpus immaculatum, et illud corpus univit sibi et animae rationali, quae quidem immunitatem habuit a culpa et in se et in carne coniuncta. Et sicut immunitatem habuit a reatu culpae, sic secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae immunitatem habere debuisset a passibilitate miseriae. Quod ergo in carne illa remansit poenalitas, hoc fuit ex dispensatione ipsius assumptis, concurrente simul acceptione illius animae rationalis, quae in primo instanti suae creationis habuit usum cognitionis, et placuit sibi tali corpori uniri propter salutem generis humani. - Et sic patet, quod tales defectus in Christo fuerunt non necessitate generationis, sed voluntate dispensationis, voluntate, inquam, divina praeveniente, sed voluntate creata concomitante." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 335).

¹⁰⁴ "In plantatione autem naturali plantavit Deus corpora nostra convertendo elementa in humores, et humores in membra similia et dissimilia: et de plantatione illorum sunt quaedam ex parte corporis, et quaedam ex parte animae: ex parte corporis, ut mortalitas: ex parte dissolutionis, sicut fames ex agentibus qualitatibus primis in substantiam: et ideo illos assumpsit. In anima autem affectus naturales conjunctos consequitur dolor et tristitia separationis et mortis, et illos assumpsit: et isti sunt naturales defectus omnis hominis." Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 5, p. 274; *De incarnatione* tract. 4, q. 4, p. 210. See also Gonreau 2002, 95. Bonaventure criticizes Albert's opinion. According to Bonaventure, the idea that Christ assumed defects which God planted in our nature cannot explain why Christ did not assume all diseases or why he had the defects of penalties which did not result from a divine planting. (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 333).)

¹⁰⁵ "Considerandum igitur, quod natura nostra plantata est duobus modis, scilicet in principiis naturalibus, et gratia innocentiae, et utramque plantationem fecit Deus: gratiae autem amissionem non fecit Deus, sed culpa hominis: et ideo quae praeter naturam consecuta sunt culpam, non assumpsit, quia illa non plantavit, sicut est ignorantia, et infirmitas bene agendi in anima, et fomes libidinis in corpore, et pugna carnis adversus spiritum: et ideo illa non assumpsit." Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 5, p. 274. "[...] sed lepra, et gibbus, etc., sunt defectus personales istius vel illius, et ideo non sunt per se naturae: et cum ipse venit totam naturam reparare, ideo illos non debuit assumere." Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 5, p. 274. See also Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 4, q. 4, p. 209-210.

According to Thomas Aquinas, Christ assumed defects to redeem the human race, to cause faith in incarnation and to give an example of patience.¹⁰⁶ Since the redemption of the human race required perfect grace and knowledge, Christ did not assume defects which implied a lack of grace or knowledge (e.g. the difficulty to do good, the spark of sin, and ignorance). He also did not assume personal defects like illnesses, which only some individuals have. According to Aquinas, Christ had defects which did not demean his dignity and natural defects, which are common to all postlapsarian human beings. The natural defects (e.g. death, hunger, thirst and pain) are common to all human beings since the natural principles cause them because of Adam's and Eve's sin.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ “[...] conveniens fuisse corpus assumptum a filio Dei humanis infirmitatibus et defectibus subiacere, et praecipue propter tria. Primo quidem, quia ad hoc filius Dei, carne assumpta, venit in mundum, ut pro peccato humani generis satisfaceret. [...] Secundo, propter fidem incarnationis adstruendam. [...] Tertio, propter exemplum patientiae, quod nobis exhibet passiones et defectus humanos fortiter tolerando.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 14, a. 1 co. For Aquinas on Christ's defects, see also Gondreau 2002, 166–176.

¹⁰⁷ “[...] Christus humanos defectus assumpsit ad satisfaciendum pro peccato humanae naturae, ad quod requirebatur quod perfectionem scientiae et gratiae haberet in anima. Illos igitur defectus Christus assumere debuit qui consequuntur ex peccato communi totius naturae, nec tamen repugnant perfectioni scientiae et gratiae. [...] Sunt enim quidam defectus qui repugnant perfectioni scientiae et gratiae, sicut ignorantia, pronitas ad malum, et difficultas ad bonum. Quidam autem defectus sunt qui non consequuntur communiter totam humanam naturam propter peccatum primi parentis, sed causantur in aliquibus hominibus ex quibusdam particularibus causis, sicut lepra et morbus caducus et alia huiusmodi. [...] Sunt autem tertii defectus qui in omnibus hominibus communiter inveniuntur ex peccato primi parentis, sicut mors, fames, sitis, et alia huiusmodi. Et hos defectus omnes Christus suscepit.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 14, a. 4 co. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2 co. For Christ's absolute sinlessness, see also Gondreau 2002, 157–164. Gondreau plausibly explains that, according to Aquinas, the animal passions of Christ's human soul were defects because they were consequences of the original sin and they followed from the apprehension of an evil thing. (Gondreau 2002, 221–223.) According to Aquinas, the defects of the flesh have two causes: a remote cause and an immediate cause. The remote causes are the contrary principles of the human flesh. Before the Fall, the original justice impeded these principles from causing defects. The immediate cause is the original sin, because it removed the original justice which impeded natural principles from causing defects. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 14, a. 3 ad 2.) According to Richard Middleton, Christ assumed the defects as penalties but not the defects as faults. However, he did not assume the defects as a penalty which resulted from personal sins, were disposed to sin or were opposed to the perfection of grace as not fitting for him and not expedient for the redemption of the human race. Therefore, Christ did not assume, for example, the difficulty to do good, an inclination towards evil or ignorance. Christ only assumed defects which Richard calls pure penalties. However, he did not assume all such defects, since he did not assume personal defects like diseases. Christ only assumed defects which were common to all human beings. (Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 1, q. 3, p. 157.) Durand of St. Pourçain follows Aquinas's view about Christ's defects. (Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 239v.)

3.3. *The Pre-passions of Christ*

It was a common medieval view that pain, sadness, fear and anger were among Christ's assumed defects. However, a view that Christ had, for example, sadness was not without a problem. As Seneca claimed that a wise man cannot be sad,¹⁰⁸ it would follow that Christ, who was the wisest man in the created realm, could not be sad. The medieval theologians solved the problem by arguing that Christ's sadness was not a passion but a pre-passion. They added that the pain, fear and anger in Christ's human soul were also pre-passions, not passions, and they explained that Christ's pre-passions differed from our ordinary pre-passions. These views are especially interesting because they show that, unlike the passions of the postlapsarian human being, Christ's pain, sadness, fear and anger were thought to be strictly subjected to his rational powers. In this chapter, I study these views on the pre-passions of Christ's human soul.

The views on Christ's pre-passions were based on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, where Lombard states that Christ had fear and sadness only as pre-passions, but we have fear and sadness as pre-passions and passions.¹⁰⁹ In the twelfth-century discussions, a pre-passion and a passion were commonly treated as stages of sin. The idea goes back to Jerome, who claims that a passion is a sin but a pre-passion is the beginning of the sin. A pre-passion is a non-deliberated, emotional reaction but a passion involves consent.¹¹⁰ Although Lombard regards pre-passion and passion as stages of sin, he claims that the punishments of the sin also involve pre-passions and passions. Therefore, there are two kinds of pre-passions: sinful pre-passions and sinless pre-passions. A sinful pre-passion is the motion of the sensuality which catches the attraction of the sin and precedes the consent of reason.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Seneca, *De clementia* 2.5.5.

¹⁰⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 2, p. 98. See also Gondreau 2002, 84–85. See also Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiarum* lib. 4, cap. 18, PL 211, 1205C–1206A. Before Lombard, the author of *Summa sententiarum* noted that, according to Jerome, Christ only began to be sad. He explains that Christ began to be sad in the sense that his passions did not dominate the soul and submerge reason. Otherwise, a passion leads to sin. (*Summa sententiarum* tract. 1, cap. 17, PL 176, 75C–75D.) See also Jerome's *Commentariorum in Matt.* 26, 37, p. 253–254. The author of the *Sententiae divinitatis* clarifies that Christ's human soul had sadness and fear, but the mode of Christ's sadness and fear differed from the mode of sadness and fear in postlapsarian human beings. (*Sententiae divinitatis* tract. 4, cap. 3, p. 89.) According to Hugh of Saint Victor, as Christ was free from sin, he did not have the movements of the vices which preceded the consent of reason. Postlapsarian human beings have such movements because of original sin. (Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sacramentis christiane fidei* lib. 2, pars prima, cap. 7, PL 176, 389B–389C; 391D–391B.) For pre-passions as a stage of sin in the twelfth century, see Knuuttila 2004, 178–188.

¹¹⁰ Jerome, *Commentariorum in Matth.* 5, 28, p. 30–31. See also Knuuttila 2004, 179–180.

¹¹¹ According to Lombard, the stages of sin are as follows: 1) The sensual motion catches the attraction of the sin. 2) The sensual motion suggests sin to the inferior part of reason. 3) The inferior part of reason consents to the suggestion. 4) The inferior part of reason suggests sin to the superior part of reason. 5) And the superior part of reason consents to the suggestion.

According to Lombard, Christ's sadness and fear were sinless pre-passions because they did not separate his intellect from rectitude and the contemplation of God. When the intellect suffers in this way because of sadness and fear, they are passions.¹¹²

Following Peter Lombard, many medieval theologians thought that Christ only had pre-passions, but their understanding of these varied. Alexander of Hales claims that a pre-passion is an unexpected movement which is not foreseen by reason or the powers of the sensible part of the soul. Christ had only the last mentioned pre-passions because the powers of the sensual part of his soul were not aware of everything; he did not have the first mentioned pre-passions because his reason was aware of all movements that took place in him.¹¹³

Unlike Alexander, Bonaventure holds that a pre-passion as an unexpected movement is a movement of sensuality without the judgment of reason, whereas a pre-passion in a general sense is a diminished passion of sensuality, which is below reason as reason. Christ's pre-passions were of the latter but not the former kind.¹¹⁴ Bonaventure explains, however, that

(Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 2, d. 24, cap. 9, p. 456–457.) The sensual motion is a pre-passion. (Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in omnes D. Pauli apostoli epistolas in epistolam ad Romanos* cap. 6, PL 191, 1407D.) See also Knuuttila 2004, 181–183.

¹¹² Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 2, p. 98–99. See also Adams 1999, 24.

¹¹³ “Secundum enim quod propassio est ‘subitus motus cui non consentitur’, ut ‘subitum’ dicit illud quod non praevidetur et secundum quod ‘consensus’ dicitur rationis esse, sic propassio non fuit in eo, quia nulla mutatio fuit ita repentina, quae non praevideretur a superiori parte. Sed pars inferior, scilicet sensibilis, non omnia cognovit; unde uno modo poterat ibi esse ‘subitum’, secundum autem alium modum non. Secundum ergo quod propassio dicitur ille motus qui nullo modo praevidetur, sic non fuit in eo propassio; sed [ut dicitur] subitus motus, qui non praevidetur in parte inferiori, sic fuit in ei propassio.” Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 255. See also Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 15 (AE), p. 152. According to Alexander, a passion is an immoderate movement of the inferior part of the soul, which a soul cannot resist, or an unordered inclination to consent. Christ did not have passions, as he was able to resist the domination of the immoderate movements because of the grace of the union. (“Secundum quod dicitur ‘passio’ quando cedit anima impotens in resistendo, sicut ex vehementi delectatione accidit aliquando mors, quando scilicet huiusmodi immoderatio venit non cum cautela in parte inferiori: nulla talis immoderatio fuit in anima Christi, et haec immoderatio ‘passio’ appellatur. Unde bene dicit Hieronymus quod ‘passio non dominabatur animae eius’, quia per gratiam unionis potens fuit resistere ne dominaretur ei aliqua huiusmodi immoderatio.” Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 254–255. “Passio autem est illa inclinatio, quae est inordinatio, ad consensum.” *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 15 (AE), p. 152.) As Christ's sadness, fear and anger were not immoderate movements, they were not perturbations which caused disorder. (Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 16, d. 2, memb. 7, p. 253.) See also *Summa theologiae* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 61. See also Gondreau 2002, 92. However, Gondreau does not note the difference between the two kinds of pre-passions.

¹¹⁴ “Dicendum, quod propassio secundum generalem nominis sui acceptionem dicitur esse passio diminuta: haec autem est illa quae sistit infra rationem, ut ratio est, et ita propassio dicitur passionem partis sensualis, vel virtutis naturalis; et hoc modo vult dicere Magister et Hieronymus, huiusmodi passionem fuisse in Christo. Erant enim ex horrore sensualitatis, non rationis partis in quantum rationalis. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod definitur propassio, quod est motus subitus; dicendum, quod ibi definitur propassio, secundum quod quod est in

Christ's sensuality had movements which touched his reason as nature, but as they did not touch reason as reason they were pre-passions.¹¹⁵ Bonaventure added the distinction between reason "as reason" and reason "as nature" to his view about the pre-passions because it explained why the sadness of Christ's sensuality was a pre-passion, even though it also touched the rational part of Christ's soul.¹¹⁶

Following his account of pre-passions, Bonaventure claims that sadness, fear and anger can be before, against or subject to the command of reason. When they are before the command of reason, they arise secretly and are pre-passions as unexpected movements of sensuality. When they are against the judgment of reason, reason is subject to sensuality and perturbed (*perturbare*) since reason is turned away from righteousness. When sadness, fear and anger are subject to reason, reason commands the sensitive appetitive power to have them. According to Bonaventure, a wise or unwise, good or evil man has movements before the command of reason, but a wise man does not have them against it. Christ had sadness, fear and anger only after the command of his reason¹¹⁷ since his reason commanded them (for example, through the imagination).¹¹⁸ Bonaventure's view of Christ's pre-passions was based on the *Summa Halensis* that the passions of Christ were

nobis, in quibus sensualitas movetur praeter iudicium rationis; in Christo autem non fuit hoc." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, dub. 4. (III, 342). See also Gondreau 2002, 98.

¹¹⁵ "[...] dicendum, quod rationem attingi per modum rationis repugnat perfectioni sapientiae, non autem attingi per modum naturae. Hoc enim est, quod facit hominem cadere a statu et perfectione sapientiae, videlicet quod eius ratio cedat et succumbat passionibus, non autem quod sentiat passiones; et ita pati per modum naturae non aufert rationem propassionis. [...] Et sic fuit in anima Christi, quae secundum rationem ut naturam passiones corporis experiebatur dolore acutissimo, secundum rationem ut deliberativam passionibus corporis superferebatur gaudio virtuoso." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. (III, 354–355).

¹¹⁶ For Bonaventure on the sadness of the rational part of the soul, see Chapter 3.6.

¹¹⁷ "[...] in Christo fuit vera tristitia, non tamen omni modo, quo in nobis est. Est enim quaedam tristitia, quae est praeter rationis imperium; et est tristitia, quae est contra rationis iudicium rectum; et est tristitia, quae est subiecta rationis imperio et iudicio. Et illa tristitia est praeter rationis imperium, quae consurgit ex quadam necessitate et surreptione, sicut motus primi; et haec quidem communis est sapientibus et insipientibus, et bonis et malis. - Illa vero tristitia est contra rationis iudicium rectum, in qua ratio subiicitur sensualitati nec tantum turbatur, sed etiam perturbatur. - Illa autem est secundum rationis imperium et iudicium, quando quis tristatur, ratione dictante et suadente, ipsum tantum et taliter super aliquo debere tritari. Dico ergo, quod in Christo fuit tristitia tantum isto tertio modo, quia de nullo tristatus fuit, nisi secundum quod dictabat ei ratio. [...] Primis autem duobus modis non fuit in Christo tristitia." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 338–339); dub. 3. (III, 342); q. 3. (III, 340). "Perturbatio autem dicit deflexionem rationis ab aequitate; et hoc modo sapiens nec tristatur nec perturbatur." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 339). See also Madigan 2007, 69–70.

¹¹⁸ "[...] ratio praevidens mortem instantem fecit imaginationem mortis in ipsa parte sensuali; qua quidem facta, sensualitas mota fuit et horrore mortis concussa. [...] Praeterea, nos ipsi imaginari possumus quod volumus, quamvis non possimus, quando volumus, sentire exterius. Et ita timor in Christo de morte futura potuit esse in parte sensuali, ut merito secundum Hieronymum et Magistrum possit et debeat dici propassio." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, dub. 4. (III, 342).

subject to his will. The *Summa Halensis* describes that Christ's will was able to prevent the passive powers from having a passion and the will was able to command the act of receiving in the passive power. However, the passive powers of ordinary human beings are not subject to his will because they follow nature. Therefore, we suffer whether or not we wish to suffer.¹¹⁹

Albert the Great also thinks that Christ's sadness, fear and anger did not perturb his reason, but unlike Bonaventure, he does not apply the distinction between the reason "as nature" and the reason "as reason" to pre-passions. Christ's sadness, fear and anger were pre-passions because Christ's reason did not turn away from righteousness, but they were not pre-passion as unexpected movements.¹²⁰ Like Albert, Thomas Aquinas also holds that a pre-passion or an imperfect passion is the movement of the sensitive appetitive power, which does not change reason to iniquity, or an unexpected movement of the sensitive appetitive power, which takes place before the command of reason. The movements of Christ's sensuality were of the former kind and not of the latter, because his reason ordered all movements of the sensitive appetitive power.¹²¹ Aquinas explains that the

¹¹⁹ "Dicendum igitur quod, cum sit potentia activa et passiva, potentia activa in nobis est solum subiecta voluntati, potentia passiva non, sed sequitur conditionem naturae; in Domino vero Iesu potentia passiva sicut et potentia activa fuit subiecta voluntati, ut esset domina sui actus et suae passionis, ut sicut voluntas nostra habet dominium sui actus potens prohibere eum vel educere, ita Christi voluntas dominium habuit et potens fuit prohibere passionem a potentia patiendi assumpta vel ipsam ducere in actum patiendi. Et ideo, quia passio in effectu in Christo dependebat a voluntate, quamvis esset potentia disposita pati in carne..." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 1, p. 197. It seems that the *Summa Halensis* adopted the view that the passions of Christ were subject to his will from John of Damascus's *De fide orthodoxa* where John claims that Christ wished to hunger, thirst, fear and die. (John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 64, p. 260.) Philip the Chancellor also described that Christ's sensuality was subject to reason, as the movements of Christ's sensuality were ordered by reason. (Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono* q. 2, p. 213.) See also Knuuttila 2004, 190. Peter of Tarentaise follows Bonaventure's view. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 3, a. 1, p. 110.)

¹²⁰ "In Christo autem nihil fuit subitum ex parte ejus in quo fuit: fuit tamen subitum ex parte passionis. Vel dicatur, quod non secundum illam rationem accipitur hic propassio, sed secundum effectum: quia scilicet non deflectit rationem ab aequalitate vel aequitate regiminis." Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 9, p. 284. "[...] perturbatio dicit deflectionem rationis ab aequitate. Aliud enim est rationem tangi turbatione, et non deflecti: et aliud est tangi, et deflecti ab aequalitate regiminis quo in regno animae regit: et aliud est tangi, et deflecti ab aequalitate virtutis. Sapiens enim tangitur et patitur ratione passionis, sed non deducitur deflexus ab aequalitate et aequitate. Imperfectus autem sapiens patitur, et tangitur, et deducitur ab aequalitate quidem, sed non recedit ab aequitate. Insapiens autem patitur, et deducitur ab aequalitate, et aequitate." Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 8, p. 281. See also Gonreau 2002, 95. According to Albert, the passion of the imperfect wise man turns reason away from the righteousness of control by which reason rules a soul, but not away from the righteousness of virtue. The passion of the unwise man turns reason away from the righteousness of control and the righteousness of virtue.

¹²¹ "[...] quando ratio non immutatur a sui aequalitate vel aequitate, non dicitur passio, sed propassio, quasi imperfecta passio. Et hoc modo fuit in Christo. Et ideo dicendum ad primum quod propassio proprie loquendo, est immutatio inferioris partis tantum; et quando talis immutatio in nobis accidit, non praeordinatur a ratione, ideo Glossa secundum statum potentiarum in nobis loquens, dicit propassionem subitum motum. In Christo autem aliter fuit,

movement of the sensitive appetitive power is a passion when it changes reason from equity to iniquity so that reason follows the suggestion of passion by consenting to and choosing it.¹²² A wise man has pre-passions as unexpected movements since he has the movements of the sensitive appetitive power which do not change reason to iniquity but which are after the apprehension of the senses but before the judgment of reason.¹²³ However, Christ had passions of the soul only when his reason dictated his sensuality to have passions.¹²⁴

ut ex dictis patet.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 3 expos; a. 2, qc. 1 co; a. 1, qc. 3 ad. 2; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 8 co; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 4 co. Like Alexander of Hales, Aquinas also claims that although Christ’s reason foresaw the movements of sensuality, they were unexpected for his interior and exterior senses. (Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2 ad 5.) For Aquinas on Christ’s pre-passions, see also Adams 1999, 59–63; Gondreau 2002, 366–372; Hoogland 2003, 50–54. Like Aquinas, Richard Middleton explains that the passions of Christ always followed the command of reason, as his reason commanded sensuality to be moved moderately, according to the exigency of its nature. (Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, q. 1, p. 163–164; q. 2, p. 165; q. 4, p. 166–167.) Following Aquinas, Durand of St. Pourçain claims that a pre-passion begins in the sensitive appetitive power, but does not confuse reason. An absolute passion is a perfect passion. He explains that the completion of the movement of the sensitive appetitive power is pursuit of a desired thing, which takes place when reason is withdrawn from rectitude. Therefore, a perfect passion involves that reason is withdrawn from rectitude. (Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII*, lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 240r.)

¹²² Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 3 expos; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 9, ad 1; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 4 co; ad 3. A pre-passion as an unexpected movement is a venial sin when it aims at a forbidden.

¹²³ “Sciendum tamen, quod duplex est turbatio. Quaedam procedit ex carne, quando scilicet quis turbatur praeter iudicium rationis ex apprehensione sensuali, quae quidem turbatio quandoque quidem consistit intra limites rationis, in nullo eam obnubilans. Quae non perfecta passio, sed propassio dicitur a Hieronymo; et haec in sapientem cadit.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Io.* cap. 13, l. 4; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 8 ad 2; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1 ad 2; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 6 ad 2.

¹²⁴ “Sed in Christo nunquam surgebat motus tristitiae nisi secundum dictamen superioris rationis quando scilicet dictabat ratio quod sensualitas tristaretur secundum convenientiam naturae suae; et ideo in eo neque, fuit tristitia rationem pervertens, neque fuit necessaria, sed voluntaria quodammodo.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 8 co. “Alia est turbatio quae procedit ex ratione, quando scilicet ex rationis iudicio et deliberatione turbatur quis in appetitu sensitivo. Et haec turbatio fuit in Christo: [...] In Christo enim omnia ex deliberatione rationis etiam in inferiori appetitu sensitivo proveniebant: unde nec subiti motus sensualitatis in Christo fuerunt.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Io.* cap. 13, l. 4. In *De veritate*, Aquinas proposes four differences between the passions of the soul: 1) The passion of the soul can be about an unsuitable thing or about a suitable thing. When it is about an unsuitable thing, it is a passion in a more proper sense than when it is about a suitable thing. 2) It can be aroused unexpectedly or the will can cause it. When it rouses unexpectedly, it is a passion in a more proper sense. 3) It can drag reason or remain in the sensitive appetitive power. 4) It can be an intense or a mild change. An intense change is a passion in the more proper sense than a mild change. A sinner has the passions of the soul about suitable and unsuitable things, they are mostly unexpected, reach the will, and are intense and frequent. A just man does not have perfect passions because passions do not reach reason. An imperfect just man has intense passions but the perfect just man have mild passions because his moral virtues restrain passions. A just man has mostly unexpected passions and passions about good and evil. Christ, prelapsarian human beings and the blissed souls have no unexpected passions since their reasons command all movements of the sensitive appetitive power. Prelapsarian human beings and the blissed souls have passions of the soul only about

According to Aquinas, the essential feature of the pre-passions of Christ's human soul was that they followed the order of his reason.¹²⁵ He thinks that the sensitive appetitive power can be subject to the powers of the rational part of the soul in four ways. First, the sensitive appetitive power is subject to the rational powers when the sensitive appetitive power has joy or sadness because reason represents a delectable or a sad thing to the sensitive appetitive power through the imagination. Second, it occurs when the sensitive appetitive power has an act because the will wishes something and the intensive movement of the will overflows into the sensitive appetitive power. Third, it is thus subject when the will prevents the sensitive appetitive lest it proceed to an external act, because the sensitive appetitive power moves limbs only after the command of the will.¹²⁶ Fourth, it takes place when the sensitive appetitive power follows the particular reason or the cogitative power, which further follows the universal reason.¹²⁷

suitable things. However, Christ had passions about both unsuitable and suitable things. (Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 8 co.) In *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas holds that our passions may be about forbidden things but Christ's passion were never about forbidden things, our passions frequently precede the judgment of reason but Christ's passions arisen always after the judgment of reason, and our passions do not stay in the sensitive appetitive power but may drag reason whereas the passions of Christ stayed in the sensitive appetite power. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 4 co.) See also Thomas Aquinas, *Compendium theologiae* lib. 1, cap. 233. Durand of St. Pourçain also follows Aquinas's view on how the passions of Christ differed from our passions. (Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII*, lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 240r.)

¹²⁵ Murphy 1999, 178–184; Miner 2009, 101–104; Lombardo 2011, 94–101 also consider how passions are related to reason. For how a passion can effect on the will, see Pasnau 2002b, 252–253. In his Commentary on *De anima*, Aquinas explains that a higher appetitive power can move the lower appetitive power like the heavenly bodies of the higher sphere moves the heavenly bodies of the lower sphere, and he claims that this is the natural order of things. However, when the lower appetitive power moves the higher appetitive power, it is against the natural order and it leads to sin. (Thomas Aquinas, *Sentencia De anima* lib. 3, cap. 10, p. 250–251.) This indicates that the perfectly ordered soul is like well-ordered universe, where inferior spheres are moved by the higher spheres.

¹²⁶ “Subduntur autem appetitivae inferiores, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, rationi tripliciter: primo quidem ex parte ipsius rationis; cum enim eadem res sub diversis conditionibus considerari possit et delectabilis et horribilis reddi, ratio opponit sensualitati mediante imaginatione rem aliquam sub ratione delectabilis vel tristabilis secundum quod ei videtur, et sic sensualitas movetur ad gaudium vel tristitiam; [...] Secundo ex parte voluntatis: in viribus enim ordinatis ad invicem et connexis ita se habet quod motus intensus in una earum, et praecipue in superiori, redundat in aliam; unde cum motus voluntatis per electionem intenditur circa aliquid, etiam irascibilis et concupiscibilis sequuntur motum voluntatis; [...] Tertio ex parte motivae exequentis; sicut enim in exercitu progressio ad bellum pendet ex imperio ducis, ita in nobis vis motiva non movet membra nisi ad imperium eius quod in nobis principatur, id est rationis, qualiscumque motus fiat in inferioribus viribus: unde ratio irascibilem et concupiscibilem reprimat, ne in actum exteriorem procedant;” Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 25, a. 4 co; *Summa theologiae* I^a q. 81, a. 3 co; I^a–II^a q. 24, a. 3 ad 1. Aquinas thinks that a human being has two motive powers (*vis motiva*). The sensitive appetitive power commands an external act, and another motive power executes an external act. (*Summa theologiae* I^a q. 75, a. 3, ad 3.) The idea of two motive powers was based on Avicenna's *Liber de anima* pars. 1, cap. 5, p. 82–83.

¹²⁷ “Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine, sicut supra dictum est, vis cogitativa; quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium.

Aquinas does not describe how the passions of Christ's human soul followed from the order of reason, but his general account implies that the passions followed from reason either through the imagination or the particular reason, or because the sensitive appetitive power did not exercise an external act without the command of the will.

Aquinas's idea that the intensive movement of the will overflows into the sensitive appetitive power is quite obscure and scholars have proposed different interpretations about it. Murphy claims that when the sensitive appetitive power has a movement because the will has an intense act, then sensory cognition is also involved.¹²⁸ Lombardo suggests that the overflow takes place when the will moves the intellect, the intellect causes the particular reason to form an intentional object, and a passion follows in the sensitive appetitive power.¹²⁹ However, Aquinas's rather obscure account of the overflow from the will to the sensitive appetitive power does not involve explicitly the idea that sensory cognition is also involved (as Murphy claims) or that the will affects on the intellect, which affects on the sensitive appetitive power through the particular reason (as Lombardo claims). Aquinas seems to think that when the will has an intense act, the sensitive appetitive power has a similar act because the act of the will overflows into the sensitive appetitive power, but, as Miner notes, he does not claim that this involves some kind of mechanism between the will and

Unde ab ea natus est moveri in homine appetitus sensitivus. Ipsa autem ratio particularis nata est moveri et dirigi secundum rationem universalem, unde in syllogisticis ex universalibus propositionibus concluduntur conclusiones singulares. Et ideo patet quod ratio universalis imperat appetitui sensitivo, qui distinguitur per concupiscibilem et irascibilem, et hic appetitus ei obedit." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a q. 81, a. 3 co. According to Aquinas, the particular reason apprehends sensible things with intentions (e.g. good or harmful) and it knows intentions when it compares particular intentions, as the universal reason compares universal intentions. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a q. 78 a. 4 co.) For Aquinas on the particular reason, see King 1999, 126–130; Pasnau 2002b, 253–257; Miner 2009, 76–82; Lombardo 2011, 23–25; 96–98. For Aquinas on the relation between the particular reason and the universal reason, see King 1999, 128–130; Pasnau 2002b, 253–258; Lombardo 2011, 96–98. When Aquinas studies whether the passion of the soul increases or decreases the goodness or evilness of an act, he claims that the passion of the soul follows from the judgment of reason when a person chooses to be affected by it in order to work promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetitive power. Aquinas does not explain how the passion of the soul follows from a choice, but it seems that this takes place either through the imagination or the particular reason. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–IIae q. 24, a. 3 ad 1.) Although Murphy claims that the judgment of reason and the will can effect a passion, when she comments on this text she claims that Aquinas here introduces a new way of how passion is reason-dependent. Murphy explains that a person does not choose to elicit a passion, but chooses "that an already occurring passion should have its full effect on oneself". (Murphy 1999, 183–184.) Miner agrees with Murphy's reading. (Miner 2009, 104.) However, nothing in Aquinas's text suggests that the sensitive appetitive power is taken to have a passion before choosing. Rather, it seems that here also Aquinas thinks that the judgment of reason causes a passion.

¹²⁸ Murphy 1999, 179, n. 32.

¹²⁹ Lombardo 2011, 90.

the sensitive appetitive power.¹³⁰ It seems that, according to Aquinas, the act of the will just overflows into the sensitive appetitive power like the joy of the will overflows into the inferior powers, into the essence of the soul and into the flesh.¹³¹ Aquinas thinks, however, that all passions of the soul have an object.¹³² As Aquinas does not describe how the overflow takes place, it is not clear how the passion of the sensitive appetitive power has an object when the act of the will overflows into the sensitive appetitive power.

Aquinas thinks that our sensitive appetitive power is not always obedient to reason because the imagination and the senses can also move the sensitive appetitive power independently from reason. Since the imagination and senses can move in their own right the sensitive appetitive power, our sensitive appetitive power enjoys autonomy in respect to reason.¹³³ However, Christ's sensitive appetitive power was perfectly subject to his reason because, according to Aquinas, Christ did not have the affective spark to sin (*fomes*), which was the habitual unordered desire (*concupiscentia*) of the sensitive appetitive power of that which was against reason.¹³⁴ He did not have the affective spark to sin because the irrational part of Christ's human soul had perfect moral virtues, which made his sensitive appetitive power obedient to reason.¹³⁵ This indicates that the affective spark to sin is the

¹³⁰ Miner 2009, 103.

¹³¹ For more about this overflow, see Chapter 3.7.

¹³² King 1999, 107–110.

¹³³ “Sic igitur anima dicitur dominari corpori despotico principatu, quia corporis membra in nullo resistere possunt imperio animae, sed statim ad appetitum animae movetur manus et pes, et quodlibet membrum quod natum est moveri voluntario motu. Intellectus autem, seu ratio, dicitur principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu, quia appetitus sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti imperio rationis. Natus est enim moveri appetitus sensitivus, non solum ab aestimativa in aliis animalibus, et cogitativa in homine, quam dirigit universalis ratio; sed etiam ab imaginativa et sensu. Unde experimur irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare, per hoc quod sentimus vel imaginamur aliquod delectabile quod ratio vetat, vel triste quod ratio praecipit. Et sic per hoc quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis in aliquo rationi repugnant, non excluditur quin ei obediant.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a q. 81, a. 3 ad 2. Aquinas founds his idea on Aristotle's *Politics*, where Aristotle claims that a soul's control over the flesh is a despotic one, but the mind's control over the sensitive appetitive power is a political one. (Aristotle, *Politica* I.5, 1254b2–15.) Aquinas explains that as the subjects of a despotic ruler cannot resist his commands, limbs cannot resist the command of the soul; by contrast, the subjects of a political ruler are able to resist his commands. According to Aquinas, reason is like the political ruler since the sensitive appetitive power can resist its command. See also King 1999, 130–131; Pasnau 2002b, 257–264; Gondreau 2002, 273–276; Lombardo 2011, 99–101.

¹³⁴ “[...] fomes nihil aliud est quam inordinata concupiscentia sensibilis appetitus, habitualis tamen, quia actualis concupiscentia est motus peccati. Dicitur autem concupiscentia sensualitatis esse inordinata, inquantum repugnat rationi, quod quidem fit inquantum inclinatur ad malum, vel difficultatem facit ad bonum.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 27 a. 3 co. For the *fomes peccati*, see Gondreau 2002, 342–349.

¹³⁵ “Virtus autem moralis quae est in irrationali parte animae, eam facit rationi esse subiectam, et tanto magis quanto perfectior fuerit virtus [...] Ad rationem autem fomitis pertinet inclinatio sensualis appetitus in id quod est contra rationem. Sic igitur patet quod, quanto virtus fuerit magis in aliquo perfecta, tanto magis debilitatur in eo vis fomitis. Cum igitur in Christo fuerit virtus secundum perfectissimum gradum, consequens est quod in eo

reason why our sensitive appetitive power can follow the senses and the imagination independently from the command of reason.

Since the movements of Christ's sensitive appetitive power always followed reason, it seems that Christ's sensitive appetitive power did not have autonomy. Gondreau and Lombardo disagree, however. Gondreau claims that Christ "could experience spontaneous affective movements that initiated with his sensitive appetite, yet which would have gone no further if they conflicted with reason".¹³⁶ Following Gondreau, Lombardo claims that "Aquinas must mean to apply to Christ his preferred metaphor of reason ruling the passions politically, implying that Christ's passions enjoyed their own proper autonomy and spontaneity, while also instinctively following the guidance of reason. In other words, Aquinas does not mean that Christ became angry only after he commanded himself to become angry, but rather that Christ spontaneously became angry in ways that complemented his reason and cooperated with its implicit judgments."¹³⁷ However, Madigan states, "In Jesus's soul, reason is never a reactor; it is always a dictator."¹³⁸ I think that Madigan is right. Aquinas does not argue that Christ's sensitive appetitive power had autonomy in respect to reason or spontaneous movements, as Lombardo and Gondreau think. Gondreau claims that the movements of the sensitive appetitive power were spontaneous because they were natural movements.¹³⁹ However, Aquinas does not claim that the natural movements are spontaneous. Instead, he explicitly claims that the natural movements of the sensitive appetitive power were ordered by the reason.¹⁴⁰ Lombardo founds his view on Aquinas's idea of the political ruler, but it is not clear how the idea fits with Christ's human soul since the movements of Christ's sensuality did not precede his reason.

John Duns Scotus's view about pre-passions was new, since he argued that Christ's will had pre-passions.¹⁴¹ This view was founded on the idea that the will can have passion, an emphasis which was favoured especially by Franciscan theologians.¹⁴² Scotus explains that when the intellect represents a thing which makes the sensitive appetitive power sad, the will has sadness without the act of the will. Since sadness is without the

fomes peccati non fuerit..." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15 a. 2 co. However, Christ's bodily powers and corporeal fluids were not subject to reason. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15 a. 2 ad 1.)

¹³⁶ Gondreau 2002, 340–341. See also Gondreau 2002, 309–310.

¹³⁷ Lombardo 2011, 211.

¹³⁸ Madigan 2007, 70.

¹³⁹ Gondreau 2002, 316.

¹⁴⁰ See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2 co; d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 8 co; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 18, a. 6 co; *Super Io.* cap. 13, l. 4.

¹⁴¹ For more about Scotus on the passions of the will, see Chapter 3.6.

¹⁴² See Chapters 3.1. and 3.6.

act of the will, Scotus says that it is a pre-passion as the unexpected passion of the will.¹⁴³ A pre-passion can be also the passion of the will, which follows from the act of the will but does not ruin reason. Christ's will had pre-passions in both senses because the will had a passion that preceded the act of the will and a passion that followed from the act of the will but did not ruin reason.¹⁴⁴

Peter Auriol reiterated the traditional view that Christ's passions did not precede, but instead followed reason. Therefore, for example, when Christ's reason judged that it was good to desire, to be sad or to enjoy, the act of the interior appetitive power followed.¹⁴⁵ However, Walter Chatton held that Christ had passions which did not follow reason. For example, when Christ felt pain on the cross, the crucifixion caused pain immediately in the sensitive appetitive power without the command of reason.¹⁴⁶

3.4. *The Fear and Anger of Christ*

When the medieval theologians examined Christ's passions, they studied only Christ's fear, anger, pain and sadness. Christ's joy was studied

¹⁴³ "[...] dum tamen appetibile intelligatur et per intellectum possit praesentari voluntati, sufficit ad hoc ut 'conveniens appetitui sensitivo' sit conveniens voluntati, et 'disconveniens' disconveniens et triste: sic enim ponitur aliqua delectatio subrepticia praecedere in voluntate omnem actum liberum voluntatis. Et sicut in delectationibus subrepticiis, ita etiam potest poni in tristitiis vel doloribus respectu obiectorum tristium," John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 503; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 390–391. "[...] si non tantum patiebatur voluntas subrepticie motu praeveniente consensum, qualis passio convenit ei ut natura (et potest dici 'propassio')..." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 534.

¹⁴⁴ "Ad Magistrum et Hieronymum: si non tantum patiebatur voluntas subrepticie motu praeveniente consensum, qualis passio convenit ei ut natura (et potest dici 'propassio'), sed etiam patiebatur motu sequente nolle libere elicited, tunc intelligendum est propassionem esse ut distinguitur a passione illa quae obruit rationem, qualis nulla fuit in Christo." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 534. In his *Lectura*, Scotus seems to think that passions which were after the act of the will were not called pre-passions. ("Aliter dici potest: si sequatur actum rationis, non tanta fuit ut impediret usum rationis, - et non potuit dici propassio," John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 392.)

¹⁴⁵ "Sed hic attende quod omnes tales passiones quae fuerunt in Christo fuerunt non ut praevenientes rationem sed sequentes quoniam in potestate sua erat quibus tangeretur nec fuerunt illi ut rebus subvertentes sed ei obediens ut quando iudicabat bonum fuit desiderare, tristere, gaudere huius..." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, MS M₁, fol. 75v, the 1605 printed edition p. 456. According to Auriol, there are four kinds of passions of the interior appetitive power: sinful passions (e.g. envy), passions which supposes evil (e.g. shame), good passions (e.g. anger through zeal), and indifferent passions (e.g. sadness). Christ had only good and indifferent passions. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, MS M₁, fol. 75v, the 1605 printed edition p. 456.)

¹⁴⁶ "[...] ille dolor talis erat passio qualis natus erat statim sequi ad crucifixionem. Sed ad crucifixionem statim causatur dolor sensitivus, nec oportet expectare usum rationis." Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 127. For more about Chatton on Christ's pain, see Chapter 3.6.

merely in relation to his pain and sadness.¹⁴⁷ In this chapter, I focus on the discussion about Christ's fear and anger. The medieval theologians thought that Christ's human soul had fear and anger above all because in the Bible was claimed so: Christ had fear in Gethsemane (Mark 14:33) and anger when he threw merchants and moneychangers out of the temple (John 2:17). Fear and anger were not major issues in medieval Christology and the views about them were quite sketchy.

The discussion about fear was based on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, where he lists five kinds of fears.¹⁴⁸

Fear	Christ had	Christ did not have
Natural or human fear	X	
Worldly or human fear		X
Servile fear		X
Initial fear		X
Pure, filial or friendly fear	X	

Lombard explains that natural or human fear is about death and a penalty.¹⁴⁹ Worldly or human fear is about the peril of the flesh or the loss of possessions. It is a sin and an evil, since Christ forbade it (Matthew 10:28).¹⁵⁰ Servile fear is about Hell, and it is good because it helps avoidance of sin.¹⁵¹ Initial fear is about punishment and offending beloved ones. It takes place when one begins to love. Lombard states without further clarification that all kinds of charity remove servile fear, whereas initial fear is compatible with initial charity but not with perfect charity.¹⁵² Friendly fear arises from perfect love, and blessed souls have it.¹⁵³ According to Lombard, Christ did not have worldly, servile and initial fears because worldly fear is evil, and servile and

¹⁴⁷ In his *De fide orthodoxa*, John of Damascus examines passions like joy (*laetitiis*), sadness, fear and anger. (John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 27–30, p. 119–124.) In the Christological part of his work, he only deals with Christ's fear. According to John, Christ had natural fear since his soul wished against his death. Christ did not have an irrational fear, which arises from a disturbance in thinking. Such fear takes place, for example, when one fears a noise at night. (John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 67, p. 265–266.) John's idea about Christ's fear is in line with the statements in Maximus the Confessor, *Disputatio cum Pyrrho* (PG 91, 297D.), and Pseudo-Athanasius, *De incarnatione domini nosti Jesu Christi contra apollinarium* (PG 26, 1123A–1124A). On fear of Hell in the patristic period, see Bernstein 2000, 183–205.

¹⁴⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 34, cap. 4, p. 192–193; *Collectanea in omnes D. Pauli apostoli epistolas in epistolam ad Romanos* cap. 8, PL 191, 1140A.

¹⁴⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 35, cap. 9, p. 198. See also John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 67, p. 265–266.

¹⁵⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 34, cap. 4, p. 193. See also Cassiodorus, *In psalterium expositio* ps. 127, PL 70, 931B.

¹⁵¹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 34, cap. 4, p. 193. See also Augustine, *Enarrationes in psalmos* ps. 127, n. 6–9, p. 1871–1874, PL 37, 1680–1683.

¹⁵² Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 34, cap. 6, p. 196; cap. 4, p. 193.

¹⁵³ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 34, cap. 4, p. 193.

initial fears are not compatible with perfect charity. Christ had natural fear and friendly fear since he respected God.¹⁵⁴

Following Lombard, Alexander of Hales writes that Christ had natural fear and fear of respect, but he did not have worldly, servile or initial fears. Christ's human soul had natural fear because the soul wished against death. Furthermore, reason as nature had natural fear since it wished against death, but reason as reason did not have it since it wished for the death.¹⁵⁵ Like Alexander, the *Summa Halensis* also claims that Christ had natural fear and fear of respect, but it adds that natural fear can be: 1) fear about death, which takes place when a soul wishes against death, 2) the fear of sensuality about a future evil apprehended by the senses, 3) the fear of reason about an understood evil, like Hell and divine judgment, or 4) irrational fear, which follows from a disturbance in thinking and from incredulity, together with ignorance. Christ had only the first two natural fears mentioned here.¹⁵⁶ Bonaventure also claims that Christ had natural fear,

¹⁵⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 34, cap. 9, p. 198; cap. 8, p. 197.

¹⁵⁵ "Timore nomen duplicem habet intelligentiam. Est enim timor naturalis, nolente anima dividi a corpore, propter eam quae a principio a Conditoris imposita est [ei] naturalem compassionem; unde timor naturalis fuit in eo. Est alius timor rationis, et iste non fuit, quia supervenit opus rationis, scilicet eligentia, qua voluit separationem." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 16, d. 2, memb. 4, p. 247. "Eodem modo in parte superiori non erat omnino separata a timore, sed timor ille erat naturalis, absque omni deliberatione; sed quando advenit opus electionis, statim fit opus et sic fuit appetitus separationis." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 16, d. 3, memb. 3, p. 259. "Utrum timor servilis sit in Christo, nulla est dubitatio. Sed, cum in eo fuerit timor reverentiae, quaeretur utrum maior fuit effectus timoris reverentiae in Christo quam in nobis." Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 15 (AE), p. 156. According to Alexander, fear of respect belongs to reason and heavenly souls also have it. Initial fear is about an inability to satisfy sins for God, servile fear is about eternal punishment, worldly fear is about the loss of earthly goods, and human fear is about wounds and injuries. Alexander goes on to explain that there is sensual fear, which is twofold. A prelapsarian human being can have sensual fear as an irrational impetus when a terrible thing is apprehended. A postlapsarian human being has sensual fear as a prepassion, which is an unexpected movement. (Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 15 (AE), p. 153–154.) According to Alexander, when a soul has fear, a heart is not always moved. For example, a heart is not moved when a soul fears God through filial fear or fear of respect. However, a heart is moved when a soul fears an external thing. (Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 15 (AE), p. 150–151.)

¹⁵⁶ "Timor naturalis dicitur multipliciter. Est enim timor naturalis per modum naturae, quo modo dicit Ioannes Damascenus quod 'timor naturalis est, nolente anima dividi a corpore' etc., 'propter quod anima naturaliter timet et agoniam patitur et refugit mortem' velut natura morbum. Est iterum timor naturalis per modum sensualitatis in apprehensione futuri mali per sensum, secundum quod ipse Ioannes Damascenus dicit alibi quod 'malum, quod expectatur, constituit timorem', et hoc ex parte sensualitatis, non rationis. Et istis duobus modis fuit timor naturalis in Christo. Est etiam timor naturalis secundum modum comprehensionis, quae est secundum rationem, secundum quod dicitur timeri malum intelligibile, ut gehenna vel iudicium divinum, et hic timor non fuit in Christo. Et est timor naturalis secundum immoderationem naturae, secundum quod dicit Ioannes Damascenus quod timor est 'ex perditione cogitationum et credulitate cum ignorantia; qui timor praeter naturam est', quo modo non fuit timor in Christo, [...] Item, timor gratuitus dicitur multipliciter, scilicet servilis, initialis et filialis, qui est duplex: timor offensae et reverentiae; quod ultimo modo fuit solum timor gratuitus in Christo," *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 3, p. 64. The fear of sensuality about a future evil apprehended by the

namely, fear of death and fear of respect, but he explains that Christ only had fear of death which was subject to his reason. Because Christ was free from sin, he did not have lustful fears like worldly fear.¹⁵⁷

While the aforementioned Franciscans views were based on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, Aquinas's view is derived from Aristotle's works. Following Aristotle, he holds that fear is the passion of the irascible power, which takes place when the sensitive appetitive power escapes an apprehended future harmful thing and there is hope that a thing can be avoided even though it is difficult.¹⁵⁸ Natural fear is about things which are repugnant to one's natural desire to exist, whereas non-natural fear is about things which are repugnant to the desire of the appetitive power but not against one's nature.¹⁵⁹ Aquinas claims that Christ's sensitive appetitive

senses is based on John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 26, p. 119. Following Peter Lombard, the *Summa Halensis* claims that gratuitous fears are servile fear, initial fear and filial fear, and filial fear is either fear about an offense or fear of respect.

¹⁵⁷ "Timor autem gratuitus est in triplici differentia: quidam enim est timor poenae, quidam est timor offensae, quidam reverentiae. Prima et secunda non fuit in Christo, pro eo quod perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem utrumque; sed secundum tertiam differentiam fuit in Christo, quia sic a perfecta caritate non expellitur, sed potius consummatur, [...] Est et alius timor libidinosus, et iste similiter in multiplici differentia est: quia est timor mundanus, et est timor humanus; et nullus istorum fuit in Christo [...] Est iterum timor in tertia differentia, timor scilicet naturalis, et iste est in triplici differentia: quidam est sensualitatis praeventis rationem, quidam sensualitatis subiacentis rationi, quidam vero est ipsius partis rationalis. Primus timor est naturae corruptae et quodam modo inordinatae, similiter et tertius; secundus vero est naturae corruptae, sed tamen ordinatae. Quoniam ergo in Christo, quamvis esset defectus passibilitatis, non tamen fuit defectus inordinationis et vitiositatis; hinc est, quod fuit in eo timor medio modo, non primo vel tertio. [...] non fuit in eo timor, qui rationem eius praeventiret, vel rationem eius perturbaret;" Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, dub. 3. (III, 341–342). Following William of Auxerre, Bonaventure describes that Christ's fear about his future death took place when his reason foresaw his future death and formed an imagination about it in the sensual part of the soul. Fear followed in Christ's sensuality after this imagination. (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, dub. 3. (III, 342).)

¹⁵⁸ "[...] timor causatur ex apprehensione mali futuri. Apprehensio autem mali futuri, si omnimodam certitudinem habeat, non inducit timorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Rhet., quod timor non est nisi ubi est aliqua spes evadendi, nam quando nulla spes est evadendi, apprehenditur malum ut praesens; et sic magis causat tristitiam quam timorem." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 7 co. "[...] ita obiectum timoris est malum futurum difficile cui resisti non potest." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–II^aae q. 41, a. 2 co. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 3 co. Aquinas's description is based on Aristotle, *Rhetorica* lib. 2, cap. 5, 1382a22–1383a11. Since fear is the passion of the soul, it involves a corporeal change. The corporeal change of the fear is the contraction of heat and the spirit from the outer parts of the flesh to the inner parts. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–II^aae q. 41, a. 1 co; q. 44, a. 1 co.) For Aquinas on fear, see Gondreau 2002, 404–414; Miner 2009, 231–251. Albert the Great does not propose a detailed description of fears or go over which fears Christ had. He explains that fear can be virtue, sin or a condition of nature, but he does not describe in detail what such fears are. Fear as virtue is when a brave man fears, fear as sin is worldly fear, and fear as a condition of nature is when a morally settled man fears. Albert states that since fear does not always entail sin, Christ had fear. (Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 8, p. 282.) In Gethsemane, Christ felt fear about his forthcoming death. (Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 4, q. 2, a. 3, p. 209; *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 7, p. 308.)

¹⁵⁹ "Est enim, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., timor de malo corruptivo, quod natura refugit propter naturale desiderium essendi, et talis timor dicitur naturalis. Est iterum de malo

power had natural fear about his future death. He also describes that uncertainty of a future event can cause fear, but Christ did not have such fear, as Christ's human soul was not uncertain about future things.¹⁶⁰ Christ did not fear his death from the moment of his conception because, according to Aristotle, fear is about an imminent future evil thing.¹⁶¹ Aquinas was the first to state that Christ also had admiration, which was not fear.¹⁶² He holds that admiration is about a new unaccustomed thing. Christ had admiration because he encountered things which were unaccustomed to his experiential knowledge.¹⁶³

Richard Middleton deviates from the views of the aforementioned Franciscans and Aquinas, arguing that Christ did not have sloth (*segnities*), blushing (*erubescencia*), shame (*verecundia*), astonishment (*admiratio*), stupefaction (*stupor*) or anxiety (*agonia*), which were fears listed by John of Damascus, Nemesius of Emesa and Thomas Aquinas.¹⁶⁴

contristativo, quod non repugnat naturae, sed desiderio appetitus, et talis timor non est naturalis." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–II^aae q. 41, a. 3 co. See also Aristotle, *Rhetorica* II.5, 1382a22–23.

¹⁶⁰ "Sic igitur timor potest considerari quantum ad duo. Uno modo, quantum ad hoc quod appetitus sensitivus naturaliter refugit corporis laesionem, et per tristitiam, si sit praesens; et per timorem, si sit futura. Et hoc modo timor fuit in Christo, sicut et tristitia. Alio modo potest considerari secundum incertitudinem futuri adventus, sicut quando nocte timemus ex aliquo sonitu quasi ignorantes quid hoc sit. Et quantum ad hoc, timor non fuit in Christo, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 7 co; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 3 co. For Aquinas on Christ's fear, see also Gondreau 2002, 408–414. Aquinas holds that Christ feared his future death because his reason formed a sensible species about that future death in the imagination, which moved the sensual appetite to fear. (Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 3 ad 3.)

¹⁶¹ "Ad quantum dicendum quod quamvis mors a principio conceptionis esset praevisa, non tamen praevidebatur ut imminens; et ideo dubitationem non faciebat, sed solum quando jam imminerebat." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 4 ad 5. See also Aristotle, *Rhetorica* II.5, 1382a24–26.

¹⁶² "[...] non quaelibet admiratio et stupor sunt species timoris, sed admiratio quae est de magno malo," Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–II^aae q. 41, a. 4 ad 4. For Aquinas on Christ's admiration, see also Gondreau 2002, 414–427.

¹⁶³ "[...] admiratio proprie est de novo aliquo insolito. In Christo autem non poterat esse aliquid novum et insolitum quantum ad scientiam divinam; neque etiam quantum ad scientiam humanam qua cognoscebat res in verbo; vel qua cognoscebat res per species inditas. Potuit tamen esse aliquid sibi novum et insolitum secundum scientiam experimentalem, secundum quam sibi poterant quotidie aliqua nova occurrere. Et ideo, si loquimur de Christo quantum ad scientiam divinam et scientiam beatam, vel etiam infusam, non fuit in Christo admiratio. Si autem loquamur de eo quantum ad scientiam experimentalem, sic admiratio in eo esse potuit." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 8 co. Avicenna also examines admiration. (Knuuttila 2004, 224.)

¹⁶⁴ Following John of Damascus (*De fide orthodoxa* cap. 29, p. 121–122) and Nemesius of Emesa (*De natura hominis* cap. 14, p. 103–104), Aquinas claims that the species of the fear are sloth, blushing, shame, astonishment, stupefaction and anxiety. Sloth (*segnities*) is fear of toil that burdens a nature. Aquinas clarifies that a person who avoids working because he fears excessive hardship has sloth. Blushing (*erubescencia*) is fear of disgrace given by another person because of a future act. Shame (*verecundia*) is fear about a disgrace given by another person because of a past act. Astonishment (*admiratio*) is fear about a great future evil which a person cannot understand. Stupefaction (*stupor*) is fear about an unfamiliar future evil which is estimated to be great. Anxiety (*agonia*) is fear about a future evil like misfortune, which is

Richard explains that Christ did not have sloth and stupefaction because they were a superabundance of fear, while Christ had only mild fear. He did not have blushing and shame because he did not have shameful acts, astonishment because he was able to consider the causes of all kinds of evils, and anxiety as he was able to see all future evils.¹⁶⁵ While Richard holds that Christ had fear about his future death, he does not clarify whether he also feared other things.¹⁶⁶

Walter Chatton's view about the fear of Christ's human soul is especially interesting, since it includes an explanation of how the will can weaken and control fear in the sensitive appetitive power. According to Chatton, Christ had moderate fear because it followed the right reason and did not destroy the right reason and incline Christ's will to choose life.¹⁶⁷ He

unforeseeable. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–II^ae q. 41, a. 4 co.) See blushing and shame in Aristotle, *Rhetorica* II.6, 1383b12–1385a15. For Nemesis and John of Damascus, see Knuuttila 2004, 233.

¹⁶⁵ "Sex sunt species timoris scilicet segnitie [...] et erubescencia [...] et verecundia [...] et admiratio [...] et stupor [...] agonia [...] segnitie, et stupor videntur esse species superabundantie timoris. Si tamen proprie loquendo species dici debent, quia utrum sint species superabundantie timoris proprie dicte, vel partes in modo dubium est, quia in Christo non fuit aliqua timoris superabundantia, ideo in Christo non fuit aliquod praedictorum. Alii autem quatuor timores praesupponunt, vel includunt defectus, qui in Christo esse non poterant: non enim poterant committere turpem actum: nec in ipso esse poterat insufficientia considerandi causam cuiuscunque mali, quantumcunque magni quodcunque etiam futurum praevidebat." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, q. 3, p. 166.

¹⁶⁶ "[...] ideo ex apprehensione mortis futurae, orta fuit in appetitu sensitivo animae Christi passio timoris non contra imperium, nec praeter imperium rationis, nec etiam de necessitate; quia Christus si voluisset, se potuisset praeservare a passione timoris." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, q. 3, p. 165. According to Richard, the sensitive appetitive power has fear when a soul apprehends an arduous future evil that does not take place necessarily in the near future and cannot be avoided without difficulty. Richard claims that evil that will take place after a long time does not cause fear or it causes only mild fear (*modica*). However, if one has a strong imagination about a great, inescapable evil that occurs after a long time, fear follows. (Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, q. 3, p. 165.) Richard explains that the sensitive appetitive power can have fear about a future evil as the estimative power can apprehend things that take place in the near future, which external senses do not sense. Richard claims that even animals can perceive future things. For example, an ant carries a grain into a cave before rain because its estimation apprehends a future rain. Moreover, the apprehension of reason can move the sensitive appetitive power through the imagination. (Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, q. 3, p. 165.) Durand of St. Pourçain holds that since the apprehension of a future evil causes fear and Christ apprehended his future death, he had fear. (Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 240r.)

¹⁶⁷ "Et primo dico quod illud quod supponitur, scilicet quod timuerit, est rationabile." Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 3, p. 137. "Cum igitur quaeritur utrum habuerit moderatum timorem, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi. Aut quod habuerit timorem conformem rectae rationi; aut timorem remissum et non in summo. Et dico quod sic ad utrumque intellectum. Nam si praeهابuisset timorem in summo de passione futura, ille tunc vehementissime retraxisset a sustinentia passionis, recta ratio et electio conformis inclinasset ad oppositum. Igitur fuisset in Christo rebellio et contrarietas magna." Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 3, p. 137–138. Chatton says, however, that fear inclined Christ's will to wish against death conditionally, even though it

expounds that fear is moderate when the command of the will restrains the inferior powers from not behaving in the way in which a passion inclines to or the will weakens it through the imagination.¹⁶⁸ Chatton's idea that the will can weaken fear through imagination is based on his view that the rational powers can control the passions of the sensitive appetitive power. According to Chatton, the will cannot control passions directly. He describes that a change in the heart directly and naturally causes the passion of the sensitive appetitive power. Since the change causes a passion naturally, the causality is not subject to the command of the will. For example, blood that arises around a heart effects a desire for reverence, but the will cannot control the arising directly.¹⁶⁹ However, the will can cause the passion of the sensitive appetitive power indirectly through the imagination. Walter clarifies that thinking and volition can cause imagination, which causes a change in the heart, and such change naturally causes a passion of the sensitive appetitive power.¹⁷⁰

did not incline the will to wish against death absolutely. (Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 3, p. 138.)

¹⁶⁸ "Dico aliter quod moderatio timoris potest intelligi fieri [...] dum timor est in anima, quod per imperium voluntatis cohibeantur potentiae inferiores ab executione inordinata in quam inordinate inclinat ille timor. [...] Quia recta ratio et electio libera conformis rectae rationi debet impedire et potest ab executione deordinata in quam inclinat passio. Potest etiam mediate remittere huiusmodi passionem modo superius exposito." Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 135–136. Chatton states that, according to the common view, fear becomes moderate when the will commands the sensitive appetitive power to fear more mildly, but he criticizes this view because the will cannot command the sensitive appetitive power immediately. (Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 135.)

¹⁶⁹ "Et primo proba quod timor non sit actus immediate elicitus a voluntate, quia illa passio non causatur immediate ab aliquibus principiis vel potentiis quae habent immediate obedire voluntati, quia est actus organicus, id est causatus ad transmutationem et alterationem organicorum et a qualitatibus eorum, [...] Item, ubi consequentia est necessaria, si antecedens non sit in potestate nostra, nec consequens. Sed non est in potestate nostra quin sanguis ascendatur circa cor, et ex hoc consequentia necessaria sequitur appetitus vindictae. Igitur appetitus vindictae non est immediate, sicut actus elicitus, in potestate nostra." Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 2, p. 136. "Hoc non est imaginabile quod illud quod causatur naturaliter a causis praesentibus [...] quod tale immediate subsit imperio voluntatis, [...] Arguo igitur sic: aut illa passio causatur immediate ab anima in appetitu sensitivo, aut ad transmutationem organi corporalis per causas naturales. Si secundum, propositum. Quia tunc sicut est in potestate mea approximare ignem vel non, sed tamen ipso approximato non est in potestate mea quin agat et quin effectus proveniat, similiter in proposito." Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 135.

¹⁷⁰ "Dico ad praesens quod ad vehementem cogitationem intellectivam et actum volendi vel nolendi causatur imaginatio vehemens. Hoc enim experimur quod vehemens imaginatio causari potest ad vehementem dictamen intellectus et imperium voluntatis, et ad vehementem imaginationem moventur humores circa cor, ad quorum transmutationem et alterationem transmutatur organum cordis aliquando motu dilatationis, aliquando motu constrictionis; et causantur in appetitu sensitivo, cuius organum est cor, passionis gaudii et tristitiae in tantum quod aliquando ex vehementi imaginatione aliquis incurrit febrem vel aliam infirmitatem. Et ideo dico quod omnes actus qui necessario sunt in nobis ad praesentiam causarum naturalium mutantur immediate ad transmutationem organi, sed bene mediate potest causari per actum intellectus et voluntatis," Walter Chatton, *Reportatio*, lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 127."

Contrary to Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales claimed that Christ also had anger.¹⁷¹ In this interpretation, Christ had anger through zeal, which was an act, but not anger as a passion, which is a perturbation.¹⁷² Christ did not have the anger which, according to Augustine, was a turbulent appetite of the mind about that which impedes the facility of action. Since the fluids of Christ's flesh were well disposed, Christ also lacked the anger which, according to John of Damascus, was a fervour of the blood around the heart resulting from an exhalation of bile.¹⁷³ The *Summa Halensis* states that anger is desire for revenge. When it arises from the impatience of injured desire, it involves perturbation and is a turbulent appetite and a fervour of the blood. When it arises from a love of justice, it is without perturbation. Christ had only this last mentioned type of anger.¹⁷⁴

Unlike the earlier Franciscans, Bonaventure thought that Christ's anger involved perturbation and progress of the blood. He explains that anger is the affection of detestation about an evil thing and it can involve perturbation, which touches only the sensual part of the soul but not the eye of the mind, or it can touch the sensual part of the soul and the eye of the mind only temporally (anger through zeal), or it can touch the sensual part of the soul and darken the eye of the mind (vicious anger). Bonaventure holds

¹⁷¹ When John of Damascus studies anger, he claims that anger is a boiling of the blood around the heart or the desire for revenge. There are three kinds of anger: bile (*fel*), mania and madness (*cotus/furor*). (John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 30, p. 122–123.) John took this terminology from Nemesius of Emesa, *De natura hominis* cap. 19, p. 102–103, which he copied verbatim.

¹⁷² “Dicendum quod ira per zelum, vel est ut actus, et sic erat in Christo; vel ut passio, et sic non erat in Christo, quoniam ira passio est cum perturbatione.” Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 15 (AE), p. 153; p. 154.

¹⁷³ “Augustinus, Ad Nebridium: ‘Ira est turbulentus animi appetitus auferendi ea quae facilitatem actionis impediunt’; et ita in Christo non fuit ira. – Ioannes Damascenus: ‘Ira est fervor eius qui circa cor est sanguinis ex vaporatione fellis’; et ita in Christo non erat ira, quoniam in eo erant humores secundum verissimam dispositionem.” Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 15 (AE), p. 151. Alexander refers to Augustine, *Epistulae* 9, p. 22, PL 33, 73. and John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 30, p. 122–123. Aristotle says that anger as fervour of the blood around the heart is the material definition of anger. The formal definition is the desire for revenge. (Aristotle, *De anima* I.1, 403a30–403b1.) Although Alexander deals with the anger of Christ, Gondreau claims that Bonaventure was the first who studied it. (Gondreau 2002, 97.)

¹⁷⁴ “Ira dicitur dupliciter. Est enim ira appetitus vindictae cum perturbatione, quo modo definitur ira ab Augustino: ‘Ira est turbulentus appetitus’ etc., et a Ioanne Damasceno: ‘Ira est fervor’ etc.; secundum istum modum non fuit in Christo. Alio modo dicitur ira appetitus vindictae absque perturbatione ex amore iustitiae, et hoc modo fuit ira in Christo, [...] Quod ergo est perfectionis iustitiae fuit in Christo, quando scilicet eiecit vendentes et ementes de templo; quod autem est imperfectionis, scilicet perturbatio ex existimatione impotentiae, non fuit in Christo.” *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 5, p. 65. “[...] dicendum quod appetitus vindictae dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo proveniens ex impatentia laesae concupiscentiae, sicut dicit Ioannes Damascenus: ‘Ira est auxilium vindicis laesae concupiscentiae; cum enim concupiscimus aliquid et prohibemur ab aliquo, irascimur adversus eum’, [...] Alio modo est proveniens ex amore iustitiae divinae, [...] Et hoc modo solum fuit in Christo appetitus vindictae.” *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 5, p. 65–66.

that Christ had anger as the affection of detestation which touched only his sensuality, but not the eye of the mind.¹⁷⁵ Christ's anger also involved ascent of blood around the heart, but this ascent was moderate. In ordinary human beings, the ascent is not moderate because sensuality fights against reason.¹⁷⁶

Aquinas explained that Christ had the anger of the will and the anger of the irascible power. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, he argues that anger of the will is willing to take revenge for an evil, whereas the anger of the irascible power aims at destroying a thing which is apprehended to be contrary to a thing which is desired. The anger of the irascible power is zealous when reason orders it and it is vicious when reason does not order it. According to Aquinas, Christ had the anger of the irascible power as anger through zeal.¹⁷⁷ In the *Summa theologiae*, he expounds that anger is a complex passion of the soul since it arises when one has sadness and desire for revenge.¹⁷⁸ The objects of anger are revenge and the person on

¹⁷⁵ “[...] ira uno modo dicit pure affectionem, et sic dicitur ira affectus detestationis alicuius mali, vel apparentis mali. Alio modo ira dicit affectum cum poena; et sic ira habet perturbationem et inquietationem annexam. Hoc autem potest esse in triplici differentia: quia aut perturbatio illa solum tangit potentias inferiores et nullo modo tangit oculum mentis; aut tangit oculum mentis ad tempus turbando, sed non excaecando; aut oculum mentis attingit ipsum perturbando et obnubilando. Et secundum hoc motus irae in quadruplici differentia reperitur, secundum quod colligitur ex dictis Sanctorum: uno modo pure dicit affectum detestationis; et hoc modo potuisset esse in Adam in statu innocentiae. Alio modo dicit motum detestationis cum inquietatione et perturbatione partis sensualis sine aliqua perturbatione mentis, et hoc modo fuit in Christo affectio irae; [...] Tertio modo dicit affectum detestationis cum commotione et perturbatione non solum partis sensualis, sed etiam rationis ad tempus; et hoc modo reperitur ira in viris iustis, qui irascuntur ira per zelum, [...] Quarto modo ira dicit affectum detestationis cum commotione sensualitatis et etiam mentis, ita quid commotio illa habet se cum perturbationem mentis annexam, vel ad illam est ordinata; et sic est ira per vitium, et reperitur in peccatoribus et prohibetur a Domino.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2, q. 3. (III, 340). A wise man has the second kind of anger and a sinner has the third kind. Adam also had anger before the Fall, but his anger was the affection of detestation without perturbation. (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2, q. 3. (III, 340).)

¹⁷⁶ “Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ira est ex accensione sanguinis circa cor; dicendum, quod illud verum est in nobis, in quibus caro repugnat spiritui, et sensualitas rationi, qui non tantum habemus corruptionem poenaltatis, immo etiam foeditatis; hoc autem non oportet esse in Christo. – Si quis tamen diceret, in Christo fuisse accensionem sanguinis, sed moderate, non videtur esse inconueniens.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2, q. 3. (III, 340).

¹⁷⁷ “Quandoque enim ira ponitur pro habitu vel actu vitii, quod opponitur mansuetudini, quod in IV Eth., irascibilitas dicitur: [...] Alio modo dicitur ira voluntas vindicandi aliquod malefactum. Et sic ira non est passio, proprie loquendo, nec est in irascibili, sed in voluntate. Et sic ira est in Deo et beatis et in Christo fuit. Tertio modo dicitur ira proprie quaedam passio vis irascibilis, quae contingit ex hoc quod vis irascibilis tendit ad destructionem alicujus quod apprehenditur contrarium voluto vel desiderato; et si quidem sit ex ordine rationis insurgens, vel ordinata ratione, sic dicitur ira per zelum, et sic fuit in Christo; si autem sit inordinata, sic erit ira per vitium, quae in Christo nullo modo fuit.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2 co. Anger can also be irascibility, which is opposed to mildness. For Aquinas on Christ's anger, see also Gondreau 2002, 434–441.

¹⁷⁸ “Non enim insurgit motus irae nisi propter aliquam tristitiam illatam et nisi adsit desiderium et spes ulciscendi,” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–IIae q. 46, a. 1 co. See also Aristotle, *Rhetorica* II.2, 1378a32–1378b5; 1379a9–15.

whom revenge is desired.¹⁷⁹ The desire for revenge is a sin when it takes place without the order of reason (anger through fault), but sinless when it follows justice (anger through zeal). Christ had anger through zeal since he had a sinless desire for revenge and sadness.¹⁸⁰ Richard Middleton also thought that Christ had anger of the will and anger of the sensitive appetitive power. He claims that anger of the will was willing to inflict a penalty for wrongdoing and the anger of the sensitive appetitive power was a desire to revenge wrongdoing, which was possible but difficult to accomplish. However, Christ did not have irascibility, which was an abundance of anger.¹⁸¹

3.5. *Pain and Sadness of the Sensible Part of the Soul*

In the medieval discussions about the psychology of incarnation, the idea of whether the human Christ had true pain begs a question because, for instance, Hilary of Poitiers (c. 310 – c. 367) claimed that Christ did not feel

¹⁷⁹ “Et sic motus irae tendit in duo, scilicet in ipsam vindictam, quam appetit et sperat sicut quoddam bonum, unde et de ipsa delectatur, tendit etiam in illum de quo quaerit vindictam, sicut in contrarium et nocivum, quod pertinet ad rationem mali.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–II^aae q. 46, a. 2 co. See also Aristotle, *Rhetorica* II.2, 1378b1–5.

¹⁸⁰ “Et sic ira est passio composita ex tristitia et appetitu vindictae. Dictum est autem quod in Christo tristitia esse potuit. Appetitus etiam vindictae quandoque est cum peccato, quando scilicet aliquis vindictam quaerit sibi absque ordine rationis. Et sic ira in Christo esse non potuit, hoc enim dicitur ira per vitium. Quandoque vero talis appetitus est sine peccato, immo est laudabilis, puta cum aliquis appetit vindictam secundum ordinem iustitiae. Et hoc vocatur ira per zelum, dicit enim Augustinus, super Ioan., quod *zelo domus Dei comeditur qui omnia perversa quae videt cupit emendare; et, si emendare non possit, tolerat et gemit*. Et talis ira fuit in Christo.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 9 co; ad 1. Following John of Damascus and Nemesius of Emesa, Aquinas distinguishes between three kinds of anger. Bile (*fel*) is quick anger. Mania (*mania*) is anger caused by sadness which remains in the memory a long time. Madness (*furor*) is anger that does not rest until a revenge takes place. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–II^aae q. 46, a. 8 co.) Durand of St. Pourçain follows Aquinas in stating that sadness is the cause of the anger because desire to take revenge for a done injury arises from sadness. As Christ had sadness, he also had anger. However, Christ did not have anger through fault, which preceded the judgment of reason, but anger through zeal, which followed from the judgment of reason. (Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII*, lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 240r.)

¹⁸¹ “[...] ira tripliciter potest accipi. Uno modo pro superabundantiam irae, que secundum philosophum. 4. Ethicorum. capitul. 12 dicitur iracundia, et sic ira non fuit in Christi, [...] Alio modo pro voluntate vendicandi aliquod maleficium, et sic ira est in appetitu intellectiuo, et sic fuit in Christo, inquantum homo, et in sanctis angelis est, et in Deo. Tertio modo pro quodam passione appetitus sensitiui insurgente ex apprehensione illatae iniuriae, ut possibilis vindicari quamuis cum difficultate. [...] Hoc tertio modo fuit passio in appetitu sensitiuo animae Christi: ex hoc, quod apprehendebat inferri Deo iniuriam a peccatoribus quantum in eis erat, quae iniuria possibilis erat vindicari, cum difficultate tamen non ex parte Dei, sed ex parte peccatorum rebellium, et difficultum ad poenitentiae susceptionem, et ex parte naturae humane si suis naturalibus relinqueretur,” Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, q. 4, p. 166–167. When Richard claims that irascibility is the abundance of the anger, he refers to Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* IV.5, 1125b29–31.

pain. In his *De Trinitate*, Hilary explained that Christ did not feel pain although his body was injured. Despite Hilary's text, the medieval theologians argued that Christ had true pain, primarily because the Bible claimed so. The medieval theologians proposed different ways of interpreting how Hilary's text was in harmony with the view that the human Christ had true pain, but it is dubious how successful these interpretations were.¹⁸² In this chapter, without paying attention to the medieval interpretations of Hilary's text, I study the nature of Christ's pain and sadness in the sensitive part of his soul. The psychology of the incarnation was one significant locus where theologians studied what pain was. Since John of Damascus and Avicenna, pain was associated with the perception of the apprehensive power, but the discussion about the psychology of incarnation shows that in the thirteenth century, pain was also associated with the movement of the sensitive appetitive power. In this respect, pain was similar to the passions of soul like sadness, fear and anger. The discussion also exposes that Thomas Aquinas and the Franciscan theologians after him proposed different views about the pain. It should be noted that when the medieval theologians used *dolor*, it could refer to pain related to the sense of touch and non-physical pain, whereas *tristitia* refers to non-physical pain. Aquinas also remarks that these terms are used in this way.¹⁸³ In this and the following chapters, I use the terms 'sadness' or 'pain', depending on which term the author in question prefers.

¹⁸² In the twelfth-century discussion, the central theme was how to interpret authoritative texts where it was claimed that Christ did not have true pain. Hugh of Saint Victor remarks that a theologian, whom he does not name, has claimed that Christ did not have true pain when his flesh suffered. He argues that the idea is absurd because the Bible proves and the redemption of the human race required that Christ had true pain. (Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sacramentis christiane fidei* lib. 2, pars 1, cap. 7, PL 176, 390C–390D.) The most discussed author who seemed to deny that Christ had pain was Hilary of Poitiers. Peter Abelard is one of the first twelfth-century author who claims that the idea is from Hilary's *De Trinitate*. According to Hilary, Christ's flesh was pierced, for example, but he did not feel pain. (Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* lib. 10, PL 10, 361A). In his *Sic et non*, Abelard does not argue against Hilary but quotes a Gallo-Roman theologian Claudianus Memertus, who explained that when Hilary claimed that Christ did not feel pain, he meant that Christ did not suffer diminishment of merit. (Peter Abelard, *Sic et non* q. 80, p. 283–296; Claudianus Memertus, *De statu animae* lib. 2, cap. 9, PL 53, 752B.) Peter Lombard described that when authors claim that Christ did not have true pain and sadness, they claim that Christ did not have pain and sadness as passions and he did not have them necessarily. (Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 2, p. 98; cap. 3, p. 100–102.) See also *Sententiae divinitatis* tract. 4, cap. 3, p. 89; Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiarum* lib. 4, cap. 18, PL 211, 1205C–1206A. Madigan explains in detail how Hilary's view was related to Arian theology. Madigan says that the medieval commentators of Hilary's text changed its meaning, since they tried to interpret Hilary's unorthodox view (i.e. Christ did not feel pain) for the better. (Madigan 2007, 51–62.) However, Pomplun argues that the interpretations of the medieval theologians were plausible. (Pomplun 2009, 202–211.)

¹⁸³ "Quandoque tamen tristitia, large loquendo, dolor dicitur. Unde Augustinus distinguit dolorem animae secundum se qui proprie dicitur tristitia, et dolorem animae per corpus, qui proprie dicitur dolor." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 2 co.

Following John of Damascus, Alexander of Hales describes that Christ had pain which was a sensation (*sensus*) of the injury of the flesh.¹⁸⁴ Like Alexander, Bonaventure also states that Christ had pain because he had an injury of the flesh and sensation of the injury,¹⁸⁵ but he adds that Christ also had sadness of the sensitive and the rational concupiscible powers about the injury and evil things that took place for others.¹⁸⁶ Bonaventure clarifies that Christ's human soul had pain of the passion about death and pain of the compassion about our sins. Both pains were extremely intense and both were in Christ's sensuality and the rational part of the soul. The pain of the passion was first in Christ's sensuality and then in other powers, but the pain of the compassion was first in the rational powers and then in his sensuality.¹⁸⁷

Thomas Aquinas thought that pain was related to sensation, but wavered about whether pain was a corporeal passion or passion of the soul. In his *Commentary on the Sentences* and *De veritate*, he clarifies that

¹⁸⁴ "Non opponitur, immo simul stare possunt in anima Christi gaudium de praesentia deitatis et dolor sive sensus poenae quae fuit in carne;" Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 2, memb. 5, p. 249. According to Alexander, Christ's pain was great, as only the pain of the damned souls in regard to their separation from God was greater. (Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 4, memb. 1, p. 267.) In his *De fide orthodoxa*, John of Damascus claims that pain is the feeling of a passion. (John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 132.) John took the idea from Nemesius of Emesa's *De natura hominis* cap. 15, p. 93–94. Nemesius's idea was based on Galen's *Elements*, where Galen claims that pain requires a passion and sensation of a passion. On the sources of Nemesius's view, see Sharples 2008, 129–130, n. 643.

¹⁸⁵ "Dicendum, quod absque dubio, sicut Evangelium dicit, et fides catholica sentit, vera doloris passio fuit in Christo. In ipso enim fuit caro passibilis et perforabilis, fuit etiam virtus sentiendi, secundum quam anima compatitur corpori laeso. Quoniam ergo haec duo verum dolorem faciunt, scilicet vera laesio et verus laesionis sensus, et haec duo vere fuerunt in Christo; indubitanter tenendum est, quod in Christo fuit vera doloris passio." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1. (III, 346). See also Adams 1999, 45–47. Bonaventure proposes three ways to interpret Hilary's claim that Christ did not have pain: 1) Hilary changed his mind in a text which was seen by William, the bishop of Paris, 2) Hilary claims that Christ as God did not sense pain, or 3) Hilary claims that Christ did not have the cause of the pain (i.e. sin). (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1. (III, 346–347).) The *Summa Halensis* also held that Christ's senses had pain and his sensuality had sadness. (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 1, p. 199; tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 2, p. 63.) The *Summa Halensis* explains that Hilary claimed that Christ did not have the nature of pain and he did not have pain necessarily, as the actuality of the pain was subject to Christ's will. (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 1, p. 197; memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 1, p. 199.)

¹⁸⁶ "Secundo, utrum habuit tristitiam in concupiscibili." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2 (III, 336). "[...] absque dubio [...] in Christo fuit vera tristitia." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2 (III, 338).

¹⁸⁷ "[...] in Christo duplex dolor fuit, secundum quod dicunt Sancti, videlicet dolor passionis et dolor compassionis, et uterque dolor intensus fuit et acerbus. Multum enim in se doluit, et multum nobis condoluit; et uterque istorum dolorum et in sensualitate fuit et in ratione, sed ordine permutato. Nam dolor passionis et carnis primo attingebat animam secundum sensualitatem, et deinde secundum alias vires. Dolor vero compassionis primo erat in ratione, et ex ratione redundabat in sensualitatem." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 3. (III, 358.)

pain is a corporeal passion rather than the passion of the soul as it begins in the flesh, whereas sadness is the passion of the soul. Pain differs from sadness because pain is about a thing (i.e. the injury of the flesh) that is unsuitable for nature and the sense of touch, but sadness is about a thing that is unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power. Furthermore, pain follows from the apprehension of the sense of touch, but sadness follows from the apprehension of the inner sense, and pain is in the sense of touch but sadness is in the sensitive appetitive power.¹⁸⁸ Christ had pain since his sense of touch perceived the injury of his flesh,¹⁸⁹ and sadness since the inner senses perceived the injury as unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power.¹⁹⁰ A different view is found in the *Summa theologiae*, where Aquinas writes that

¹⁸⁸ “Primo quantum ad contrarietatem: quae quidem in dolore attenditur quantum ad ipsam naturam dolentis quae per laesivum corrumpitur; sed in tristitia quantum ad repugnantiam appetitus ad aliquid quod quis odit. Secundo quantum ad perceptionem: quae quidem in dolore semper est secundum sensum tactus, ut dictum est, in tristitia autem secundum apprehensivam interiorem. Tertio, quantum ad ordinem istorum duorum, quia dolor incipit in laesione et terminatur in perceptione sensus, ibi enim completur ratio doloris; sed ratio tristitiae incipit in apprehensione et terminatur in affectione. Unde dolor est in sensu sicut in subjecto, sed tristitia in appetitu. Ex quo patet quod tristitia est passio animalis, sed dolor est magis passio corporalis.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3 qc. 2 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 ad 9; a. 9 co. According to Aquinas, the sense of touch has pain because a thing which is unsuitable for the flesh is unsuitable also for the sense of touch. (Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 1 co.) For Aquinas on Christ’s pain and sadness, see also Gondreau 2002, 380–403.

¹⁸⁹ “Unde cum in corpore Christi fuerit vera laesio, quia fuit divisio continui per clavos, et fuerit ibi verus tactus; de necessitate oportet dicere, quod fuerit ibi verus dolor.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 1 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 8 ad 7. When Aquinas studies Hilary’s text, he explains that Hilary either: 1) withdrew his teaching in a text saw by the bishop of Paris, 2) proposed the idea against those who denied Christ’s divinity, 3) denied the dominium of pain over reason, or 4) claimed that Christ did not have pain necessarily, as he was free from sin. (Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 3 expos; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 8 ad 7; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 5 ad 1. See also Gondreau 2002, 384–388.) According to Albert the Great, Christ had pain when the sense of touch or the estimative power apprehended the injury of the flesh. The immediate cause of pain was the apprehension about the injury as contrary to the union of the soul with flesh. (Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, p. 268; *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 4, p. 223–224.) For Albert on the inner senses, see Ashley 2013, 303–314. In his *De incarnatione*, Albert describes that when Hilary claimed that Christ did not have pain, he argued against those who claimed that Christ was merely a human being. Albert was the first who also claimed that the bishop of Paris, Wilhelmus Parisiensis, had seen a book where Hilary changed his view. (Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 5, p. 224–225.) In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Albert adds that some of Hilary’s texts can be understood so that Christ did not have pain because of sin, as Christ assumed pain voluntarily. (Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 10, p. 287.) Peter of Tarentaise also says that Christ had pain, as he had the injury of the body and he perceived it. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 112.)

¹⁹⁰ “[...] hic quaeritur de tristitia secundum quod est passio animalis in parte sensitiva. [...] Et ideo cum accidebat aliquid contrarium delectationi inferiorum partium, erat de eo tristitia;” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1 co. “[...] quamvis laesio corporis in Christo non fuerit nolente ratione, fuit tamen contra appetitum sensualitatis, et sic fuit ibi tristitia.” Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 8 ad 10.

pain is also a passion of the soul in the sensitive appetitive power.¹⁹¹ Although pain and sadness are in the same sensitive appetitive power, they differ because the object or mover of the pain is the injury of the flesh sensed by the sense of touch, whereas the object or mover of the sadness is an evil thing apprehended by the imagination. When Christ's sense of touch perceived the injury of his flesh, he had pain, and when his interior sense apprehended the injury, the sins of his disciples and the Jews who killed him, he had sadness.¹⁹² Aquinas holds that Christ's pain and sadness were the greatest pain and sadness that a human being can have in this life.¹⁹³

Peter of Tarentaise states that Christ had pain because his sense perceived the injury of the flesh, but he does not define in which power pain was.¹⁹⁴ He adds without further clarification that Christ's sensuality had signs of pain like crying, when the inferior part of his reason and the will as nature had pain and sadness about evil things which took place for other human beings.¹⁹⁵ Following Aquinas's view in his *Summa theologiae*, Durand of St. Pourçain holds that Christ had pain and sadness, which were the passions of the soul and the movements of the sensitive appetitive power.

¹⁹¹ "Unde dolor, secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo, propriissime dicitur passio animae," Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a-II^aae q. 35, a. 1 co.

¹⁹² "[...] ad veritatem doloris sensibilis requiritur laesio corporis et sensus laesionis. Corpus autem Christi laedi poterat, quia erat passibile et mortale, [...] Nec defuit ei sensus laesionis, cum anima Christi perfecte haberet omnes potentias naturales. Unde nulli dubium debet esse quin in Christo fuerit verus dolor." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 5 co. "Sicut autem dolor sensibilis est in appetitu sensitivo, ita et tristitia, sed est differentia secundum motivum, sive obiectum. Nam obiectum et motivum doloris est laesio sensu tactus percepta [...] Obiectum autem et motivum tristitiae est nocivum seu malum interius apprehensum, sive per rationem sive per imaginationem, [...] Potuit autem anima Christi interius apprehendere aliquid ut nocivum, et quantum ad se, sicut passio et mors eius fuit, et quantum ad alios, sicut peccatum discipulorum, vel etiam Iudaeorum occidentium ipsum. Et ideo, sicut in Christo potuit esse verus dolor, ita in eo potuit esse vera tristitia," Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15, a. 6 co; I^a-II^aae q. 35, a. 2 co. Also, Sarot (1994, 68, n. 21.) and Gondreau (2002, 380–384.) remark that Aquinas changed his mind about pain in this way in *Summa theologiae*.

¹⁹³ "[...] in Christo patiente fuit verus dolor et sensibilis, qui causatur ex corporali nocivo; et dolor interior, qui causatur ex apprehensione alicuius nocivi, qui tristitia dicitur. Uterque autem dolor in Christo fuit maximus inter dolores praesentis vitae." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 46, a. 6 co; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 3 co.

¹⁹⁴ "Ad complementum doloris vel delectationis duo requiruntur: unum est coniunctio convenientis aut disconvenientis: alterum est perceptio coniunctionis. In Christo fuit vera coniunctio disconvenientis, scilicet laesiui corrumpentis harmonium corporis; et vera eius perception in anima, cum non esset per fruitionem abstracta a sensibus: unde fuit in eo verus dolor." Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 112.

¹⁹⁵ "In compassione aliquid est perfectionis, scilicet voluntas subueniendi: aliquid imperfectionis, scilicet dolor. Primum est in angelis, et fuit in Christo: secundum non est in angelis, sed fuit in Christo: non tamen ex qua parte erat comprehensor, scilicet in ratione superiori: sed ex qua parte erat viator, id est, secundum voluntatem naturae, et rationis inferioris, et sensualitatis, quia mala aliorum visa generabant tristitiam in ratione, dolorem in naturali voluntate, et signa doloris, ut fletum, in sensualitate." Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 3, a. 2, p. 111.

He maintains that Christ's sensitive appetitive power had pain when his sense of touch perceived the injury of the flesh and sadness when his interior apprehensive power (e.g. the imagination) perceived his death.¹⁹⁶

Contrary to Aquinas, Richard Middleton argued that although the sensitive appetitive power had pain, the subject of the pain and the subject of the sadness were not the same power. Middleton's view was based on the teaching favoured by the Franciscan theologians that each exterior sense has an appetitive power proper to it. He explains that pain follows the apprehension of the exterior sense about a present evil, and it is in the exterior appetitive power, whereas sadness follows the apprehension of the interior apprehensive power and it is in the interior appetitive power.¹⁹⁷ Richard's view is opposed to what Aquinas says in his *Summa theologiae*, because he thinks that the subject of the pain differs from the subject of the sadness.¹⁹⁸ Richard is also opposed to Aquinas's view in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, since he claims that the subject of the pain is not the sense of touch but the exterior appetitive power related to it.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁶ "Primum est, quod in Christo fuit vera passio, prout dicit motum appetitus sensitivi. [...] ubicumque est vera passio corporalis percepta per sensum et motum appetitus sensitivi secundum conditionem apprehensionis, ibi est uera passio animalis, sed in Christo fuit uera passio corporalis percepta per sensum et motum appetitus sensitivi secundum ordinem apprehensionis: ergo in Christo fuit passio animalis. [...] Et per rationem patet quia dolor sensibilis causatur proprie ex perceptione eius quod laedit temperamentum corporis. Et haec perceptio est per solum tactum, qui inter alios sensus est discretius eorum, quae concurrunt ad temperamentum corporis. Constat autem quod in Christo fuit aliquid laesivum temperamenti corporis, quia percipiebatur per tactum qui fuit in Christi temperatissimus: ergo sequebatur ad hoc uerus dolor: [...] tristitia causatur ex nociuo naturali, seu ex malo apprehenso per imaginationem, vel aliquam uirtutem interiorem: sed talis apprehensio fuit in Christi, frequenter enim fuit imaginatus mortem antequam pateretur, ergo fuit in eo uera tristitia." Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri III* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 239v–240r.

¹⁹⁷ "Dico ergo, quod differunt penes apprehensionem, quia dolor exterior est post apprehensionem particularis sensus maxime tactus, ita quod haec apprehensio, etiam si nulla alia adesset posset sufficere ad causandum exteriorem. Dolor interior post apprehensionem mali praesentis interiorem, sive illa apprehensio sit per imaginationem, vel per rationem, vel per utramque, et talis apprehensio posset sufficere ad causandum dolorem, non assistente apprehensione per aliquem particularem sensum. Differunt etiam penes appetitus in quibus est dolor, quia dolor interior, qui speciali nomine dicitur tristitia est in appetitu interiori voluntario seu sensitivo, vel in utroque. Dolor exterior est in appetitu, qui dicitur exterior, eo quod immediate mouetur post exteriorem apprehensionem, maxime sensus tactus," Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 4, p. 171.

¹⁹⁸ "[...] dicunt aliqui, quod in eodem appetitu sensibili est passio tristitiae, et dolor qui dicitur esse in sensu exteriori, quia non dicitur esse in sensu exteriori, nisi sicut in causa ex eo, quod per apprehensionem sensus tactus, qui est sensus particularis causatur. Tristitia autem causatur ex apprehensione interiori." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 1, p. 168.

¹⁹⁹ "Ideo alii soluunt aliter ad argumentum, quod sicut sensus tactus [...] apprehendit, quae temperamento corporis conueniunt, vel disconueniunt, ita appetit conuenientia, et refugit disconuenientia, unde in ipso in quantum est, refugiens corporis laesionem est, ille dolor sensibilis, qui dicitur esse in sensu exteriori." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 1, ad 3, p. 168.

According to Richard, the interior sensitive appetitive power of Christ's human soul had sadness when his interior apprehensive power perceived a disagreeable thing like death, which was present or was inescapably going to take place in the near future.²⁰⁰ The interior sensitive appetitive power had sadness also about an evil thing taking place for others. Richard thinks that sadness about his death and sadness about others were the same kind of sadness because Christ, who loved his neighbour, apprehended the evil experiences of others as evil things that he met himself.²⁰¹ Richard is the first who holds that there are many kinds of sadness, but Christ did not have all of them. Richard takes the list of sadnesses from John of Damascus and Nemesisius of Emesa.²⁰²

He clarifies that *accidia* and *achos* represent a superabundance of sadness. *Accidia* is exaggerated sadness and *achos* is intense sadness which removes the voice. Richard states that Christ did not have *accidia* and *achos* since he had only moderate sadness. Envy is sadness about another's good which is apprehended to be evil to the person feeling envy. Christ did not have envy because he did not apprehend another's good as evil to himself. However, Christ had compassion when he apprehended that another had a good thing, which was actually evil for the owner's soul. Richard goes on to claim that Christ had misery, but he does not describe what the misery was.²⁰³

Later, Richard Middleton's view of pain was followed especially by Franciscan theologians. Like Bonaventure and Richard, John Duns Scotus thought that each sensitive apprehensive power had an appetitive power related to it,²⁰⁴ and, following Richard, he explains that the

²⁰⁰ Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, q. 1, p. 163.

²⁰¹ Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, q. 2, p. 164.

²⁰² John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 28, p. 121; Nemesisius of Emesa, *De natura hominis* cap. 18, p. 101–102.

²⁰³ Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, q. 2, p. 164.

²⁰⁴ Scotus bases his idea of pain on the general view of the passive and active powers. He thinks that the interaction of the passive power with an active power involves three stages: inclination, proximity and receiving. The relation of inclination means that the passive power is inclined to the active power inasmuch as the passive power can receive a form from the active power. The relation of the proximity means that the passive and active powers are immediately close to each other. The outcome of this relation is that the passive power receives a form from the active power. Scotus emphasizes that the inclination and the proximity do not cause a new form, but they are the causes without which a form does not take place (*causae sine quibus non*). The cause of the coming-to-be of the new form is the active power. These triple stages explain how the sight has joy and pain. The sight is the passive power and an object is the active power. The sight is not just inclined but also disinclined to certain objects. The sight is inclined to a visible external object that perfects it and disinclined to a contrary visible object that corrupts it. Scotus claims that the relation that completes an inclination is suitability (*convenientia*) and the relation associated with

subject of the pain is the sensitive appetitive power related to the senses because only the appetitive power is inclined or disinclined towards an object, whereas the senses apprehend an object.²⁰⁵ An unsuitable object like the injury of the flesh caused pain in Christ's sensitive appetitive power related to the sense of touch when an object was close to the sense of touch and its appetitive power.²⁰⁶

Unlike Aquinas, who thought that sadness was an act of the sensitive appetitive power, William Ockham clarifies that pain and sadness are passions and qualities, but not the acts of the sensitive appetitive power, and he states that the apprehension of the sense and the sensitive appetitive power are the causes of the pain.²⁰⁷ He argues that the act of the sensitive appetitive power is not the cause of the pain. The act of the sensitive appetitive power is about an absent thing and it ceases when a thing is present, whereas pain is about a present thing. Ockham explains that the act of the sensitive appetitive power cannot cause pain, as it does not exist when the appetitive power has pain.²⁰⁸ Unlike Scotus, he thinks that an object does

disinclination is unsuitability (*inconvenientia*), but he does not specify this further. Scotus states that when sight and an object which the sight is inclined to are close to each other, the sight receives perfection from the object, which is delight. Delight of seeing is a passion as an object causes it and it is a quality of the faculty. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 493–494; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 371–372.) When the sight and an object which the sight is disinclined towards are close to each other, the sight receives pain. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 494; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 371–372.) For Scotus on pain and sadness, see also Adams 1999, 87–90; Knuuttila 2011, 743–747; 2012, 119–122; Drummond 2012, 53–72; Barnes 2012, 306–312.

²⁰⁵ “Quod si quaeratur cui imprimatur ista forma, ut perfectibili inclinato quae dicitur ‘delectatio’, vel ut perfectibili contra-inclinato quae dicitur ‘dolor’, an scilicet potentiae sensitivae apprehensivae vel appetitui eius, - videtur magis quod appetitui, quia possumus distinguere potentiam qua anima potest hoc apprehendere et qua inclinatur in hoc ut perfectivum extrinsecum, quae inclinatio nata est terminari apprehensione tantum praecedente; et ita sicut sensui per se attribuimus apprehendere, ita videtur quod sic inclinari, ita scilicet quod terminatio illius inclinationis sequatur ad apprehensionem, conveniat appetitui sensitivo.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 495–496; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 371. As Drummond notes, the interaction between the passive and the active powers requires that they are brought together. Therefore, the interaction between the sensitive appetitive power and the object requires that the object is present to the appetitive power through the apprehensive power. (Drummond 2012, 63.)

²⁰⁶ “[...] in Christo fuit verus dolor in parte sensitiva, quia obiectum approximatum tactui suo et appetitui sensitivo erat disconveniens illi sensui,” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 505–506; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 374–375; *Reportatio* ib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478. According to Scotus, Hilary claimed that Christ did not feel pain because Christ did not feel pain necessarily, as Christ was able to not feel pain if he wished, and because he did not have the cause of suffering, which is original sin. (John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* lib. 2, d. 15, q. 1, p. 479; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 363; p. 392.)

²⁰⁷ “[...] quod dolor, qui proprie est passio et qualitas appetitus sensitivi, ab apprehensione sensitiva causatur, et non ab obiecto apprehenso [a] sensu nec ab actu appetitus, sed solummodo ab apprehensione et potentia appetitiva et Deo.” William Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 251).

²⁰⁸ “Actus enim desiderandi vel fugiendi numquam est nisi respectu rei non habitae, respectu cuius pro tunc non est delectatio nec tristitia. Sed quando res concupita habetur, tunc cessat actus uterque et causatur dolor vel delectatio immediate ab apprehensione sensitiva,

not cause pain, but an object is only an indirect cause inasmuch as it causes the apprehension of the sense.²⁰⁹

Peter Auriol also thought that pain is the passion of the exterior appetitive power.²¹⁰ He explains that pain involves a corporeal change and the apprehension of the exterior sense, but not the evaluation of the estimative power because the exterior appetitive power is related only to its exterior sense, not to inner sense.²¹¹ Christ's exterior sensitive appetitive power had pain and the interior sensitive appetitive power had sadness as passions.²¹² Auriol also examines whether the interior sensitive appetitive

non ab actu appetendi sicut supra dictum est." William Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 256). See also William Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 252–253; 260).

²⁰⁹ "Primum, scilicet quod dolor in appetitu sensitivo non causatur ab objecto apprehenso, patet per propositionem frequenter acceptam quod effectus sufficienter dependet ex suis causis essentialibus et dispositionibus earum. Sed destructo objecto, remanente apprehensione objecti in sensu, nihilominus potest causari dolor vel delectatio in appetitu." William Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 251). "[...] est solum causa mediata respectu illius passionis et solum causa causae quatenus naturaliter causat cognitionem intuitivam in sensu et eam conservat, quae cognitio causat immediate passiones praedictas modo praedicto." William Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 252).

²¹⁰ According to Auriol, the pleasure of the flesh (*delectatio carnalis*), the pleasure of the soul (*delectatio animalis*), and pain and sadness are the passions of the sensitive appetitive powers. The pleasure of the flesh and the pleasure of the soul differ from each other because the pleasure of the flesh follows the exterior senses, but the pleasure of the soul follows the estimative power. The pleasure of the flesh is in the exterior sensitive appetitive power, but the pleasure of the soul is the interior sensitive appetitive power. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, MS M₁, fol. 70r, the 1605 printed edition p. 445.) What Auriol says about the pleasure of the flesh and the pleasure of the soul applies also to pain and sadness. Therefore, pain is the passion of the exterior sensitive appetitive power and sadness is the passion of the interior sensitive appetitive power.

²¹¹ "Nunc dico quod mihi videtur hic. Si loquamur de facto quantum ad radicem de immutatione corporali dico quod de facto dolor et tristitia corporalis non sunt sine immutatione aliquo reali." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 72v, the 1605 printed edition p. 449. "Sed ego non teneo quod ad causandum dolorem exigatur iudicium aestimativae. Sed dico quod sola apprehensio exterior requiratur et ratio est quoniam dolor est in appetitu exteriori subiective unde non est subiective in corde quoniam alius est dolor carnis et delectatio quam dolor et delectatio cordis. Tunc aestimativa non causat aliquid exteriori, ergo etc." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 73r–73v, the 1605 printed edition p. 451. Pleasures of an indigent nature (e.g. pleasure of food and drink) involve acquiring of a form, whereas pleasures of a non-indigent nature (e.g. pleasure of speculation) does not involve the acquiring of a form. Pain involves the abandoning of a suitable form. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 72v, the 1605 printed edition p. 450.) Auriol's teaching about pain was based on Henry of Ghent's and Scotus's views. According to Auriol, Henry says that pain requires a corporeal change, which is perceived by the sense and evaluated to be evil by the estimative power. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 72r, the 1605 printed edition p. 449; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* XI, p. 460r–460v.) However, unlike Henry, Scotus thinks that pain supposes only the apprehension of the sense, but not the apprehension of the estimative power and a corporeal change. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 72r, the 1605 printed edition p. 449; John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 488–492.)

²¹² "Tunc dico, quod dolor de passione fuit vehementissimus in appetitu exteriori. [...] De appetitu autem interiori dico, quod in corde habuit dolorem non summum sed temperatum

power has sadness necessarily when the exterior sensitive appetitive power has pain. He holds that when an animal has pain, it also has sadness because the exterior sense, the imagination and the estimative power apprehend the same object.²¹³ However, when a human being has pain he does not have sadness necessarily, because when the exterior sense, the imagination and the phantasy apprehend that the passion of the flesh is evil, the estimative power of the human being can judge that a passion is good as related to the future, since it can be aware of the future things. When the estimative power judges that a passion is good, joy follows in the interior appetitive power.²¹⁴

Contrary to Auriol and Ockham but following Aquinas, Walter Chatton stated that pain was either the act of the sense of touch or the act of the interior sensitive appetitive power, but not the act of the exterior appetitive power.²¹⁵ Christ had pain as the act of the interior sensitive appetitive power. Chatton argues that pain was not the act of the will because

[...] Tertio dico, quod nullus actus doloris fuit in voluntate.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 2, a. 2, MS M₁, fol. 76r–76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 457–458. Unlike Auriol, Walter Chatton thinks that Christ’s will had sadness because the will wished against the death conditionally. The sadness of the will was not a passion, but the act of the will or the indirect cause of the passion. (Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 125–126.)

²¹³ “Tota igitur ratio quare sic se concomitantur tales passiones diversarum potentialium est ex connexione obiectorum [...] quando potentiae sic se habent quod praesente obiecto uni potentiae fuit obiectum conforme alteri necessario ex passione causata ab obiecto illa potentia fuit passio conformis in alia. Sed ad praesentiam obiecti extra fit necessario obiectum praesens in imaginatione et ab ista fit obiectum conforme in aestimativa et obiectum sic iudicatum necessario est obiectum appetitus etc. Igitur de primo ad ultimum praesente obiecto in sensu extra fit necessario obiectum praesens potentia non libera sequitur necessario passio in appetitu et hoc in animalibus aliis ab homine.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 2, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 74r, the 1605 printed edition p. 453. Auriol explains that an object is present in many apprehensive powers because all powers of the soul are rooted in the same essence. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 2, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 74r, the 1605 printed edition p. 453.)

²¹⁴ “Secundo dico quod in homine non necessario sequitur passio in appetitu interiori ex passione corporalis appetitus. [...] Dico enim quod quodcumque fit passio exterior et recipiatur ab imaginatione vel phantasmate potest esse immutatio in iudicio aestimativae. Aestimativa enim discurri, compellitque futurum bonum cum praesenti malo et iudicat passionem exterius apprehensam esse bonam. Et tunc sequitur necessario gaudium in corde quod expresse patet in matribus in quibus iudicium propter gaudium futurum non sequebatur passionem exteriorem. [...] In brutis autem animalibus quia non discurrunt nec apprehendunt sic futurum bonum ut iudicium aestimativae possit trahere ad aliud quam apprehensum est exterius non potest sequi non conformis in appetitu interiori.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 2, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 74r, the 1605 printed edition p. 453.

²¹⁵ “Secundum dubium est utrum, praeter apprehensiones sensitivas et praeter passiones cordis, sint aliae passiones in sensu exteriori. [...] Dicunt aliqui quod sic. [...] Sed istud non video clare, sed magis videtur mihi quod non oportet, praeter passiones cordis et ipsas apprehensiones sensitivas, ponere dolores vel delectationes distinctas realiter ab illis, ita quod tactus, praeter actum tangendi, habeat dolorem realiter ab illo actu distinctum et a dolore cordis. Nam omni alio circumscripto, hoc solo posito quod in potentia tactiva recipiatur actus disconvenientis, potentia tactiva dolet. Sed hoc solo posito quod actus dolendi, qui est passio distincta ab actibus apprehensivis, recipiatur in potentia appetitiva ad transmutationem cordis, ipsa dolet.” Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, p. 202.

the immediate cause of the act of the will was the will. Pain was the act of the sensitive appetitive power, which was caused immediately by a change in the heart.²¹⁶ However, the will and reason could be indirect causes of the pain since they can cause pain through the imagination.²¹⁷ The crucifixion of Christ caused pain directly without reason and the conditional wishing against the death caused pain indirectly via the imagination.²¹⁸ Unlike Auriol, Chatton thinks that the sensitive appetitive power has a passion necessarily when the exterior sense perceives its object. He describes that when a sensible thing effects perception in the exterior sense, first follows the act of the imagination and then the change of the heart, which causes necessarily a passion in the sensitive appetitive power.²¹⁹

3.6. Pain and Sadness of the Rational Part of the Soul

In part of his argumentation for the claim that Christ had true pain and sadness, Lombard quotes Augustine's *Enarrationes in psalmos*, where

²¹⁶ "Et dico ad hunc intellectum quod dolor passionis qua Christus principaliter erat afflicto, non erat actus volitivus, sed erat actus causatus ad transmutationem organi corporis, quia sicut pluries tetigi, omnis actus causatus immediate a voluntate est volitio vel nolitio." Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 126; d. 33, q. 1, a. 7, p. 209.

²¹⁷ "Dico ad praesens quod ad vehementem cogitationem intellectivam et actum volendi vel nolendi causatur imaginatio vehemens. Hoc enim experimur quod vehemens imaginatio causari potest ad vehemens dictamen intellectus et imperium voluntatis, et ad vehementem imaginationem moventur humores circa cor, ad quorum transmutationem et alterationem transmutatur organum cordis aliquando motu dilatationis, aliquando motu constrictionis; et causantur in appetitu sensitivo, cuius organum est cor, passionis gaudii et tristitiae in tantum quod aliquando ex vehementi imaginatione aliquis incurrit febrem vel aliam infirmitatem." Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 127. For how, according to Chatton, reason and the will can cause a passion indirectly, see Chapter 3.4.

²¹⁸ "[...] ille dolor talis erat passio qualis natus erat statim sequi ad crucifixionem. Sed ad crucifixionem statim causatur dolor sensitivus, nec oportet expectare usum rationis. Similiter de dolore causato mediante usu rationis, quando scilicet mediante dictamine intellectus et imperio voluntatis, ad vehementem imaginationem causatur transmutatio et alteratio cordis. Non est igitur actus volitivus." Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 127–128. See also Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, p. 128.

²¹⁹ "Tertio, videndum utrum passiones cordis necessario causentur ad sensationes exteriores. Dicunt aliqui quod sic in bruto, sed non in homine, quia cogitativa in homine est potentia discursiva. [...] Sed ista non reputo vera, quia primi motus non sunt in potestate nostra, et hoc non tantum est verum de sensationibus exterioribus, quia ibi non est appetere animale, sicut probatum est. Et hoc patet etiam, quia primi motus spei et desperationis non possunt esse in sensibus exterioribus, et tamen nec illi sunt in potestate nostra, quia tunc in primis motibus posset esse peccatum mortale. Igitur necessario causantur ad sensationes exteriores, et hoc ante deliberationem. Quod etiam dicunt de cogitativa non est verum, quod per eam ante omnem deliberationem possit vitari ne ad praesentiam sensationum causantur passiones cordis. Nam ad praesentiam sensibilibus necessario ante deliberationem causantur sensationes, et illis positae imaginationes, et illis positae transmutationes et alterationes, ad quas ita naturaliter causantur ibi passiones, sicut calor in calefactibili ad praesentiam ignis." Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, p. 204–205.

Augustine claims that Christ's human soul was full of pain.²²⁰ Although Lombard does not further elaborate on this idea,²²¹ many medieval theologians thought that this indicated that pain also touched the rational part of Christ's human soul. Albert the Great reported also a historical reason why theologians argued that pain touched the rational part of the soul. He explains that an anonymous abbot had been preaching that the superior part of Christ's human soul did not suffer when his flesh suffered, but masters at the University of Paris condemned the doctrine.²²² However, unlike the teaching of the anonymous abbot, the view that pain also touched the rational part of Christ's soul was not without philosophical challenges because Aristotle seemed to claim that the intellect could not have sadness.²²³ In this chapter, I study the discussions about the pain and sadness of the rational part of Christ's human soul. The discussions reveal that the Franciscan and Thomistic conceptions of the passibility of the soul and its powers framed the ideas of rational pain and sadness, and John Duns Scotus's influential view about the sadness of the will was based on the formulations of earlier Franciscan theologians.

According to the *Summa Halensis*, the powers of the rational part of Christ's human soul had a passion as sadness, as follows.

Reason	Superior part	Inferior part	Will	
As nature	Sadness	Sadness	As nature	Pain
As reason	-	Sadness	As reason	-

²²⁰ Augustine, *Enarrationes in psalmos* ps. 87, n. 3, p. 1209, PL 37, 1110; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 1, p. 96.

²²¹ While the twelfth-century theologians were usually not interested in the question of how Christ's whole soul was full of pain, Hugh of Saint Victor proposed an answer related to his notion of will. He relied on Augustine's teaching that sadness is the dissent about those things which happen to us against our will. (Augustine, *De civitate Dei* lib. 14, cap. 15, p. 438, PL 41, 424; cap. 6, p. 421, PL 41, 409.) Hugh taught that the will of pity was related to the sufferings of other human beings. Since the will of pity wished against the destruction of Jerusalem, it had pain because of that. (Hugh of Saint Victor, *De quatuor voluntatibus in christo* PL 176, 842B.) In Hugh's view, when the will wishes against a thing that takes place, there will be pain or sadness in the will. In his *Scito te ipsum*, Peter Abelard also claims that a passion follows from wishing against. He proposes his well-known example of a man in a prison who wishes to put his own son in prison in his place so that he may seek his own ransom, and he explains that the father does not wish to put his own son in prison since it involves the great pain of the soul. For Abelard, the wish is here a passion rather than a will. Since the father desires an end (i.e. to seek ransom), he tolerates a means which he does not wish and which causes a passion. Like Augustine, Abelard says that a passion follows when something takes place against the will. (Peter Abelard, *Scito te ipsum* p. 8–10.) See also Saarinen 1994, 56. For emotions as volitions in Abelard, see King 2010, 173.

²²² "Fuit enim praedicatum, quod Christi anima non fuisset passa secundum partem superiorem a quodam abbate, sed Parisiis ab universitate Magistrorum pro haeresi condemnatum est." Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, p. 270.

²²³ Aristotle, *Topica* I.15, 106a38.

Following Alexander of Hales's teaching about the passibility of the powers, the *Summa Halensis* teaches that like the will of Christ, his reason was also divided into reason "as nature" and reason "as reason". The reason as nature desired a union with the flesh and avoided separation from it, whereas reason as reason was not compassionate for the flesh. The *Summa Halensis* holds that Christ's reason as nature and as reason had a passion, which the *Summa Halensis* associates with sadness. The inferior part of Christ's reason as nature had a passion about the injury of the flesh and as reason about the sins of the disciples. However, the superior part of reason had a passion only as nature but not as reason.²²⁴

According to the *Summa Halensis*, Christ's will also had a passion, which was pain. The will as nature, which wished life as such, had pain about the injury of the flesh, but the will as reason did not because it wished for the injury in relation to the redemption of the human race.²²⁵ Unlike Aquinas, who argues that Christ's will as reason wished for death absolutely, the *Summa Halensis* claims that the will as reason wished the death conditionally. It explains that the will wishes for a thing conditionally when it wishes because of a condition, which pulls or pushes to wish for a thing. When a condition does not take place, the will wishes against a thing.²²⁶ Christ's will as reason wished for death conditionally since it wished for it for the sake of the redemption of the human race.²²⁷ As the will as nature

²²⁴ "[...] est considerare rationem dupliciter, secundum quod dicit Augustinus quod ratio dividit se in duo, in superiorem et inferiorem secundum duplicem comparisonem. Item, ratio dupliciter potest considerari, vel ut natura vel ut ratio; secundum quod consideratur ut natura, appetit unionem cum suo corpore et refugit separationem. Dicendum ergo quod in Christo fuit passio in ratione, secundum quod ratio et secundum quod natura. Unde Hieronymus, Matth. 26, 38, Tristis est anima mea etc.: 'Contristatur propter scandalum Apostolorum'. Et hoc intelligendum est de inferiori ratione; scandalum vero non est solum in ratione ut natura [...] sed in ratione ut ratio. In superiori autem parte fuit passio ut est natura, non ut est ratio." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 2, p. 200; tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 2, p. 63. "[...] rationem ut naturam, secundum quam unitur corpori et naturaliter per hoc compatitur; et est considerare rationem ut rationem, secundum quod non se habet ad corpus, immo actum habet extra corpus." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 3, p. 64. The view of the *Summa Halensis* that reason can have sadness, which is a passion, is interesting because it implies that the passion of reason is cognition. The fourteenth-century Franciscan, Adam Wodeham, maintained that a passion can be cognition. (Pickavé 2012, 99–109.) Although the view of the *Summa Halensis* is too vague to be compared with Wodeham's defined view, it is possible that the theories of the early Franciscan theologians had an impact on the later Franciscans to consider a passion as cognition.

²²⁵ "In naturali ergo voluntate fuit passio, sed non in deliberativa. Naturalis autem voluntas est per comparisonem ad suum corpus, et dolet de contrario, scilicet de separatione; ideo passio fuit in voluntate naturali. Deliberativa est secundum quam contulit utilitatem passionis, et secundum hanc non fuit passio." *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 3, p. 201.

²²⁶ *Summa theologica* lib. 1, pars 1, inq. 2, tract. 1, q. 1, tit. 1, cap. 5, a. 1, p. 435. See also Saarinen 1994, 77–7.

²²⁷ *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 4, p. 202.

wished without a condition, this implies that the will as nature wished against death. Since the *Summa Halensis* seems to suppose that the passion of Christ's will was related to the willing, it indicates that it had in mind Augustine's description of sadness as dissent about those things which happen to us against our will.²²⁸ Hence, the will as nature had sadness about death because it wished against it.

Like the *Summa Halensis*, Bonaventure also held that the powers of the rational part of Christ's human soul had pain as a passion about our sins and the injury of his flesh. Following his view that the will can have passions and Augustine's view of sadness, Bonaventure states that Christ's will had pain about our sins because the will wished against sin taking place.²²⁹ He goes on to explain that reason as reason did not have pain about the injury of the flesh, whereas reason as nature had. The reason as reason had joy about the injury, because the will as deliberative wished for the injury after the deliberation of reason, which considered the injury in relation to the salvation of the human race.²³⁰ However, Christ's reason as nature had pain since the will as nature wished against the injury.²³¹ The superior part of

²²⁸ Augustine, *De civitate Dei* lib. 14, cap. 15, p. 438, PL 41, 424; cap. 6, p. 421, PL 41, 409.

²²⁹ "[...] et de illo quidem dolore, qui inest animae secundum se, non est dubium, quin Christus fuerit passus secundum rationem. Compassus enim fuit et doluit pro peccatis nostris; et iste dolor in voluntate rationali erat procedens ex consideratione rationis, videlicet ex recognitione peccatorum nostrorum." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. (III, 354). When Bonaventure studies contrition, he explains that pain can be the dissent (*dissensus*) of the will or the passion of the sensitive part of the soul, which the dissent of the will produces. (Bonaventure, 4 Sent. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1. (IV, 383–384).) The idea of pain as dissent is based on Augustine's account of pain. (Augustine, *De civitate Dei* lib. 14, cap. 15, p. 438, PL 41, 424; cap. 6, p. 421, PL 41, 409.) The dissent requires that the will wishes against a thing that takes place or a thing displeases the will. (Bonaventure, 4 Sent. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1. (IV, 384).) When the will wishes against a thing that takes place, the will causes pain. Bonaventure does not clarify where the will causes pain, but supposedly it causes pain first in the will and then in the sensuality. (Bonaventure, 4 Sent. d. 16, pars. 1, a. 3, q. 2. (IV, 393).) Both absolute and conditional wishing can effect pain. (Bonaventure, 1 Sent. d. 48, dub. 4. (I, 861); 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 367).) Before Bonaventure, William of Auxerre stated that conditional willing or *velleitas* effected sadness. (Saarinen 1994, 76–77.)

²³⁰ "De alio autem dolore, qui inest animae ex carne, non est usquequaque evidens. Distinguunt tamen magistri nostri communiter, quod ratio dupliciter habet considerari, videlicet ut ratio et ut natura. Si consideretur ut ratio, sic passiones, quae ei attribuuntur, sunt consequentes ipsam deliberationem; et hoc modo anima Christi corpori patienti non compatiebatur, immo multum gaudebat et gratulabatur; vehementer enim placebat ei pati pro salute generis humani." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. (III, 354). "[...] dicendum, quod nihil impedit, quod ratio de aliquo gaudeat ut ratio, et contristetur ut natura, pro eo quod aliquid potest repugnare voluntati secundum appetitum naturalem, et consonare voluntati secundum appetitum deliberativum. Frequenter enim voluntate liberi arbitrii refugimus quae natura appetit, et appetimus quae natura refugit; sic et in proposito habet intelligi." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. (III, 354).

²³¹ "Si autem consideretur ratio ut natura; sic, cum habeat naturalem appetitum et inclinationem ad corpus, utpote perfectio ad perfectibile, patiebatur, corpore patiente. Anima enim rationalis non tantum est perfectio corporis humani secundum potentias sensibiles, cum corpus humanum sit ordinatum ad nobiliorem perfectionem, quam sit corpus brutale; sed secundum se totam, hoc est, secundum complementum suae essentiae et suarum potentiarum

Christ's reason as reason also had joy, but reason as nature had pain about the injury.²³²

As Bonaventure thinks that Christ had sadness in the concupiscible power,²³³ and he argues that Christ's will had sadness, this supposes that a soul not only has sensitive but also rational concupiscible and irascible powers.²³⁴ His view about the rational concupiscible and irascible powers is partly based on the idea that the rational appetitive power can have passions. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Bonaventure explains that the rational appetitive power is the will when it rules and the concupiscible or the irascible power when it is affected and ruled, and it can have a passion when it is moved and ruled by itself.²³⁵ This indicates that the rational concupiscible and irascible powers are the seats of the passions of the will. Bonaventure's view about sensual and rational concupiscible and irascible powers is a kind of mixture of views proposed by Bonaventure's teacher, John of la Rochelle. When John describes Augustine's division of the powers of the soul, he makes a distinction between the rational, the irascible and the concupiscible powers of the soul. A soul is apt to know by means of a rational power, which involves all cognitive powers, and it is apt to be affected by means of irascible and concupiscible powers, which involve all affective powers.²³⁶ When John describes John of Damascus's idea of motive powers, he makes a division between rational and irrational motive powers. The

universitatem, est corporis perfectio et habet ad ipsum naturalem appetitum et inclinationem et coniunctionem, ac per hoc delectationem et compassionem. Concedendum est igitur, quod anima Christi fuerit compassa corpori secundum rationem, secundum quod consideratur ratio ut natura, cum passio corporis fuerit acerbissima, sicut ostensum fuit supra." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. (III, 354). "[...] dicendum, quod nihil impedit, quod ratio de aliquo gaudeat ut ratio, et contristetur ut natura, pro eo quod aliquid potest repugnare voluntati secundum appetitum naturalem, et consonare voluntati secundum appetitum deliberativum." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. (III, 354).

²³² "Dicendum, quod secundum communem sententiam magistrorum passio Christi non solum stetit in sensualitate nec tantum pervenit ad rationem inferiorem, sed extendit se usque ad superiorem portionem. [...] anima Christi ex coniunctione sui ad corpus patiens et afflictum tota patiebatur et affligebatur, ut per illam passionem et dolorem illum tota peccatrix anima curaretur. Et sic dolor fuit et passio in Christo secundum supremam rationis partem, quamvis in ea fuerit gaudium fruitionis." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 356). "Et sic fuit in anima Christi, quae secundum rationem ut naturam passiones corporis experiebatur dolore acutissimo, secundum rationem ut deliberativam passionibus corporis superferebatur gaudio virtuoso." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. (III, 354–355).

²³³ "Secundo, utrum habuit tristitiam in concupiscibili." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2 (III, 336). "[...] absque dubio [...] in Christo fuit vera tristitia." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2 (III, 338).

²³⁴ Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 33, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 717); *Breviloquium* pars 2. c. 9, p. 227.

²³⁵ Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 33, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 717); 2 Sent. d. 25, pars. 1, a. 1, q. 6, resp. (II, 605); d. 24, pars. 1, a. 2, q. 2. (II, 564). For Bonaventure on concupiscible and irascible powers, see Prentice 1957, 30–36. Later on, for example, John Duns Scotus also argues that the will was divided into the irascible and concupiscible powers. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 33, q. 1, p. 295–296; Knuuttila 2004, 267.)

²³⁶ John of la Rochelle, *Summa de anima* cap. 63, p. 64; cap. 67, p. 72.

concupiscible power and the irascible power are the irrational powers.²³⁷ Like John of Damascus, Bonaventure seems to think that a soul has rational and irrational motive powers, but because he also adopts Augustine's idea, he divides both motive powers into irascible and concupiscible powers.

After Bonaventure, the view that the powers of the rational part of Christ's soul had sadness as a passion was favoured, especially among the Franciscan theologians. For instance, Richard Middleton, who argued that Christ's will could have passions,²³⁸ thought that Christ's will related to the inferior and superior parts of his reason as nature had sadness about the injury because the reason as nature apprehend the injury as evil and the will naturally escaped it. The will related to the inferior part of reason as reason also had sadness about the injury since the reason apprehended the injury as evil, whereas the will related to the superior part of reason as reason did not since the reason apprehended the injury as good.²³⁹

The teaching of Albert the Great about how the whole soul of Christ suffered is quite obscure, but it is noteworthy given its similarities with Aquinas's teaching. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Albert states that the whole of Christ's human soul as nature suffered with his flesh, but the whole soul as the principle of the act did not.²⁴⁰ Christ's intellect as nature

²³⁷ John of la Rochelle, *Summa de anima* cap. 74, p. 92. John explains that Avicenna also divides the appetitive power into concupiscible and irascible powers. (John of la Rochelle, *Summa de anima* cap. 105, p. 180.)

²³⁸ See Chapter 3.1.

²³⁹ "Primo modo ille dolor qui fuit in sensu Christi exteriori attingebat istum intellectum, nomine intellectus comprehendendo totam partem intellectiuam, quae comprehendit intellectum, et voluntatem non intelligendo, quod in parte intellectiua esset dolor sub ratione qua sensibilis, sed tristitia pro dolore in exteriori sensu, quia absolute naturali apprehensione apprehendebatur, ut malus, et ideo ipsum voluntas naturaliter refugiebat. Secundo modo intellectus potest considerari dupliciter, uno modo inquantum considerat bonum, et malum in comparatione ad causas inferiores, et sic habet rationem inferioris portionis. Alio modo inquantum considerat bonum et malum in comparatione ad causam superiorem, quae est voluntas Dei, et etiam inquantum superiorem causam contemplabatur secundum se, et sic habet rationem superioris portionis. Primo modo erat tristitia in voluntate Christi pro sui corporis passione, quia inquantum apprehendebatur in comparatione ad patientis innocentiam, et inquantum illam inferentes faciebat contra rationem rectam voluntati displicebat, et ita patet, quod in inferiori portione partis intellectiue fuit tristitia pro corporis passione: et inquantum consideratur, ut natura, et inquantum consideratur, ut ratio. Secundo autem modo in parte intellectiua animae Christi nulla penitus fuit tristitia, quia inquantum intellectus apprehendebat corporis sui passionem, ut diuinae placitam voluntati ad redimendum genus humanum sic voluntas Christi de sui corporis passione gaudebat inquantum etiam ipsam voluntatem Dei secundum se contemplabatur anima Christi, planum est, quod non tristabatur, sed in summa suauitate fruebatur, et sic patet, quod in superiori portione animae Christi, et si pro sui corporis passione fuerit tristitia inquantum considerabatur, ut natura, non tamen inquantum consideratur, ut ratio." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 2, p. 169. According to Richard, the intellectual part as nature apprehends naturally good and evil as such, whereas the intellectual part as reason apprehends good and evil in relation to something. (Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 2, p. 168–169.)

²⁴⁰ "Sed intelligendum, quod in anima duo est considerare, scilicet quod est natura hominis, et principium operationum humanarum. Quantum ad primum tripliciter consideratur:

also suffered with the flesh, but not as the principle of the contemplation.²⁴¹ In his *De incarnatione*, Albert holds that Christ had sadness in his sensitive appetitive power and will, whereas his senses and reason apprehended a sad thing.²⁴² He explains that since the superior part of reason apprehended the death in relation to the redemption of the human race, sadness about the death and joy about the redemption of the human race followed in the will.²⁴³ Since Albert thinks that pain and sadness in appetitive powers were qualities²⁴⁴ but only the sensitive appetitive power can have passible qualities,²⁴⁵ he seems to think that the sadness of the will was a quality and the sadness of the sensitive appetitive power was a passible quality. This implies that the will and the sensitive appetitive power of Christ had different kinds of sadness.

Aquinas's view on how pain touched Christ's whole soul differed from the Franciscan views, partly because their conceptions about the passibility of the rational part of the soul varied. Regarding his view on the passibility of the powers, recalling Albert, Aquinas explains that the whole soul of Christ as the form of the flesh was changed accidentally when the flesh had an injury. The injury also accidentally touched all powers of the soul, including the superior part of reason, since the powers were rooted in the essence of the soul.²⁴⁶

quaedam enim habet in quantum est forma substantialis, et quaedam habet in quantum est anima, et quaedam in quantum est natura hominis ut homo est. [...] Tertium in quantum est natura hominis ut homo est, natura, inquam, dans homini esse hominis et rationem, [...] In hac igitur consideratione tota anima conjuncta compatitur. Alia autem est consideratio animae secundum quod est principium operationum humanarum, et sic non est necesse quod tota compatiatur: quia quaedam virtus ejus potest esse circa contemplationem aeternorum, et quaedam affecta passionibus corporum.” Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, p. 271.

²⁴¹ “[...] et ideo intellectus ut natura hujus, patitur et compatitur, licet non necessarium sit ipsum pati, ut est principium operis quod est contemplatio.” Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, p. 271.

²⁴² “[...] quod non oportet omnem vim animae esse subiectum passionis ad hoc quod aliquis totus patitur, sed omnem vim in genere, non in specie, aliquid facere ad hoc quod sit dolor. Et ita fuit in Christo. Apprehensiva enim apprehendit triste, et motiva sustinuit tristitiam, et hoc sive sint superiores sive inferiores.” Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 8, p. 226; q.

²⁴³ “Ergo cum ratio Christi superior apprehenderit mortem ordinatam ad redemptionem et in ipsa fuerit plena conceptio mortis et plena conceptio redemptionis, ex parte superioris, quae est in ratione, de necessitate relinquitur duplex affectio: una respondens redemptioni et altera morti, ita tamen, quod una ad alteram ordinetur, ut sit gaudium, quod contristat secundum naturam.” Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 4, q. 2, a. 2, p. 208.

²⁴⁴ “Motus sequitur apprehensionem, ut dicit Philosophus, idest affectio sequitur conceptum, et secundum naturam vel qualitatem concepti est qualitas affectus. Si enim apprehensum est tristibile et indelectabile, sequitur in affectu tristitia vel dolor. Si autem ipsum est iucundum et delectabile, relinquitur in affectu delectatio vel gaudium.” Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 4, q. 2, a. 2, p. 208.

²⁴⁵ See Chapter 3.1.

²⁴⁶ “[...] laesio quidem principaliter est in corpore, sed consequenter in anima, in quantum corpori unitur. Unitur autem anima corpori per suam essentiam; in essentia vero animae omnes potentiae radicanter, et secundum hoc illa laesio ad animam et ad omnes partes eius in Christo pertinebat, etiam ad superiorem rationem, secundum quod in essentia animae fundatur;” Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 9 co; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 46, a. 7 co;

Aquinas adds that Christ's reason and will also had sadness but, unlike the sadness of the sensitive appetitive power, sadness was not a passion of the soul. The reason can have sadness in the sense that it reveals for the will a thing which is opposed to the will, and the will can have a similitude of sadness, which is a simple act of the will but not a passion of a soul nor an externally caused change in the will.²⁴⁷ The superior part of Christ's reason did not have sadness except accidentally, that is, because it was rooted in the essence of the soul. Aquinas explains that since the object of the superior part of reason was eternal good, which was not opposed to the will, the superior part of reason did not have sadness. However, the inferior part of Christ's reason had sadness since it revealed to the will the injury of the flesh and our sins and miseries.²⁴⁸ The superior part of reason did not have sadness due to the miseries and the defects of human beings since it apprehended all these in relation to the divine wisdom. Therefore, the superior part of Christ's reason apprehended the defects of the human beings as allowed by the divine wisdom and miseries as punishments of sin.²⁴⁹

Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 3 co; a. 3, qc. 2 co. Following Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise holds that when Christ's body suffered, all powers of the soul as nature suffered. The inferior and the superior parts of reason as reason had joy, because the inferior part considered the injury as related to the redemption of the human race and the superior part saw the injury in the Word of God as related to the salvation of the human race. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 112–113.)

²⁴⁷ “[...] tristitia non potest esse in ratione sicut in subjecto, sed solum sicut in ostendente id quod est voluntati repugnans; nisi ratio accipiatur prout comprehendit vim apprehensivam et affectivam, in qua est tristitia sicut in subjecto, quamvis non tristitia quae est passio quae solum est in sensitiva parte, ut prius dictum est.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 2 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 9 co; ad 7. Although Aquinas claims that the will of God, angels and human beings can have joy and sadness, he emphasizes that they are bare acts of the will, which do not involve a passion in a proper sense. (Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 3 expositio; *Summa theologiae* I^a–II^aae q. 22, a. 3 ad 3; I^a q. 59, a. 4 ad 2.) On God's emotions in Aquinas, see Sarot 1994, 76–82; Westberg 1996; Pasnau 2002b, 242–243; Miner 2009, 35. According to Peter King, the acts of the will are pseudopassions. The acts of the will are not passions since they do not involve a corporeal change, but they are similar to the acts of the sensitive appetitive power. All passions of the sensitive appetitive power have analogous dispassionate passions of the will. For example, sadness as a passion has a counterpart in the will, which is a dispassionate sadness. (King 2012a, 22–29.) See also Lombardo 2011, 75–77.

²⁴⁸ “Objectum autem superioris rationis sunt bona aeterna, ex quibus nihil erat contrarium voluntati Christi. Unde in ratione superiori, secundum quod ad objectum suum comparatur, non poterat esse tristitia in Christo; poterat autem esse, quantum ad rationem inferiorem cujus objectum sunt res temporales in quibus aliquid contrarium voluntati ejus aliquo modo accidere poterat [...] Sicut ipsa laesio corporis erat contra aliquam voluntatem Christi, qua naturaliter mortem refutabat, et similiter etiam mala humani generis ei displicebant. Unde in ratione inferiori poterat esse tristitia etiam secundum quod ad objecta sua comparatur.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 2 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 9 co; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 46, a. 7 co.

²⁴⁹ “Et quamvis dilectio proximi ad superiorem rationem quodam modo pertineat, in quantum proximus ex caritate diligitur propter Deum, superior tamen ratio in Christo de proximorum defectibus tristitiam habere non potuit, sicut in nobis habere potest. Quia enim ratio superior Christi plena Dei visione fruebatur, hoc modo apprehendebat quidquid ad

Aquinas thinks that his view about how the injury of the flesh touched Christ's reason is consistent with the ideas proposed by the Franciscans. When Franciscan theologians claim that Christ's pain reached the superior part of reason as nature, according to Aquinas, they claim that the injury reached the superior part of reason because it was rooted in the essence of the soul. However, pain did not reach the superior part of reason as reason, which is reason as related to its act and an object, because the superior part of reason did not reveal the injury as opposed to the will. The inferior part of reason as nature suffered because it suffered the injury of the flesh accidentally and the inferior part of reason as reason because it revealed the injury as opposed to the will. Aquinas explains that the distinction between reason "as reason" and reason "as nature" can be understood also in another way in the inferior part of reason. The reason as nature makes a judgment about things, which are naturally known as good and evil and which are naturally desired or avoided. The reason as reason makes judgment about things, which are good or evil as related to something, and it knows them as desirable or avoidable in this way. Christ's death was evil as such, but good in relation to the redemption of the human race. Therefore, according to Aquinas, the inferior part of reason as reason did not have sadness about the death, but the inferior part of reason as nature had sadness about it, though not as a passion of the soul.²⁵⁰

Above I argued that, according to Aquinas, not only Christ's sensitive appetitive power but also his will and reason had sadness. However, Lombard disagrees with this as he claims that "Christ's sorrow was only in the sense appetite".²⁵¹ It is true that, according to Aquinas, Christ had sadness as the passion of the soul only in his sensitive appetitive power, but his other powers also had sadness, although then sadness was not the passion of the soul. Lombard bases his view on *Summa theologiae*, but he does not consider *Commentary on the Sentences* and *De veritate* disputation. Whereas in his *Commentary on the Sentences* and *De veritate* Aquinas claims that the reason and the will of Christ had sadness, in his *Summa theologiae* he does not state that so clearly. However, here he seems to think so as well. As Aquinas argues in *Summa theologiae* that other powers than the superior part of the

aliorum defectus pertinet secundum quod in divina sapientia continetur, secundum quam decenter ordinatum existit et quod aliquis peccare permittatur, et quod pro peccato puniatur. Et ideo nec anima Christi, nec aliquis beatus Deum uidens, ex defectibus proximorum tristitiam pati potest." Thomas Aquinas, *Compendium theologiae* lib. 1, cap. 232. Following Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise states that the natural will, the inferior reason and sensuality had the pain of compassion, but the superior will of reason did not have it. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 3, a. 2, p. 111.)

²⁵⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 2 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 9, ad 7.

²⁵¹ Lombardo 2011, 217.

reason were causes of Christ's sadness, this indicates that the inferior part of the reason also had sadness in the sense that it was the cause of the sadness. In addition, when Aquinas explains that Christ's death caused sadness because the will of Christ did not wish for death as such, he seems to think that the will had sadness as well.²⁵²

Although Durand of St. Pourçain explained that Christ's will had a passion, which was the movement of the will, his view about the sadness of the rational part of Christ's soul was Thomistic rather than Franciscan. Durand explains that as the apprehension of the sense about an unsuitable thing causes the movement of the sensitive appetitive power, the apprehension of the intellect about an unsuitable thing causes the movement of the will. Since Christ's intellect apprehended an unsuitable thing, his will had a corresponding movement, which was dislike. As Durand claims that dislike was a passion in a broad sense, he moves toward Aquinas but steps back from the Franciscan intellectual tradition about the passibility of the powers. It is noteworthy that Durand does not argue that the superior part of Christ's reason had sadness but, like Aquinas, he seems to suppose that the superior part of reason had only joy.²⁵³

It is generally acknowledged that John Duns Scotus's view about the passibility of the powers differed from Aquinas's view.²⁵⁴ Scotus thought that the will can have passions like joy and sadness which are not merely acts metaphorically called passions, as in Aquinas. Scotus's teaching is based on the prior Franciscan views about the sadness of the will, especially Bonaventure's thought, but it is more detailed than these. The aforementioned Franciscans did not formulate what kind of feature sadness as a passion of the rational power was, whereas Scotus clarified that sadness as a passion of the will is an externally caused quality in the will and not an act of the will.²⁵⁵ He defines sadness as a passion, but not a free act of the will like wishing (*velle*) or wishing against (*nolle*), because the will cannot effect sadness immediately as it can effect wishing or wishing against,²⁵⁶ and

²⁵² Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 46 a. 6 co; III^a q. 15, a. 6.

²⁵³ Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 240r.

²⁵⁴ Hirvonen 2004, 71–73; Knuuttila 2004, 267–268; 2012, 117; King 2010, 180–181; Drummond 2012, 55–56. For Scotus on the passions of the will, see especially Boulnois 2003; Knuuttila 2004, 267–272; 2011; Barnes 2012, 306–312; Drummond 2012.

²⁵⁵ “[...] sequitur approximatio huius obiecti, videlicet apprehensio quod volitum vel nolitum habet esse; et ex hoc ultimo videtur sequi in voluntate passio ab obiecto ipso sic praesente, gaudium scilicet et tristitia.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 498. See also John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 373.

²⁵⁶ “Non est etiam passio ista in voluntate a se ipsa effective, quia tunc esset immediate in potestate voluntatis, sicut volitio et nolitio sunt in potestate voluntatis. Sed hoc est falsum: nolens enim, si nolitum eveniat, non videtur immediate habere in potestate sua tristitiam; si esset etiam a voluntate ut a causa activa, esset eius operatio, sicut ‘velle’ quod est ab ea et in ea.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 499. As Scotus thinks that an object

because God and blessed souls can wish against but they cannot be sad, since what they wish against does not take place.²⁵⁷

In Scotus's detailed analysis, the will has sadness when the intellect apprehends that an object unsuitable to the will takes place, as follows: 1) when the will freely and absolutely²⁵⁸ or 2) freely and conditionally wishes against it.²⁵⁹ Scotus thinks that the will can have sadness because of conditional wishing against even when it wishes for a thing absolutely. He explains that when the will wishes against a thing conditionally but the condition is not fulfilled, the will can wish absolutely for a thing but has sadness because of such conditional wishing against. Scotus refers to Aristotle's example of a merchant in a storm to illustrate such conditional wishing against. Here a merchant wishes against throwing goods into the sea conditionally; he would wish against throwing away the goods if he were able to avoid drowning in some other way. Since that condition is not fulfilled, he does not wish against throwing but instead

causes the passion of the will, does this risk the freedom of the will? Scotus answers that it does not, though he thinks that between the will and an object is the necessity of the consequence (*necessitas consequentiae*) because when the will wishes against an object that takes place, the will has sadness necessarily. However, an object does not act in the will necessarily since it is up to the will whether it wishes for or wishes against an object. Therefore, the will can control through its act whether it has sadness, but when the will wishes against a thing that takes place it has sadness necessarily. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 499–500; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 373–374.)

²⁵⁷ “Quod autem tristitia proprie sumpta sit passio voluntatis, videtur, quia non est aliqua eius actio vel operatio, quia non ‘velle’, patet; nec ‘nolle’ nec ‘non velle’, - probatio, quia Deus et beati possunt summe nolle et non velle aliquid, non tamen possunt tristari, quia non potest evenire illud respectu cuius habent nolle vel non velle; ‘tristitia autem de iis est quae nobis nolentibus accidunt’, secundum Augustinum.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 498–499; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 373. Scotus quotes Augustine's *De civitate Dei* where Augustine describes that pain is the discomfort and dissent of the soul caused by the passion of the flesh, whereas sadness is a dissent caused by a thing that the will wishes against. Like Bonaventure, Scotus adds that pain is first in the sensitive part and sadness is first in the intellectual part of the soul. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 485.) Like pain, sadness also requires an act of the apprehensive power. Scotus holds that, basically, joy is caused in the will when the intellect apprehends that an object which the will wishes exists, and similarly sadness is caused when the intellect apprehends the existence of what is willed against. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 498; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 373.) On why the will can have passions, see Drummond 2012, 54–59.

²⁵⁸ “[...] non sic obiectum comparatum ad voluntatem, quae libera est, licet aliquod ex natura sua sit conveniens voluntati, puta ultimus finis, cum sit ultimate conveniens sibi per actum voluntatis acceptantis et complacentis sibi in illo. Et talis convenientia est posita per velle obiecti, vel disconvenientia per nolle obiecti, et ita relationibus convenientis et disconvenientis - concomitantibus rationes voliti et noliti - sequitur approximatio huius obiecti, videlicet apprehensio quod volitum vel nolitum habet esse; et ex hoc ultimo videtur sequi in voluntate passio ab obiecto ipso sic praesente, gaudium scilicet et tristitia.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 498; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 373. Like Bonaventure, Scotus adds in *Reportatio* that when the will dislikes a thing which takes place, the will has sadness. (John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478.)

²⁵⁹ “Praeter modos tristandi praedictos duos (vel tres, si secundus modus dividatur in duos), videtur posse poni tertius (vel quartus) modus tristandi: propter nolle condicionatum, quando scilicet aliquis nollit aliquid quantum in se esset, tamen in aliquo casu vult illud.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 504; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 385; 387–389.

wishes absolutely to do so; nothing coerces him to wish, but he wishes to throw the goods away because of circumstances which he did not wish. According to Scotus, such conditional wishing against is sufficient for sadness.²⁶⁰ As Scotus claims that the will has sadness when it wishes absolutely or conditionally against a thing, he follows Bonaventure's view that absolute and conditional wishing against effects the sadness of the will when the opposite takes place.²⁶¹

An object is also unsuitable for the will when: 3) it is unsuitable for the will naturally or 4) when it is unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power.²⁶² Scotus explains that when an object is unsuitable for the will naturally, the will has sadness about it necessarily and the will cannot naturally wish for an object when it wishes naturally for the contrary object.²⁶³ An object unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power is also unsuitable for the will because of a natural connection between the sensitive appetitive power and the will. When an object is unsuitable for the will naturally and unsuitable for the will because it is unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power, the will has sadness without an act of the will.²⁶⁴

It is noteworthy that, in the *Ordinatio*, Scotus states that the will has sadness when the will wishes against a thing, but he adds that is doubtful (*dubium*) whether the will has sadness because an object is unsuitable for the will naturally or unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive

²⁶⁰ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 504.

²⁶¹ Bonaventure, 1 Sent. d. 48, dub. 4. (I, 861); 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 367).

²⁶² "Sic igitur, recolligendo istud membrum, videtur de quadruplici 'disconveniente voluntati' esse tristari proprie: [...] tertio modo, quia disconveniens voluntati ut natura; quarto modo, quia disconveniens appetitui sensitivo..." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 505.

²⁶³ "[...] disconvenientia obiecti naturalis ab ipsa voluntate ut naturali potentia, absque hoc quod ipsum obiectum sit nolitum nolle elicito, sufficit ad tristitiam voluntatis causandam. [...] velle naturale alicuius sufficit ad non posse naturaliter velle oppositum illius, et per consequens ad non posse naturaliter gaudere de opposito illius et ad necessario tristari de eo, sicut velle beatitudinem naturalem sufficit ad tristandum de miseria naturali." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 501–502. Scotus thinks that when a thing which is against an inclination to the advantageous takes place, the will necessarily has sadness. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 502; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 390.) For more about the inclinations of the will, see Wolter 1986, 39–41; Williams 2002b, 345–349; 2016; Taina Holopainen 2014, 553–554.

²⁶⁴ "Ad secundum potest dici quod etiam illa connexio voluntatis cum appetitu sensitivo, dum tamen appetibile intelligatur et per intellectum possit praesentari voluntati, sufficit ad hoc ut 'conveniens appetitui sensitivo' sit conveniens voluntati, et 'disconveniens' disconveniens et triste: sic enim ponitur aliqua delectatio subrepticia praecedere in voluntate omnem actum liberum voluntatis." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 503. Scotus explains that when the sense perceives an object unsuitable to the sensitive appetitive power, the intellect reveals an object for the will and the sadness of the will results, as the object is unsuitable also to the will. Since the will is passive with respect to all passions of the will, it does not co-act with the sensitive appetite but co-suffers. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 503.)

power.²⁶⁵ It is not clear whether Scotus thinks in the *Lectura* that the will can have sadness without the act of wishing against. There are texts where he claims that the will can have sadness only when the will wishes against an object²⁶⁶ and texts where he describes how the will has sadness without the act of the will.²⁶⁷ In the *Reportatio*, Scotus studies Christ's sadness only as related to absolute and conditional wishing against.²⁶⁸ Although Scotus studies at length how the will has sadness when an object is unsuitable naturally for the will and unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power, and he argues that it was possible that Christ had sadness because of these reasons, this indicates that he is, however, unsure whether the will can have sadness without the free act of the will.

Unlike Aquinas, who claimed that the superior part of reason and the will related to it did not have sadness, Scotus held that the superior part of Christ's will had sadness. He divides Christ's will into superior and inferior parts and states that the superior part of the will in a strict sense is the will as it considers only God and eternal things, and in a broad sense as it wishes for something related to God.²⁶⁹ Since the superior part of Christ's will did not wish against God and divine perfection, the superior part in a strict sense could not have sadness.²⁷⁰ However, the superior part in a broad sense and the inferior part of the will can have sadness about the lack of fruition, sins, and evil things in a person himself or beloved ones.²⁷¹ The

²⁶⁵ "Praeter istum modum tristandi, qui videtur manifestior, quando videlicet obiectum sit disconveniens per nolle voluntatis, - videtur dubium de disconvenientia alia ipsius obiecti utrum sufficiat ad causandum tristitiam: videlicet si obiectum est disconveniens naturaliter (et non volitum libere), - vel si obiectum est disconveniens appetitui sensitivo et sibi triste, et per hoc sit sufficienter disconveniens voluntati, dum tamen ostendatur sibi per intellectum propter colligantiam voluntatis cum appetitu sensitivo." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 501.

²⁶⁶ John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 373–374; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 377.

²⁶⁷ John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 390–391.

²⁶⁸ John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478–479.

²⁶⁹ "[...] primo videndum est de quo tristabatur Christus secundum superiorem portionem. Et illa dupliciter accipitur: uno modo stricte, pro intellectu et voluntate prout respiciunt sola aeterna; alio modo large, pro intellectu ut iudicat de quocumque secundum regulas aeternas, et pro voluntate ut vult quaecumque referendo ad aeterna" John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 510–511; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478.

²⁷⁰ "Primo modo non potest portio superior voluntatis ordinate tristari, quia talis tristitia sequeretur ad nolle Deum in se vel ad nolle aliquam perfectionem intrinsecam sibi inesse; [...] et hoc non pertinet ad portionem superiorem stricte sumptam." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 511–512; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 378.

²⁷¹ "Secundo modo loquendo de portione superiore, de tribus posset tristari talis portio: primo videlicet de carentia fruitionis respectu obiecti aeterni; secundo de peccato sui vel alterius voluntatis; tertio de aliis malis, suo supposito disconvenientibus vel aliis personis dilectis." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 511–512. "Et quoad duo prima obiecta, scilicet fruitionem et iustitiam, non oportet distinguere inter portionem superiorem et inferiorem, [...] Sed quoad tertium obiectum, videlicet passionem Christi, oportet aliter dicere de portione una et alia, et hoc secundum quattuor vias positas in primo articulo de

superior part in a broad sense and the inferior part of Christ's will did not have sadness about the lack of Christ's fruition or Christ's sin because Christ was not without fruition and he never sinned. However, they had sadness about other people's sins, since they wished against sins which others had.²⁷²

When Scotus turns to study the sadness of Christ's will about his death, he applies the four ways of being sad.²⁷³ The superior part of Christ's will had sadness about the death because it wished against death naturally and conditionally. In *Ordinatio*, Scotus describes that because the superior part of Christ's will as nature wished naturally for Christ's personal good, it naturally wished against death and had sadness about it.²⁷⁴ However, in *Lectura* he seems to think that the superior part of Christ's will did not have sadness because of natural wishing.²⁷⁵ The superior part also had sadness, as it wished against death conditionally, since it would wish against death as such if justice and all favourable things could happen without death.²⁷⁶ However, the superior part of the will did not have sadness because

disconveniente contristante, - de quibus videndum est si omnes possunt poni circa utramque portionem." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 514.

²⁷² "Quoad primum istorum, anima Christi non tristabatur, quia non-fructio vel non-perfectio eius (quae fuit nolita) non evenit in morte, [...] Quoad secundum, de peccato proprio, non tristabatur, quia nullum habuit, sed de alieno, puta de infidelitate discipulorum dubitantium, de crudelitate Iudaeorum persequentium." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 512. "Et quoad duo prima obiecta, scilicet fruitionem et iustitiam, non oportet distinguere inter portionem superiorem et inferiorem, quia sicut inferior intellectus potest habere ista pro obiectis, ita voluntas inferior de quibusdam non tristabatur sicut superior, quia non evenerunt nolita, et de quibusdam evenientibus tristabatur, ut de peccatis, quia et sic erant nolita." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 514; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 378–379; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478.

²⁷³ Scotus's view of Christ's sadness about the death is based on the concept of the will as nature. When Scotus studies Christ's sadness, he claims that the will as nature has two meanings. The will as nature in the first sense is the will as it aims at an object that perfects the will, and in the second sense the will is related to something because of the natural constitution of the will. While the will as nature in the first sense is the inclination of the will to an object proper to the will, the will as nature in the second sense is the inclination of the will to the objects of other appetitive powers as well. According to Scotus, the superior part of the will is the will as nature in the first sense and the inferior part of the will is the will as nature in the second sense. Hence, the superior part of the will is naturally inclined to an object proper to the will and the inferior part of the will is naturally inclined to the objects of the inferior appetitive powers as well. The will as nature in general involves the superior and the inferior parts of the will. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 516–517.)

²⁷⁴ "Ulterius, ad propositum applicando adhuc obiectum voluntatis Christi quod est 'passio', [...] Et primo de portione superiore, patet de voluntate ut natura quod ipsa sic voluit bonum esse huius personae et in ordine ad aeternum, - et sic nolitum evenit, et hoc nolitum contra affectionem commodi, non tamen contra iustitiam; nolitum autem sic, scilicet contra affectionem commodi, est sufficiens causa tristandi (ex primo articulo); igitur hoc modo superior voluntas ut natura tristabatur de passione." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 518.

²⁷⁵ "Respondeo quod naturale nolle non sufficit ad tristandum de eo quod accidit contra velle naturale, [...] et ideo ad tristandum non sufficit voluntas naturalis." *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 380.

²⁷⁶ "Tertio, videndum est de portione superiore ut libera est, et de nolitione condicionali [...] Sic videtur dicendum esse quod illa portio noluit passionem, id est noluisse quantum in se fuisset si omnia prospera et iusta secundum se appetibilia aequae fuissent sine ea." John

of absolute wishing against, since the superior part of reason judged that the death was good and, as a consequence, the superior part of the will wished absolutely for the death.²⁷⁷

Scotus criticizes Aquinas's view that pain reached the superior part of Christ's reason because it was rooted in the essence of the soul. According to Scotus, this view does not fit with Aquinas's idea that the powers of the soul are united with a soul accidentally. Scotus explains that a predicate (i.e. pain) does not belong to a subject (i.e. the superior part of the reason) because of something that happens to a subject accidentally. Therefore, it cannot be said that the superior part of the reason had pain because a soul has pain if, as Aquinas says, the superior part of the reason was united with a soul accidentally.²⁷⁸ Scotus also criticizes Aquinas's idea that a soul as the form of the body had pain. According to Scotus, because a soul as the form of the body cannot have pain or consider the object of the pain, a soul as the form of the body cannot be the reason why the powers of the inferior and the superior parts of the soul have pain.²⁷⁹

According to Scotus, the inferior part of Christ's will as nature had sadness about the death since it had compassion for the sensitive appetitive power. Scotus explains that when Christ's sensitive appetitive power had pain about death, the intellect revealed the death to the inferior part of the will and it had sadness.²⁸⁰ The inferior part also had sadness as it wished against the death conditionally. As for the question of whether the inferior part of Christ's will absolutely wished against his death and had sadness because of such wishing against, Scotus proposes two opinions.²⁸¹

Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 520–521; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478–479.

²⁷⁷ “Sed videndum est secundo de portione superiore voluntatis in quantum libera est, et de tristitia consequente in ipsa actualem nolitionem accidentis. [...] Videtur ergo quod sicut ratio superior non potuit iudicare hoc malum pro tunc, referendo ad finem ultimum, sed determinate bonum [...] ita voluntas superior ut libera, ordinata, non potuit illud pro tunc nolle, sed determinate velle, et ita nec de illo tristari tristitia consequente absolutum nolle liberum.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 519–520; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 379; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478.

²⁷⁸ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 483–484; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 365; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 477. According to Aquinas, the powers are united with the soul accidentally, but Scotus argues that the powers and a soul are formally distinct. (Cross 2002b, 268–269.)

²⁷⁹ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 484; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 365–366.

²⁸⁰ “Ultimo videndum est de portione inferiore respectu huius obiecti quod est ‘passio’: patet quod ipsa, ut natura sive ut coniuncta appetitui sensitivo, compatiebatur tristando.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 522–523; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 390–391.

²⁸¹ “Sed dubium est de portione inferiore ut libera est, si patiebatur propter nolle liberum absolutum vel condicionatum. Quantum ad condicionatum, videtur similiter dicendum sicut dictum est de superiore.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 522–523; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 387–389.

According to the first opinion, which Scotus favours,²⁸² the inferior part of the will did not absolutely wish against his death because, for example, the inferior part of reason did not conclude that the death was evil.²⁸³ According to the second opinion, the inferior part of Christ's will had sadness about the death because of absolute wishing against. Scotus explains that when the inferior part of Christ's reason considered the death without attending the end of the death, it did not declare it to be wished, and in this sense the inferior part of Christ's will did not wish (*non vult*) his death.²⁸⁴ However, Scotus criticizes this opinion. Whereas the opinion claims that the inferior part of the will did not wish (*non velit*) for death, according to Scotus, not wishing (*non velle*) does not indicate wishing against (*nolle*), which sadness of the will requires.²⁸⁵ Scotus also states that when the inferior part of Christ's reason considered the death without the end, which was the reason

²⁸² In the *Lectura* and *Ordinatio*, Scotus does not take a clear position on whether the inferior part of Christ's will wished against his death. However, in the *Reportatio* he states explicitly that the inferior part of the will wished for death *simpliciter* and it did not wish against it *simpliciter*. (John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 479.)

²⁸³ "Quantum ad hoc, videtur dicendum quod non, de ratione, et consequenter de voluntate." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 523; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 380–382. Scotus describes that because the superior part of Christ's reason asserted in the highest degree that the death was good and the superior part of the will wished absolutely for the death in the highest degree, the inferior part of reason was not able to assert that the death was evil and the inferior part of the will was not able to wish against absolutely it, since the inferior and the superior parts were two parts of the same power. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 523; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 380–382; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 479.) According to the first opinion, although the inferior part of the will did not have sadness about the death because of absolute wishing against, it had sadness about the death as nature and since it wished against it conditionally. The opinion holds that the whole of Christ's human soul was full of sadness because the inferior and superior parts of the will, and the will as nature and as free, had sadness. The superior and inferior parts of the intellect were also full of sadness, as they apprehended a thing which was unsuitable for the will. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 530.)

²⁸⁴ "Si quis tamen velit in voluntate inferiore assignare aliquam causam tristitiae quae non fuit in superiore, dicendo quod inferior absolute noluerit illam poenam, quod de alia non est verum, - poterit ita ponere quod inferior portio considerat passionem absque ordine ad finem ultimum, quia 'sub illa circumstantia considerare' est rationis superioris; sed circumstantia illa circumscripta, non est volita, quia tantum propter illam est volenda; ergo ratio inferior non dictat eam volendam, et ita nec voluntas illa vult eam." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 530; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 382–384; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 479. See also *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 386–387. According to this opinion, Christ's death included an act and circumstances that occurred with an act. As the death can be eligible because of one circumstance but not eligible because of another circumstance, the same power can have two contrary acts about such an object at the same time even though the same power cannot have two contrary acts about a simply same object. Therefore, the will can wish a thing because of one circumstance, but wish against it because of another circumstance. For example, Christ's will wished for the death in relation to an end, but wished against it when lacking consideration of an end. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 532–533; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 386–387; p. 391.)

²⁸⁵ "Contra istam viam potest argui: Primo, quia ratio, cui innititur, tantum ostendit possibilitatem huius quod 'voluntas inferior non velit illud quod superior vult absolute', - quod non est propositum, quia 'non velle absolute' non infert 'nolle absolute', quale nolle negat alia via." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 531.

why the death was wished, the inferior part of reason did not reveal the death as wished against but as neutral.²⁸⁶

As the first opinion holds that the inferior part of Christ's will wished for the death absolutely and wished against it conditionally, did this indicate that the inferior part of Christ's will had two contrary acts at the same time? Scotus answers that the will did not have two contrary acts because the conditional wishing against was latent or habitual, since unrealized conditions hindered Christ's will to wish against his death.²⁸⁷ Scotus explains that the will wishes against a thing conditionally when it wishes against a thing because of a condition. When a condition is fulfilled, the will wishes against actually, but when a condition is not fulfilled the wishing against is hindered. Christ would wish against his death if the human race could be saved by another means, but because the condition "the human race could be saved by another means" was not fulfilled, it hindered the actual wishing against death. Therefore, the will wished against the death habitually, which was sufficient for sadness. Scotus thinks that when something impedes the wishing, the will wishes *secundum quid*, but when nothing hinders the will it wishes *simpliciter*. As the wishing against was hindered, the will wished against the death *secundum quid* and since the will wished against the death habitually it was able to wish for the death actually.²⁸⁸ However, Drummond proposes another quite speculative explanation how the will is able to wish a thing and to wish against a thing conditionally at the same time. When Drummond describes the Aristotelian example of a merchant who throws goods into the sea, he explains that, according to Scotus, before a merchant wishes to throw goods into the sea, the will had an act about an end, which is the reason why a merchant wishes against throwing. Such willing against leaves a habit in the will and, therefore, the will habitually wishes against the throwing.²⁸⁹

Following Scotus, William Ockham also held that the will can have passions.²⁹⁰ He expounds that a passion is a form of the appetitive power which requires actual cognition and which can be regulated by the

²⁸⁶ "Declaratur hoc, quia ratio inferior, si ostendat a sine circumstantia finis ultimi, propter quam a est volendum, ostendit a non ut volendum, nec tamen ut nolendum, sed quasi neutrum, quia determinabile circumstantiis volibilitatis, non autem determinatum ad nolibilitatem, quia tunc non esset per aliud volibile." John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 531.

²⁸⁷ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 520–521; *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 505.

²⁸⁸ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 528; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478–479.

²⁸⁹ Drummond 2012, 69–70.

²⁹⁰ For more about William Ockham on the passions of the will, see Hirvonen 2004, 107–170; Knuuttila 2004, 272.

right reason. Sadness and the joy of the will are passions of the will.²⁹¹ Ockham differs from Scotus in arguing that the will has sadness only when the will wishes against a thing absolutely or conditionally, because the act of the wishing against causes the sadness of the will. The will does not have sadness when an object is naturally unsuitable for the will or unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power.²⁹² Like Scotus, Ockham also separates the act of the will from the sadness of the will because the will can wish against a thing without sadness.²⁹³ However, unlike Scotus, Ockham thinks that the will can wish against a thing which takes place without sadness since, for instance, God can prevent the act of wishing against from causing sadness.²⁹⁴

Although Peter Auriol argued that the will cannot have passions, he held that the will can have sadness as an act of the will.²⁹⁵ However, Auriol was the first to claim that Christ's will did not have sadness at all, even though Christ's exterior sensitive appetitive power had pain and the interior sensitive appetitive power had sadness as a passion.²⁹⁶ Auriol is aware that he steps back from the traditional doctrine that Christ's will had sadness in one form or another, but he justifies his opinion by claiming that,

²⁹¹ "[...] dico quod per passionem intelligo omnem formam existentem in potentia appetitiva natam regulari ratione recta ad hoc quod sit recta, quae requirit actualem cognitionem ad suum esse existere. [...] Ex isto sequitur quod tam actus appetitus sensitivi, et breviter omnes, quam actus voluntatis quam etiam delectatio et tristitia quae sunt in voluntate, sunt passiones; quia omnia ista sunt formae distinctae a cognitione, et sunt subiective in potentiis appetitivis, et sunt regulabiles recta ratione mediate vel immediate, et requirunt actualem cognitionem ad suam existentiam." William Ockham, *Quodlibeta* 2, q. 17 (OTh. IX, 186–187).

²⁹² "Et utraque tam volitio quam nolitio absoluta et condicionata est sufficiens ad causandum tristitiam et delectationem modo prius declarato. Ex quibus patet quod illi duo modi quos Ioannes ponit causare delectationem et tristitiam non sunt veri." William Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 265).

²⁹³ "Sed delectatio et tristitia distinguuntur ab actibus, quod patet ex hoc quod actus voluntatis possunt remanere sine delectatione et tristitia," William Ockham, *Quodlibeta* 2, q. 17 (OTh. IX, 187).

²⁹⁴ "Similiter, cum angelus bonus habeat actum nolendi respectu multorum quorum opposita eveniunt, puta angelus bonus deputatus ad custodiam hominis habet actum nolendi respectu peccati hominis absolute et tamen homo peccat, quare non tristatur ex hoc sicut homines et angeli mali: [...] Vel potest dici, sive velit aliquid absolute sive conditionaliter cuius oppositum accidit, non tamen tristitia causatur; vel per miraculum, puta quia Deus non concurrat cum tali volitione ad causandum tristitiam; vel quia tristitia et summa delectatio sibi repugnant quoad potentiam creatam, sicut prius dictum est." William Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 267; 257–258; 270).

²⁹⁵ See Chapter 3.1.

²⁹⁶ "Tunc dico, quod dolor de passione fuit vehementissimus in appetitu exteriori. [...] De appetitu autem interiori dico, quod in corde habuit dolorem non summum sed temperatum [...] Tertio dico, quod nullus actus doloris fuit in voluntate." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 2, a. 2, MS M1, fol. 76r–76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 457–458. Unlike Auriol, Walter Chatton thinks that Christ's will had sadness because the will wished against the death conditionally. The sadness of the will was not a passion, but the act of the will or the indirect cause of the passion. (Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 125–126.)

according to Hugh of Saint Victor, Christ felt the greatest pain only in the flesh.²⁹⁷

Since the sensitive appetitive power of Christ's human soul had sadness but his will did not have it, Auriol thinks that Christ's affectivity differed from the affectivity of all other human beings. Auriol explains that normally the interior sensitive appetitive power is connected with the will, so that when the will has an act, the interior sensitive appetite has a similar act. For example, when the will has love, the interior sensitive appetitive power has love and a corporeal change follows.²⁹⁸ The coincidence of the acts of the will and the sensitive appetitive power results from the coincidence of the judgments of the intellect and the estimative power. When the will has an act, the intellect has a corresponding judgment, and when the intellect has a judgment, the estimative power has a similar judgment because the intellect is turned towards the senses. Since the act of the sensitive appetitive power follows from the judgment of the estimative power, the interior sensitive appetitive power has an act when the will has an act.²⁹⁹

However, according to Auriol, when Christ's exterior sensitive appetite had the greatest pain a human being can ever have and his

²⁹⁷ Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 458.

²⁹⁸ "[...] nunquam est actio in voluntate quin sit conformis motus in appetitu sensitivo. Et probo primo, quod ita sit de facto per experientiam. Nunquam enim insurgit in voluntate amare quin fiat similis motus in appetitu sive in corde. Accipio igitur istam propositionem quod numquam est actus voluntatis quin sit immutatio in corde. Sed nunquam est immutatio in corde quin sit actus appetitus, ergo etc." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 2, a. 2, MS M₁, fol. 74v, the 1605 printed edition p. 454.

²⁹⁹ "[...] quando voluntas est in actu suo necessario est intellectum esse in conformi iudicio. Secundo, ad iudicium intellectus necessario est iudicium conforme in aestimativa [...] Quia impossibile est esse iudicium intellectus quin sit conforme iudicium in aestimativa vel cogitativa. Sed ex iudicio aestimativae sequitur actus conformis in appetitu." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 2, a. 2, MS M₁, fol. 75r, the 1605 printed edition p. 455. Although Auriol thinks that when the will has an act, the intellect has an act necessarily, he does not think that when the intellect has an act, the will has an act necessarily, since the will moves itself. (Hoffmann 2015, 75–81.) The intellect and the estimative power have similar judgments because the intellect is connected with the senses. Auriol holds that the intellect has twofold acts. When the intellect understands, the imagination is in act and when the intellect composes and divides, the estimative power composes and divides. As the judgment of the intellect involves composing and dividing, the estimative power and the intellect have similar acts when the intellect judges. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, MS M₁, fol. 75r, the 1605 printed edition p. 455.)

interior sensitive appetite had mild sadness,³⁰⁰ Christ's will had only joy.³⁰¹ Christ's interior sensitive appetitive power and the will did not have similar acts because Christ's intellect was able to know without turning towards the senses, since Christ's intellect knew things in the Word of God and through the infused intelligible species.³⁰² Therefore, the intellect and the estimative power were able to judge differently and the interior appetitive power was able to have sadness when the will had joy as an act of the will.³⁰³ In this respect, Christ's human soul differed from the souls of all other human beings.

In contrast to Auriol's view, Walter Chatton thinks that the will and the sensitive appetitive power in ordinary human beings can have dissimilar acts simultaneously because the will does not move the sensitive appetitive power directly. For example, when the sensitive appetitive power desires fornication, the will can wish against fornication at the same time. Chatton holds that this is possible since only a contrary passion destroys the passion of the sensitive appetitive power instantaneously, but the will cannot cause a contrary passion except through the imagination, which does not take place instantly. Therefore, it is possible for the will to wish against fornication while the sensitive appetitive power desires it.³⁰⁴

³⁰⁰ "Tunc dico quod dolor de passione fuit vehementissimus in appetitu exteriori. [...] De appetitu autem interiori dico quod in corde habuit dolorem non summum sed temperatum qualem docet virtuosum." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 76r–76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 457–458. Sadness was mild because Christ's estimative power considered Christ's joy. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 77r, the 1605 printed edition p. 459.)

³⁰¹ "Tertio dico quod nullus actus doloris fuit in voluntate. [...] nam dolor de passione erat in carne ut in subiecto. Sed gaudium de fruitione in voluntate quod non est in corpore vel corde." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 458.

³⁰² "Intellectus qui in actu suo non utitur organo nec alligatur ad phantasmata non sequitur necessario est conforme iudicium potentiae illius organi. Sed intellectus animae Christi est hic. Ergo etc. Assumptum probatur quia Christus vel iudicabat per species infusas vel videbat in Verbo et ideo non egebat potentia organica scilicet phantasia." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 458. For Auriol on the knowledge of Christ, see Chapter 1.4.

³⁰³ "[...] dico quod in Christo intra intellectum et aestimativam non fuit colligantia in conformiter iudicando. Cuius oppositum est in nobis quia nullum actum habere possumus quin habeamus illum conformem aestimativae. Sed ubi intellectus est separatus sed non quod oportet quod utatur specie fantastica sicut est in Christo qui habuit species infusas vel innatas. Ubi sic est non oportet habere omnem actum conformem iudicio aestimativae. Et ex hoc Christus potuit dimittere stare iudicio aestimativae et iudicare secundum intellectum bonum est pati et tamen non oportet quod iudicet hoc aestimativae. Et ideo simul ad eliciendum illum fuerunt talis dolor in corde et iudicium tale aestimativae cum alio iudicio intellectus et actu voluntatis non dolentes." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 76v–77r, the 1605 printed edition p. 458.

³⁰⁴ "Item, ad volitionem aliquam qua quis vult fornicari, sequitur vehemens cogitatio et vehemens imaginatio, qua mediante causatur alteratio humorum circa cor et cordis illam imaginationem consequentem sequitur passio concupiscentiae in appetitu sensitivo, si qua posita et stante, aut potest homo libere nolle exsequi, et habetur propositum. Aut non, sed e

3.7. Pain and Joy

“Those who say that the victim on the rack or the man who falls into great misfortunes is happy if he is good, are, whether they mean to or not, talking nonsense. [...] Pain is driven out both by the contrary pleasure, and by any chance pleasure if it be strong.”³⁰⁵

In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle claims that pleasure and pain are incompatible since a person who takes pleasure in something cannot feel pain. Aristotle’s idea was puzzling when related to Christ because medieval theologians thought that Christ had great pain and beatific joy at the same time.³⁰⁶ In this chapter, I study how theologians solved this problem.³⁰⁷

Alexander of Hales states that the joy of the superior part of Christ’s reason seemed to exclude sadness because perfect joy implies the total absence of unsuitable conditions but sadness indicates union with an unsuitable condition.³⁰⁸ Alexander argues, however, that the superior part of Christ’s reason had perfect joy and sadness at the same time because the

contra, certum est quod potest nolle et concupiscentia illa non tollitur instantanee, quia non nisi per passionem contrariam vel per motum contrarium, nam illa passio acquirebatur per motum localem humorum circa cor. Igitur non tollitur subito sed per motum localem contrarium. Igitur stant in principio simul.” Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, p. 128–129.

³⁰⁵ Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* VII.14, 1153b19–21; 1154b13–15, transl. by W. D. Ross.

³⁰⁶ About the greatness of Christ’s pain and sadness, see Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 16, d. 4, memb. 1–3, p. 261–271; *Summa Halensis*, *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 5, p. 215; Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 3, resp. (III, 358–359); Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 16, a. 2, p. 294; Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 3 co; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 46 a. 6; Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 3; q. 4, p. 170–172; Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 3, p. 240v; Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 387–388; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478. However, Peter Auriol claims that Christ’s pain was great, but his sadness was mild. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 76r–76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 457–458.) For more about the greatness of Christ’s pain, see Hoogland 2003, 54–61. For more about the beatific joy, see Kitanov 2006.

³⁰⁷ In the twelfth century, Hugh of Saint Victor remarked that if Christ had pain, it would seem that he did not have joy about God because pain is incompatible with joy. Hugh solves the problem by explaining that Christ’s human soul was united differently with the flesh and God. Christ’s human soul had pain as the soul was the life of the flesh, whereas the soul had joy as God was the life of the soul. Therefore, according to Hugh, Christ’s human soul was able to have pain and joy at the same time. (Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sacramentis christiane fidei* lib. 2, pars prima, cap. 6, PL 176, 389A–389B.)

³⁰⁸ “[...] anima Christi convertebatur ad superius non tantum secundum cognitionem, sed secundum affectionem, quia habuit dotes; relinquitur ergo quod in anima eius fuit perfectissima delectatio; ergo nihil inconueniens inerat illi. [...] Item, delectatio est coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti: ergo summa delectatio est summa coniunctio. Ergo ubi est summa delectatio, ibi est summa seiunctio ab omni inconuenienti; ergo videtur quod non potuit esse tristitia in eadem parte...” Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 3, memb. 4, p. 259–260.

superior part of reason as reason had joy but reason as nature had sadness.³⁰⁹ Following Alexander, the *Summa Halensis* holds that although the greatest joy weakens sadness maximally,³¹⁰ the joy of Christ's will did not weaken the pain of the will because joy and pain were not in the same part of the will as the will as reason had joy but the will as nature had pain.³¹¹

Unlike these early Franciscans, Bonaventure thought that the superior part of reason was able to have pain and joy at the same time because pain and joy were not contrary. He explains that they were not contraries, since pain was about death whereas joy was about God, and joy was in the superior part of reason *per se* because of its gratuitous union with divine nature, but pain was in the superior part *per accidens* because of its natural union with the flesh.³¹² Further reasons why the superior part simultaneously had joy and pain were that the superior part of reason rejoiced about pain since Christ's pain was the matter of his joy³¹³ and pain and joy did not weaken each other because Christ was the only human being whose superior part of reason was turned towards God and the flesh at the same time.³¹⁴

³⁰⁹ "Ibi fuit passio; et illa, sicut dictum est, pervenit ad superiorem partem rationis ut est natura, sed ratio ut ratio vincebat omnino illam, quia in illa fuit gaudium." Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 16, d. 4, memb. 3, p. 260.

³¹⁰ "Passio, quae magis habet sibi coniunctam delectationem minor est, et quae maxime coniunctam minima est; sed Christus semper fruebatur; ergo minimam habuit passionem." *Summa theologia* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 5, cap. 1, p. 214. The *Summa Halensis* also states that, according to Augustine, a soul as a soul is united with the flesh, but a soul as a spirit is not united with the flesh. Because Christ's human soul as a soul had a passion and the soul as a spirit had the greatest joy, the different parts of the soul had joy and a passion at the same time. (*Summa theologia* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 61; tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 1, p. 198.)

³¹¹ "[...] dicendum quod delectatio fuit in voluntate ut est ratio, passio vero in voluntate ut est natura, et ideo non ex eadem parte fuit delectatio et passio." *Summa theologia* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 5, cap. 1, p. 214.

³¹² "Ad haec autem intelligenda tria oportet supponere, quae sunt vera et probabilia, videlicet quod gaudium fruitionis et dolor passionis non sunt affectiones contrariae, quia non sunt respectu eiusdem nec omnino eodem modo insunt eidem, sed unum inest per se, alterum per accidens: quia gaudium inest propter coniunctionem gratuitam ipsius cum Deitate, sed dolor propter naturalem coniunctionem ipsius cum carne; et quia non sunt affectiones contrariae, possunt in anima esse secundum eandem partem." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 356). Adams also studies Bonaventure's view of the simultaneity of joy and pain. (Adams 1999, 47–49.)

³¹³ "Altera suppositio est, quod non tantum huiusmodi dolor et gaudium non sunt contraria, sed unum est materiale respectu alterius; et ideo simul eidem inesse poterant, sicut in viro poenitente videmus, quod simul dolet et de dolore gaudet. Sic et anima Christi secundum naturam corpori patienti compatiebatur, tamen de illa passione et compassione laetabatur." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 356).

³¹⁴ "Tertia suppositio est, quod Christus simul erat viator et comprehensor, ita quod viatoris cognitio non impediabat comprehensoris cognitionem, nec affectio affectionem; et illud fuit in Christo singulare propter officium mediatoris, quo debebat experiri et divina et humana. Unde sicut simul et semel poterat perfecte converti ad Deum et converti ad nos, ita quod una illarum conversionum alteram non impediabat nec retardabat: sic potuit secundum eandem partem animae simul et semel gaudere in Deo et compati corpori suo, ita quod nec dolor a gaudio, nec gaudium a dolore pateretur aliquam diminutionem sive remissionem." Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 356). In his *Breuioloquium*, Bonaventure argues that

Unlike Bonaventure, Albert the Great held that the greatest joy and the greatest sadness were contrary. Since they were contrary, it seemed that Christ's reason did not have them at the same time because, according to Aristotle, contraries cannot be in the same subject at the same time.³¹⁵ However, Albert explains that contraries can be in the same subject when one of them is the cause and the matter of another. Christ had joy and sadness simultaneously because sadness was the cause and the matter of joy, since Christ enjoyed his sadness.³¹⁶ Albert criticizes the solution of the early Franciscans because, according to Albert, the division between reason as nature and reason as reason is conceptual, but a conceptual division cannot explain how contraries can be in the same subject at the same time.³¹⁷

that the superior part of Christ's reason as reason had great joy because it was united with God, but the superior part of reason as nature suffered since it was united with the flesh. Bonaventure thinks that the superior part of reason of the human being cannot normally suffer and have joy at the same time, but Christ was exceptional in this respect. (Bonaventure, *Breuiiloquium* pars 4, cap 9, p. 250.)

³¹⁵ "Dicit philosophum, quod contraria non sunt simul in eodem secundum idem. Sed summus dolor et summum gaudium sunt contraria. Ergo non sunt simul in eodem. Ergo non secundum rationem Christus summam habuit tristitiam, cum secundum rationem frueretur aperta visioni dei, quae est summum gaudium, ut dicit Augustinus." Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 9, p. 227. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* IV.6, 1011b17–19; lib. 5, c. 10, 1018a24–26. Albert remarks that joy and sadness seemed to be equal (*ex aequo*) because they were about equal things since Christ's reason apprehended the death as unsuitable and the fruition as suitable. However, according to Aristotle, reason cannot think about two equal things at the same time (Aristotle, *Topica* II.10, 114b33–35.), which seems to imply that the appetitive power related to reason was not able to have joy and sadness at the same time. Albert, however, argues that joy and sadness were not equal because reason did not apprehend two equal things at the same time since it considered the death as means and the redemption as an end. Therefore, the appetitive power was able to have joy about the redemption and pain about the death at the same time. (Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 9, p. 227–228; tract. 4, q. 2, a. 2, p. 208.) Thomas Aquinas explained that since Christ's intellect was able to know the divine essence and the sense of touch was able to perceive the injury of the flesh at the same time, Christ was able to have joy and pain at the same time. Even if the intellect, the senses and the imagination could not be aware of different things at the same time, the inferior appetitive power can have pain and the superior appetitive power can have joy simultaneously because the same thing known can cause pain and joy in different appetitive powers. (Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 10, ad. 10.)

³¹⁶ "Et similiter tristitia et gaudium ex parte affectus non sunt ex aequo, sed unum de altero ut gaudium de passione. Et ita patet, quod non est inconueniens contraria inesse eidem simul, quorum unum est causa et alterum causatum, et quorum unum est materiale et alterum finis rationis." Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 9, p. 227–228; tract. 4, q. 2, a. 2, p. 208; *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, p. 272.

³¹⁷ Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 9, p. 227. Albert also rejects supernatural explanations. He explains that, according to one solution, only Christ's reason was able to have the greatest pain and joy at the same time because Christ's human nature was united with the divine nature. Christ's reason as related to the divine nature had the greatest joy and his reason as related to the flesh had the greatest sadness. Albert does not accept this solution because it implies that Christ was different human being than others since Christ had a different reason than others did. According to another solution, Christ was able to have two contraries in his reason because Christ as God was omnipotence. Albert thinks that this solution is not plausible because it entails that Christ's reason had sadness miraculously but, according to Albert, reason had it naturally. (Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 9, p. 227.) According to Albert, one might try to solve the problem by arguing that pain and

Thomas Aquinas's innovative solution was based on his view about the passibility of the powers. He holds that although the superior part of reason had joy, it was also touched by pain because it had joy about its object but pain as it was rooted in the essence of the soul. This pain was not located in the intellectual power and did not cause any real change to it.³¹⁸ Aquinas obviously thinks that he is in line with the Franciscan theologians because in Aquinas's terminology this means that the superior part of Christ's reason as reason had joy and the superior part of reason as nature had pain. The inferior part of reason, the sensitive appetitive power and the sense of touch also had sadness and pain because of an object (i.e. the injury of the flesh), although in different ways. Aquinas admits that contraries impede each other, but he claims that Christ's pain, sadness and joy were not contrary. They were not contrary because they were not about the same object, pain and sadness could be the object of the joy, and they were not in the same power (and if they were in the same power, they were different acts of the power).³¹⁹

According to Aristotle, intensive pain not only hinders joy as its opposite, but any kind of joy, which implies that pain and sadness impede joy even if they are not contrary. Aquinas says that pain and sadness may

joy were not contrary because they were about different objects. However, Albert does not accept this since he thinks that joy and pain were contrary at least in their effects but he does not clarify what the effects were. (Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, p. 272–273.)

³¹⁸ “Relinquitur igitur quod superiorem rationem attingebat ipse dolor, in quantum in esse animae radicatur, et erat ibi gaudium summum in quantum per actum suum Deo fruebatur; et sic ipsum gaudium conveniebat rationi superiori per se, quia per actum proprium, dolor autem quasi per accidens, quia ratione essentiae animae, in qua fundatur.” Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26 a. 10 co; ad 9; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 2 ad 5; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 46, a. 8 ad 1. For Aquinas on the simultaneity of pain and joy, see also Gondreau 2002, 441–452. Following Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise claims that the superior part of reason as nature had pain and the superior part of reason as reason had joy. Peter holds that reason as nature was reason as rooted in the nature of the soul, but unlike Aquinas, he adds that therefore reason had a natural desire to preserve a human being. Peter explains that pain and joy were not contrary because the pain of the superior part of reason was about the injury of the flesh as such, whereas joy was about the injury of the flesh as related to the redemption of the human race. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 113.)

³¹⁹ “[...] sed in ratione inferiori et in sensualitate et in sensu erat tristitia et dolor, etiam secundum comparisonem ad objecta, in quantum secundum has potentias dolebat de poena corporis et aliis huiusmodi: qui tamen dolor erat quodammodo materia gaudii fruitionis, in quantum gaudium illud se extendebat ad omnia illa quae apprehenduntur ut Deo placita. Et sic patet quod dolor qui erat in anima Christi, nullo modo gaudium fruitionis impediabat, neque per modum contrarietatis, neque per modum redundantiae. Tristitia enim contrarium gaudium impedit, sicut quodlibet contrarium impeditur a suo contrario. Tristitia autem quae erat in anima Christi, nullo modo gaudio fruitionis contraria erat: quod patet ex tribus. Primo, quia non inerat eidem secundum idem, sed vel in diversis potentiis erat, vel in eadem secundum diversam operationem; secundo, quia non erat de eodem; tertio, quia unum erat materia alterius, sicut accidit in poenitente qui dolet, et de dolore gaudet.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 2 ad 5; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 10 ad 9; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 46, a. 8 ad 1.

impede any kind of joy because the sadness and pain of one power can overflow into other powers.³²⁰ He explains that the overflow takes place between the powers of the soul and between a soul and flesh because the powers of the soul are united (*colligantia*) in one essence and a soul and flesh are united in one existence of the soul-flesh composite.³²¹ According to Aquinas, the overflow explains why the apprehension of the soul sometimes heats or cools the flesh or why joy, sadness and love sometimes cause health, illness or even death. It also explains why the change of the flesh touches a soul, why an act of the sensitive appetitive power follows from an intense act of the will, why an intense contemplation impedes an act of the inferior powers, and why intense passion of the sensual appetite clouds reason.³²²

According to Aquinas, the overflow between the powers of the soul belongs to the normal order of nature. However, Christ was able to prevent the overflow between the powers whenever he wished since the natural order was subject to his will because of the divine arrangement. Therefore, Christ's joy did not expel his pain and sadness since the joy of Christ's superior power did not overflow into inferior powers, into the essence of the soul and into the powers as they were rooted in the essence of the soul.³²³ Aquinas explains that joy did not overflow into the essence of the

³²⁰ "Sed ulterius omnis tristitia, secundum philosophum in VII Eth., impedit omnem delectationem per quamdam redundantiam, secundum quod nocumentum unius potentiae redundat in aliam." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 2 ad 5; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 10 arg. 2; ad 2.

³²¹ "[...] secundum naturae ordinem, propter colligantiam virium animae in una essentia et animae et corporis in uno esse compositi, vires superiores et inferiores, et etiam corpus invicem in se effluunt quod in aliquo eorum superabundat;" Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 10 co.

³²² Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 10 co. Aquinas's view of *colligantia* and overflow has similarities with Peter of John Olivi's teaching of *colligantia*. For example, like Aquinas, Olivi thinks that *colligantia* takes place between the powers of the soul and between a soul and flesh. Since Aquinas does not explain the nature of *colligantia* and overflow in detail, it is not clear whether it includes efficient causality, whereas Olivi explicitly argues that it does not. For Peter of John Olivi on *colligantia*, see Toivanen 2013, 70–75.

³²³ "In Christo autem secus est, nam propter divinam virtutem Verbi, eius voluntati subiectus erat ordo naturae; unde poterat hoc contingere ut non fieret praedicta redundantia sive ex anima in corpus vel e converso, sive ex superioribus viribus in inferiores vel e converso, virtute Verbi id faciente, ut comprobaretur veritas humanae naturae quantum ad singulas partes eius, ut decenter impleteretur quantum ad omnia nostrae reparationis mysterium. [...] Sic ergo patet quod, cum in ratione superiori esset summum gaudium, in quantum per eius operationem anima Deo fruebatur, ipsum gaudium in superiori ratione persistebat, et non derivabatur ad inferiores vires animae neque ad corpus; alias nullus dolor nec passio in eo esse potuisset. Et sic effectus fruitionis non pervenit ad essentiam animae in quantum est forma corporis, neque in quantum est radix inferiorum virium; sic enim et ad corpus et ad inferiores vires pervenisset, ut accidit in beatis post resurrectionem." Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26 a. 10 co; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 2 ad 5; a. 2, qc. 1 co; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 15 a. 6 co; a. 5 ad 3; q. 14 a. 1 ad 2; *Compendium theologiae* lib. 1 cap. 231. Following Aquinas, Durand of St. Pourçain holds that Christ's pain and sadness did not weaken his joy because pain, sadness and joy were not contrary and the overflow between the superior and inferior powers did not take place in Christ. The pain and sadness of the sensitive appetitive power and the joy of the will were not contrary because they were not in the same

soul as it was the form of the body because Christ's flesh was not glorified and as it was the root of the inferior powers since joy did not expel sensory pain and sadness. Joy reached the essence of the soul only in that it was the root of the superior reason.³²⁴

In the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas proposes a detailed view of how sadness and joy are contraries, but he does not apply the idea to Christ's pain and joy. According to Aquinas, an object specifies sadness and pleasure. They are contraries generally as sadness escapes and joy pursues an object. When they are about the same object, they are contrary specifically. For example, sadness about death and joy about death are contrary specifically. Aquinas explains that sadness and joy are not contrary specifically when objects are separated or opposed. When objects are separated, then also sadness and joy are separated, and when objects are opposed, then sadness and joy have mutual fittingness. For example, pleasure about good and sadness about evil can be in the same subject at the same time.³²⁵

Following Aquinas's general view on how sadness and joy are contrary, Richard Middleton argued that although sadness and joy in the superior part of the soul were contrary, the same power of Christ was able to have them at the same time because they were related to different objects. Joy was about God and about the injury of the flesh as it pleased the divine will, and sadness was about the injury as it was contrary to human nature and the innocence of the sufferer.³²⁶ Peter of Palude appears to hold confusingly

power, and the sadness and joy of the will were not contrary since they were about a different object, as joy was about God and sadness about a created thing. (Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 3, p. 240v.)

³²⁴ "Si enim consideretur essentia animae in passione Christi prout est actus corporis, sic fruitio ad eam non perveniebat: alias corpus eius gloriosum factum fuisset. Similiter nec ad essentiam, secundum quod est radix inferiorum virium: quia sic fruitionis gaudium dolorem passionis, qui erat in viribus inferioribus, totaliter evacuasset. Perveniebat autem ad essentiam animae secundum quod est radix superioris rationis. Et quia essentia animae est simplex, et est tota in qualibet potentia; ideo dicitur quod tota anima fruebatur in Christo: in quantum scilicet est radix superioris rationis; et tota patiebatur: in quantum scilicet est actus corporis, et radix inferiorum virium." Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibet* VII, q. 2 co; *Summa theologiae* III^a q. 46 a. 8 co.

³²⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I^a–II^aae q. 35 a. 4 co; a. 3 co.

³²⁶ "[...] contraria, quae specificantur ex sui comparatione ad aliud cuiusmodi sunt tristitia, et gaudium, quae specificantur ex sui comparatione ad obiecta possunt esse in eodem, secundum rem diverso, tamen quantum ad rationes, et comparationes diversas: unde in eadem potentia animae Christi secundum rem potuit esse gaudium in comparatione ad superiorem causam, et in comparatione ad corporis passionem in quantum compraehebatur, ut divinae placita voluntati: et in eadem potentia potuit esse tristitia in quantum comparabatur ad suam radicem scilicet animae essentiam: et per comparationem ad ipsam passionem in quantum apprehendebatur ut contrario bono naturae patientis: et in comparatione ad patientis innocentiam." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 2, ad 2, p. 169. The inferior part of Christ's human soul had sadness and the superior part of his soul had joy at the same time because sadness and joy were not contrary, as they were not about the same object and sadness was a matter of joy since the superior part

that joy and pain in Christ were not contrary because the objects of the joy and pain were not contrary (i.e. the divine essence and a temporal injury). However, this opinion remains obscure since Peter does not explain why pain and joy about contrary things would be contrary (e.g. joy about virtue and sadness about sin).³²⁷ He also adds that Christ's pain and joy were not contrary for the further reason that the pain of the will was natural pain, but the joy of the will was supernatural joy. He explains that a person cannot normally have supernatural joy and natural pain at the same time because of the common law of justice, but as Christ lived under the special law he had them simultaneously.³²⁸

Scotus's view about the simultaneity of joy and pain shows similarities with Aquinas's view, although their ideas of joy and sadness

apprehended that sadness pleased God's will. (Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 2, ad 2, p. 169.)

³²⁷ "Dolor autem iste et gaudium in Christo bene potuerunt simul esse; quia non habent contrarietatem adinuicem nam in contrariis causatis ab aliis secundum modum causarum accipiendus est modus effectuum. [...]. Cum igitur dolor et gaudium solum habeant contrarietatem ex relatione ad alia cum sint motus quidam et passiones que habent contrarietatem semper ex relatione ad alia: et tale gaudium et dolor in Christo accipiantur ex relatione ad alia que inter se contrarietatem non habent: sicut gaudium ex relatione ad essentiam diuinam et dolor ex relatione ad aliquod temporale quid diuine essentie non contrariatur." Peter of Palude, *Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum* d. 14, q. 2, p. 82v–83r. Peter reports three opinions for why Christ was able to have pain and joy at the same time. According to the first opinion, which remains that of Peter Auriol's view, as the sensitive part of Christ's human soul had only pain and the intellectual part of the soul had only joy, Christ had great pain and joy at the same time because the different parts of the soul had them. Peter states that this opinion is opposed to John of Damascus's view that Christ had a sad intelligence (*mestam intelligentiam*), which implies that the intellectual part of Christ's human soul had sadness. According to the second opinion, a soul can be considered as nature and as power. Christ's human soul as nature had pain, but the soul as power had joy. Peter says that this opinion involves several problems. First, it indicates that the same had pain and joy at the same time because joy overflowed from the soul as power into the soul as nature. Second, since a bond between the soul as nature and the soul as power is greater than a bond between the soul as nature and the sensitive powers of the soul, and the soul as nature suffered when the sensitive power had a passion, therefore also the soul as power suffered when the soul as nature suffered. According to the third opinion, which Peter seems to favour, Christ's human soul can be considered as nature, as the inferior reason and as the superior reason. The whole soul as nature suffered since Christ's sensitive and intellectual souls suffered. However, whereas the inferior reason had pain, the superior reason did not. (Peter of Palude, *Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum* d. 14, q. 2, p. 82v.)

³²⁸ "Primum patet: quia videtur quod fruitio et dolor naturalis non contrariantur formaliter et ideo simul possunt stare de potentia absoluta: quia non sunt unius generis [...] qua contraria formaliter sunt unius generis cuiusmodi non sunt naturale et supernaturale: sed secundum legem communem iusticie non simul stant vera damnatio et quodcumque gaudium: quia ab omni gaudio illi merentur excludi. similiter vera gloria et dolor cuicunque: sed lege speciali: quia Christus debuit esse comprehensor et viator: quia essentia merendi et satisfaciendi sunt in actu voluntatis eadem congruentia cum actu fruendi stabat actus merendi et actus satisfaciendo. dolor autem voluntatis quem de morte habuit fuit meritorius et pro nobis satisfactorius. unde in sola voluntate Christi beate cum summo gaudio fuit dolor: sicut in illa sola cum premio fuit meritum." Peter of Palude, *Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum* d. 14, q. 2, p. 83r.

were different.³²⁹ According to Scotus, the superior part of Christ's will had sadness and joy at the same time because sadness and joy were not contrary. Scotus explains that as the passions of the will are dependent on an object essentially, joy and sadness are opposed only when they are about the same object.³³⁰ Scotus remarks that, according to Aristotle, a great pleasure prevents all kind of sadness and, according to Avicenna, the powers of the soul cannot have many intense acts at the same time because the intense act of one power prevents the intense acts of other powers.³³¹ Scotus describes that this is so because the powers are united (*colligantia*) with each other and the pleasure and sadness of one power overflow into other powers. However, the greatest joy in the superior part of Christ's will did not overflow into the

³²⁹ According to Scotus, the superior part of Christ's will had sadness and joy at the same time because sadness and joy were not contrary. Scotus explains that as the passions of the will are dependent on an object essentially, joy and sadness are opposed only when they are about the same object. (John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 392–393; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 479.) Scotus remarks that, according to Aristotle, a great pleasure prevents all kind of sadness and, according to Avicenna, the powers of the soul cannot have many intense acts at the same time because the intense act of one power prevents the intense acts of other powers. (John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 361–363; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 477.) Scotus describes that this is so because the powers are united (*colligantia*) with each other and the pleasure and sadness of one power overflow into other powers. However, the greatest joy in the superior part of Christ's will did not overflow into the superior part of the will as it considered the death, the inferior part of the will or the sensitive appetitive power because of a miracle. (John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 394–395; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478; 479.) When Peter of Aquila studies the simultaneity of Christ's pain and joy in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, he proposes four opinions about it. Three of them are verbatim the same opinions which Peter of Palude proposes in his *Commentary on the Sentences*. The fourth opinion is Peter of Aquila's view, which he claims to be the same as Scotus's opinion. According to Peter, Christ had maximal pain due to the injury of his flesh and joy did not weaken this pain, as joy did not overflow from a soul into the flesh. Christ's deliberative will did not have sadness because it did not wish against the death, but the will as nature had sadness since it wished against the death. Peter states that Christ's pain and joy were not contraries because they were not in the same way in the same subject and the object of the pain differed from the object of the joy. (Peter of Aquila, *Commentaria in quatuor Libros Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 123–125.)

³³⁰ John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 392–393; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 479. When Peter of Aquila studies the simultaneity of Christ's pain and joy in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, he proposes four opinions about it. Three of them are verbatim the same opinions which Peter of Palude proposes in his *Commentary on the Sentences*. The fourth opinion is Peter of Aquila's view, which he claims to be the same as Scotus's opinion. According to Peter, Christ had maximal pain due to the injury of his flesh and joy did not weaken this pain, as joy did not overflow from a soul into the flesh. Christ's deliberative will did not have sadness because it did not wish against the death, but the will as nature had sadness since it wished against the death. Peter states that Christ's pain and joy were not contraries because they were not in the same way in the same subject and the object of the pain differed from the object of the joy. (Peter of Aquila, *Commentaria in quatuor Libros Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 123–125.)

³³¹ John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 361–363; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 477.

superior part of the will as it considered the death, the inferior part of the will or the sensitive appetitive power because of a miracle.³³²

A new feature in Scotus's thinking is his argument that although joy effects an expansion and sadness a constriction of the heart, Christ was able to have joy and pain at the same time. He explains that either the joy of Christ's will did not change his heart since this joy did not overflow into his heart, or joy and sadness moved his heart equally or unequally. If joy and sadness moved Christ's heart equally, then the heart was not moved because the changes of the heart impeded each other, and if joy and sadness moved his heart unequally, then one of the changes of the heart dominated the other.³³³

Like Aquinas and Scotus, William Ockham thought that the will of Christ had sadness and joy at the same time because of a miracle, which he elucidated with new examples. According to Ockham, joy naturally destroys sadness, but God can prevent the corruptible action of the joy. Since God prevented the corruptible action of Christ's joy, Christ had joy, pain and sadness at the same time.³³⁴

Peter Auriol's solution to the problem of how Christ was able to have joy, pain and sadness at the same time included new medical ideas. Auriol traditionally held that although joy and pain were contrary, Christ could have them simultaneously since they were in separate powers: Christ's exterior appetitive power had pain and his will had joy.³³⁵ Auriol remarks

³³² John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 394–395; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478; 479.

³³³ “Unde potest dici, uno modo, quod gaudium non redundabat in cor, quia etiam non redundabat in portionem inferiorem; unde gaudium potentiae voluntatis Christi, quod habuit circa obiectum aeternum, non redundabat in eandem potentiam circa aliud obiectum; ideo nec est mirum si non redundabat in cor. - Vel aliter, quod aut gaudium et tristitia circa cor fuerunt aequalia, aut non? Si sic, ergo non movebatur motu dilatationis nec constrictionis, quia tunc unum impediret actionem alterius [...] Si autem fuerunt inaequalia, tunc unum dominabatur, et qualitercumque fuerit corpus eius, constringebatur; unde contristabatur cor eius, - nec tantum dilatabatur per gaudium sicut si esset per tristitiam commotum. Et ideo non tantam redundantiam habuit gaudium super cor eius, sicut dolor aut tristitia.” John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 395–396; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 479.

³³⁴ “Per hoc patet ad secundum de Christo quod nolitio condicionata sufficit ad causandum tristitiam, [sed Deus] suspendit miraculose, ultra generalem influentiam, actionem summae delectationis respectu illius tristitiae corrumpendae. Quia summa illa delectatio, quantum est ex natura sua, expelleret omnem tristitiam si aliqua inesset, et impediret ne causaretur si non inesset, nisi eius actio corruptiva et expulsiva suspenderetur per potentiam Dei. Sicut Deus concurret secundum generalem influentiam cum corpore ad movendum se de uno loco ad alium, et istud corpus expelleret aliud corpus de alio loco ne simul exsistant, nisi eius actio expulsiva suspendatur per miraculum. In angelo autem bono, licet concurrat secundum generalem influentiam cum volitione condicionata ad causandum tristitiam, tamen non suspendit activitatem illius summae delectationis respectu tristitiae destruendae. Et propter hoc in angelo bono non causatur tristitia sicut in Christo, quantumcumque obiectum nolitum eveniat.” William Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 269; 264).

³³⁵ “Nunc his praemissis deduco sic solutionem prima difficultatis. Arguo sic duo actus vitales oppositi non {sunt in} <insunt> complete eidem essentiae sed solum potentiae, quod

that this indicates that Christ's human soul had intense pain and intense joy at the same time, but, according to Avicenna, the powers of the soul cannot have many intense acts at the same time.³³⁶ Auriol's new point was that the problem arises because all bodily powers require spirits. He explains that when one power has an intense act, the spirits multiply in the organ of the power and the organs of other bodily powers lose the spirits, such that the acts of these powers become weak.³³⁷ The acts of incorporeal powers like the intellect and the will do not require the spirits directly.³³⁸ However, the act of the will requires the spirits indirectly because when the will has an intense act, the intellect and the estimative power also have an intense act. When the estimative power has an intense act, the spirits multiply in the organ of the estimative power and, as a consequence, other bodily powers have fewer spirits and they cannot have an intense act. Therefore, since the act of the will requires the spirits through the acts of the intellect and the estimative power, the greatest pain and the greatest joy cannot coexist at the same time. However, the intense act of Christ's will did not weaken the act of the sensitive appetitive power because Christ's intellect was not tied with the senses, as it knew things in the Word of God and it had the infused intelligible species. Therefore, the intense joy of Christ's will did not require the spirits through the acts of the intellect and the estimative power, and joy did not weaken the pain of the exterior sensitive appetitive power.³³⁹

probo quia gaudium et quilibet actus potentiae habet potentia pro subiecto. Sed in Christo non ponuntur gaudium de fruitione et dolor de passione licet sint opposita in eadem potentia, licet ponantur in eadem essentia: igitur, etc." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in IV librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 458.

³³⁶ "Impossibile est animam secundum diversas potentias in actibus suis simul esse intensus summe, ut quod summe cogitet et summe audiat vel videat, quod una potentia aliam potentiam distrahit. Et Avicenna: Attentio animae distrahitur dum est intenta in alio actu. Item, est hoc expertum. Sed si in Christo simul fuisset gaudium de fruitione <et> dolor de passione, fuisset in actu summe intenso de visione beatifica et fuisset tristitia summa de obiecto tristabili." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in IV librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 76r, the 1605 printed edition p. 457. See Avicenna, *Liber de anima* pars. 4, cap. 2, p. 14.

³³⁷ "Dico ergo, quod tota ratio est, quia omnes potentiae indigent spiritibus mentalibus, quibus mediantibus quaelibet potentia organica exercet actum suum; et tunc quando una potentia, puta cogitativa, est in actu suo intenso, species multiplicantur ad locum ubi viget illa potentia. Et sic de aliis potentiis organicis. Et ratio est, quia intensio in actibus istarum potentiarum est per intensionem spirituum, ita quod quando species multiplicantur ad organum alicuius potentiae sit actus illius intensus, et ex hoc sit diminutio spirituum circa organa aliarum potentiarum, et tunc actus illarum non possunt sic vigere." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in IV librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 77r, the 1605 printed edition p. 459. For spirits in medieval medicine, see Knuuttila 2002, 56–58.

³³⁸ "Cuius ratio est oppositus eius, quod statim dictum est, quia voluntas non indiget instrumento in actu suo scilicet spiritibus nec etiam intellectus. [...] Nec etiam impeditur propter hoc sensus quin intensissimo possint esse in actu suo. Sic etiam est de intellectu et voluntate quae ad invicem non se distrahunt eo quod non utuntur uno organo corporali scilicet spiritibus quemadmodum potentiae organicae." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in IV librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 77v, the 1605 printed edition p. 460.

³³⁹ "In Christo potuit simul esse dolor de passione et gaudium de fruitione. Et quod non sit repugna in talibus nisi ratione spirituum, ut dictum est, quia scilicet subtrahuntur species ab

Walter Chatton argued against Auriol's view that the same subject had joy and pain at the same time, because the immediate subject of vital acts such as joy and pain was the soul, not the power of the soul. Therefore, the subject of Christ's pain and joy was his soul.³⁴⁰ Chatton argues that Auriol's view that the same subject did not have pain and joy was inconsistent with Auriol's other claims. Chatton explains that, according to Auriol, a power and a soul are the same thing and the subject of the vital act is a power. Since Auriol argued that the subject of Christ's pain differed from the subject of the joy, and a power and a soul are the same thing, according to Chatton, this indicates that Christ had two souls. However, according to Chatton, Auriol claims that human beings have only one soul.³⁴¹ Chatton adds that Auriol's claim that Christ's will did not have pain was also inconsistent. Chatton explains that since Auriol thinks that wishing against is a sadness of the will, it appears that Christ's will had sadness because the will wished against the sins of the Jewish people and it conditionally wished against death.³⁴²

According to Chatton, Christ's human soul was able to have the joy of the will and the sadness of the appetitive power simultaneously because the conditional wishing against of the will could effect sadness in the sensitive appetitive power when the will had absolute wishing. Chatton explains that these two acts of Christ's will were not contrary because the object of one act was a thing as such, but the object of the other act was a thing under a condition. Chatton applies Aristotle's example about distress to demonstrate that the will can wish for a thing absolutely but wish against it conditionally at the same time. In this example, the will wishes for throwing of the goods absolutely and it wishes against the throwing of the goods conditionally.³⁴³ Although the will and the sensitive appetitive power

una per intensionem actus alterius potentiae. In Christo autem substractio spirituum a voluntate per intensionem actus potentiae sensitivae nil facit ad remissionem actus voluntatis, nec aliquid immutat circa illam quia ipsa non utitur speciebus in actu suo eo quod species non sunt in voluntate. Dicit, quod ratio nulla quia in nobis dum intellectus et volitio sunt in actu suo, minuuntur aliae virtutes. Dico, quod non est simile. In nobis enim quia intellectus est ligatus cogitativae. Ideo dum intellectus est in actu inteso oportet quod cogitativa tunc sit in actu suo inteso. Et sic aliae partes mittunt species ad cogitativam. Non sic de beatis nec de Christo quia eorum intellectus non est necessario alligatur cogitativae in actu suo eo quod habent species aliunde." Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in IV librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M₁, fol. 77va, the 1605 printed edition p. 460.

³⁴⁰ "[...] omnis actus vitalis habet pro primo et immediato receptivo ipsam animam." Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, p. 124. "Ad istum articulum dico quod sunt in eodem subiecto primo et immediato propter causam praedictam; nec de hoc deberet esse dubium." Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 126.

³⁴¹ Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 125.

³⁴² Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 125–126.

³⁴³ "Sed ego dico ad praesens quod aliquis est dolor qui sequitur nolle vel velle absolutum; aliquis est qui sequitur velle vel nolle condicional, sicut patet de illo qui cum videt

can have contrary acts at the same time, according to Chatton, the sensitive appetitive power cannot have contrary passions at the same time because, as Chatton claims against the view of Scotus, the heart cannot have the changes of expansion and constriction simultaneously.³⁴⁴

[tempestatem] necesse vult velle absolute proicere merces in mari, nollet tamen condicionali nolitione, si aliter posset evadere, et ex tali nolitione causatur tristitia. arguo: cum velle absoluto proiciendi merces in mari stat nolle condicionali; igitur multo magis cum illo velle absoluto stabit tristitia conformis illi nolitioni condicionali. Similiter aliquis experitur se aliquid diligere, et tamen simul cum hoc experitur in se actum nolendi oppositum condicionalem. Nec tamen sunt contraria, quia obiectum unius actus est illud quod experitur per simpliciore categoricam et obiectum alterius illud quod experitur per condicionalem.” Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, p. 128.

³⁴⁴ “Nec tamen contrariantur directe et per se, sed indirecte et mediate, quia mediate modo praeexposito potest causare passionem contrariam; quae passiones contrariae non stant simul, sicut nec motus dilatationis et motus constrictionis cordis, quibus mediantibus causantur.” Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, p. 129.

CONCLUSIONS

The overall focus of this study concerned thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century academic discussions about the incarnation from the viewpoint of philosophical psychology as it was understood in medieval times. My study explored the following questions: what themes did the discussions about knowledge, will and passions in Christ's human nature include, what were the main ideas in the psychology of the incarnation, and how was the teaching about Christ's human soul related to psychology in natural philosophy. The investigation provided a new approach to the psychology of the incarnation in the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theories by examining many unexplored sources and addressing them from the viewpoint of philosophical psychology rather than doctrinal theology.

As theologians studied the knowledge, will and passions of Christ separately, this study was also divided into a corresponding set of three chapters. In the first chapter, I examined the discussion about the knowledge of Christ, in the second chapter the discussion about the will of Christ, and in the third chapter the discussion about his passions. Thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians began their study about the knowledge of Christ by considering the division of knowledge. Following Peter Lombard, they argued that Christ had divine knowledge and human knowledge and, following Richard of Saint Victor, they added that the human Christ also had experiential knowledge about singular matters. Alexander of Hales was one of the first thirteenth-century theologians to further divide the human knowledge of Christ. His division was significant, even though not all of his related ideas were long-lived. He claimed, for example, that Christ had human knowledge that was proper only to him, but the subsequent theologians did not adopt this view. From Alexander on, however, the standard view was that the human Christ had knowledge of the Word of God, knowledge of things in the Word of God, knowledge of things in themselves, and experiential knowledge.

The divine illumination of the intellect was a much debated theme in medieval theology. Related to this discussion, theologians asked whether Christ's knowledge of the Word of God also required the light of glory. Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas argued that it did, because the light of glory disposed Christ's human soul to see the Word of God. However, John Duns Scotus held that such light was not needed since the Word of God gave a vision of itself directly to Christ's intellect. Although theologians thought that Christ's human intellect was the most perfect of created intellects, they stated that God also remained incomprehensible for the human Christ since he did not comprehend the infinity of God.

Medieval views about the omniscience of the human Christ reflected different opinions about the intellect's abilities. Peter Lombard

taught that the human Christ knew everything that God knows, but not all theologians followed his view. Later theologians agreed that the question was centred on the knowledge about things in the Word of God, but they disagreed about whether the human Christ knew everything that God knows. Bonaventure was the first to suggest that the human Christ knew everything habitually, and later on the Franciscan theologians were disposed to follow his teaching. John Duns Scotus first argued in a radical way that Christ knew everything actually that can be known, since his human intellect had infinitely many acts, but Scotus also ended up proposing that the human Christ knew everything only habitually. Thomas Aquinas's view was opposed to that of Bonaventure. He argued that the human Christ knew things actually in the Word of God, but not habitually, and he did not know everything because he did not know the divine unrealized possibilities. The Dominican theologians tended to follow Aquinas's thinking. For example, Durand of St. Pourçain maintained that Christ did not know everything in the Word of God. However, his view was new in the sense that he held that Christ knew the essences of all things, including the essences of possible things, but not which of the things existed.

The intelligible species was a much-debated theme in medieval psychology, and it was treated also in the psychology of the incarnation. Medieval theologians thought that the human Christ knew things not only in the Word of God but also things in themselves, since he possessed infused intelligible species which God located in the intellect at the first instant of its existence. The idea of Christ's infused intelligible species differed from the Aristotelian idea of acquired intelligible species treated in the commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*. According to the standard Aristotelian view, the intellect acquires intelligible species through the senses, but the idea here was that Christ had intelligible species which were not acquired but poured into the intellect. Durand of St. Pourçain's view about the knowledge of things in themselves was a new one, as he held that the intellect did not need intelligible species, which implied that Christ's intellect did not have infused intelligible species. Scotus was the first to associate knowledge about things in themselves with abstract knowledge, and he argued that Christ had abstract knowledge about universals and particulars. Basing his idea on Aristotle's view of how particulars are known in universals, Scotus held that Christ knew particulars through the intelligible species proper to particulars. Thus, Christ did not know an infinite number of particulars, but only some of them. However, Peter Auriol thought that Christ had abstract knowledge of all actual particulars and he knew particulars through the intelligible species of the universals.

One theme of the discussions about the knowledge of Christ was his experience. The notion of experience was discussed already in the twelfth century. Bernhard of Clairvaux and Anselm of Canterbury claimed that Christ had experiences, but Richard of Saint Victor was the first to argue

that Christ progressed in experiences. Thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians followed Richard's teaching and they discussed what Christ's experience was. Alexander of Hales argued that Christ experienced sensible things through the cognitive power and the penalties of sin such as pain and sadness through the affective power. Aquinas proposed two views about Christ's experience. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, he argued that experience was the experiential certitude which Christ's human soul acquired without the intelligible species when the soul perceived things for the first time. In the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas claimed that Christ's experience was acquired knowledge which he gained through the senses when his agent intellect abstracted intelligible species from phantasms. Scotus associated experience with intuitive knowledge, while Peter Auriol stated that Christ had experiences in the Aristotelian sense of experience, which were not intuitive knowledge but knowledge acquired through memories.

Aquinas was the first to maintain that Christ acquired experiential knowledge because his agent intellect abstracted intelligible species. Since he thought that this knowledge was needed because an operation proper to Christ's active intellect was to make intelligible species actual by abstracting them from phantasms, his view about Christ's knowledge had a strong Aristotelian tone. Aquinas's opinion implied that Christ knew the same thing through three cognitions: in the Word of God, and through infused and acquired intelligible species. Later on, theologians discussed the question of whether Christ had acquired knowledge, since it seemed to be useless because he also had infused conceptual knowledge. Peter of Palude stated that Christ had acquired knowledge, but he did not get it through the senses since God located it in Christ's intellect. However, John Duns Scotus and Durand of St. Pourçain argued that Christ did not have acquired knowledge, because such knowledge does not differ from infused knowledge.

Since Aristotle thought that the intellect can know only one thing at the same time, this gave rise to a discussion about whether the intellect can have only one simultaneous act. This question was dealt with also in respect to Christ. Aquinas stated that Christ knew things in the Word of God actually. If Christ also knew actually the same things in themselves or through intelligible species, it would follow that Christ's intellect had more than one act at the same time. While Aquinas did not study this possible outcome, Richard Middleton argued that Christ's intellect was able to have more than one act at once. Scotus went further and explained in his early work that Christ's intellect was able to have even infinitely many acts at the same time when the intellect saw things in the Word of God, but he later changed his mind.

In the second chapter, I studied thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions about the will of Christ. The main themes of

the discussions were how the will of Christ was divided, whether the wills were contrary and whether Christ had free choice or free will. When John of Damascus wrote about the will of Christ, he stressed that Christ had divine will and human will. Hugh of Saint Victor further divided Christ's human will, but more influential was Peter Lombard's view that the human Christ had the will of reason and the will of sensuality as two different powers. This became the standard medieval view. Franciscan theologians like Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol added that the human Christ had as many wills of sensuality as he had senses, but Aquinas argued that he had only one will of sensuality. William of Auxerre was one of the first to follow Aristotle's view that the will was in the rational part of the soul, and he argued that only the will of reason was a will in the proper sense. Later on, all theologians adopted this view.

One of the main divisions in respect to medieval teachings about the will involved its division into the will "as reason" and the will "as nature". This idea was introduced by the early Franciscans in a discussion about the will of Christ in order to explain how the will of the reason wished for and avoided death at the same time. Bonaventure associated the will as reason with *thelesis* and the will as nature with *bulesis*, which were Greek words derived from John of Damascus, and he argued that these were two ways of wishing for something. Albert the Great described the division between the will as reason and the will as nature in a new way, as he thought that different objects explained it. Aquinas added a new explanation, describing that the will as reason and the will as nature were acts of the will about an end and a means to an end. John Duns Scotus's innovation was to associate the will as nature with the natural will, which was the inclination of the will but not its act.

The second main theme of the debate about the will of Christ was the question of whether his wills were contrary. This theme was related to the question of whether the same person can wish for contrary things at the same time. Theologians argued, for example, that although in Christ the divine will and the will as reason wished for death and the will of sensuality and the will as nature sought to avoid it, the wills were not contrary. There were many ways to explain how the wills were not opposed to one another. One of the standard explanations was based on John of Damascus's *De fide orthodoxa* and Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, which taught that Christ's human will wished what the divine will wished for it to wish. When Christ's human will wished not to die and his divine will wished his death, the wills were not contrary as the human will wished what the divine will wished for it to wish.

Theologians proposed other explanations as well. William of Auxerre and the *Summa Halensis* argued that even though the will of reason and the will of sensuality wished for contrary things, the wills were not contrary because the will of reason and the will of sensuality were in different parts of the soul, and the will of sensuality wished for life as such but the will

of reason wished for death because of the redemption of the human race. Albert the Great used Aristotelian causes to explain how the human will can be uniform with the divine will. He argued that the conformity of Christ's human will and divine will corresponded to material and efficient causes since his human will and divine will wished for the same thing or the human will wished what the divine will wished for it to wish. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas introduced a new explanation based on the means-end distinction. He expounded that the will of reason and divine will were not contrary when they wished for the same end and means to an end. When the will of reason and the will of sensuality wished for means as such, these human wills and the divine will did not wish for the same thing, but the human wills wished what the divine will wished for them to wish. In the *Summa theologiae*, however, Aquinas did not apply the end-means distinction; instead he argued that Christ's wills were not contrary because the will of sensuality and the will as nature did not reject the reason why the divine will and the will as reason wished for death, and because the wills did not impede each other. Giles of Rome was one of the first to hold that Christ's human wills were similar to the divine wills because God's antecedent will and Christ's will as nature wished for the same thing and God's consequent will and Christ's will as reason wished for the same thing. Durand of St. Pourçain also introduced a new explanation, as he argued that all of Christ's human wills wished what God's consequent will wished for them to wish, but only the will as reason wished what God's antecedent will wished for it to wish.

Theologians thought that since Christ's human wills wished for contrary things, not all of his wills were fulfilled. They proposed that volitions *secundum quid*, conditionally, habitually or non-actually or the will of sensuality were not fulfilled. However, what Christ wished *simpliciter* and through the will as reason was always heard. The *Summa Halensis* stated that the desire of Christ's sensuality was not always heard. Aquinas held that the fulfilment of Christ's will depended on whether the will wished absolutely or conditionally. What the will of Christ wished absolutely and *simpliciter* took place, but what the will wished conditionally and *secundum quid* did not happen. Furthermore, John Duns Scotus stated that the will of Christ wished *simpliciter* when it wished without condition and *secundum quid* when it wished conditionally. The wishing *simpliciter* was always fulfilled, but the conditional wishing was not. Scotus introduced a new theme in the discussions when he argued that the will of Christ wished actually when it wished *simpliciter* and it wished habitually when it wished *secundum quid*. This implied that Christ's actual non-conditional wishing was always fulfilled. Following Scotus, Peter Auriol explained that Christ's human will as actual conformed with the divine will. Among the aforementioned theologians, William Ockham was the first who claimed that there was a rebellion between Christ's appetitive powers.

Free choice and free will were a major topic in medieval philosophy, but a minor theme in the discussions about the will of Christ. Theologians asked whether Christ's free choice involved an act at the first instant of his being, how his choice was free and whether Christ chose and deliberated. The early Franciscans, Bonaventure, Albert the Great and Durand of St. Pourçain argued that Christ did not use free choice at the first instant of his being, whereas Aquinas and Scotus argued that Christ did. The discussion about Christ's free choice shows that, according to the theologians, freedom of choice was not based on an ability to choose good or evil. All theologians thought that Christ's choice was free, but since he was a sinless human being, he was able to choose only good. Alexander of Hales stated that Christ's free choice was free from coercion and sin. Following Anselm of Canterbury's view that the will was an instrument that moves itself, Bonaventure held that free choice was free because it was able to move itself to wish. However, Albert the Great explained that Christ's will was free as it was able to choose this good, to not choose this good or to choose a different good.

The question of whether the choosing required deliberation was mainly dealt with in relation to theological problems about the free choice of God and Christ. John of Damascus taught that Christ did not choose because choosing implied ignorance. However, the *Summa Halensis*, Aquinas and Scotus argued that since choosing did not always imply ignorance, Christ was able to choose. For example, Aquinas stated that deliberation indicated ignorance, but choosing did not require deliberation because choosing followed from the judgment of reason. As Christ's reason did not doubt what to do, it made a judgment and chose without deliberation.

In the third chapter, I studied the discussions about the passions of Christ. The main themes of the discussions were how Christ's human soul was passible, what passions he had, and how he was able to have pain, sadness and joy at the same time. The views of thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians about the passions of Christ based on the views about the passibility of the soul and its powers. The passibility of the soul was also treated in Aristotle's *De anima*, where Aristotle argued that a soul was not passible except accidentally. However, the orthodox doctrine taught that Christ had a passible soul. When theologians studied the passibility of Christ's human soul, they first treated the question of what was a passion and then how the soul of Christ and its powers were passible. Following Aristotle and John of Damascus, theologians argued that 'passion' had many meanings, and they stated that the notions of passion and passibility in a broad sense involved receiving. However, their views about passion and passibility in a strict sense varied. According to Alexander of Hales, passibility in a strict sense was the ability to receive a suitable or an unsuitable passion, which could be moderate or immoderate. The *Summa Halensis* held that a passion was a received movement, which was suitable

or unsuitable for a receiver. Thomas Aquinas's view about passions differed significantly from these early Franciscan views. Aquinas said that passion in a strict sense was a change where a thing received a form while simultaneously losing a contrary form. Later on, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard Middleton and Durand of St. Pourçain adopted Aquinas's view that a passion involved receiving and losing as its basic hallmark.

Following Aristotle and John of Damascus, theologians regarded it as a trivial fact that there were also passions of the soul. Like John of Damascus, the *Summa Halensis* also thought that the passion of the soul was the movement of the soul when good or evil was apprehended. Albert the Great argued that the passion of the soul was the act and the passible quality of the sensitive appetitive power. It was a passion because the sensitive appetitive power had it when it was moved by the apprehended thing and it was an act because a soul acted in the flesh when a soul had it. Thomas Aquinas's view differed from that of Albert the Great, as he thought that the passion of the soul was a passion because it involved the change of the flesh and it was a movement rather than a quality. Aquinas separated the passion of the flesh from the passion of the soul, and he argued that the passion of the flesh was a passion which began in the flesh, whereas the passion of the soul was the movement of the sensitive appetitive power which involved the change of the flesh.

Alexander of Hales and the *Summa Halensis* taught that Christ's human soul was passible in all senses of a passion, but Aquinas, following Aristotle, argued that Christ's human soul was passible only accidentally. Aquinas held that Christ's human soul was changed accidentally when his flesh was changed because the soul as the form of the flesh was part of the soul-body composite. Aquinas's view had some similarities with Albert the Great's view in this respect. Albert explained that a soul was changed somehow when a soul-flesh composite had a passion, and he argued that the passibility of the flesh differed from the passibility of the soul.

Theologians also studied the passibility of the rational powers of Christ's human soul. They agreed that all powers of Christ's human soul were able to receive, but disagreed on whether the powers of the rational part of the soul were able to have passions in a strict sense. Alexander of Hales was the first to argue that the superior part of Christ's reason as nature was able to have a suitable or unsuitable passion with the flesh. The *Summa Halensis* and Bonaventure added that the will of Christ also had a passion when it had sadness. Aquinas's view differed from the Franciscans since he restricted the passibility of the powers of the soul to the sensitive appetitive powers. Like the Franciscans, Aquinas held that reason and the will can have passions, but he clarified that they were acts and passions only in a broad sense or metaphorically. Only the acts of the sensitive appetitive powers were passions in a proper sense, because they included the real change of the

bodily organ. However, Aquinas stated that the passions of the flesh touched accidentally all powers of the soul. Aquinas's view that the powers of the rational part of the soul cannot have a passion except metaphorically did not receive unconditional acceptance. Peter of Tarentaise expounded that the will was able to receive the species of the unsuitable thing and to lose the species of the suitable thing, and, following the Franciscans, Richard Middleton argued that the will was able to have passions. Early fourteenth-century theologians like John Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Peter Auriol, Walter Chatton and Durand of St. Pourçain did not consider the passibility of Christ's human soul, but their views about the passibility of the will varied. Like the early Franciscans and Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus and William Ockham taught that the will of Christ could have passions. In earlier Franciscan accounts, it was unclear what kind of quality the passion of the rational power was, whereas Scotus clarified that it was an externally caused quality in the will and not an act of the will. However, like Aquinas, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton argued that only the sensitive appetitive power can have passions and Durand of St. Pourçain held that the will can have passions only in a broad sense.

According to medieval theologians, Christ did not assume all defects of human beings. For example, Christ did not assume sin but the penalties of sin, which are common to all human beings. Although theologians emphasized the humanity of Christ, they taught that Christ did not suffer any diseases. Among the assumed defects were fear, anger, pain and sadness, which theologians called pre-passions rather than passions. When twelfth-century theologians discussed the nature of sin, following Augustine and Jerome, they taught that a pre-passion was a stage of sin. Peter Lombard adapted the idea of the pre-passions to Christology and explained that the fear, pain and sadness of Christ were sinless pre-passions. The understanding of theologians about Christ's sinless pre-passions varied. Alexander of Hales held that Christ had pre-passions which were unexpected movements, since they were unseen by the sensible part of the soul. However, many theologians thought that Christ did not have pre-passions as unexpected movements because Christ's fear, anger, pain and sadness as the movements of the sensitive appetitive power were subject to his reason. Bonaventure clarified that Christ had pre-passions as diminished passion of sensuality, which remained under reason as reason since reason commanded them. Thomas Aquinas claimed that fear, anger, pain and sadness of Christ were pre-passions of the sensitive appetitive power which did not turn his reason away from righteousness. They were not pre-passions as unexpected movements of the sensitive appetitive power, because the movements of Christ's sensitive appetitive power followed the command of his reason. John Duns Scotus proposed a new view about the sinless pre-passions of Christ when he taught that the will of Christ had pre-passions as passions of the will, which preceded the act of the will or did not cloud reason.

Following Peter Lombard, theologians argued that there were many kinds of fears but Christ did not have all of them. The early Franciscans and Bonaventure applied Peter Lombard's list of fears and held that Christ had natural fear about his death and friendly fear in respect to God. Thomas Aquinas also claimed that Christ had fear of death, but he did not mention other fears. Richard Middleton studied the question of whether Christ had the fears listed by John of Damascus and ended up claiming that Christ had a mild fear of death, but not the fears mentioned by John. Walter Chatton also stated that Christ had mild fear about his death as, for instance, his will weakened the fear of the sensitive appetitive power through the imagination. Unlike Peter Lombard, later theologians taught that Christ also had anger (for example, when he threw the merchants and moneychangers out of the temple). The early Franciscan theologians emphasized that Christ had anger without perturbation. Bonaventure, however, thought that the anger of Christ was the affection of detestation, which involved perturbation that touched the sensual part of the soul but not the eye of the mind. Aquinas argued that Christ had anger of the will and anger of the irascible power. The anger of the will was not a passion of the soul, but a bare act of the will, while the anger of the irascible power was anger through zeal since it followed the command of reason.

One of the most discussed themes in the psychology of the incarnation was Christ's pain and sadness. Medieval theologians agreed that the powers of the sensitive part of Christ's human soul had pain and sadness, but the views of the theologians regarding these varied. Following John of Damascus, the early Franciscans and Bonaventure explained that the pain of Christ was a sensation of the injury of the flesh. Bonaventure added that the sensitive concupiscible power of Christ also had sadness about the injury and evil things taking place for others. In his different works, Thomas Aquinas proposed two views about the pain and the sadness of Christ. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, he claimed that pain was a corporeal passion and sadness was the passion of the soul. Christ's pain was in the sense of touch and it followed the apprehension of that, whereas sadness was in the sensitive appetitive power and it followed the apprehension of the inner apprehensive power. However, in his *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas stated that pain was also a passion of the soul in the sensitive appetitive power. Christ had pain and sadness about the injury of the flesh and the sins of human beings. Richard Middleton proposed a new view about the pain and the sadness of Christ when he argued that pain was in the external sensitive appetitive power related to the sense of touch and sadness was in the interior sensitive appetitive power related to the interior apprehensive power. Like Richard, John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol also argued that the subject of Christ's pain was the sensitive appetitive power related to the sense of touch.

All theologians accepted that the suffering of Christ touched the powers of the rational part of his soul, but they disagreed on whether the

powers had passions and whether the superior part of reason had sadness. This discussion demonstrates that the early Franciscan theologians and Bonaventure had already put forward the idea that the will can have sadness as a passion, while Aquinas denied it. Their views differed because their understanding about a passion varied. While the Franciscan theologians thought that a passion and passibility involved only reception, they did not demarcate the powers of the rational part of the soul outside the passibility. Although Aquinas also thought that the will can have passions since the will was moved, unlike the Franciscans he stated that the will did not have passions properly because a passion was a change related to the flesh. Later on, Scotus developed the Franciscan view of the passions of the will.

The *Summa Halensis* and Bonaventure stated that the will of Christ and the superior and the inferior parts of his reason had sadness as a passion, but they did not elaborate on what kind of passion sadness was. Following Augustine, who claimed that sadness occurred when the will wished against a thing that took place, Bonaventure thought that the will of Christ had sadness (for instance, when his will wished against the sin of other human beings). Unlike the Franciscans, Thomas Aquinas argued that the will of Christ had sadness as a passion only metaphorically and the superior part of reason did not have sadness except accidentally. John Duns Scotus's view about the sadness of Christ's will followed Bonaventure's teaching in particular, but it was much more detailed. Scotus argued that the will of Christ had sadness when the intellect apprehended that a thing unsuitable for the will took place. An object was unsuitable for the will when the will wished against it absolutely or conditionally, or it was unsuitable for the will naturally or unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power. Scotus described the superior and the inferior parts of Christ's will as having sadness about other people's sins because the will wished against sin taking place. The inferior and the superior parts also had sadness about death because they wished against the death conditionally, because the death was unsuitable for the superior part naturally, and because it was unsuitable for the inferior part since it was unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power. Following Scotus, William Ockham also explained that the will can have sadness as a passion of the will, but he argued that the will can have sadness only when it wishes against a thing absolutely or conditionally. An object which was unsuitable for the will naturally or unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power did not cause the sadness of the will, as in the view of Scotus. However, following Aquinas, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton argued that the will of Christ did not have sadness as a passion. Auriol denied that the will of Christ had sadness in any sense, whereas Chatton argued that the will had sadness as an act of the will.

One of the main questions in the discussion about the passions of Christ was how the human Christ was able to have beatific joy, pain and sadness simultaneously. The idea was problematic as, for example, Aristotle

argued that a person cannot have pain and joy at the same time. Theologians solved the problem in many ways. Alexander of Hales was the first to argue that Christ had pain and joy at the same time because the superior part of reason as reason had joy, but the superior part of reason as nature had sadness. Unlike Alexander, Bonaventure argued that Christ had pain and joy at the same time because they were not contrary, Christ was the only human being whose superior part of reason was turned towards God and the flesh at the same time, and the superior part of reason rejoiced about pain. Albert the Great thought that the pain and the joy of Christ were contrary, but held that contraries can be in the same subject when one of them is the cause and the matter of another, like the sadness of Christ was the cause of his joy. The idea that Christ had joy about his pain became the standard, even though it is difficult to imagine how a person can be happy about great pain. Following his view about the passibility of the soul, Aquinas explained that although the superior part of reason had joy, it was touched by pain accidentally and not subjectively because it was rooted in the essence of the soul. He furthermore proposed a new problem related to the joy and the pain of Christ when he remarked that, according to Aristotle, pain does not hinder only contrary joy, but any kind of joy. Aquinas solved the problem by explaining that pain and sadness normally impede any kind of joy because the sadness and the pain of one power overflow into other powers of the soul. However, such an overflowing did not take place with Christ because of the divine arrangement. Later on, Scotus's view of how Christ was able to have pain and joy at the same time was similar to that of Aquinas, although their ideas of joy and sadness were different. A new point in his thinking was to argue that although joy causes expansion in the heart and sadness a constriction, Christ was able to have joy and pain at once.

Peter Auriol added a new theme to the discussion when he pointed out that, according to Avicenna, the powers of the soul cannot have many intense acts at the same time. As the pain and the joy of Christ were great, this indicated that Christ's human soul had two intense acts at once. Auriol explained that a human being is not able to have many intense acts at the same time because the acts of the corporeal powers require spirits. However, the will of Christ did not require the spirits through the corporeal powers, because his intellect was able to know without turning towards the senses. Therefore, Christ was able to have the greatest pain and joy at the same time. Auriol also argued that the same subject did not have pain and joy simultaneously as the sensitive appetitive power of Christ had pain, but his human will had joy. Contrary to Auriol, Walter Chatton argued that the same subject had pain and joy at the same time because the subject of the pain and joy was Christ's human soul.

The discussions about the psychology of the incarnation were also interesting in the sense that they provided comparable pictures of the Franciscan and Thomistic intellectual traditions. In general, some emphases

about the psychology of Christ's human soul indicated that the early Franciscan theologians Bonaventure and Aquinas established two traditions about the application of psychology to Christology. The Franciscan theologians were usually apt to follow the Franciscan emphases and the Dominican theologians were generally apt to follow Aquinas's views. However, the discussions also revealed the flexibility and movement between the traditions: Not all Franciscans followed the Franciscan intellectual tradition as, for example, Richard Middleton, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton also followed Aquinas. And all Dominicans did not always adhere to Aquinas unconditionally, as there were Dominicans like Durand of St. Pourçain who criticized him.

For example, questions like whether Christ knew everything that God knows, whether Christ had many sensitive appetitive powers related to the external senses, and whether Christ's soul and his will had passions were questions associated with different Franciscan and Thomistic emphases. Franciscan theologians from Bonaventure to Peter Auriol defended the view that Christ knew everything that God knows, whereas Dominicans from Thomas Aquinas to Durand of St. Pourçain argued that Christ did not know everything. However, there were divisions inside these traditions; for example, the Franciscan Richard Middleton, following Aquinas, claimed that Christ did not know everything actually and wavered in terms of whether Christ knew everything habitually. In addition, Bonaventure, Middleton, Scotus, and Aureol argued that Christ had many sensitive appetitive powers related to exterior senses, but Aquinas argued that Christ had only one sensitive appetitive power. Whereas Alexander of Hales and the *Summa Halensis* thought that a passion involved receiving and a soul was passible, Aquinas argued that a passion involved not only receiving but also losing and that the soul itself was changed only accidentally. The outcome was that most Franciscan theologians argued that the powers of the rational part of Christ's human soul were also passible, but Aquinas restricted the passibility of the powers to the sensitive appetitive power. Following Aquinas, the Dominican Durand of St. Pourçain claimed that the will had passions only in a broad sense, but the Dominican Peter of Tarentaise departed from Aquinas, as he explained that the will can have passions. The Franciscan intellectual tradition was also partly divided in this respect, as Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton thought, following Aquinas, that the will cannot have passions.

However, these positions were not essential in all parts of the discussions, and all theologians treated the same basic questions established by Peter Lombard. For example, all theologians agreed that Christ knew the Word of God and the things in it, he did not comprehend God, he had infused intelligible species, and his will was divided into the will "as reason" and the will "as nature". Furthermore, for example, the question of whether the knowledge about the Word of God required the light of glory divided

theologians regardless of whether they were Franciscans or Dominicans. Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Richard Middleton argued that Christ had the light of glory, but Scotus explained that such light was not needed.

The medieval discussions about the psychology of the incarnation were interesting also from the view point of philosophy. They revealed that theologians applied various ideas from psychology as a branch of natural philosophy in developing their views about theological matters, but Christological views also influenced the philosophical thought of some theologians. In the discussion about the knowledge of Christ, theologians mainly applied ideas from philosophical debates. The question of whether Christ had the light of glory was based on the debate of whether understanding required divine illumination. Following Augustine and Neo-Platonic sources, Bonaventure and Aquinas argued that all intellectual knowledge required some kind of divine illumination, whereas Scotus stated that not even the beatific knowledge included supernatural light. Influenced by Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, many medieval theologians taught that a human being can have only negative knowledge of the divine essence. It was thought that not even the perfect human intellect can know God completely, since Christ did not fully comprehend God. The debate on the omniscience of Christ reveals that there were different opinions about whether the created intellect was able to know everything that God knows. Theologians proposed different limitations regarding Christ's knowledge; while Scotus was the only one to argue that the human intellect can know everything actually through separate infinite acts, but he later gave up this idea. His argument was associated with the question of whether the notion of actual infinity is consistent and whether there can be several different acts in the intellect simultaneously.

One major theme in psychology as a branch of natural philosophy concerned the intelligible species. Theologians applied this debate when they explained how Christ had infused knowledge. In Aristotelian psychology, the intelligible species were considered to be acquired through the senses, but in the discussions about the knowledge of Christ it was assumed that a human intellect can have intelligible species which are not acquired through the agent intellect and the senses, as in Christ's infused knowledge. Interest in the question of how many simultaneous acts the intellect can have grew when some theologians assumed that Christ knew the same things through different actual cognitions, although Aristotle had argued that a human being can have only one act of the intellect at once. Philosophical views of experience were also often applied. The question about experience was dealt with in twelfth-century theological psychology, but later theologians developed the concept of experience in the psychology of the incarnation. They proposed that experience was, for instance, either sense knowledge, experiential certitude,

acquired knowledge, intuitive knowledge or habit acquired from memories, all these being derived from a special philosophical context of their own.

The discussion about the will of Christ shows that the Christological themes also influenced philosophical conceptions. In the twelfth century, sensuality was treated in many contexts, but the idea of the will of sensuality and the will of reason was introduced chiefly in the psychology of the incarnation. The early Franciscans proposed that Christ's will of reason was divided into the will "as reason" and the will "as nature", the teaching of which was adopted into philosophical language. Whereas the ideas of the affections of the will, absolute and conditional will, and free choice were taken from philosophical discussions into Christology, the question of whether choosing requires deliberation was mainly dealt with in theological contexts. Although Aristotle had explained that choice was deliberated desire, the medieval theologians argued that Christ chosen without deliberation. Furthermore, the discussions indicate that, according to the medieval theologians, free choice is free even if it can wish only for good.

Furthermore, in the discussions about the passions of Christ, theologians adapted ideas from psychology as a branch of natural philosophy, but also introduced new ideas. The medieval theologians argued that Christ's human soul was passible even though Aristotle had claimed that a human soul was moved only accidentally. The ideas of the inferior and superior parts of the soul, the apprehensive and appetitive powers, and the irascible and concupiscible powers were treated by the faculty psychology and applied to Christ's human soul as such because medieval theologians thought that Christ had the powers of an ordinary human being. However, Christ's human soul was free from sin, which was a central reason why the psychology of Christ differed from the psychology of ordinary human beings. Christ's freedom from sin influenced thought about pre-passions. Pre-passions also explained how Christ, who was the wisest man in the world, was sad, even though Seneca had claimed that a wise man cannot be sad. Following Augustine and Jerome, the twelfth-century theologians studied pre-passions when they treated stages of sin, but pre-passions had a crucial role in Christology as well. The debate about Christ's sinless pre-passions proved that theologians thought that at least a sinless human being can have emotions which are not spontaneous, but subject to the rational powers. When theologians discussed Christ's pain and sadness, they derived ideas of pain and sadness from earlier discussions, as these were examined going back to ancient philosophy, and applied these ideas to Christ. Although the passions of the will were also treated in other contexts, theologians developed their views in relation to Christ. For instance, Scotus proposed his influential doctrine on the sadness of the will when he examined the passions of Christ. The question about the simultaneity of Christ's pain and sadness was based on Aristotle, but when they theorized about Christ's human soul theologians challenged Aristotle's teaching that a person cannot have pain

and joy at the same time. When theologians explained how Christ could have pain and joy simultaneously, some of them applied the idea of the *colligantia* between the powers, which was a much debated theme in psychology as a branch of natural philosophy.

The psychological approach in Christology was also related to medieval medicine and metaphysics. When Scotus dealt with the changes of Christ's heart and Peter Auriol examined the spirits of Christ's flesh, these were questions studied in medicine. Metaphysical questions about instants of time, divine possibilities, and the passibility of the soul and its powers were also considered in relation to Christ. These can be taken as examples that show how theological and philosophical discussions about the nature of the soul influenced each other in the context of thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Christology.

The medieval debates about psychology in Christology were also interesting theologically as they shed light on medieval views about Christology. Following the Council of Chalcedon, all medieval theologians thought that Christ had a human nature which he shared with all other human beings. Therefore, he had the same cognitive and appetitive powers as we have. Theologians explained that although the human Christ was as perfect as possible, he also had some defects similar to those of a postlapsarian human being: the human Christ felt pain, sadness, anger, and fear. For example, therefore, theologians abandoned the Docetist claim that Christ did not feel true pain. However, the medieval theologians thought that the passions of the human Christ differed greatly from those of postlapsarian human beings as Christ was free from sin. Unlike postlapsarian human beings, Christ had only pre-passions, which were strictly subjected to the powers of his rational part of the soul. In addition, Christ was the only human being who could feel the greatest pain, sadness, and joy at once. The medieval discussions also demonstrate that, according to the theologians, a human being can wish for different or even opposed things than God without sin and the perfect vision about God is not possible for a created intellect. This last idea emphasizes that for the medieval theologians, God was ultimately a mystery.

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